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The aim of this thesis is to employ an historical, non-prescriptive approach to translation, in 
order to examine the social constitution and role of translations of the ancient Greek concept 
of democracy in nineteenth-century Britain. For this purpose it develops two levels of 
argumentation in parallel. On the one hand, it suggests the necessity to historiase both the 
production of translation works and the concepts, methods and precepts of historiographic 
analysis by which these works become the object of knowledge and understanding. In this 
sense, part of this thesis focuses on a range of contemporary models for translation research, 
with particular emphasis on the notion of translation norms, in order to discuss their 
theoretical problematic, but also to trace their roots in conceptions of translation, knowledge 
and society developed in the intellectual and political tradition of modernity. On these 
grounds, it seeks to advance an understanding of translation that defines the translated text as 
a symbolic articulation of the social conditions that brought it into being, and also as a 
response to these conditions, which acts to channel them into new directions by rewriting 
them in a novel form of expression. On the other hand, this theoretical framework is employed 
and further qualified by the historical analysis of translations of the concept of democracy in 
Britain. The primary texts used for this purpose are: translations of Thucydides’ History o f the 
Peloponnesian War, which define democracy in relation to conceptions of social organisation 
and structures; translations of Plato’s Protagoras, which define democracy in relation to the 
notion of subjective autonomy and freedom; translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
which relate democracy to an ethics of duty; and translations of Sophocles’ Antigone, which 
relate democracy to the concepts of justice and laws. These works are shown to have 
developed as a reaction to absolutist forms of politics and an endorsement of the liberal- 
democratic ideals that sustained the establishment of Britain as a modem bourgeois society. It 
is thus argued that translations from classical Greek acted to legitimise a political system that 
was directly related to the historical advancement of industrial capitalism and the challenging 
of older social structures and relations this enterprise entailed, by providing new social models 
to an ideologically perplexed audience that lacked a clear sense of its social and political 
identity. This move was realised by a process of transformation and manipulation of the 
source texts, which related democracy to an abstract ideal of formal individual freedom and 
equality and defined democratic politics as a system of contestable social hierarchies that was 
presumed to establish the rational basis for political decisions in a modem civilised society. 
This seemingly consistent ideological discourse was, however, at the same time interrupted 
and fragmented by conceptual gaps, contradictions and antinomies, which were inscribed in 
the translated texts and formed the precepts of a critique and problématisation of their 
historical context. The conclusion of this study turns from the nineteenth-century to the 
present context and seeks to reflect on the repercussions of modem thought on translation, 
knowledge and democracy for contemporary theorising.
6The act of knowing is not like listening to a discourse already constituted, a mere fiction which we have simply to 
translate. It is rather the elaboration of a new discourse, the articulation of a silence.
Pierre Macherey, A Theory o f Literary Production. Transl.Geoffrey Wall.
INTRODUCTION
WHY STILL WASTE OUR TIME ON REWRITES?' AND HOW?
PROBLEMS OF METHOD IN HISTORICAL TRANSLATION RESEARCH
1. The Genesis and Significance of Translation Studies
In a pioneering essay on models and methods in translation research, James Holmes deplored 
the fact that
for all their prime importance in the history of European literature, translations have by and 
large been ignored as bastard brats beneath the recognition (let alone concern) of truly 
serious literary scholars ... [Yet,] the appalling thing, really, is not that there are, 
comparatively, so few studies, but that so many of the studies that have been made are so 
haphazard, so piecemeal, so normative. And so naïve in their methodology (1978:69).
This consciously polemical assertion was made in 1976, in an international colloquium on 
Literature and Translation held at the University of Leuven, in Belgium. It was shared, in one 
way or another, by the majority of Holmes’ co-participants in the colloquium; a number of 
scholars mainly from Israel, the Low Countries and Britain, whose dissent from the 
mainstream approaches to translation at the time, had directed them toward a radical 
reconsideration of key concepts in literary and cultural theory and allowed them to articulate 
the methodological directions for a new field of research aiming at the systematic, non- 
normative and historically oriented study of translated texts.2 The work of this group was 
inspired by the striking observation that cultural and literary theory, in their traditional 
institutional forms, have either eliminated translations from our intellectual history or have 
reserved for them a predominantly negative and haphazard vocabulary, which invites us to 
perceive the phenomenon of translation as a marginal, essentially imperfect and uninteresting 
mode of writing. Itamar Even-Zohar, a writer who was to become a leading figure for the new 
approach during the next decades, found this fact important enough to make it the starting 
point of his influential essay “The Position of Translation within the Literary Polysystem”, 
which was also presented at the colloquium. This work stressed, with genuine surprise, that 
despite the broad recognition of the role translation has played in the shaping and 
crystallisation of national cultures “it is amazing to realize how little research has been done 
in this field, on either the theoretical or the descriptive level” (1978a: 117).
This shared amazement was both accurate and fruitful. The well-established 
devaluation of translation and the consequent lack of scholarly interest in its study was, and is
1 The title refers to André Lefevere’s article "Why Waste Our Time on Rewrites? The Trouble with Interpretation 
and the Role of Rewriting in an Alternative Paradigm" (1985).
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still, conspicuous at different levels of our social life: from the organisation of disciplinary 
divisions in academic institutions and the laws of copyright to the published criticisms of 
translated texts and the conventional scholarly discourses on the nature and methods of 
translation study. In British universities translation departments have been relatively limited in 
numbers, while more often than not they tend to conceal themselves under the name of more 
established disciplines: literary theory, linguistics, comparative literature, cultural studies.2 3 It 
is not without significance that an article published in the Times Literary Supplement in 1980 
and included in the subsequent editions of the Oxford English Dictionary under the lemma 
‘translation’ describes a translation theorist as “one of the very few people in the world 
working in this field”.4 To complete this institutional setting, several national and 
international copyright laws do not quite recognise translation as an intellectual production 
which is equal with an original one, and reserve, as Lawrence Venuti has argued, an exclusive 
right in derivative works for the author of a text, despite the will or intentions of the translator 
(1998:50).5
Holmes and Even-Zohar’s discontent is further substantiated when we consider both 
our commonsensical and scholarly conceptions of translation. Criticism of translated texts 
seems, indeed, to be almost compulsively inclined to condemn irredeemable mistakes and 
inadequacies, to point out how, after all, a translation falls short of a source text, except 
perhaps for those few cases when translation is viewed as ‘original’ writing per se, when it 
actually ‘loses’ its ‘non-creative’ and ‘secondary’ features. The majority of translations are 
thus described in negative terms, as a kind of derivative mass-production, which at best plays 
the humble role of compensating for our linguistic limitations, while at worse violates the 
depth and beauty of great pieces of literature, by essentially (and necessarily paradoxically) 
lacking the one and unique quality available to it: faithfulness to the semantic depth and 
aesthetic forms of original literary writing.
Had it been coherent and homogeneous, the above image would have hardly attracted 
attention. The development of a critical stance towards a given intellectual order can only 
emerge from a pre-existing condition of disjunctions and inconsistencies -  however implicit
2 The colloquium “Literature and Translation" resulted in the publication of a volume with the same title, edited 
by James S. Holmes, José Lambert and Raymond van den Broeck in 1978.
' While it is not possible to draw generalised conclusions on the status of translation studies in the contemporary 
academic world, it seems that the systematic study of translation (which is not taken to mean merely the technical 
training of translators) has only recently developed into an autonomous discipline, and cannot be said to occupy a 
central position in the already devaluated and marginalized human sciences. I am not aware of any systematic 
research on the topic. I did nevertheless find illuminating references on this issue in relation to Western European 
and North-American universities in Venuti (1998), Pym (1998), Bush (1998) and Round (1988).
4 O.E.D. s.v. ‘translation’. (Cf. Times Literary Supplement, 12 Sept. 1980: 992-993).
5 For a further discussion of translation in relation to copyright laws see Venuti 1995a.
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these may be -  not when this order is experienced as an irreplaceable and unified way of 
conceiving reality. Voices of dissent can be heard when a state of consensus begins to lose its 
stability, when it reveals fissures and paradoxes, not when it is smoothly compatible with the 
ways intellectual communities perceive and describe their objects. And while these voices 
become recognisable at the moment they manage to escape isolation, when their 
multiplication entails not merely a quantitative but a qualitative transformation of the 
framework within which they are situated, one can always trace them back in history and 
discover the conditions which foreshadowed their development and the thinkers of the past 
who were capable of rising ‘ahead of their time’ and glimpsing future potentials. There is, of 
course, an unavoidable degree of bias when one attempts to identify shifts in the history of 
ideas, when one seeks to prioritise those moments at which dissent from a dominant model of 
thought produces a qualitative change, or more accurately, when quantitative differentiation is 
transformed, if only by the sheer force of numbers, into a qualitative one. Périodisation is then 
more a conventional point of reference, than a representation of radical alterations that erase, 
totally dispel, older ideas and establish new ones. Yet, once their constructed and conventional 
nature is acknowledged, historical periods may serve to indicate moments at which theoretical 
schemes do separate themselves from their predecessors, changes whose establishment may 
not erase, but certainly corrodes previous convictions and makes their future survival seem 
more unlikely and less relevant to a set of new cultural and social conditions.
This is precisely the significance the 1976 colloquium acquires in the context of this 
thesis. It marks a moment of transformation, which was not an individual articulation of 
dissent, but the collective initiation of a dialogue that developed much further than expressing 
the mere discontent of participants with pre-existing translation-conceptions. For despite their 
dedications to diverse methodological approaches and theoretical agendas, the thinkers who 
worked, studied and communicated during the last three decades within the field named by 
André Lefevere Translation Studies (1978: 234-235) have produced a visible (because 
qualitative) theoretical and institutional change: they have created the space and tools for a 
novel, non-prescriptive and historically-oriented understanding of translation production. This 
change did not of course mean the elimination of “haphazard” and “essentialist” definitions of 
translation. What it did entail was the potential for conceiving these definitions from a 
different viewpoint, a perspective which could render apparent their intrinsic contradictions 
and inconsistencies, and enable us to study translations not in order to discover their ‘faults’ 
and ‘infidelities’, but in order to understand their historical shaping, illuminate conditions that 
can account for their canonicity, and describe their role as relatively autonomous and
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socioculturally significant phenomena. As Susan Bassnett and Lefevere argued twenty-two 
years after the Leuven colloquium,
A tremendous change, perhaps the most tremendous change in the field of translation 
occurred not when more and more interfields were added, but when the finality, the goal of 
work in the field was drastically widened. In the 1970s, translation was seen ... as “vital to 
the interaction between cultures". What we have done is to take this statement and stand it 
on its head: if translation is, indeed, as everybody believes, vital to the interaction between 
cultures, then why not take the next step and study translation, not just to train translators, 
but precisely to study cultural interaction? (1998a: 6)
As with all genuine dialogues, this change was hardly formed on the basis of 
intellectual consensus. It indicated a shared distance, a disengagement from a certain thought­
mode, but not the identification with a common new one; a shift of focus, which brought to 
light previously dismissed objects, but not necessarily an agreement as to the means with 
which these objects could be classified and interpreted; a number of common questions and 
problems, but not the articulation of common answers; a shared goal, succinctly described by 
Lefevere as “the problems raised by the production and description of translations” (1978: 
234), but certainly not shared routes for its attainment. The methodological diversity of 
contemporary Translation Studies is, I think, both unavoidable and fruitful. Once the focus of 
one’s research is no longer the assertion of ideal equivalence relations, but the study of 
translation within culture and within society, as an objective and real historical phenomenon, 
one cannot afford to have one-dimensional, unified translation descriptions. The object of 
one’s research becomes unstable and differentiated, not merely because translations 
themselves have been historically diverse, but also because we look at them from disparate 
methodological positions, we read them on the basis of various and often oppositional 
convictions and hypotheses, through which we become able to define what translation has 
been and how it has functioned in different historical societies. This plurality of research 
models is therefore the unavoidable outcome of genuine historical research, which does not 
seek to reveal its object through the means of a simplistic empiricism, a process of searching 
deeper into the past per se, while remaining unaware of its own tools and means of analysis, 
but enables the development of an interpretive space within which diverse readings of history 
can be accommodated, without any of them being considered as final and incontestable. It is 
precisely this diversity of positions, which is nevertheless harboured by the higher unity of a 
shared space for conversation, that has constituted the methodological foundations and 
perspective of the present study: the space created by historical and relatively autonomous 
translation research, as this has been developed during the last three decades within the field 
of Translation Studies.
Why Still Waste our Time on Rewrites? And How? II
Apart from the expression of an intellectual debt, which is itself no less meaningful 
than the exploration of methodological issues, this acknowledgement has a number of 
implications for the development of my thesis. When it is asserted that this study locates itself 
within the historical paradigm of translation research, this means, first and foremost, that it 
will not concern itself with a set of problems and questions which would indeed have been 
meaningful within a traditional prescriptive framework, but which seem to lose their 
significance when seen from an historically-oriented perspective, and will only initially be 
preoccupied with the issues and dilemmas brought to light by the encounter of prescriptive 
and historical models of translation theory. To be sure, the need to keep a line of inter- 
paradigmatic communication open is indisputable, since only such a line can enable the 
constant testing and criticism of one’s methods and hypotheses. Yet it is neither possible nor 
fruitful to focus exclusively on such a dialogue, which, however productive, is unavoidably 
preventive of configuring and elaborating a paradigm's internal vocabulary and methods; a 
process which necessitates the drawing of conceptual distinctions and theoretical categories 
that can only be achieved once some fundamental level of agreement has already been 
established. This means that while the encounter between historical and prescriptive models 
for translation analysis has admittedly raised a set of methodological problems that should not 
be easily dismissed by contemporary research, the fundamental question behind my own work 
is not so much whether we should study translations as part of historical cultural productions 
(to which the answer is yes), but how this process o f histoncisation can be deepened and 
valorised, how it can be nourished and refined by the insights of the rest of social and cultural 
sciences, and how, finally it can develop a set of theoretical hypotheses and research models, 
which would not only seek to do justice to the reality of our object, but would also allow us to 
perceive and criticise the more immediate reality of our own approach to it. In other words, 
my main concern is not, or not only, to endorse and justify the historical turn in the study of 
translation against prescriptive approaches, but to discuss, within the ‘historicist’ or 
‘descriptive’ or ‘cuituralisf paradigm, how this turn can be fully materialised.
In practical terms this position initially entails that the choice of my object, the 
translations of the Greek concept of SrjfiOKparía ( ‘democracy’) into English during the 
nineteenth century, as well as the main position and aim o f my research, an historical analysis 
of these translations, are not going to be justified at any length, precisely because such a 
justification has been articulated by the theoretical works on which this study is based. This 
does not have to mean the uncritical acceptance o f already established positions and 
hypotheses, to which historiographic translation research, such as the present one, contributes
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nothing further than a mere confirmation or negation. Clearly this route is de facto 
unavailable, not only because of the interdependence of theoretical thought and particularised 
historiographic narratives, but also because of the irreducible diversity of research models in 
the discipline, which necessitates the adoption and justification of specific perspectives and 
methodological tools in order to proceed to a coherent translation analysis and a consistent 
historical interpretation. Neither does this acknowledgement mean that the predominant 
position assumed by this thesis, that translations play a significant role in our social and 
cultural history, which can be illuminated by historiographic research, is not going to be tested 
against the particular development and function of translation in the historical context in 
question. Yet it does mean that my study begins with a set of hypotheses -  the need to 
examine past translation production, the priority of historical translation analysis over 
prescriptive approaches and so on -  which, while not altogether axiomatic, are seen as 
establishing its point of departure and methodological foundations. I shall then seek to clarify 
these hypotheses and map the theoretical territory within which this thesis is located by 
seeking, initially, to delineate a definition of my object. Thus the question that will concern us 
in the next pages of this introduction is: ‘what is translation’? Or, more accurately, what is 
translation from the point of view of historical translation research?
2. On Defining the Object of Translation Research: Historical Translation Studies and
its Interlocutors
A way of approaching definitions of translation within the context of historical translation 
studies is to locate these definitions in the framework of a dialogue among three imaginary 
interlocutors. The first one, which is present for the longest period in the field, is the so-called 
prescriptive paradigm, which is predominantly concerned with applications of translation 
theory: it seeks to teach what translations should be and prescribe how to produce them. 
While this concern is, of course, as old as translations themselves,6 its phase that is of the 
utmost relevance to our discussion is the period that begins with the introduction of linguistics 
into translation theory in the fifties and sixties; a time during which a number of translation 
theorists employed research models offered by the Saussurean, Hallidayan, Firthian, and, less 
often, Chomskyan traditions, in order to define translation and draw some conclusions on how 
to practise it. The second of these interlocutors, which was initially formed in an attempt to 
oppose prescriptive theories, is the descriptive-historical paradigm, which developed along the 
lines of the Leuven colloquium, but articulated more clearly its methods and theoretical
6 In a collection which seeks to map the development of Western translation theories, Douglas Robinson traces a 
concern with the production of translation back to Herodotus (1977).
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directions during the following decades. The third interlocutor is more complex to define and 
certainly far less homogeneous than the others, but can nevertheless be considered for our 
purposes under a unified category, which would consist of the various conceptions and uses of 
translation in other fields of the human and social sciences, and more particularly those 
concerned with historiographic and intercultural understanding. Clearly such a category, 
which is the product of a conscious generalisation, is not meant to imply a reduction of the 
diversified uses of translation in contemporary theoretical thinking in the humanities. It can 
nevertheless be justified on the grounds that my approach to these conceptions takes place 
from the perspective of translation research per se, and is therefore intended to illuminate the 
role of this broader discourse in forming the vocabulary and methods of translation analysis, 
rather than seeking to engage with the meanings and uses of translation within a 
philosophical, cultural, social or historical frame of reference.
2.1 The ‘Prescriptive’ Paradigm
While it is certainly a mistake to identify prescriptive approaches to translation with the 
exclusive employment of linguistics,7 there are probably good historical reasons to suggest 
that the majority of scholars who have proposed prescriptive models for translation research in 
the last four or five decades have found in linguistics a fertile repository of theories and 
methods of analysis. Starting with Firth’s descriptions of translation as a communicative 
phenomenon (1956';1968 and 1968) and J. C. Catford’s attempt to investigate and codify the 
conditions of translation equivalence in 1965, the systematic analysis of language in itself and 
language in its interrelation to communication processes, culture and society that has been 
developed by linguists in the last few decades, has provided translation research with 
invaluable insights for the study of translated texts in their links both to source texts and the 
communicative conditions of the target context. My interest here however lies neither in 
assessing the contribution of linguistics to translation theory,8 nor in attempting a detailed
7 As Mona Baker has argued, there is a wide range of historical approaches to translation which have fruitfully 
employed linguistic models in order to approach translations from an historical viewpoint and discuss their 
sociocultural implications (2000; forthcoming). A similar point is implied by Bassnett’s emphasis on the potential 
contribution of Firth’s view of language to our understanding of the social nature of translation writing (19801; 
1991: 21). There is a significant corpus of research which can justify this position. The work of Basil Hatim and 
Ian Mason (1990; 1997), Peter Fawcett (1995; 1997a) and Mason (1994), which employs discourse analysis and 
critical linguistics in order to illuminate the ways ideology and relations of power are unconsciously inscribed in 
the language of the translated text cannot be taken to constitute a prescriptive approach to translation, although 
other aspects of the work of the above scholars may be seen as contributions to the prescriptive paradigm.
* While there is a wide discussion of the “unhappy marriage” of linguistics and translation theory, the majority of 
those involved in it tend to identify linguistics with a purely prescriptive point of view, which they either seek to 
defend or attack, thus evoking an unjustified generalisation that fails to take into account developments in both 
fields. There is however also a fairly recent attempt to initiate a more genuine and ‘impartial’ dialogue on this 
issue evidenced in the later works of Baker (2000; forthcoming), Maria Tymoczko (2000) as well as in a number 
of discussions that have taken place in Translation Studies conferences, e.g. the debate on Translation and
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presentation of prescriptive translation models, but in seeking to illuminate a shared logic that 
underlies conceptions of translation suggested by these models; an interpretive code employed 
by otherwise diversified theories, through which translation phenomena are approached in 
both their historical and ideal forms, as products of reality and simultaneously as the potential 
outcomes of prescriptive directions.
This logic finds justification in an attempt to get reality right. “The main reason for 
formulating a translation theory”, as Peter Newmark wrote, “is the appalling badness of so 
many published translations” (1981: 4-5). That is to say, the main objective of theoretical 
research is defined as the constitution of a set of normative rules by which existing 
translations can be assessed and criticised, so that we can develop a standard for better and 
more efficient translation practice. This standard, which has been described in terms of 
‘translation fidelity’ and, more recently, ‘equivalence’, establishes a particular kind of 
relationship between the source and target text as the necessary presupposition for the 
acceptance of a text as a (good) translation. What this supposition entails is that equivalence, 
as Sandra Halverson has argued, is determined by a dual status: as an object of study and as a 
standard for the differentiation of translation from similar activities which also produce 
derivative texts, such as paraphrase, adaptation and so on. The contention behind this 
ambiguous mode of signification, Halverson points out, is that if equivalence is sufficiently 
defined, then the limits of translation will be discernible, as it is required by true scientific 
research. Its predominant implication is that “the equivalence relationship itself requires a 
status above and beyond that of object of study” (1997:212-213); a significance which claims 
to be neither contingent nor relative, even if its accomplishment is taken to rely on culturally 
specific and differentiated translation choices.
More often than not this equivalence relation has been defined as the result of a 
process of ‘transfer’, ‘replacement’ and ‘reproduction’ of the original, especially in 
linguistically-oriented approaches to translation developed between the fifties and seventies.9 
Hence Catford suggested that translation should be seen as “the replacement of textual 
material in one language (SL) by equivalent material in another language (TL)” (1965: 20), 
i.e. a process of textual reproduction. Eugene Nida’s and Charles Taber’s work on Biblical 
translation broadened this conception by taking into account the effect of a text on its original 
audience as a separate objective of translation equivalence. Translating was thereby described
Norms, which took place at the University of Sheffield (Schaffner 1999), and the conference on Research Models 
in Translation Studies co-organised by the University of Manchester and UCL. On this issue see also Delabastita 
(1992), Baker (1996a) and Venuti (1998: 21-25).
The division between earlier linguistic approaches to translation (1950s-1970s) and contemporary ones (from 
the 1980s onwards) has been suggested by Baker (2000).
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as consisting “in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the 
source language message”, which does not merely necessitate the reproduction of its “form 
and content” (“formal equivalence”), but also the reproduction of the “effect” of the source 
text on the target culture (“dynamic equivalence”) (Nida and Taber 1969; Nida 1964: 159-60). 
Generally speaking the thrust of translation research in this context, as Mona Baker points out, 
was that specific guidelines had to be developed in order “to ensure that translators had a set 
of ready-made, reliable solutions for linguistic difficulties” which were perceived as 
essentially formal in nature: lack of equivalence at word level, culture-specific items, 
difficulties in transferring syntactic structures, non-matching of grammatical categories such 
as gender and so on (2000: 21-22). The overcoming of these difficulties and the achievement 
of an ideal, or at least the best possible, equivalence was -  and for many still is -  the 
predominant aim of theoretical translation research.
This objective was nevertheless disputed at the very moment it was articulated, not 
least because all translations — even the ones suggested in the classroom -  are notoriously 
unfaithful when assessed by a standard of total transfer or identity. Hence while working on 
the rules for a perfect equivalence relationship, translation theorists were also certain that this 
relationship is in fact an impossibility, that translation as a complete reproduction of the 
source text can never be achieved in actual historical conditions. This ambiguous thesis, 
which claims the unrealisable nature of the very task it sets out to determine, was presented in 
Catford’s conception of ‘shifts’ in translation, which recognised that changes are inherent in 
the translation process (1965: 73-82), and was explicitly conveyed by Nida’s rejection of the 
potential for ‘full’ translation, his conviction that “there are, properly speaking, no such things 
as identical equivalents” (Nida 1964: 159-60).10 This conviction, as Theo Hermans argues, 
necessitated the conception of a weaker definition of equivalence as implying similarity, 
analogy, correspondence, or matching “of a certain kind, to a certain degree and on certain 
levels only”, such as the denotative, connotative, pragmatic and so on (1991: 157). The crucial 
point not to be missed in this move is that this ‘partial’ equivalence is simultaneously an ideal 
one, since this partial matching or similarity continues to set up a standard for the definition of 
translation: it delineates the best possible solution to transfer problems, and therefore the best 
possible form of translation practice.
It was precisely this conception that was called into question by historically-oriented 
translation research and was criticised by Holmes as “piecemeal” and “haphazard” (above), on 
the grounds that the standard of equivalence it evoked could not justify its status as above or
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beyond its object. For if total or maximum equivalence is acknowledged as plainly 
unattainable, as Hermans points out, there seem to be no secure transhistorical standards for 
the definition of that “minimum equivalence” required for a given text to be defined as a 
translation (1991: 157). For if, on the one hand, we claim that only some aspects of the 
meaning, form and/or effect of the source text are essential for translation production, we 
leave open to questioning the reasons for which we would choose to prioritise these particular 
source-text features instead of others. This is not to say that such choices are not made by 
translators, but rather to suggest that the criteria by which translation theory establishes one of 
them instead of another are not essentially different to those adopted by actual translation 
practice. They are both based on contingent, historical convictions as to what constitutes a 
translation, and thus none of the them can justify its positioning above or beyond the other. If 
on the other hand we assume that actual translations are always partial, but we can 
nevertheless define full equivalence in theoretical terms, as an ideal but unrealisable model, 
one may legitimately ask how we are able to conceive and articulate this ideal, given the lack 
of such potential from a target-language perspective. If, in other words, we view all 
translations as evidence of their impossibility, is it feasible to claim, at the same time, that 
theoretical contemplation can itself provide the yardstick for the measurement of a total, but 
nevertheless inconceivable translation equivalence? Does not theory also adhere to particular 
meanings of equivalence, does it not “collude”, as Bassnett puts it, “to alternative notions of 
translations” as much as imperfect translators and rewriters do (1998: 39)?
In the development of both linguistics and translation theory in the eighties and 
nineties the notion of equivalence is qualified and becomes more complex, but its essential 
features are never abandoned, even by clearly functional approaches to translation, such as 
Skopos theory." What becomes, however, far less popular is the assertion of its unique and 
transhistorical nature, the supposition that definitions of translation equivalence should 
exclusively focus on linguistic features and/or function of the source text and the problems 
that emerge in attempts to reproduce them. For contemporary theorists who approach 
translation from a pedagogic and prescriptive point of view, equivalence is not the ideal, but
>0 The same idea is concisely presented in the title of a recent article by Nida, in which translation is described as 
both "Possible and Impossible” (1996).
11 Skopos theory argues that equivalence may only be one of the possible aims of the translator but cannot 
provide an overarching definition of translation. According to Katharina Reiss and Hans J. Vermeer, this 
definition should be determined on the basis of the translation's 'adequacy' to the ‘skopos', that is the 
communicative function of the translated text, which should aim to be the same as that of the source text (Nord 
1997: 9-10, 34-36). My knowledge of Skopos theory (and the tradition of German translation theories) through 
predominantly secondary sources does not legitimise an affirmative articulation of this point. What I only want to 
suggest is that the claim that translation should aim to achieve a similarity in terms of ‘communicative function'
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unrealisable recovery of a static original, but a relationship that is contingent and relative as 
much to constraints imposed by the source text as to conceptual structures and historical 
conditions of the target context. As Wemer Roller has pointed out,
equivalence is a relative concept in several respects: it is determined on the one hand by the 
historical-cultural conditions under which texts (original as much as secondary ones) are 
produced and received in the target culture, and on the other by a range of sometimes 
contradictory and scarcely reconcilable linguistic-textual and extra-linguistic factors and 
conditions (1995: 196).
This thesis manifests a significant shift from previous approaches to translation. For earlier 
models, translating was defined as an attempt to produce the closest possible equivalence to 
the source text, while the target-culture conditions were seen as mere obstacles to this process. 
On the contrary, according to Roller, the very concept of equivalence is jointly defined by the 
source and the target contexts, and thereby translation ceases to be a servile and essentially 
imperfect reproduction of the original. It is considered as “a communicative event” in its own 
right, as Baker has put it, “which is shaped by its own goals, pressures and context of 
production” (1996b: 175). By the same move translation becomes relativised. Its meaning is 
not merely grounded on the idea of faithful transfer, but on the supposition that ‘faithfulness’ 
can mean different things in different contexts, that the success of translation production relies 
as much on the understanding of the source text and culture as on the adherence to principles, 
norms and goals set up within the translator’s immediate historical context.
This transformation should not, however, be taken to entail the complete dissociation 
of translation from a given source text. To say that translation is shaped by its own goals and 
context never meant in this framework that translation is exclusively shaped by the target- 
culture conceptions, that it should abandon any attempt to achieve a kind of ‘resemblance’, a 
degree of equivalence to the original. From the point of view of prescriptive, applied 
translation studies12 such a move is neither feasible nor perhaps fruitful, since the very idea of 
equivalence provides the means for determining what translation ‘is’, in opposition to other 
forms of rewriting, and thus how theory should teach it. Roller describes translation as bound 
by a double linkage: by its link to the source text and by its link to the communicative 
conditions of the target context. “This double linkage” he suggests “is central in defining (and 
this means in particular: differentiating) the equivalence relation” and simultaneously 
necessary for the task of applied translation studies: the attempt to identify “translation
seems to me to maintain the idea of equivalence, even if the latter is defined in terms of communicative 
conditions and processes.
12 The term is used on the basis of Holmes’ categories of ‘descriptive’, ‘theoretical’ and ‘applied’ translation 
research (19721; 1988:78-79).
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difficulties” or “problems” and propose possible solutions in a didactic context (1995: 197, 
200-201) -  propose in other words how these problems can be solved by a particularised 
definition of translation correctness.
There is no doubt that this postulate is necessary for any attempt to teach translation, 
any discipline which seeks to direct translators on how best to achieve the results required 
from them in various professional contexts. Evocations of a concept of equivalence cannot be 
excluded from the pedagogic branch of translation studies without simultaneously cancelling 
its nature and purpose. For so long as one’s aim is the teaching of translation, one cannot 
avoid proposing a notion of ‘correctness’, which is already implied in the teaching of foreign 
languages, let alone the delineation of rules for translation practice. What is important to 
consider, however, at the moment we admit this necessity, is the usefulness of this tool 
outside the translation classroom, that is to say, in attempts to examine the role and status of 
translation in various historical contexts, within which conceptions of ‘equivalence’ and 
definitions of translation practice have been different to our own. In other words can a 
prescriptive model be fruitfully employed in a study which does not aim at training translators, 
but at investigating what were the meaning and function of translations in history?
The answer given to this question by the descriptive-historical branch of translation 
research was generally a negative one. Conceptions of equivalence which maintain an 
evocation of correctness based on the source text or context were rejected as unable to 
contribute to the understanding of what translation has been for various historical 
communities. From this point of view, equivalence was seen as a “functional” and “relational” 
concept, whose meaning, as Gideon Toury pointed out in his seminal work In Search of a 
Theory of Translation, is exclusively related to conceptions of translation propriety that 
develop in the target society. Translation was thereby redefined as any utterance which is 
assumed to be a translation within a given sociocultural community, irrespectively of its actual 
-  or what we consider as actual -  relation to the source text (1980: 43).
2.2 Towards a Model for Historical Research
The development of a descriptive approach to translation, which was introduced as a “new 
paradigm” in the field (Hermans 1985a: 7), was inextricably related to the Leuven conference 
mentioned above, followed by two other conferences held in Tel Aviv in 1978 and in Antwerp 
in 1980,11 as well as the research of a relatively small group of scholars who have been
” The proceedings of the second conference were published in the journal Poetics Today (1981: 2.4) edited by 
Itamar Even-Zohar and Toury and of the third in the Journal Dispositio (1982: 7. 19-21). This information is 
taken from Hermans 1999: 12.
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working on translation since the seventies. The main hypothesis which informed this 
perspective is that the meaning of translation cannot be defined as an a priori, but should be 
discovered through a process of historical description, which is the only means for examining 
what translation has been in different cultural contexts. This idea is clearly articulated by 
Toury’s assertion that
... a ‘translation’ will be taken to be any target-language utterance which is presented or
regarded as such within the target culture, on whatever grounds < 1985: 20).
Toury subsequently proposed the term ‘assumed translation’ in order to denote this concept 
(1995a). By this move the descriptive paradigm dissociated itself from attempts to define what 
translation should be. It proposed instead that translation studies should develop an empirical 
approach to its object, a method of analysis that should “refrain from value judgements in 
selecting subject matter or in presenting findings, and/or refuse to draw any conclusions in the 
form of recommendations for ‘proper’ behaviour” (Toury 1995:2). This postulate, which was 
subsequently developed and qualified by both Toury and others, articulated a necessary 
presupposition of historical translation research, which also constitutes a fundamental 
assumption of the present thesis: that in order to understand the production and function of 
translations in history one cannot rely on a strictly delineated definition, by which these 
translations should be appraised, but should rather proceed by examining “what translation 
has proved to be in reality” (ibid.: 32) and under which historical conditions conceptions and 
practices of translation have come into being. What this supposition implies, in terms of the 
present thesis, is that my subsequent analysis of translations will neither be concerned with an 
assessment of these works in terms of their faithfulness or equivalence to their originals nor 
will it seek to suggest how best these originals could have been translated into English. For 
the question that informs my research is not whether translations of ‘democracy’ measure up 
to an ideal of translation propriety, but how these translations formed such an ideal in their 
specific historical context, how they produced a rewriting14 of their originals that became to 
be seen as a faithful translation of the Greek concept of ‘democracy’ in the framework of 
nineteenth-century British society.
This statement requires immediate qualification. To say that my work will refrain from 
prescriptive definitions of its object and will seek to employ instead a ‘descriptive’ and 
‘historical’ approach may initially appear to imply that translations of ‘democracy’ will be 
considered as totally independent from the originals, that they will be examined as texts rather 
than translations, which bore no semantic or cultural relation to the writings that constituted 
their sources. This idea has, indeed, been suggested by a significant number of translation
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theorists as the immediate and inescapable logical consequence of the disengagement of 
translation research from the notions of ‘faithfulness’ and ‘equivalence’. Venuti for example 
has argued that the recognition of the point that translation is never quite ‘faithful’, it never 
establishes an identity and it can never be a transparent representation “releases translation 
from its subordination to the foreign text and makes possible the development of a 
hermeneutic that reads the translation as a text in its own right, as a weave of connotations, 
allusions, and discourses specific to the target-language culture” (1992a: 8, my italics).14 5 
Drawing on Venuti’s suggestion, Rosemary Arrojo takes this argument further, and maintains 
that the translator’s inevitable visibility implies the identification of authorial and translational 
task, to the extent that we are justified in dismissing any distinction between authors, 
translators, interpreters and readers alike (1997: 28, 30).
To be sure, such an approach is, of course, feasible. There is ostensibly no reason why 
we should not be able to collect a number of translations -  say, English translations of Greek 
literature during the nineteenth century -  and examine how these texts were shaped, what 
were their historical meaning and reference, whether their form adhered to or deviated from 
dominant forms of non-translated literature, whether they expressed conservative or 
progressive tendencies in the target community, or whatever one may choose to investigate. 
Yet, the moment we decide to collect translations, rather than any other category of texts -  
say, drama or poetry, both translated and original -  we obviously assume and suggest that the 
texts put under the specific category ‘translation’ have something in common, they share at 
least one feature (even if this is the fact that they are conceived as translations) which is 
somehow peculiar to them and cannot be viewed as the distinctive feature of other cultural 
products of the target community. For if there is nothing distinctive in these texts, either in the 
beliefs of the group which initially created them and read them or in our own historical 
hypotheses, there is absolutely no reason why we should decide to gather them together, under 
one name, and examine them as if they were a group. There is certainly nothing essential, in a 
metaphysical sense of the term, that is shared by these texts, nothing which would distinguish 
them from non-translations in all times and places. Yet, the very existence of our collection 
and the name we give to it -  “examination of translations of Greek texts into English” -  is 
both a testimony and an endorsement of a (degree of) identity, a unity whose truth has been
14 On the use of the term ‘rewriting’ see Lefevere 1992.
14 It is important to emphasise that after the publication of the edition Rethinking Translation (1992), from which 
this extract is taken, Venuti's work indicates a shift from this position, by showing a specific interest in the way 
the original as a "foreign” text is rewritten in a context of the target-culture's (domestic) systems of valuer., 
beliefs and discourses. Cf. Venuti 1995; 1998; 2000. This turn, as Bassnett has pointed out (in a private 
conversation) can be fruitfully examined as an attempt to bring into Translation Studies the theoretical 
problematic of contemporary critical discourses of postcolonial, poststructuralist and postmarxist thinking.
Why Still Waste our Time on Rewrites? And How? 21
institutionally and socially established before us and which is indeed reinforced by our 
concrete acts of choosing and naming.
This unity, as Toury has pointed out, derives, in the case of translation, from the 
presumed distinction between original and translated texts as well as the presumption of some 
kind of relationship between them.16 This does not mean that there exists no authorial 
presence in the translator’s voice or that originals are not subjected to interpretive readings. I 
am merely arguing that the categories ‘original’ and ‘translation’ have been constituted in our 
culture -  and many others -  as separate ones, and hence have produced a number of real and 
objective distinctions, as well as a number of real and objective interrelations between source 
and target text, even if these can only be discerned in this culture’s self-identification and not 
in the ‘reality’ of the texts themselves. Furthermore, I am arguing that while these relations 
cannot be a priori defined or restricted in an essentialist way, their assumption is a sine qua 
non presupposition of the study of translations as translations and a sine qua non 
presupposition of an academic discourse which calls itself Translation Studies.
This hypothesis stands, I think, in accordance with Toury’s definition of the assumed 
translation. Toury has admittedly argued that translations should be “regarded as facts o f the 
culture which hosts them, with the concomitant assumption that whatever their function and 
identity, these are determined within that same culture and reflect its own constellation.” 
(1995a: 136. Cf. Toury 1980: 16; 1985: 19). Yet he perceptively described this assumed 
translation in terms of a cluster of three interconnected postulates: a) a source text postulate; 
b) a transfer postulate; and c) a relationship postulate. Translation was therefore specifically 
defined as
any target-culture text for which there are reasons to tentatively posit the existence of 
another text, in another culture and language, from which it was presumably derived by 
transfer operations and to which it is now tied by certain relationships, some of which may 
be regarded - within that culture - as necessary and/or sufficient. (1995a: 145)
Toury has clarified that the crucial aspect of this definition is not the existence of the source 
text as such, nor the actual degree of identity (if any) of translation with that text, but the 
presumption that the process whereby “translation came into being involved the transference 
from the assumed source text of certain features that the two now share”; a presumption which 
then produces a relationship postulate, as it “implies that there are accountable relationships 
which tie it [translation] to its assumed original” (ibid.: 144). The above definition of the 
assumed translation does not allow us to ignore the source text (or, more accurately, the ways
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the source text exists in target-culture assumptions), but only refutes the acceptance of an a 
priori and one-dimensional relationship of faithfulness or equivalence between the translation 
and the original. It further draws attention to the establishment of a number of accountable 
relations between the two texts, which can then be grasped as the expressions of beliefs of the 
target culture as to what constitutes the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the naming 
of a text as a translation. If no relationship can be determined, we must conclude that the 
hypothetical community in question has not developed a concept or practice of translation. We 
are therefore not justified in studying texts as translations. If the target community does not 
conceive any relationship of the kind, though we can discern one, we must conclude that this 
community does not have a concept of translation that is similar to ours. It is nevertheless 
engaged in a cultural practice which we have reasons to classify as translation. And finally, if 
the target community defines a set of such relationships, while we can see none, we must 
conclude that our conception of translation is different to the one expressed in this 
community, and proceed to understand the thought-mode and cultural traits that form and 
sustain this different conception. In all these cases, a distinction as well as a relationship 
between the source and target text are presupposed and have to be self-critical ly determined. 
For their absence either relegates historical translation research to silence -  an admittedly 
consistent choice, if we decide to make it -  or expands it so much that it makes it identical 
with the entirety of contemporary human sciences -  a choice which implies that translation 
would actually mean nothing, precisely because it is taken to mean everything.
But there is a final, and perhaps the most important, objection to my argument, which 
would point out that a choice of examining translations as unbound by the original texts is 
self-consciously subversive of established thought-modes. It does not seek to conform to 
existing institutional and conceptual frameworks, but acts against them and aims to fragment 
and dismantle dominant conceptions of translation, and together with them the social and 
ideological world that sustains them. It could then be argued that the non-identity, the 
fundamental heterogeneity of both translation, original writings and the cultures which 
produce them, as Venuti suggests, is already a reality, our irreducibly fragmented reality, 
which is obscured by the discourses of faithfulness and transparency, because it is threatening 
to the status quo both culturally and politically. For the binary opposition between ‘original’ 
and ‘translation’, which makes translation appear invisible and subordinate to a presumably 
‘coherent’ authorial writing, acts to conceal the fact that 16
16 The existence of pseudotranslations, as has been defined by Toury (1980; 1995), does not invalidate this 
argument, since in this case also, readers suppose a relation between the translation and an original, even if the 
latter had never actually existed.
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neither the foreign text nor the translation is an original semantic unity; both are derivative 
and heterogeneous, consisting of diverse linguistic and cultural materials which destabilize 
the work of signification, making meaning plural and differential, exceeding and possibly 
conflicting with the intentions of the foreign writer and the translator (Venuti 1992a: 7).
Hereby emerges the political significance of any attempt to disrupt the relation between 
translation and source text: an emphasis on the non-transparency, the visibility of the 
translator would be, in Venuti’s view, a political gesture par excellence; an attempt to 
question the nationalist and homogenising ideology implied in the marginal status of 
translation in contemporary institutions and force a revaluation of pedagogical practices and 
disciplinary divisions that derive from this status (ibid.: 6-7, 9-10; 1998: 1-13)
This is, indeed, a compelling position, since it does not merely draw our attention to 
the totalising function of a concept, but also expresses a political commitment and a utopian 
vision, in which it finds its justification and purpose. For what Venuti’s thesis illuminates is 
that conceptions of translation and authorship do not develop as a merely literary or cultural 
concern which is removed from the social conditions of its making, but emerge as an 
articulation and a means of sustaining these conditions: institutional hierarchies, national 
formations, differences in wages and social position, inequality of cultural status and power, 
intellectual property rights, the role of the market in the formation of textual production and 
so on. What is, however, conspicuously absent from it is a self-reflexive move, an attempt to 
investigate how this social world, which has produced the master-slave relationship between 
original and translation, has also brought into being the reality of cultural fragmentation and 
heterogeneity, and thereby the theorisation of this reality. It thus fails to ask whether the 
glorification of cultural disparity, which it proposes as a utopian alternative, could be seen 
from a different perspective as a constitutive element of contemporary institutional structures, 
an outcome and reinforcement of what Fredric Jameson has perspicaciously described as the 
cultural logic of late capitalist societies (1991), whose laws are more nourished and sustained 
by our fragmented social identities, rather than being politically threatened by them.
This absence of self-reflexive thought does not only provoke an uncritical evocation of 
a re-conceptualisation of translation, which appears able to be developed per se, while social 
conditions and political structures which sustain it remain static and stable; it further entails an 
inability to recognise how the alternative it brings to light, which is at one and the same time 
seen in the present and desired as a future ideal, is far from being incompatible with these 
conditions. It is, indeed, far from being alien to a tradition which has never denounced its 
interest in embracing disparate cultural expressions under its own names, from the nomination 
of Queen Victoria Empress of India to the presence of gay culture in today’s high-fashion
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magazines in London. We can, of course, legitimately describe this tradition as already and 
irreducibly dismantled. We can call into question what translation claims to be and challenge 
its assumed unity. We can also describe the marginality of translation as illusory and 
mystifying, a false conception formed in the context of a dominant language, social 
organisation and political institutions. We may then choose to disrupt this dominance by 
emphasising the fragmentation of all forms of speaking and writing, by revealing the 
incoherence and instability at the heart of what, in our world, passes as coherent and stable. 
We may become engaged in this political enterprise which illuminates the non-inter­
relatedness of translated texts, the lack of anything which may unite them and the lack of 
anything that may distinguish them from so-called original writings. We may still continue to 
name this internally disrupted aggregation of texts ‘translations’. Yet we also need to turn to 
our social and cultural history, and thus to the description of ‘assumed’ translations, in order 
to ask whether the tradition of thought we set out to criticise has already constituted a space 
for our criticism within itself, whether assumptions of translation and authorship manifested 
in it were reduced to an enforcement of essentialist ideals of homogeneity or whether they 
developed to be complicit with a celebration of cultural difference within which our own 
discourse is now embedded. We need to ask whether relations of domination and power in 
this tradition have been merely justified by evoking their internal coherence, by resting on a 
unified originating subject -  the subject that is embodied in the idea of the author -  or whether 
their force lay precisely in a paradoxical duality which created subjectivity at the very moment 
the unity of the subject was dispelled, totally fragmented, thus becoming deprived of a unified 
and socially effective dissenting voice. It is from this point of view that the present study will 
seek to describe and examine the history of assumed distinctions and assumed relations 
between translations and source texts: on the grounds that there is no real distance between an 
idealistic assertion of social unity and homogeneity and a glorification of cultural difference, 
so long as both are articulated as hypostasised conditions of human communities per se, rather 
than the expression of specific and accountable historical and social processes.
Now having argued the priority of a descriptive-historical method for the present 
thesis, it is important to turn to the varied meanings and processes of translation description, 
and their implications for the definition of my object. Such an attempt, which touches upon 
methods of historical research, brings us to the interface between Translation Studies and 
those interlocutors which stand at the ‘outer’ limits of the field.
Why Still Waste our Time on Rewrites? And How? 25
2.3 The Uncertainties of Description
The first step in an historical approach to translation would be, as was argued, to seek to read 
translation and metatranslation discourses of a particular time and place in order to determine 
what was meant by the term and practice of translation in the context in question. Yet this 
process, as we have learned from the hermeneutic tradition, is far from being straightforward 
and thus far from ‘merely’ descriptive. As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, the medium 
through which such reading takes place, the subject’s own language, is not a neutral means 
that can transcribe past texts and cultural conceptions, but embodies a range of contemporary 
presuppositions and predilections, ‘prejudices’ that belong to our own thought and history, 
and preclude in advance an immediate access to our object of study. This thesis, which was 
mainly developed by Gadamer in Truth and Method (I9601; 1989), did not seek to evoke a 
conventional notion of ‘prejudices’ that defines them as impediments, constraints to an 
objective view of the text. According to Gadamer, the very ‘objectivity’ of this view is an 
inherently perspectivist one, since our potential for historical understanding does not imply 
the elimination, but the use of our ‘prejudices’. For it is only through them that a distant text 
and a distant culture’s horizon of meaning can make any sense to us. ‘Prejudiced’ 
understanding, interpretation, Gadamer suggests, does not entail a distortion of knowledge; it 
shapes the only possible knowledge of meanings and cultures (I9601; 1989: 277-306).
The supposition that our understanding of other cultures is contingent and relative to 
the conceptual potential and cultural tradition of its own historical production has been largely 
influential for contemporary thought and has implied the employment of a metaphorical 
conception of translation as a theoretical alternative to the idea of faithful description and 
representation. Within the framework of what has been aptly called an ‘interpretive turn’17 
manifested in philosophical, historical and social research Clifford Geertz described 
anthropological writings as “interpretations” of cultures, “fictions” not in the sense that they 
are imaginative thought experiments, but in the sense that they are “something made”, 
“fashioned” within the cultural structures of the target community (1973 ; 1993:15). Starting 
from a more politicised theoretical perspective James Clifford not only drew attention to the 
inherently translational character of disciplines such as ethnography and anthropology, but 
also emphasised the transient, socially constructed truthfulness of their interpretive meaning, 
whose objectivist claims are in the full sense of the word ideological and “are made possible 
by powerful ‘lies’ of exclusion and rhetoric” (1988:38-44; 1986:7). If such works 
problematised traditional conceptions of transparency and scientific neutrality, by arguing
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both theoretically and through empirical studies that ‘writing’ about other cultures necessarily 
takes place from a cultural and social perspective and, if we follow Clifford’s thought, on 
behalf of a political one, a parallel discussion taking place at the interface between 
philosophy, literary theory and cultural studies employed the notion of interpretation in order 
to challenge the univocality of textual and more particularly literary meaning. Already 
anticipated by Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of ‘heteroglossia’ (1934-351; 1981: 259-422), which 
pointed out the plurality of social voices inscribed in the (literary) text, the idea that meaning 
cannot be reduced either to the individual intentions of its author or to the linguistic codes of a 
one-dimensional and static text has been argued by theorists as diverse in their methodological 
positions as Fredric Jameson, Stanley Fish, and Jacques Derrida. Although it is not the 
intention of this work to impose a false unity among theoretical agendas ranging from 
Marxism to hermeneutics and poststructuralism, it is significant to emphasise that what these 
writers suggested, if only as an initial theoretical presupposition, is a negative postulate: that 
meaning cannot be determinatively and finally defined, but exceeds definitions by being 
constantly reinterpreted and reconstructed within the diversified conceptual potential of its 
receiving communities.
A position as radical as this did more than question empiricist conceptions of historical 
representation. It problematised at the same time a line of thought that goes back to traditional 
hermeneutic theories, informed as much by Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Romantic subjectivism 
as by Wilhelm Dilthey’s historicism. The idea of empathetic understanding of the authorial 
genius, which was at work in Schleiermacher’s conviction that hermeneutics should aim to 
understand an author better than he understood himself (Ricoeur 19811; 1995: 46-47) evoked 
as the task of interpretive analysis the discovery of a subjectivity which is no longer seen 
either as coherent or as creative as it used to be. Likewise Dilthey’s attempt to situate 
hermeneutics in history and see the coherence of the text as the articulation of an equally 
coherent lifeworld (Ricoeur 1981; 1995: 48-53) has been challenged by a tradition of thought, 
which owes as much to poststructuralism as it does to Marxism, and reads both texts and 
historical worlds as constituted by fissures and breaks, by textual and concomitantly social 
articulations of contradictions, tensions and inconsistencies. Most significantly, the idea of 1789
17 On the term see the edition of Hiley, Bohman and Shusterman The Interpretive Turn. Philosophy, Science, 
Culture (1991).
18 See the first chapter of the Political Unconscious entitled “On Interpretation” (1981:17-102)
19 See especially Fish’s concept of ‘interpretive communities’ in his Is There a Text in the Class? The Authority 
o f Interpretive Communities (1980).
0 Derrida employs the concept of 'translation' in a complex way, whose detailed analysis lies beyond the aims of 
this introduction, but will be touched upon in the development of my thesis. Suffice to say at the moment that
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hermeneutic fidelity, which was intended to provide the human sciences with an interpretive 
method that would claim equal authority and validity with the explanatory methods of natural 
sciences, was deemed to be as idealist as its Cartesian predecessors. The valorisation of a 
static conception of meaning inscribed in the notion of historical truthfulness, the assertion of 
the social and political neutrality of cultural languages, and the prioritisation of a universalised 
tradition of world-conceptions as both the presupposition and the ultimate end of interpretive 
processes, became the focus of a rigorous critique, inspired by the work of French and 
American poststructuralism, Marxism and postmarxism, feminist and postcolonial theorists, 
who found a minimum consensus in the conviction that interpretations of texts and readings of 
history cannot merely be viewed as accurate or inaccurate representations, as faithful or 
unfaithful translations.
While the emergence of Translation Studies in the seventies was marked by a similar 
problematic regarding the nature of translation, and several scholars in the field were eager to 
develop an interdisciplinary dialogue,21 it was only recently that the notions of ‘description’ 
and ‘interpretation’ of translation were actually called into question in the context of 
translation theory. During the seventies and the eighties the aim of translation research was 
predominantly formulated along the lines given by Holmes’ seminal paper “The Name and 
Nature of Translation Studies”:22
As a field of pure research - that is to say, research pursued for its own sake, quite apart from 
any direct practical application outside its own terrain- translation studies has two main 
objectives: (1) To describe the phenomena of translating and translation(s) as they manifest
translation, as Andrew Benjamin has pointed out, plays a crucial role in Derrida’s view of philosophical 
understanding and is considered as the enactment of the possibility and practice of philosophy (1989:1).
21 There are several examples of works which introduced into the field of translation studies a methodological 
and theoretical problematic that had been developed in other disciplines. One of the first attempts to explore such 
a potential was made by a writer whose entire contribution to the field of translation research drew on a fruitful 
oscillation between translation studies, literary and cultural theory, namely André Lefevere. In one of his first 
publications, an article entitled ‘Translation: The Focus and Growth of Literary Knowledge”, Lefevere was 
directly engaged with traditional hermeneutic models for the understanding of translation, which he sought to 
prove as scientifically, theoretically and methodologically unfruitful for translation research (1978a: 9, 15-25). 
Lefevere did not only consider Translation Studies as the receiver of theoretical contemplation that develops 
outside the field. He also envisaged the possibility of a mutual interaction and dialogue between Translation 
Studies, literary, linguistic and cultural theories, and believed that a theory of translation elaborated on non- 
prescriptive grounds could also be of use to other disciplines (1978). In the following decades a wide number of 
theorists, including Bassnett (1993; 1998a), Hermans (1996; 1999a; 1999b), José Lambert and Clem Robyns 
(forthcoming), Tejaswini Niranjana (1992) and Venuti (1998), have followed similar directions and sought to 
examine translation from perspectives that were given by philosophical, historical and literary thought on 
interpretation.
22 ‘The Name and Nature of Translation Studies” is an expanded version of a paper presented in the Translation 
Section of the Third International Congress of Applied Linguistics, held in Copenhagen, 21-26 August 1972. It 
was first issued in the APPTS series of the Translation Studies Section, Department of General Literary Studies, 
University of Amsterdam, 1972. The version included in the 1988 edition which I am using follows its second 
prepublication form (1975).
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themselves in the world of experience, and (2) to establish general principles by means of 
which these phenomena can be explained and predicted (19721; 1988: 71).
If we provisionally postpone a discussion of the second of these aims, and the ways these two 
objectives were interrelated, we can immediately observe the influence of Holmes’ viewpoint 
on Toury’s already mentioned hypothesis that the ‘assumed translation’ is what translation 
proves to be in reality, and therefore what it may be expected to be in specifiable social 
conditions (1995: 32). What this suggestion presupposes is the transparency of the means of 
historical description: contemporary theory. For, as Toury has emphasised, while “well- 
performed studies always bear on their underlying theories” the truth-value of any theoretical 
hypothesis can only be established against the results of empirical research; as it is only the 
latter that can enable the verification, refutation or modification of theoretical hypotheses 
(1995: 15-16).
Such evocations of a ‘reality’ of translations, which is seen as accessible through 
empirical studies, became central in the ways Translation Studies formed a self-descriptive 
discourse and presented itself as a new scientific model. This thesis brought into being a 
paradoxical ambivalence in the context of descriptive translation research. On the one hand, 
the descriptive paradigm challenged both the notion of empathetic understanding of linguistic 
equivalence and the dissociation of translation production from the social structures and 
cultural norms of the target community. What was emphasised instead was the need to 
examine translation as the product of multiple and conflicting historical forces -  personal, 
cultural, social, political -  which should not be reduced to the determining role of the original, 
but should be seen as produced by the historical conditions, norms and necessities that 
develop in the context of the target culture. On the other hand, it was suggested that the 
engagement with an enterprise of rewriting that shares many features with the process of 
translation, namely the understanding and historical interpretation of past texts, works under 
no contemporary constraints or goals, follows no norms, but can be a faithful and accurate 
description of its source-object: translation in history.
The endorsement of epistemological realism underlying this statement, that is to say 
the belief that statements possess a truth-value which is not contingent on our means of 
knowing it but established in virtue of a reality existing independently of us (Dummett, 1978: 
146), silenced, paradoxically, precisely what it aspired to reveal: the social and cultural 
contingency of any conception of translation. For how could one argue that all forms of 
translation are historically conditioned and assert at the same time that a contemporary 
rewriting of translation history occupies an Archimedean viewpoint, a cultural and political 
vacuum from which it merely reports what translations said or did? As was soon felt by an
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important number of translation theorists since the early nineties, the two claims were hardly 
reconcilable. The rejection of essentialist conceptions of translation stood so evidently at odds 
with an assumed neutrality of translation descriptions that it necessitated the rethinking and 
revaluation of the latter. This process found substantial theoretical support in the wider 
dispute about interpretive fidelity and representation that was simultaneously taking place in 
the human and social sciences.
Among the first systematic attempts to develop such a problematic and articulate a 
self-reflexive discourse in translation theory appears in a number of articles and other works 
written by Hermans since 1995. Hermans focused on the epistemological fallacies entailed by 
evocations of empiricism in translation research and suggested a conception of translation 
descriptions as interpretive acts, which are neither neutral nor transparent, but constitute part 
of a broader discursive framework that is entangled in the social, cultural and institutional 
conditions of its own historical context (1996: 47-48; Cf. 1995; 1997 16-20; 1999a: 65-69; 
1999: 144-150). Hermans’ work employed the hermeneutic supposition that understanding is 
only possible through a certain conceptual framework into which we ‘translate’ other cultural 
conceptions, in order to argue that this process is not simply a matter of conceptual fidelity or 
infidelity -  whether we can perform accurate or inaccurate interpretations -  but a 
predominantly cultural and social issue. For these conceptions, he maintained, articulate 
historically conditioned beliefs and ideas which are somewhat imposed on the object-culture, 
in the sense that the language of this culture is made comprehensible for us only when it is 
transcribed into our own language, when it is made commensurable to our own definitions of 
translation, and therefore the beliefs and values that are inscribed in them. This process, 
according to Hermans, is entangled in a network of asymmetrical power relations in two ways. 
On the one hand an historiographic account of translations shapes an image of the object- 
culture which is made to conform to certain social, ethical and political standards by which the 
‘culture-object’ is re-figured as ‘Other’ and subsequently appraised (1999a: 68). On the other 
hand the translation researcher assumes a position, a ‘social persona’ within her own social 
and cultural context, thereby locating her work in a framework of pre-existing structures, 
institutions and power relations. Thus, the study of translations, like translation itself, 
becomes a social practice which, far from being socially innocent and purely scientific, is 
multiply determined by the historical conditions of its making (1996: 48).
What this recognition necessitates, in Hermans’ view, is the development of self- 
critical and reflexive thought, which would avoid the pitfalls of empiricism and acknowledge
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its own ‘biases’, its inescapable dependence on an historical context within which it is 
produced and to which, in turn, it contributes:
When we engage in historical and cross-cultural studies on translation, we translate other 
people's concepts and practices of translation on the basis of our own, historical, concept of 
translation, including its normative aspect and the values it secures. We have no other 
choice. But having become conscious of the problem inherent in our descriptions we can 
devise strategies that acknowledge as much. That ought to be part of the ethos of the 
discipline (1999a: 68-69).
This conclusion is, I think, no less puzzling than it is illuminating. For if, as it is argued, 
thought’s embeddedness in history does not entirely preclude the possibility of self­
understanding and criticism, if the limits imposed on interpretation are at least flexible enough 
to permit a consciousness of the problem at stake -  however partial and limited -  then one 
may legitimately ask why would such consciousness confine itself to ‘acknowledging as 
much’ rather than seeking to transform itself and the world that brings it into being? To be 
sure, when discussed in terms of epistemology, the relativisation of historiographic certainty 
implied in the above hypothesis is hardly disputable -  at least not from a position that seeks to 
historicise itself as much as it recognises the historical nature of its object. Yet so long as this 
thesis is phrased in social and political terms, that is to say, so long as interpretation is not 
merely described as a problem of cognition and historical accuracy, but as a discourse that is 
made possible within particular social structures and relations, does not this politicised 
consciousness concomitantly create social and political obligations? And do not these 
obligations remain essentially unfulfilled by merely recognising the relativity of one’s 
theoretical position? If, in other words, a self-critical understanding of translation-description 
is not reduced to a mere dilemma regarding our faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the past, but 
is seen as a predominantly social phenomenon that cannot be separated from its institutional 
and political context, then I cannot see how this understanding can be actualised as devoid of 
the responsibility for choice and judgement, how it can abandon the obligation to appraise and 
evaluate its social bonds and contribution, while continuing to ascertain a self-critical 
viewpoint.
A way of addressing this issue has been suggested by Venuti, who sought to articulate 
a critique of what he names as the “scientific model” in translation research by emphasising 
the inevitability of judgement in the development of historical and cultural theory. Venuti 
takes as his starting point Toury’s thesis that translation research should seek to establish itself 
as an empirical science and thus refrain from value judgements. In Venuti’s view this claim 
can be seen today “as theoretically naive or perhaps disingenuous” on the grounds that
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“judgements cannot be avoided in this or any other cultural theory.” For even “at the level of 
devising and executing a research project”, he argues, a scholarly interpretation will be laden 
with the values and interests of its particular situation (1998: 27-28). Hence in the case of 
descriptive translation research Venuti sees the claims to objectivity as a repression of more 
concrete disciplinary interests, namely the attempt to “install translation studies in academic 
institutions”, develop a theory that would “prevail over others that are not scientific” and 
become “implicated in academic empire-building” insofar as descriptive studies take its 
“audience to be scholars, not translators” (1998: 28). At a broader level, as Venuti points out, 
what is not recognised by Toury’s hypothesis is that the insistence on value-free translation 
studies prevents the discipline from considering its position in relation to the hierarchy of 
values that define its historical context at large, and from examining the cultural and social 
impact translation research may have.23 For so long as conceptions of translation and 
translation norms “include a diverse range of domestic values, beliefs, and social 
representations which carry ideological force in serving the interests of specific groups” then 
‘descriptions’ of translation, according to Venuti, ought to adopt a critical stance towards their 
object, be able to assess its ideological and political significance and simultaneously 
contribute to the self-critical shaping of their present (1998: 29).
What it is important to maintain from this critique is that historical consciousness is 
also a political consciousness and thereby obliged to recognise its historicity and 
simultaneously make choices, that is to say, be able to prioritise one form of history and 
politics instead of another. Yet this is far from being a conclusion to this discussion. For the 
question that immediately arises from such a thesis is: on which grounds can one select, judge, 
criticise and propose alternatives? If our consciousness of history can only be a relativised and 
historically contingent consciousness, as both Venuti and Hermans point out, that is, a 
consciousness which has no other standards for judgement apart from world-perspectives, 
how can we choose and construct a particular position against those our choice necessarily 
rejects and marginalizes? On which basis can we argue, in our case, that a range of readings 
and translations of ‘democracy’ was authoritarian and oppressive, while appraising another as 
fostering the ideals of human solidarity, equality and responsibility -  a judgement that has to 
assume in advance the value and desirability of a particular form of society and politics, thus 
excluding alternatives? In other words, is it possible to develop a politically constructive 
critique of translation (among other cultural phenomena) without claiming some validity for
23 Tejaswini Niranjana develops a similar crilicism of descriptions of Translation Studies as an 'empirical 
science”, arguing that such a claim cannot but repress conditions of domination and power differentials that 
inform the relations between languages (1992: 59-60)
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our thought, without evoking a certainty which presumably betrays, by its very articulation, 
the aims it seeks to serve?
Venuti’s response to this question seems to be a negative one. In his view any attempt 
to base the validity of one’s position on a scale that may extend beyond its original, relative 
limits in a cultural group or consciousness is unavoidably an imposition on others, an 
enforcement of a false homogeneity that marginalizes and oppresses ‘otherness’, no matter 
whether this process takes place at the level of theory, as a claim to scientificity, or at the level 
of translation practice. On these grounds, he suggests that an ethics of translation should take 
as its “ideal the recognition of cultural difference”: it should criticise the narcissistic dismissal 
of ‘foreign’ and minority values (the two terms are somewhat confusingly put together in 
Venuti’s work); “promote cultural innovation and change”; recognise cultural particularity 
and alterity; and resist an ethics of sameness that hews to dominant domestic values and 
consolidates existing institutions and authorities (1998: 187-188).
This seems to me a self-defeating position, at least when discussed in political terms. 
‘Change’ and ‘innovation’ cannot themselves constitute an ethical imperative, since they 
could lead as easily to fascism as to a “democratic agenda” which Venuti takes to be the aim 
of a politicised critique (1998: 10). Neither can the opposition between the domestic and the 
foreign form the basis of such a critique, not least because a good number of openly 
oppressive cultures in human history have (fortunately) been foreign to others. That is to say, 
one may easily suggest foreignisation as a means for the radicalisation of a ‘domestic’ politics, 
when we translate postcolonial writings into English, but could the same point be argued for a 
possible translation of Mein Kampf into a liberal-democratic context? What I want to 
emphasise by this example is not that postcolonial texts are necessarily politically progressive 
and radical or that there is an insurmountable distance between liberal democracies and the 
historical development of fascism in Europe, but that the opposition ‘domestic’ vs. ‘foreign’ is 
so abstracted from the historical meanings ‘ethics’, ‘morality’, ‘justice’ and ‘politics’ have 
acquired in our societies that it is not only in danger of becoming an empty theoretical 
evocation that unavoidably fails to explain how power and domination takes form in concrete 
historical situations; it is also employable by such a diversity of political positions that one 
becomes immediately sceptical regarding its value as a yardstick for historical judgement and 
choice.
Venuti’s evocation of minority and dissenting cultures is more complex, but does not 
avoid falling into a similar mode of reasoning. For while it perceptively takes as its object of 
critique the dominant discourse of the liberal bourgeois societies, in which it is located, it
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mistakenly assumes that any minority within these societies articulates a desirable political 
ideal, merely by virtue of its position as minor and marginal. Yet while this thesis may 
demonstrate the ethical value of, say, ethnic voices seeking social recognition, it is highly 
questionable whether it can bestow a similar value on a minor group of religious 
fundamentalists demanding the prosecution for homicide of all women who have abortions.24 
The following chapters of this thesis will provide a further example. As we shall examine, 
positive appraisals of classical democracy emerged in the context of late eighteenth-century 
Europe as a minoritized voice, positioned against a thought-mode that saw equality as 
identified with anarchy. Yet this originally minor discourse acted to sustain a social system 
that hardly denied its mission to maintain and impose relations of domination and human 
oppression. To be sure, this role could not have been attained unless this new discourse had 
managed, progressively, to extend and secure its canonicity; but still it would be difficult to 
argue that the fundamental reason behind the oppressive aspects of Western democracies was 
their appeal to majorities.
On the contrary, one can hardly reduce the entire body of canonical writings of the 
Western tradition to an unequivocal reinforcement of relations of domination that defined the 
politics of this tradition. Terry Eagleton has succinctly developed this point by seeking to 
account for the values of canonical literature, which cannot be equated with a support of the 
political establishment:
Homer was not a liberal humanist, Virgil did not champion bourgeois values, Shakespeare 
put in a good word for radical egalitarianism, Samuel Johnson cheered on popular 
insurrection in the Caribbean, Flaubert despised the middle classes and Tolstoy had no time 
for private property (2000: 52).
This is not to say that the canon of Western literature and culture was politically innocent or 
generally progressive, but to suggest that this canon, part of which consisted of ancient Greek 
literature, and in particular ancient Greek literature in translations, was culturally multilayered 
and politically ambiguous. It thus lent itself to the justification of both ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ 
intentions: it became the repository of ideals of equality and freedom at the very moment it 
was used to sustain a system of social hierarchies, domination and power differentials. It was 
precisely this ambiguity, as will be discussed in the next chapters, that has created a potential 
for self-criticism and evaluation, a capacity to view this world and seek, simultaneously, to
24 This position has been argued on several occasions by Terry Eagleton, who draws attention to the pure 
formalism of the evocation of minority-cultures as a political or ethical ideal and points out that a number of 
‘minor’ cultural forms cannot be approved simply because they are cultural forms, or because they are part of a 
rich diversity and heterogeneity of such forms (2000: 15).
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disengage ourselves from its convictions, judge its social and cultural values, and pursue 
alternatives to them.
From this point of view, the object of the present thesis, namely the ways classical 
‘democracy’ was understood and actualised in the Western tradition, and Britain in particular, 
since the late eighteenth century, is also its most fundamental presupposition. For this object, 
as I shall seek to argue, can provide a basis for the investigation of distinctions between 
historical ‘truths’ and ‘lies’, between the ‘just’ and the ‘unjust’, the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’, in 
short a basis for a political questioning of our cultural history that has already been initiated 
within it, as a form of self-questioning and criticism. To be sure, this tradition did not give 
final answers to the above dilemmas. Instead it invited ahistorical and vulnerable certainties: 
either of scientific omnipotence or of the essential absence of knowledge potentials; either of 
conceptual universal or of conceptual incommensurability; either of cultural identity or of 
cultural difference; either of pure translatability or of untranslatability. Yet it also made clear -  
at least at its most revealing moments -  that its inherent aporias cannot be separated from the 
institutional, social, and political forces which mark their historical appearances, that every 
time we treat our dilemmas as merely intellectual puzzles, we are already trapped within them, 
we speak from the position that was so aptly described by Samuel Weber’ Institution and 
Interpretation as “the idea and ideal of knowledge” (1987: ix). It was precisely this thought­
mode, which separates historical tmth from our social world and our particular role within it, 
that was sustained as much as it was questioned by the translations of democracy during the 
nineteenth century.
3. Translation as a Political Issue
At the beginning of the nineties, Bassnett and Lefevere argued that the most significant 
outcome of the development of Translation Studies was to show that “translation, like all 
(re)writings is never innocent. There is always a context in which the translation takes place, 
always a history from which a text emerges and into which a text is transposed” (1990:11). 
This history, which manifests the manipulation, appropriation and domestication of source 
texts,25 and necessitates that our thought on translation ceases to search for ideals of 
translation identity, but concentrates instead on ‘gains and losses’ (Bassnett 19801:1991), 
‘difference’ (Hermans 1999a), perhaps ‘radical difference’ between the translation and the 
source text (Venuti 1998; Godard 1990), is the object and ultimate framework of this study.
25 For a further analysis of the terms used as descriptions of ‘translation’, see Bassnett and Lefevere (1990a), 
Hermans (1985), Lefevere (1992), Venuti (1995).
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To describe translation as an historical phenomenon requires a further step: to seek to 
investigate how this phenomenon develops as an integral part of historical processes, how it is 
formed by social values, ideas, necessities, intentions, and how, in turn, it may affect the 
social context of which it is part. This thesis will seek to provide a twofold answer to this 
question. It will suggest that translation acquires a certain historical function both as a 
category (or concept) which defines what it means to translate in a certain context, and as a 
body of texts, which is posited within the broader discursive networks of the target society. 
While these two aspects of translation activity are obviously interrelated, they should also be 
distinguished from each other for a number of reasons. First, conceptions of translation and 
metatranslation discourses do not necessarily correspond to practices that develop in the same 
context. As Toury has suggested, such theoretical attempts to define what translation is or to 
prescribe norms of translation propriety constitute a category of discourse which is 
fundamentally different from the “primary” products of translation behaviour. This difference 
should not be understood in terms of a presumed incapacity of translators to follow rules or 
fulfil their explicitly expressed goals and intentions. Normative pronouncements and 
theoretical formulations of this kind, in Toury’s view, are rather produced as expressions of 
beliefs and values, which neither determine nor describe translation practice. Instead they 
prescribe an ideal category of translation, which more often than not tends to lean toward 
propaganda and persuasion or reflect the writer’s naïveté and lack of sufficient knowledge of 
actual translation behaviour (1995: 65-66). What is more, metatranslation discourses do not 
only consist of conceptions of translation in the conventional sense of the term, but also of 
metaphoric uses of translation, which do not address themselves to problems of practice, but 
to the meaning and implications of translation as regards processes of understanding and 
intercultural communication, definitions of the cultural and social identity of the target 
community, the relation of this identity to other cultures and so on. From this perspective, 
conceptions of translation will be treated as a relatively autonomous discourse, which does not 
affect practice in a direct and straightforward manner, but nevertheless participates in the 
formation of the broader social discourses through which translators conceive of themselves 
and their work, formulate assumed relations between translations and source texts, and set up 
the norms and goals of their practice.
The main hypothesis I shall seek to pursue in the next chapters is that an historical 
approach to translation entails the understanding of both conceptions of translation and 
translated texts as political phenomena. This is not merely to say that the work of translation 
theorists may be affected by their political creeds, or that translations may transform and
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manipulate source texts due to political interests, or even that the translation of certain works 
-  such as translations of ‘democracy’ -  may have political implications. My use of the concept 
‘political’ is both broader in the range of application, and stricter as regards its meaning. It is 
broader in the sense that it can be employed as a denominator of all intellectual and cultural 
products of a social community, be they literary texts, translations, scientific discourses, 
works of art and so on. In other words, the particular meaning of the word ‘political’ I seek to 
delineate is not compatible with a distinction between a range of (or aspects of) translations 
which may be considered as political and others which may not.26 It rather refers to the 
embeddedness of translation discourses in organised societies, which enable the articulation of 
certain forms, networks of concepts, meanings and values, that are inscribed in translation 
choices, and act, at the same time, to sustain or question the social formation which brought 
them into being.
The phrase ‘organised societies’ is, in a sense, tautological, since there is no social unit 
which does not manifest a form of organisation. It may nevertheless be illuminating to provide 
a brief description of its meaning. The term is employed here to suggest that societies are not 
mere aggregations of individuals or groups. Instead, all social units develop institutional 
mechanisms by which they classify their members; advance specific modes by which they 
produce the intellectual, cultural and material goods that are necessary for their maintenance; 
construct educational and legal frameworks by which they assign the production of certain 
goods to specific people who are trained for this purpose; delimit the rights of each of their 
members to use these goods; and determine acceptable, permissible and forbidden forms of 
social conduct as well as apparatuses intended to enforce and maintain their organisation and 
structure.
A social formation can then function and reproduce itself insofar as social agents 
acquire a sense of identity through which they realise their distinct roles, participate in social 
processes and modes of production, understand differences between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘just’ 
and ‘unjust’, ‘true’ and ‘untrue’ that are meaningful in their community, and know what they 
are allowed or obliged to do, or not do. Personal and collective identities are articulated in 
language (among other semiotic systems), or, more accurately, in the particular uses of 
language in discourses: the relatively coherent practices by which a community, as Michel 
Foucault argues, systematically categorises and forms the objects of which it speaks, in ways 
that establish certain relations between these objects, while making other relations or objects 
inconceivable. The fundamental feature of discursive formations, in Foucault’s view, does not
26 This position, which draws on Jameson’s thesis in The Political Unconscious (1981: 20), will be further
Why Still Waste our Time on Rewrites? And How? 37
lie in their capacity to pick up an already given object and make it conceivable and 
communicable by merely relating it to a concept. Instead, discursive formations form these 
objects. That is to say, they determine a network of relations through which and in accordance 
with which communities are able to understand and speak of certain objects, name them, 
classify them, analyse them, reflect on and deal with them (19691; 1972: 31-49).
Social identities are then articulated in order to be realised as given. What is more, 
they are articulated in ways that indicate their relation to the historical society which brought 
them into being. This means that while a certain range of these identities would be 
encountered in all social units (such as the identity of the persons or groups who take care of 
the younger members of a community), disparate social formations would give rise to 
corresponding discourses and modes by which people understand themselves and the social 
context in which they are situated. In classical Athens, for example, the members of the city 
can be generally classified into three main social categories, namely citizens, slaves and 
women, each of which had a specific social role, rights and obligations, as well as certain 
relationships to the others and to the social body as a whole. The discourses which articulated 
the notion of citizen, slave and woman, or the conceptions of rights, laws and justice in this 
context were connected to the specific historical conditions of classical Athens. Thus one 
cannot find direct equivalents to them in modem societies, in which slavery no longer exists, 
the category of citizen has been merged with that of the individual, while women constitute a 
social and cultural group which is different to its presumed equivalent in ancient Greece.
Translations and metatranslation discourses are then defined as political on the 
grounds that they express socially significant convictions and values, which codify the 
organisation of a society as well as the social experience of this organisation. This position 
should not, however, be taken to entail a one-directional causative process, in which 
discursively defined categories play a merely functional and secondary role -  that is to say, 
they result from necessities (i.e. the necessity to produce certain kinds of identity) that exist in 
themselves independently of the words by which they are conceptualised. Historical social 
reality, it is argued, forms the condition for the production of discourses. Yet a condition is 
not to be defined as a given, a thing-in-itself. As Pierre Macherey has argued, a condition is 
not a cause in the empirical sense. It is the principle of rationality which makes a discourse, a 
cultural product, a literature, a translation -  in short a work -  accessible to thought. Thus, to 
know the conditions of a work, according to Macherey, is not to reduce its production to 
merely the growth of a seed which contains itself all its future possibilities, a genesis which is
analysed in the second chapter of this thesis.
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the reverse image of analysis. Instead, to know the conditions of a work “is to define the real 
process of its constitution, to show how it is composed from a real diversity of elements which 
give it substance”; elements which are to be understood as the products of history, but not 
outcomes of historical “fatality”. For while the work does not come to being by chance, it 
does involve novelty; it is an act which mobilises the seemingly given situation which brought 
it into being. And it is this mobility, Macherey argues, which is inscribed in the very letter of a 
work, that makes it possible and from which the work emerges ( 19661; 1978: 49). The 
translation work is therefore constructed by demarcating its irreducible difference from the 
reality which conditions its very production (the difference between discourse and the social 
real) and by simultaneously mobilising, transforming, modifying, (re)conceptualising this 
reality. But more than this, the nature of this work is realised at the very moment it becomes 
the object of knowledge qua discourse -  and it is only in this capacity, which incorporates 
nothing different to it, that the whole historical truth of translation -  a truth that is irreducible 
to language -  can be reconstructed.
From this perspective, this thesis will initially discuss certain aspects of 
metatranslation discourses that developed in the context of modernity. These works, which 
were produced as much by translation theorists as by philosophers, will be found to have had a 
profound significance for the constitution of the ideals of autonomy, liberty and subjectivity 
that defined democratic thought during the nineteenth century. In this respect, the basic notion 
that emerged in these discourses and is of interest to my work is that of the knowing and 
producing subject in its relation to the worldly order. As will be argued, conceptions of 
translation articulated at the time a twofold and inherently ambiguous understanding of this 
notion; on the one hand, they asserted that both the social and the natural world are totally 
ordered for human beings, while on the other hand, they claimed that society and nature are 
constituted, transformed and transformable by autonomous human thought and action. This 
dual postulate identified knowledge with a process of deciphering and subsequently with 
representation of the world-order. It thus entailed a definition of man’s cognitive capacity as a 
form of transcription: a faithful translation of things into words which knows no obstacles, 
because human thought is taken to exist in harmony with the order of nature, since both of 
them are created along with a divine image and meaning of things. It followed that despite its 
declared autonomy, thought and knowledge were thereby conceived of as already subjected to 
an order that stood beyond themselves, and were rendered at once absolute and incapable of 
genuine self-criticism and judgement. Yet at the same time no philosophy or translation theory 
asserted the possibility of such an idealised, total translation without weakening its confidence
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with a doubt regarding the human potential to achieve this totality. Every endorsement of 
translatability, which claimed to have established a final image of the original and, in terms of 
philosophy, a final system of knowledge, was qualified before it was fully fashioned as an 
absolute, and regressed into partiality. By the same token, every certainty gave way to an 
infinite questioning of the rules that justified its validity. The moment human thought sought 
to represent the social and natural world in their immutable order, it was also obliged to avow 
that neither nature nor societies are totally determined for man, that they both emerge for us as 
the products of human, historical institution.
The tension between these convictions developed as a conceptual and simultaneously 
social and political construct. The supposition of autonomy and the concomitant subjection of 
thought to a given order developed in the context of institutional, social and political 
transformations to which this ambiguous discourse was intrinsically related. The principles 
that informed conceptions of translatability, and the broader issues of understanding and 
judgement they evoked, came to articulate the traits of a society in which individual freedom 
and sociocultural hierarchies prevail. What was then argued was that autonomous human 
cognition could only develop in the context of sociocultural divisions, which would 
presumably realise the natural destiny of human societies, the form of social organisation 
which is prescribed by nature, and should therefore be pursued by people. This hierarchical 
structure was nevertheless dissociated from a priori defined categories of individuals or 
groups that could be considered as co-substantial with authoritative or subordinate positions. 
Instead, what was claimed was the formal right of every individual to establish his social 
status by participating in a competition informed by equality of opportunity and the 
canonisation of individual freedom by a civil constitution.
These ideas entertained a multilayered relationship to the development of bourgeois 
societies and the institutions of liberal democracy by which these societies were politically 
organised. At a first level, metatranslation discourses emerged as articulations and 
simultaneously a means of naturalising the principles that defined their social context: a) a 
division of labour in a way that within a social unity each individual and group would occupy 
a specific position and function within the overall system of social production; b) the 
constitution of a framework of individual rights to property and contract, which entailed that a 
certain range of these activities were valued as higher than others and thus entitled certain 
individuals or groups engaged with them to a profit that was unavailable to others; and c) the 
development of an institutional and legal framework which facilitated a degree of social
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mobility of individuals without challenging the stability of the structures that sustained social 
hierarchies.
Yet at the same time, conceptions of translation also enunciated a critique of these 
principles, which was simultaneously a form of self-critique and self-questioning. Far from 
being continuous and internally coherent, their apparent claim that intellectual and political 
autonomy could only be realised in modem bourgeois societies was disrupted and challenged 
by the very words that were employed to sustain it. The stability of the discourse which 
presented hierarchies and endless competition as the essential feature of all forms of collective 
life was thereby rewritten as contingent and precarious. What is more, it was shown to be a 
product and a reinforcement of a social world within which autonomy is undermined by being 
formally actualised in the context of social inequality, while knowledge is treated more as a 
mode of investment and social empowerment and less as an intellectual and cultural 
enterprise. That is to say, the same translation discourses which evoked an indisputable 
connection between autonomous thought and the subjection to a hierarchical and competitive 
social order, also articulated a dispute for their words; a form of subtext which not only 
indicated the ideological nature of their claims, but also made possible the conception of 
alternatives to them.
It may then be illuminating to provide, at this point, a brief description of the way the 
concept of ‘ideology’ will be used in this analysis. A useful way of categorising conceptions 
of ideology has been suggested by John B. Thompson in his Studies in the Theory of Ideology, 
in which the author proposes a division between “neutral” and “critical” approaches of the 
concept. The former define ideology as a merely descriptive term -  that is to say, ideology 
denotes systems of thought, systems of belief, symbolic practices which pertain to social 
action or political projects. This means that there is no attempt to distinguish between the 
kinds of action ideology nourishes and animates; ideology is present in every social assertion, 
cultural product or political programme, no matter whether this is directed towards the 
preservation or transformation of a particular social order. On the contrary, for a ‘critical’ 
conception of ideology, the use of the term ‘ideology’ is essentially linked to the process of 
sustaining asymmetrical relations of power and domination (1984: 4) and while the distinction 
between ideological and non-ideological positions can be in this context a highly debatable 
issue, what is not disputed is the need for the maintenance of such a distinction, the 
preservation of a critical standpoint from which the social and political significance of 
discourse can be illuminated and criticised.
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A similar division between ‘neutral’ and ‘critical’ conceptions of ideology has been 
suggested by Baker as the fundamental distinction between those approaches to translation 
that are informed by critical linguistics and those based on cultural studies. As she points out, 
from the perspective of the former, ideology
is not necessarily a set of ideas that are false or politically undesirable. The definition of 
ideology here is more neutral and relates to the ways in which people order and justify their 
lives. Cultural studies, by contrast, tends to foreground the undesirable side of ideology in 
discourse and to suggest that it is deliberate and planned (1996: 16).
This foregrounding, Baker suggests, may give the misleading impression that a certain range 
of discourses -  including those of translation scholars -  are ideologically neutral; an 
implication that would be impossible to entertain from the perspective of critical linguistics 
“which sees all discourse, all commentary on the world or any aspect of it as a mediated 
version of the world and therefore not ideologically neutral or objective” (ibid.: 16).
While approaches to translation informed by cultural studies are not accurately 
described when identified with an uncritical condemnation of ‘planned’ and ‘undesirable’ 
discourses (and it is also questionable whether all applications of critical linguistics view 
ideology as neutral27), Baker’s former category of ideology as an all pervasive discourse is 
helpful in setting up a limit against which the concept can be defined for the purposes of my 
own argument. This limit is precisely posited by the supposition that all forms of socially 
constituted thought are effectively identical to ideology, the view of “language as ideology”, 
as Gunther Kress and Robert Hodge phrased it (1979); a thesis from which my use of the 
concept seeks to be clearly dissociated. To define ideology in these terms, namely as “the tacit 
assumptions, beliefs and value systems which are shared collectively by social groups” as 
Hatim and Mason suggest (1991:144), makes the important claim that all forms of thought 
and all linguistic articulations are embedded in particular social contexts and cannot be 
viewed as isolated from social determination and resonance. Yet at the same time it bestows 
on ideology so general and imprecise a meaning that the term ceases to be useful, not least 
because “any word which covers everything”, as Eagleton aptly points out, “loses its cutting 
edge and dwindles to an empty sound”. Not only is such definition unworkably broad, 
Eagleton suggests, but is also suspiciously oblivious of the ways specific historical discourses 
act to sustain processes of political power and relations of domination, which is precisely the 
significance of the term from a critical point of view (1991: 7, 28-30).
'  Basil Bernstein’s employment of linguistics in the analysis of socialisation processes and reproduction of social 
classes is an indicative example of a different approach to the concept. On the issue see especially Bernstein’s 
article "Social Class, Language and Socialisation’ in his Class, Codes and Control, vol. I. Theoretical Studies 
Towards a Sociology o f Language (1971: 170-189).
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What this position entails is not an analysis of ideology as the trait of historical 
objects, which may presumably be illuminated from the vantage point of the present. Instead, 
a critical approach to ideology necessitates, first and foremost, the development of a self­
reflexive vocabulary, which would seek to examine models of translation research in terms of 
their social constitution and implications: as products of a certain kind of society, but also as 
means of endorsing, questioning or challenging the modes by which this society is instituted. 
Surely such a critique of ideology cannot be reduced to theoretical contemplation alone, 
however reflexive this may be. Insofar as this contemplation is unable to alter the social 
conditions of its engendering, it cannot but develop as an integral part of them and as 
ultimately responsible for the ideological violence it seeks to unmask and criticise. Given this 
limit, the contemporary analysis of cultural products, and translations in particular, can at least 
employ the potential for self-reflexion constituted by the ambivalences of modem thought, in 
order to illuminate the historical roots of its own assumptions and hypotheses, consider their 
contribution to social reality and seek to advance a problematic that would make possible its 
self-critique and transformation.
An attempt to relate contemporary models for translation analysis to their historical 
context, and specifically the intellectual and political tradition of modernity, will be made in 
the second chapter of this thesis. It will thus be argued that the advent of modernity, both as a 
discourse and as a social reality, stands in a relation of tension and interdependence to these 
models. Our modes of defining culture as the broader context of translation practice, 
sociocultural structures as the origin of translation norms and the subject as the most 
immediate cause of translation choices draw upon an interpretive space, whose terms and 
limits can be traced back in modem thought and shown to carry with them the ambiguous 
connotations of their origin. The key issue that will be discussed in this chapter is the 
development and function of translation norms. This topic will be examined from two 
different theoretical angles: namely polysystem theory and those approaches to translation that 
emphasise the critical role of the subject in the development of translation production. The 
thread of my argument will be based on an attempt to read contemporary theories through 
concepts provided by modem discourses on translation, knowledge and history, thus 
employing the latter as a means of indicating the historical roots, potentials and limitations of 
the former. This analysis will set up a key term for my subsequent discussion of translations of 
‘democracy’: a conception of translation as a socially symbolic act:28 that is, a form of 
signification, a medium, which articulates, addresses and seeks to legitimise or question the
28 The term has been suggested by Jameson (1981).
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social conditions within which it is produced at a symbolic level (i.e. constituted by language 
or other semiotic systems); and also an act, that is, a constitutive element of the social world 
which is expressed and conceptualised through it.29
The rest of this thesis will seek to relate these considerations to the translations of 
ancient Greek conceptions of ‘democracy’ in nineteenth-century Britain. Hence the third 
chapter will discuss translations of ancient Greek texts as a relatively unified system of works, 
which was introduced into the British polysystem at a moment of crisis and acquired a 
dominant position within the hierarchical structure of this polysystem. This process, as will be 
argued, was not the outcome of a universalisable structural tendency of the polysystem, which 
was purely formal in nature, but the product of the concrete historical conditions of the target 
society, which had already been articulated in modem discourses on translation, and were 
further sustained by the actual translations of conceptions of democracy, such as those 
included in rewritings of Thucydides’ History, on which this chapter will focus. The latter not 
only posited the main logic by which the target polysystem developed -  that is, a conception 
of culture and society as ‘naturally’ structured by contestable hierarchies; they further made 
evident the historical roots of this logic in the establishment of Britain as a bourgeois society, 
the empowerment of the middle class within it, and the institution of precepts by which social 
divisions and relations were naturalised. As such, these translations will provide a means for 
reading them as social and ideological constructs.
The fourth chapter will focus on a constitutive aspect of conceptions of ‘democracy’, 
namely the autonomy of the subject as an individual and social agent. On the basis of 
translations of Plato’s Protagoras, it will be argued that nineteenth-century British thought 
developed a dual understanding of the notion of the subject, which stressed at once the 
subject’s right to freedom and autonomy and the necessity for its subjection to authorities that 
were external to it. This claim, which was sustained by a range of substantial transformations 
of Plato’s text, will make evident a further ambivalence in the historical status of the subject 
in the target society, within which the ideals of sovereignty and self-determination were 
complemented by a discourse which effectively cancelled autonomy by subjugating it to 
commercial necessities and laws, social hierarchies and state-power.
The fifth chapter will be based on translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, in 
order to discuss the relation of conceptions of democracy to the constitution of ethical 
appraisals and judgements. As will be argued, translations of the Ethics articulated the 
transition from a predominantly religious conception of the ‘good’, which held that the
29 On the dual meaning of Jameson’s conception of symbolic act which stresses both the imaginary and the
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meaning of ethics was given to human beings as a revealed order of things, to the constitution 
of a secularised morality, whose central concept was ‘duty’. The constitution of this discourse 
entailed the transformation of the code of ‘virtue ethics’ expressed in Aristotle’s text and its 
appropriation by an ‘ethics of duty’, which corresponded to and fulfilled the need of a 
commercial society to control self-interested behaviour and channel social conduct into those 
directions that would ensure the maintenance and reproduction of existing social structures 
and relations.
Finally, the sixth chapter of this thesis will examine the relation of democratic thought 
to the constitution of justice and laws, on the basis of translations of Sophocles’ Antigone. 
These works invite a double reading. On the one hand, they seem to have developed as 
endorsements of a dominant social discourse, which presented as interconnected human 
autonomy and subjection to authority, and was thus closely related to the ideological motifs 
that defined other translations from the classics. On the other hand, translations of Antigone 
enabled the enunciation of ideas that were incompatible both with these motifs and the social 
world that brought them into being. Instead, they voiced a discourse that was multivocal and 
self-critical, and brought to light as interrelated the ideological and utopian aspects of 
nineteenth-century liberal thought.
Taken as a whole, translations of the concept of democracy will be shown to have 
developed as a reaction to absolutist forms of politics and an endorsement of the liberal- 
democratic ideals that sustained the establishment of Britain as a modem bourgeois society. 
This means that translations, as will be argued, acted to legitimise a political system that was 
directly related to the historical advancement of industrial capitalism and the challenging of 
previous social structures and relations this enterprise entailed, by providing new social 
models to an ideologically confused audience, which still lacked a clear conception of its 
social and political identity. This move was realised by a process of transformation and 
manipulation of the source texts which related democracy to an abstract ideal of formal 
individual freedom and equality (employed as an equivalent of the Greek idea of citizenship) 
and defined democratic politics as a system of contestable social hierarchies that was 
presumed to establish a rational basis for the making of political decisions in a modem 
civilised society. This ostensibly consistent ideological discourse was, however, at the same 
time interrupted and fragmented by conceptual gaps, tensions and contradictions, which were 
inscribed in the translated texts and formed the precepts of a reaction to and critique of their 
historical context.
genuinely historical nature of cultural products see Homer 1998: 43-44.
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This thesis will be sustained by assuming a double mode of argumentation. On the one 
hand, I will employ theoretical viewpoints that were constituted by modem discourses on 
translation, knowledge and politics in order to view them as well as contemporary thought on 
translation as an object of study. This argumentative line will be predominantly engaged in the 
examination of theoretical concepts employed in translation research. On the other hand, my 
approach to these concepts will also seek to contextualise them, delineate their historical 
development and consider their relation to democratic thought. Finally, it will seek to appraise 
the usefulness of these concepts both as a means for approaching translations of democracy 
and for understanding, through this process, the historicity of methods by which contemporary 
translation research describes and constitutes its objects. Thus the conclusion of this study will 
turn from the nineteenth-century to the present context and seek to reflect on the repercussions 
of the modem thought on knowledge and politics for contemporary theorising. On the basis of 
concepts that derive from this tradition it will suggest that a critical approach to translation not 
merely necessitates a reflexive mode of theorising, but should further articulate a problematic 
that would contribute to theory’s own transcendence by its relation to political praxis.
C h a p t e r  1
1. Understanding ‘the Order of Things’: The Possibility of Translation as the
Possibility of Knowledge
In his letter on translation, written in 1530, Martin Luther (1483-1546) affirmed that he 
rendered the New Testament into German with faith: “I worked hard and faithfully on that 
translation” he wrote, and “I did it all to help my dear fellow Christians, and for the glory of 
the Man upstairs” (Robinson 1997: 88). This dual faith to the author of the source text and his 
contemporary audience was for Luther not merely the reason for his engagement with the 
enterprise of translation, but also the justification of his decision to adopt a specific translation 
method and render the original into the German vernacular. It was precisely his faith, he 
argued, which enabled the reconciliation of two mutually conflicting responsibilities of a 
Biblical translator: the writing of “the most exact possible rendering a man is able to provide” 
and the need to make the original accessible to those who were unable to gain access to it and 
therefore adapt translation “to the reader’s understanding”. The distance between these two 
poles, the source text and the target readership could be solved, Luther suggested, by a 
conscious turn to the target community and the employment of the language of the common 
people: “the mother in the house, the children on the streets, the common man in the market­
place”. Far from distorting the sacred meaning of the original, he stated, this language was the 
only means for the rewriting of God’s words as he would have uttered them had he been 
speaking in German (Lefevere 1977:7-8).
The novelty of Luther’s postulate did not consist in the attempt to reproduce the 
authority of divine meaning. The writing of the Septuagint30, St. Jerome’s (347-420) Vulgate 
or the numerous commentaries on the Scriptures are much older testimonies of a similar 
enterprise, which was followed by a series of non-European and (after the beginning of the 
fourteenth century) European translations of the Bible.31 Neither was the endorsement of 
undiminished faithfulness to divine speech a new idea in the Western tradition. Quite the 
contrary. Luther’s defence against the Catholic church ostensibly endorses the same belief in 
the source-text’s sacredness which guides his opponents to attack his translation, and declares 
a faith which, if not altogether identical, appears at least to comply with the conviction that the 
word of God is the ultimate source and justification of human meaning and existence. What
C o n c e p t io n s  o f  T r a n s l a t a b il it y  a n d  t h e  E m e r g e n c e  o f  t h e  M o d e r n  S u b je c t
30 The translation was made from the Hebrew Bible during the period from 275 to 100 BC in Alexandria.
On the history of Bible translations, see William Smalley’s Translation as Mission. Bible Translation in the 
Modern Missionary Movement (1991) and Bassnett 19801; 1991: 45-50.
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was however radical in his translation was the positioning of divine words in the context of 
spoken vernaculars and the subsequent recognition of every individual as the legitimate 
interpreter of their meaning.32 The writers of the Septuagint produced a translation which was 
assumed to reflect the uniqueness and authenticity of divine discourse, and therefore all of 
them wrote one and the same text, with no internal divisions or disagreements. What made the 
translations identical was not the skill of the translators, but the pre-existence of a unified and 
unifying spirit of God, who authorised their meaning. Once this unity disintegrated through 
the recognition of the original’s different vernacular renderings, a transcendent world-order 
could no longer maintain its sovereignty. The authority of a verbum Dei could be shared with 
and subsequently subjected to the secular sensibility of human subjects. Yet this opened path 
to the disenchantment of the world was not simply actualised as an act of autonomisation and 
emancipation. As Peter Dews has aptly put it, the collapse of belief in a cosmic order that 
guides human endeavour constituted, at the same time, a trauma of such magnitude that 
Western thought could only struggle to come to terms with it; and indeed, the shock waves of 
man’s disengagement from religious authority reverberated throughout philosophical thinking 
during the next centuries (1995: 1-2).
A century after Luther’s translation, in the period described by Foucault as the 
Classical era of Western thought,33 René Descartes (1596-1650) substituted the order of 
rational understanding for the hypostatisation of religious meaning: he had no doubt that 
reason could be the universal standard for the measuring and evaluation of the fallible human 
senses. Or, more accurately, he used ‘Doubt’ in order to resist both fallacious experience and 
scepticism, and advance to an objective, autonomous and verifiable conception of reality. His 
certainty exhibited little religious pretension.34 Yet it did exhibit a profound enchantment with
32 Hegel was one of the first thinkers who drew attention to the contribution of Luther’s religious and 
concomitantly political enterprise to the ideal of autonomous reflection and religious emancipation. As he 
emphasised in the Philosophy o f History, the Reformation transformed religious into reflective thought that was 
disengaged from subjection to ecclesiastic dogmas and marked the beginning of a period in which "the Spirit [is] 
conscious that is free inasmuch as it wills the True, the Eternal -  that which is in and for itself Universal" on the 
basis of a new “principle of subjectivity” ( 18401 ; 1956: 412,438; Cf. ibid. 412-457).
33 See chapters 1-7 ofThe Order o f  Things ( 19661 ; 1974: 3-216).
34 While Descartes’ references to ‘God’ in the Meditations ( 16411 ; 1986) and the Principles o f Philosophy 
( 16441 ; 1988) cannot be ignored, it seems that the concept of ‘God’ is employed in these works more as a 
principle which can verify human knowledge than as a means for setting up a transcendent realm of truth. From 
this point of view, Descartes’ argument that the ultimate guarantee of truth-claims is God’s immanent and perfect 
nature could also be read in a reverse order: it is because man can know, that he can also conceive and actualise 
divine standards of transcendence -  that is to say, it is man’s potential for knowledge which creates ‘God’ as the 
presupposition of knowledge's verification. Furthermore the actual historical conditions of the middle 
seventeenth-century must have played a significant role in Descartes’ attempt to prove the existence of God in 
philosophical terms. In a time when Galileo was condemned for lack of faith (1633) -  an event which made 
Descartes abandon his plans for the publication of The World -  one could not really avoid mentioning divinity in 
a philosophical argument (however secular this may have been in its presuppositions and orientation) without 
considering the real dangers at which his life was immediately put.
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Western rationality, which provided the philosophical foundation for a human equivalent of 
divine knowledge: a method for understanding through which truth-claims could be made 
reconcilable with the uncertainty bestowed on them by the lack of divine certainty and their 
subjection to doubt.
The key concepts around which this new knowledge developed, Foucault has 
suggested, were ‘order’ and ‘representation’, or more precisely, order in representation. While 
in the period that preceded ‘Classical thought’ (the term is Foucault’s), the Renaissance, the 
foundations of knowledge of Western culture were set up by the supposition of ‘resemblance’ 
-  a precept which entailed that the image of language could lead directly to the image of 
things, since the former was bestowed on the latter as a divine network of signs in need of 
deciphering35 -  Descartes’ philosophy crystallised the discourse of an age which began to lose 
the security of God-given significance and wonder how the sign is related to what is signified 
by it. An answer to this question was found in the idea of representation: the conviction that 
language can be used as a means for the rewriting of natural order, the categorisation of 
simple elements and their progressive combination and taxonomy. The sciences of the 
‘classical age’, Foucault argues, form a table, on which things are arranged into ordered and 
quantifiable patterns and networks. In this framework signs are no longer the divine imprint 
on things. They become a grid of representations, which measure and classify, and thus 
constitute all empirical forms of knowledge “as knowledge based upon identity and 
difference” (19661; 1974: 71-76).
This change did not, however, mean that ‘man’ took the place of an originating ‘God’ 
who creates nature. On the contrary, the aim of ‘representation’ was the discovery of a world 
that existed in itself and whose elements were made representable through proper naming and 
classification. The crucial presupposition of this postulate, Foucault holds, was that man’s 
capacity for understanding, human intellect and ultimately man himself stand in accordance 
with the universality of nature by being situated in language. From this perspective, what was 
named as ‘rational’ order of the mind acquired its immanent status by being considered as 
intimately connected to the order of nature. The main implication of this idea was that it 
precluded the problématisation of the process of ordering, it did not allow man to represent 
either himself, as the maker of representations, or language, as the medium which classifies, 
manipulates and provides the order of things. As Foucault puts it,
Classical language as the common discourse of representation and things, as the place within
which nature and human nature intersect, absolutely excludes anything that could be a
‘science of man’ (19661; 1974:311).
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This subjection of the intellect to an order that was external to it was conceived of, in 
this context, as the utter realisation of man’s freedom. As Descartes argues in the Meditations, 
truthful understanding is underwritten by its embeddedness in the freedom of the will, which 
is essentially identical in its human and divine manifestations35 6 and becomes actualised 
through the very attainment of true understanding and judgement. Free human will, Descartes 
holds, consists in the fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or 
denial, for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that we do not feel that we are 
determined by an external force for our decision. Yet in order to be free one does not have to 
be inclined both ways. Freedom consists in the making of the ‘right’ choice:
The more I incline in one direction -  either because I clearly understand that reasons of truth 
and goodness point that way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost 
thoughts -  the freer is my choice. Neither divine grace nor natural knowledge ever 
diminishes freedom; on the contrary they increase and strengthen it (16411; 1986: 40)
For if “there is no reason pushing me in one direction rather than another”, Descartes argues, 
what I experience is not freedom per se, but the “lowest grade of freedom” (ibid.: 40). This 
postulate seems to confirm Foucault’s description of the classical episteme. For if man’s (sic) 
self-realisation and discovery of truth are attainable by following an inclination that is 
bestowed on him by an immanent reason or a benevolent God, then man acquires both his 
identity and knowing potential through a subjection to an order that works through him, but is 
neither constituted by him nor is it directly accessible to him as an object of reflection and 
contemplation. Intellect is transcendent as surely as it is transparent.
Yet at the very moment Descartes argues for such an identity of ‘subjection’ and 
‘freedom’ he also asserts that the very existence of man qua thinking being, that is, an 
existence consisting of deliberation and capacity for choice, is essentially based on the 
impossibility of an all-pervasive knowledge of the truth and the good, and thus the 
impossibility of man’s total subjection to an order that stands beyond himself. As he argues in 
a remarkable passage, which brings us back to the centrality of ‘doubt’ in the constitution of 
truth: “if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to deliberate about 
the right judgement or choice” (ibid.: 40). But if deliberation and thought essentially stem 
from the impossibility of seeing clearly, are not man and man’s gaze to the world also defined 
by their antithesis to the immanence of a universal order, are they not qualified by their 
engendering within doubt? And if this is true, does not Descartes’ affirmation of the
35 See chapter 2 of The Order of Things (19661; 1974: 17-45).
16 As Descartes writes in the Fourth Meditation, "although God's will is incomparably greater than mine, both in 
virtue of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more firm and efficacious, and also in virtue of
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transparency of representation, the possibility of truthful world-transcriptions become 
transformed, questioned by the very significance of ‘doubt’ in a method for measuring human 
experience?
It then seems that the Cartesian conception of knowledge emerges as divided. On the 
one hand, knowing consists of a discourse which is able to reach and represent reality by 
arranging itself in a system that perfectly matches a universal order; a table at which man and 
the world exhibit their immanence. On the other hand, the certainty to which this attempt 
gives rise is broken by some rupture, as Foucault would put it, which anticipates a deeper 
change that is already under way: the potential of total representation is rooted in its 
impossibility; man can think and understand the world, on the condition that perfect 
understanding is inaccessible to him, that representation is already a possibly transforming 
transcription, a potentially unfaithful translation.
If this dual enunciation of representation is still vague in philosophical discourses, its 
presence becomes gradually pervasive in the writings of literary and translation theorists since 
the seventeenth century, in which the idea of man as a transcriber of nature is complemented 
by the first signs of an acute problematic concerning the means and accuracy of 
‘transcription’. During this period Descartes’ emphasis on inductive reasoning was mirrored, 
as Bassnett argues, by the preoccupation of literary critics to formulate rules and models of 
aesthetic production which took ‘imitation’ as the key to artistic creation. This precept did not 
quite mean that art was perceived as a merely imitative skill, the capacity to work along the 
lines of pre-existing models. On the contrary, art as imitation “was the ordering in a 
harmonious and elegant manner of Nature, the inborn ability” for artistic creation; an ability 
which “transcended definition and yet prescribed the finished form” (1980*; 1991: 58). This 
postulate entailed that the literary work followed models so long as these articulated the 
universal features of art, so long as they expressed an artistic capacity that stood in accordance 
with an immanent natural order. Thus, the logic that prescribed the idea of literary imitation 
was directly equivalent to the organisation of the classical episteme, as Foucault describes it: 
as for science understanding presupposed an accordance of the cognitive and the natural order, 
so for conceptions of literature man’s inherent artistic capacity found its full realisation when 
it formed itself along the lines of the harmony of nature. Art was authentic so long as it was 
produced along the lines of timeless models, and thus literary creation, precisely as the 
outcomes of scientific enquiry, became the point par excellence at which man and 
transcendence intersected.
its object, in that it ranges over a greater number of items, nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine
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At the same time, the complete subjection of the artistic faculty to a universal model 
was never conceived as absolute, never realised as fully compliant with an order of nature. As 
Cartesian philosophy took as its task the naming of a world that was perceived as standing 
outside man, but also created a space for self-questioning by relating thought to ‘Doubt’, so 
literary significance was indeed modelled along eternal lines, but was never actually seen as 
totally identical to them. On the contrary, it appeared to be discontinuous and contradictory, 
capable of achieving an immortality that was constantly displaced, that escaped from itself by 
the very steps that built its establishment. This move was most evidently manifested in the 
development of a problematic on literary translation and translatability from the middle of the 
seventeenth until the late eighteenth century.
The discourse on translation, and in particular literary translation, which emerged in 
England and France towards the middle of the seventeenth century37 entertained, according to 
Hermans, a complicated and paradoxical relation to the notion of imitation. For although the 
two processes had often been described in similar terms since the beginnings of the 
Renaissance, they rarely, if ever, merged completely. Translation was seen at the time as a 
particular and restricted form of imitation, whose very goal, the full reproduction of the source 
text, was defined as ultimately unattainable (1985b: 103). Or to put it in another way, 
imitation was the aim, the essential feature and -  paradoxically -  also the limit of the 
translation process.
In the period until the middle of the seventeenth century, translation was described as a 
means of “providing access, unlocking, uncovering, removing obstacles, bringing into view” 
the hidden treasure of the original (Hermans 1993: 98; 1985b). The effort was deemed as both 
impossible and privileged. It was deemed impossible as a full transfer of words and 
sentences,38 because the enigma of the world -  i.e. the ultimate object of imitation, if we 
follow Foucault’s analysis of Renaissance discourse -  did not lie in words, but in the way 
language can reveal the divine secret of things and bring to light the world’s hidden 
significance.39 Yet translation was also privileged as a means of uncovering this significance; 
so long as it extracted “the hidden treasure from the bowels of the earth”, as Thomas Sebillet 
wrote in 1548 (Hermans 1985b: 104), that is, so long as it managed to unearth an image of the 
real (that is, divine) meaning rather than the wording of the original. A good translation
when considered as will in the essential and strict sense" (16411; 1986: 40).
As Hermans points out, the changes that occurred in the discourse on translation at the time made possible the 
conception of ‘literary translation’ as a separate type, a distinctive category of translation (1993: 93)
Jacques Peletierdu Mans writes in 1545 about the “chimera of a total translation of Virgil, which would render 
the Latin word for word and sentence for sentence, while preserving all of the elegance of the original texts” and 
concludes that “it cannot be done” (Hermans 1985b: 104).
See chapter 2 of The Order o f Things (19661; 1974: 17-45).
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became thereby a means for deciphering this meaning through a topographical emulation of 
the source text -  an idea that becomes evident in the metaphoric description of the translator 
as the writer who follows another’s footsteps40 -  the reconstitution of the same image in 
space. For it was this topographical ordering of the text that was taken to reveal, by analogy, 
the order of things as a whole, as Foucault writes,41 and thus translation as spatial imitation 
became a locus at which the signs of the text and the signs of nature were mutually 
interchangeable, being as a totality the signs of their divine origin. It is particularly significant 
that in this framework translation theorists, as Hermans points out, felt at ease about dividing 
the form and substance, form and meaning, in short the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of language, by 
using a wide variety of metaphoric images such as garment and body, casket and jewel, husk 
and kernel and so on (1985b: 120). For the two parts of these oppositions are united by a third 
term, namely what Foucault describes as emulation or analogy of all substances, no matter 
whether they are manifested in the text or in nature. Since all entities presumably bear on them 
the mark of God’s unified meaning, they render the sign, their ‘outside’, into a path for the 
understanding of their divine inside. From this point of view translation confirms, up to this 
moment, the relation of texts and things as one of aemulatio (the term is Foucault’s), which 
reveals the hidden immobility and perfection of the universe as surely as it would constitute, 
in the next century, one of the fundamental forces that undermined both this relation and the 
certainties it promised.
The emergence of a discourse on a “new”, “libertine way of translating” in England 
towards the middle of the seventeenth century and its equivalent in France, described as 
“belles infidèles”,42 constitute a significant break in Western thought on translation as well as 
conceptions of understanding. This is not only because these theories endorsed the relative 
freedom of the translator instead of his servile submission to the source text, but because they 
introduced ‘freedom’ and ‘servitude’ into a discourse that presaged and in many ways 
anticipated a fully-fledged problematic on the cultural contingency and plurality of meaning, 
that would develop in more concrete forms only at the end of the eighteenth century. In a 
certain sense, the first step towards the formulation of this discourse was made during this 
period by a radical transformation of the relationship between translation and original as well 
as the relation of them, as texts, to worldly reality.
It can be illuminating to approach this change through the concepts Foucault uses for 
the description of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century episteme. As was briefly discussed,
40 On the use of the metaphor see Hermans 1985b: 108-109 and 1993.
On the Renaissance’s analogy between the topography of the image of the written sign and the signs ordered in 
nature see chapter 2 of The Order o/Things (1966 ; 1974:17-45)
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this period is marked, according to Foucault’s analysis, by the rupture of the relation of 
emulation among things manifested in signs, and the reconceptualisation of discourse as a 
form of intrinsically ordered ‘representation’. In this context both translation and original text 
take a similar position as attempts at recapturing and actualising ‘Nature’ in the ‘Spirit’ of the 
artistic work, and thus both are, in a certain sense, equal, in their role as rewritings, 
representations of a universal order. Yet so long as this order had also to appear in the 
organisation of language itself, the Renaissance separation between form and substance was 
abandoned, and language came to be seen as a complete and unified system, whose perfection 
was secured by nothing outside itself, no concealed force apart from its manifested internal 
harmony. By the same token, the object of translation was transformed and was taken to 
consist of both “formal and conceptual properties” of the source text (Hermans 1985b: 122). 
While this idea enabled the evocation of a ‘free’ mode of translating, which appears to subject 
itself more to an overarching ‘spirit’ the author and the translator could share (as intellects 
participating in the order of nature) than to the source text per se, the medium of translation, 
language, was also grasped as a locus of differences between original and rewritten texts, and 
thus indicated the multivocality and particularity of literary ‘spirit’ and perception.
In this context John Denham (1615-1669), as Bassnett points out, suggests a concept 
of translation “that sees translator and original writer as equals but operating in clearly 
differentiated social and temporal contexts” (19801; 1991: 59). For Denham the process of 
translation stood at one level beyond language and was a matter of grasping the spirit of 
artistic creation, while at a different level it was bound to linguistic constraints, since it was 
because of the transfer of the text from one language into another that this spirit was claimed 
to vanish. As Denham argued in the preface to The Destruction o f Troy (1656)
... it is not |the translator's] business alone to translate Language into Language, but Poesie 
into Poesie; and Poesie is of so subtile a spirit, that in pouring out of one Language into 
another, it will all evaporate; and if a new spirit be not added in the transfusion, there will 
remain nothing but a Caput mortuum ... (Steiner, T. R. 1975: 65).
A number of points are noticeable in this statement. Firstly, Denham distinguishes translation 
from emulation, the close adherence to the words of the original. Translation, it is argued, is 
not simply a matter of transcribing language into language, but poetry into poetry, art into art. 
It lies in expressing the spirit of poetic work, which appears at first irreducible either to the 
work itself or to linguistic boundaries. That is to say, the spirit of poetry is expressed through 
language, but is not situated in it, it is articulated by words, but not experienced through 
differentiated linguistic networks. As such the essence of poetry becomes a universal. Yet it is 42
42 On the issue see Hermans 1993:93; 1985b: 105; Bassnett 1981; 1990.
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only in the next sentence that Denham claims that this spirit would disappear by the rewriting 
of poetry in a different language and can only be revalorised by the addition of a new spirit in 
the translation. By this assertion literary meaning ceases to be a trait of ‘Nature’ and becomes 
an attribute of linguistic perspectives, it is recognised as universal and, at the same time, as 
embedded in the specificity of histories and cultures, which would subsequently become 
‘natures’ in the place of a unified ‘Natural order’.
A similar ambiguity gives rise to the description of translating as a transfusion of a 
work’s ‘spirit’; an idea which is found, according to Hermans, in a variety of metaphoric 
images that describe translation as a process of ‘metempsychosis’, ‘migration of the soul’, 
‘digestion’ and ‘engendering’ (1985b; 1993: 99ff). These metaphors are employed in order to 
assert the possibility of imitation as empathetic rewriting of the source text, while expressing, 
at the same time, an emerging awareness of the linguistic and cultural obstacles to this 
process. With the exception perhaps of the idea of ‘migration of the soul’, which may imply a 
process of transfer in which the rewritten core of the original remains intact, all of the other 
metaphors evoke a tension between the possibility of faithful rendering and the need to 
recreate the spirit of the source text in the new cultural context. Metempsychosis, to which d’ 
Ablancourt refers, is not the mere transfer of soul, but its dissociation from an old form of life 
and its containment in a different one through which the soul is engendered anew.4:1 Likewise, 
digestion and engendering evoke as much the absorption of the source-text’s spirit by the 
translator as a creative process mediated by her own language. The essence of a universal 
spirit of literature becomes thereby as visible as the manner of its differentiated historical 
engenderings. It is on these grounds that Abraham Cowley (1618-1667) would choose to 
focus on the “way and manner” of the source text writer in his translation theory and 
practice.44 His emphasis is not an attempt to reproduce merely the formal features of the 
source text, but to rearticulate the accordance of meaning and manner of the original in a new 
linguistic order that develops in the target context.
From the middle seventeenth until the late eighteenth century translation theorists are 
bound by a loyalty that resembles Luther’s dual faith in God and the target audience: their 
choices seek to follow at once a universal spirit -  whose very stability is proved by the 
possibility of translation -  and the particularised articulations of this spirit in different 
languages. In this sense the discourse on translation indicates, even at this stage, a limit to its 
contemporary conceptions of language as transparent to the world it is employed to describe
41 The three components of the word 'metempsychosis’, that is meta (after) en (in) and psychosis (the process of 
giving and engendering psyche) indicate precisely this meaning.
4 Cf. Steiner, T. R. 1975: 67; Bassnett 1980; 1991: 59-60; Hermans 1993: 102.
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and, subsequently, a fundamental rupture in a discourse that identifies understanding with the 
intellect’s capacity to subject itself to a natural order. For while translation theory endorses 
that discourse that unites man and eternity, it also begins to undermine it, to anticipate 
changes that would render immanent truths as precarious, multivocal and finite.
It is precisely this dual adherence to the universal and the contingent that becomes 
crystallised in the writings of a theorist who has been described as the founder of the outlines 
of English translation theory (Steiner, T. R. 1975: 1), namely John Dryden (1631-1700).45 
Dryden described the translator as a portrait-painter, thus evoking a categorisation of 
translation as a “mimetic art” which draws “after the life” and should not transform life’s 
“features” in order to improve a picture (1900: 1: 242).46 He elaborated this metaphor in his 
preface to Sylvae, first published in 1685:
Translation is a kind of drawing after the life; where every one will acknowledge there is a 
double sort of likeness, a good one and a bad. 'Tis one thing to draw the outlines true, the 
features like, the proportions exact, the colouring itself perhaps tolerable; and another thing 
to make all these graceful, by the posture, the shadowings, and chiefly, by the spirit, which 
animates the whole (16851; 1987: 247).
Let us follow this passage carefully. Dryden does not merely say that translation resembles 
painting. He maintains that translation is a kind of drawing after the life. That is to say, while 
the model of translation-imitation is obviously the original, this object acquires a quality that 
transcends both the original and the translated text -  it becomes the ‘life’, the ‘spirit’ which 
animates the outlines, features and colouring of the picture. The object of translation is 
simultaneously transformed, it is not confined to the source text, but to the way this text 
makes manifest the spirit for artistic creation which stands in accordance with the grace and 
stability of nature. As Dryden puts it in the “Dedication to the Aeneis”, “nothing but Nature 
can give in good poetry a sincere pleasure. Where that is not ‘imitated’ ’tis grotesque 
painting” (1900: 2. 161). What is more, it is this spirit which actualises the order of ‘Nature’ 
that also constitutes the ideal subject of translation, rather than the translator himself, as a 
contingent intellect. As Dryden argues in the passage quoted above, the ultimate task of 
translation is not to copy the source text per se, but to restore its gracefulness by forming itself 
along the spirit that animated and gave grace to the original. The success of translation lies in
4' There are two book-length works on Dryden’s theory of translation written by Frost (1969) and Sloman (1985). 
On this issue see also the forthcoming edition of Stuart Gillespie John Dryden. Classicist, Translator. Dryden's 
thought on translation was developed in the prefaces to Ovid’s Epistles (1680), to Sylvae: or the Second Part of 
Poetical Miscellanies (1685), the dedication to his translation of the Aeneis (1697) and the preface to his 
translation of the Fables (1700). These texts are collected in Dryden (1900) and Walker (1987).
’ This idea becomes common for most Neoclassical translators whose art, as T. R. Steiner points out, like its 
sister arts of painting, sculpture and music, as well as poetry, was perceived as a kind of ‘mimesis’. Thus the act
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its ability to reflect the stability of ‘life’ on which both the translator and the author draw, by 
subjecting itself to the spirit of this life and thus confirming its universal nature.
Yet when Dryden seeks to set up the particular rules for this process, in his Preface to 
the translation Ovid’s Epistles (1680), the transcendence of a universal spirit becomes 
fragmented and differentiated. A translator is required to be a good poet, but also well versed 
in the different languages with which he is working. He must do his utmost to transfuse the 
general character of the original author, but nevertheless the nature of the translation 
ultimately depends on the audience for which it is intended (1900: 1.268-73); an audience 
whose difference from the original draws a limit on the intellect’s universality and 
transcendence.
2. Translatability: The Power and Finitude of the Modern Subject
So long as people believed in the transparency of the cogito and thereby the identity of a 
discourse of representation and of things, language, the medium of discursive ordering, could 
not become the object of scientific contemplation. And so long as this cogito defined its 
features as the gift of a transcendent power of which it was seen as part, man could not regard 
himself as the origin and maker of acts of cognition. Classical knowledge, as Foucault wrote, 
precluded anything that could be named as the ‘science of man’ (above). Yet towards the end 
of the eighteenth century, a number of changes, evidenced in the discourses of economics, 
natural history and biology, linguistics and philosophy, effected a radical transformation of 
existing perceptions of knowledge and raised the question “what is man?” as the central object 
and presupposition of human understanding. It is at this point in Western thought that one 
should trace, in Foucault’s view, the beginning of modem forms of understanding: an 
episteme which stemmed from the conception of man as the maker of worldly representations 
and at the same time the object of knowledge processes (19661; 1974: 312).
Two aspects of this transformation are of interest to our discussion. The first can be 
summarised in the conviction that the foundations of verifiable cognition were found to be the 
limits of ‘man’: the possibility of modem knowledge emerged, as Foucault has argued, by its 
dependence on an essentially negative conception: human finitude. The second is that this 
grounding of knowledge on man’s fundamental limitations asserted its positivity on the basis 
of an assumption of translatability, a belief in the universal communicability of truth-claims.
The most obvious representative of this change is found by Foucault in Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804), whose Critiques establish precisely the possibility of objective knowledge.
of translating was often called by them "imitating" or “copying from the life”, while translation was described as
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on the very condition that both the subject and the object of knowing remain fundamentally 
beyond man’s cognitive capacity. The Kantian / think, as George Canguilhem puts it, is 
actualised as a vehicle for the concepts of understanding, a light which ensures the 
intelligibility of experience, but comes from behind us, and we cannot turn around to face it. It 
is posited as an in-itself, without being able to grasp itself for-itself: “The I cannot know itself 
as Myself'. In the context of the modem episteme the transcendental subject of thought 
remains essentially an unknown (1994: 86). And so does the transcendental object of 
experience. Things-in-themselves put a limit on man’s ability to grasp them and thereby 
human intellect is confined to certainties offered to it within the world of ‘phenomena’. For 
this latter world, Kant maintains in the Critique o f Pure Reason,
is an island, enclosed by nature itself with unalterable limits. It is the land of truth -  
enchanting name! -  surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, 
where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of 
farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging 
him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion 
(17811; 1929: 257)
Modernity, according to Foucault’s reading, is epitomised in this startling Kantian image: in 
opposition to the creeds of the ‘Classical era’, for Kant the reality that surrounds human 
experience is opaque and remains essentially unattainable by us, but nevertheless renders truth 
knowable by enclosing it within man’s permanent limits. This is not merely to say that this 
reality remains unknown because of the finitude of the human condition, but, contrariwise, 
that this finitude sets up the possibility of truth, that man’s confinement becomes the location 
of all worldly meaning -  the land of truth. Thus ‘man’ emerges as the measure of all things 
not despite, but by virtue of his enslavement: his capacity to observe his limits converts them 
into a positive foundation of knowledge (19661; 1974: 312-318).
Let us briefly elaborate this point. The idea of finitude, in Foucault’s view, becomes in 
the late eighteenth-century the hallmark of human existence in all its forms. Man realises that 
he is dominated by work, life and language, that his being is realised and can only be reached 
through them: through his words, his body and the objects he constructs. It then seems that 
these forms possess so stable and positive a truth, that man’s intellect fades away absolutely 
against it, a truth that not only pre-exists man’s ephemeral being, but also pre-constitutes it in 
its totality. Now, the crucial trait that defines modem thought, Foucault suggests, is not the 
mere realisation of the fact that man is neither sovereign nor infinite, but a twisted logic 
through which the very limits of his being provide the grounds for the possibility of both
an "imitation", "copy”, “picture”, “likeness" (1975: 35).
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knowledge and self-constitution. For it seems that each of these positive forms in which man 
can understand himself, namely, language, artefacts and the human body, is given to him only 
against the background of his finitude, and thereby the latter becomes “that upon the basis of 
which it is possible for positivity to arise” (19661; 1974: 314). By this move, man’s 
understanding of his limitations, the realisation of his subjection to the laws of a history, an 
economics, a language and a biology which precede him, becomes the path through which he 
claims total lucidity and sovereignty. Knowledge is thereby constituted by an “analytic 
finitude”: an analytic “in which man’s being will be able to provide a foundation in their own 
positivity for all those forms that indicate to him that he is not infinite” (19661; 1974: 315). By 
the same token, total sovereignty emerges from the conviction that man’s limits, as Hubert 
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow explain, are not imposed upon him because of his intermediate 
place in the great table of beings, but are somehow decreed or imposed by man (1982: 29) 
precisely because his thought is capable of perceiving them qua limits. Thus in his 
confinement in the ‘land of truth’, man determines at once the laws of his being and the laws 
of nature through the understanding of himself as subjected to them. As Kant writes,
However exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that the understanding is itself the 
source of the laws of nature, and so of its formal unity, such an assertion is nonetheless 
correct, and is in keeping with the object to which it refers, namely, experience. Certainly, 
empirical laws, as such, can never derive their origin from pure understanding. ... But all 
empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding, under 
which, and according to the norm of which, they first become possible (17811; 1929: 148).
This postulate does not merely suggest that the truth of objects outside man’s perception are 
‘imaginary’ creations, whose existence in space and time is either doubtful or impossible to 
prove. Kant’s thesis is that while our understanding of empirical reality derives from 
consciousness, it is the empirically determined -  and thus limited and finite -  consciousness 
of our own existence which proves the existence of objects in space outside us (17811; 1929: 
244-45).
No doubt this transition from an ordering of representations to a conception of man’s 
intellectual capacities as constitutive of the world’s order was bound to erode its certainties by 
the same supposition that was evoked to establish them. So long as man regards his gaze 
towards things as the condition of the world’s existence as a conceivable object, while 
realising simultaneously that this gaze is entangled within positivities he neither controls nor 
masters, but which nevertheless determine the capacity of his seeing lucidly, then his thought 
is fundamentally attached to what exceeds it; it lies within and outside itself. Consciousness is 
bound to the ‘unthinkable’, to what stands outside its boundaries. The modem cogito, as
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Foucault maintains, is imbued with the necessity of thinking the unthought, it becomes 
grounded on the unattainable, which constitutes its very condition. This means that 
understanding no longer lies in the inborn ability of man to grasp and categorise external 
entities. The modem cogito is not so much “the discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless 
task constantly to be taken afresh”. In this form, the modem cogito must traverse, duplicate 
and reactivate the articulation of thought on everything which is not thought, yet which is 
nevertheless not foreign to thought, in the sense of an irreducible, an insuperable exteriority. 
Understanding is not a discovery of the given truths of thinking but “the constantly renewed 
interrogation as to how thought can reside elsewhere than here, and yet so very close to itself, 
how it can be in the forms of non-thinking” (19661; 1974: 324). Thought becomes 
transcendent as firmly as it becomes precarious and volatile, in need of perpetual self­
observation and self-criticism and under the constant threat of self-doubt.
Conceptions of translatability are evoked to play a dual role in this context. On the one 
hand, an ideal of translatability is the means of ensuring the transcendence of the concepts 
through which understanding is possible by demonstrating their universality. On the other 
hand, the same ideal calls into question its mode of engendering by indicating that the truth 
embodied in these concepts also resides elsewhere, that it can be revealed through them on the 
condition that it constantly eludes them. Let us follow this point by returning to Kant’s 
analysis of knowledge’s presuppositions and processes.
As is maintained in the Critique o f  Pure Reason, no representation stands in 
immediate relation to an object and thus no concept is ever related to an object immediately, 
but to some other representation of it. Thus if cognition is actualised through concepts, 
judgement is thereby “the mediated knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a 
representation of it”. Representations can relate to their objects in two ways, Kant writes: 
either the object alone makes the representation possible, in which case the representation 
does not form an a priori since it only pertains to a truth of appearances; or the representation 
alone must make the object possible, not in the sense that it produces its object in so far as 
existence is concerned, but in the sense that it functions as an “a priori determinant of the 
object”, that is, “if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to know 
anything as an object”. In this latter case all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily 
conform to the concepts of representation “because only as thus presupposing [such concepts] 
is anything possible as object of experience”. The crucial feature of these concepts, named as 
pure concepts or categories of understanding, is therefore that they universally and adequately 
constitute the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests, and which
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remain as the underlying grounds of this possibility when we abstract everything empirical 
from appearances. (17811; 1929:105, 125-126, 129-130). It follows that the forms of 
knowledge that derive from the employment of pure concepts of understanding are also 
universal, and therefore universally communicable and translatable. For it is precisely their 
total communicability that guarantees their objective accordance with the object. As Kant 
writes in the Critique o f Judgement,
Cognitions and judgements must be universally communicable. For otherwise we could not 
attribute to them a harmony with the object, but they would one and all be a merely 
subjective play of the presentational powers (1790*; 1987: 87-88).
Knowledge in this postulate extends beyond and is simultaneously based on the possibility of 
linguistic transfer. It extends beyond language and beyond a problematic on translatability, 
since the meaning of pure concepts forms the very basis by which the truth of cognitions and 
judgements can be established at a universal level, beyond their particularised linguistic 
articulations. Yet it is also fundamentally based on the possibility of translation, so long as the 
very existence of such a ‘beyond’ is grounded on a supposition of interlinguistic transfer, on 
the communicability of concepts which render experience possible in all forms of 
representation, in all languages.
No other postulate of Western theories of knowledge seems to confirm so directly 
Derrida’s position that Western metaphysics, the logos of our philosophical tradition, came to 
be conceived as transcendent by defining itself “as the fixation of a certain concept and project 
of translation”, by finding its origin in “a thesis of translatability”. For the fundamental 
presupposition of this logos, Derrida points out, has been that “truth or meaning”, which is 
what ultimately matters as knowledge, “is before or beyond language, [and so] it follows that 
it is translatable.” Meaning itself is then assumed to have a commanding role, and 
consequently “one must be able to fix its univocality or, in any case, to master its 
plurivocality”. Once this mastery is believed to be feasible, then translation, understood as 
“the transport of a semantic content into another signifying form, is possible”; and so is 
philosophy. There could be no philosophy, Derrida writes, in the sense of a discourse which 
makes a claim to truth, unless translation in this latter sense of the transport of semantic 
content is possible. From this point of view,
the thesis of [Western] philosophy is translatability in this common sense, that is, as the 
transfer of a meaning or a truth from one language to another without any essential harm 
being done (1982';1985: 120).
For it is only within the horizon of an absolutely pure, transparent and unequivocal 
translatability, Derrida suggests, that the notion of a transcendent, universally communicable
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signified that stands itself beyond linguistic particularities could be supposed to be the origin 
of philosophy. And it is only on this condition that philosophy could be viewed as the total 
and final articulation of such a beyond (ibid.; 1981: 20).
The status of this presumed signified or domain, as we learned from Foucault, stands 
close to the truth of our thought, but is never quite identified with it. Or to put it in another 
way, our truth can reach and transcribe it, while simultaneously delineating it as beyond any 
transcription and transfer, as the ‘unthinkable’ which underwrites all thought and sketches out 
its limitations. A similar point, it seems to me, is maintained by Derrida, in his description of 
translatability as “the thesis” of Western philosophy. In both The Ear o f the Other 
(19821; 1985) and “Des Tours de Babel” (1985) Derrida relates the supposition of 
translatability to the constitution of the “sacred” , the assumption of a “proper name”, which is 
supposed to occupy the origin of language, of belief, of truth. In the realm designated by this 
name, he states, understanding is both possible and impossible. Thus the name of Babel, the 
symbol of all tongues and meanings as well as the origin of linguistic diversity and translation 
signifies the city of God and the father of this city, while also meaning confusion. In this city, 
which is marked by “a patronym”, “a proper name”, “understanding is no longer possible” and 
at the same time it is actualised by referring back to its unique origin. The city of God, the 
realm of transcendence is thereby built through the construction and deconstruction of its 
borders, it is presumed to exist in virtue of the possibility and impossibility of translation 
(1985: 167-168).
It is this dual condition, the ambiguity of translation that establishes the glory and 
limits of the Kantian cogito. The power of the knowing subject, its authority, its capacity to 
constitute the sacred in a world that escapes from divine significance, occurs by surrendering 
its discourse to translation: an act which ensures the communicability of concepts of pure 
understanding in all mother tongues and renders true cognition and judgement universal. As 
Derrida writes,
the sacred surrenders itself to translation, which devotes itself to the sacred. The sacred 
would be nothing without translation, and translation would not take place without the 
sacred; the one and the other are inseparable (1985: 204).
From this perspective, translation is not a mere transfer of meaning, but a promise of truth. It 
is a promise of adjoining languages like parts of a greater whole, in an attempt at appealing to 
a third one, “a language of the truth”;47 not to a language that is true in a trivial sense, 
adequate to some exterior content, but a true tongue, a language whose truth is self-referential
Derrida’s argument is developed as a reading of Walter Benjamin's essay “On the Task of the Translator" 
0923'; 1992)
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and requires nothing outside itself to authenticate it. A promise of truth as authenticity which 
belongs to a sacred original, but can only manifest itself in translation, in the multiplicity of 
human idioms (1985: 200).
Yet this is no more a victory than it is a defeat of the subject which pronounces its 
immanent position. For this ‘beyond’ which is assured and legitimised by translatability can 
only maintain its originating nature so long as it also resists transcription; so long as it is 
conceived as irrecoverable, unrepeatable, untouchable, genuinely unthought. This is precisely 
how the proper name Babel should be construed, Derrida points out: a name which evokes 
“the law imposed by the name of God who in one stroke commands and forbids you to 
translate by showing and hiding from you the limit”. The truth of transcendence, being the 
truth of an unthinkable origin is apparently beyond every linguistic transfer and every possible 
translation. It does not lie in the representational correspondence between the original and the 
translated text, but in a language which underlies all others in their total communicability, 
while being identified with none of them (1985: 204, 195-196). What this postulate entails is 
that no human discourse can grasp this ‘true tongue’ and yet its existence is manifested in the 
ability of the ‘languages of truth’ to transform themselves into one another, to exhibit their 
immanent origin by articulating it in varied cultural forms, by asserting a possibility of 
translation that stems from translation’s prohibition.
But what is the ‘unthinkable’ in this context? Of what does the ‘beyond’ of modem 
knowledge consist? And why did it develop this dual historical function as an affirmation and 
simultaneously a negation of thought’s affinity to truth? If the development of secular 
understanding in late eighteenth-century Europe assumed the position of a sovereign creator, 
if it realised itself as the origin and maker of a worldly order, why did it make such a move of 
liberation by also enslaving itself, by designating a domain that stands irrevocably beyond its 
potential for understanding and judgement? Why did an act of reflexive knowledge and 
emancipation have to establish itself, once more, in relation to an overarching realm, a 
kingdom, as Derrida puts it, “that is never reached, touched, trodden by translation”; a 
kingdom that imposes on man a law that transcends him? (1985: 191).
Now it is true that there can be, and there have been, so many responses to these 
questions that my attempt at discussing them is far from seeking to exhaust possible answers. 
The hypothesis I shall aim to develop stems from an interest already anticipated, in a sense, 
and certainly felt as a dilemma by the modem tradition: how can women and men judge and 
choose when deprived of authoritative determinations of the true and the good? How can a 
disenchanted society deal with the tension between an essentially diversified vocabulary of
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knowledge and morality, a thought that pertains to the multiplicity of meanings -  exhibited in 
an exemplary way in the act of translation -  and the deeper and more stable tenets that are 
necessary in order to foster and sustain choice and judgement? And how did late eighteenth- 
century discourse contribute to the conditioning and implications of this dilemma? It is from 
this perspective that I shall seek to discuss, in the following pages, the preoccupation of 
Kantian thought with the universal translatability of knowledge-claims and subsequently the 
Romantic attempt to challenge this conviction, in relation to the ethical and social bearings of 
the discourse of the Enlightenment.
3. The Knowing and the Political Subject:
An Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View
For Kant ‘Enlightenment’ did not merely oppose an abstract evocation of intellectual 
blindness, but a very concrete condition of “immaturity” which prohibited men from using 
their capacity for autonomous understanding. As he argued in an article published in 1784 in 
Berliner Monatschrift,
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the 
inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is 
self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to 
use it without the guidance of another. The motto of the Enlightenment is therefore Sapere 
Aude\ Have courage to use your own understanding. (17841; 1991: 54).
By immaturity, as Foucault explains, Kant means “a certain state of our will that makes us 
accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for”. This 
supposition implies that Enlightenment must be understood as a process in which men 
participate as a collective (since no man has presumably the authority to prescribe to others 
the laws of understanding) and as individuals, by becoming engaged in an act of courage to be 
accomplished personally (19841; 1997: 305-306).
If Enlightenment necessitates the disengagement from authority and the employment 
of reason in the context of a collective enterprise it is because the full development of man’s 
capacity for understanding and judgement is for Kant realisable within a social context. As he 
argues in his essay “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”, also 
published in 1784,
(he highest purpose of Nature, which is the development of all the capacities which can be 
achieved by mankind, is attainable only in society, and more specifically in the society with 
the greatest freedom (1784*; 1998: 42).
Man, who is the only rational creature on earth, Kant writes, is destined to develop his distinct 
capacities, the use of reason, to their end (ibid.: 40). This purpose, however, is only attainable
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in society, and furthermore, in a particular form of society: that which ensures the greatest 
freedom of its members.
The crucial point not to be missed in this statement is that it is not simply man, as a 
subject in isolation, who can accomplish intellectual maturity, but man as a social being, man 
as a citizen. An enlightened mind is thereby attributed to individuals, but the constitution of 
this mind is only feasible in a society in which men develop their rational capacity, while none 
of them stands in a position to impose his knowledge or authority on others. From this point 
of view, the notion of citizenship, as Etienne Balibar has argued, seems to play an irreducible 
role in the modem equation of the knowing, enlightened subject with the universal essence of 
man. For this equation has never been autonomous and complete in itself, but has always 
relied on a different term, an essential mediation between the other two, namely the citizen. 
Thus “citizenship”, according to Balibar, “is not one among other attributes of subjectivity, on 
the contrary: it is subjectivity, that form of subjectivity that would no longer be identical with 
subjection for anyone” (1994: 7, 12).
The features of this society in which men as citizens can develop their potential, refine 
their taste and perfect their knowledge is for Kant one dictated by ‘Nature’. These features 
have therefore a transcendent value. They do not pertain to the laws of a specific state, 
community or group, but are the universal laws people are destined to follow because of their 
natural disposition. Thus an appeal to the concept of universality appears twice in the title of 
Kant’s essay: he calls for a universal history, that is, a history that demands the unification of 
all people in the context of a community, and he anticipates that this community will be 
guided by the rules of a cosmopolitan point of view, the principles of a universal law. These 
two conditions stand by and sustain each other; they emerge inseparable as the highest 
purpose of ‘Nature’ for humankind, which lies, according to Kant, as the presupposition of all 
other human goals.
A “cosmopolitan point of view”, as Derrida has suggested, is in this context equivalent 
to a philosophical approach to history, to a transcendent law of philosophy that presumably 
guides or should guide human historical endeavour. What Kant proposes is that it is 
philosophy, as an inter-cultural, inter-national, universally translatable discourse which 
articulates the natural plan aiming at the total, perfect political unity of the human species. 
From this perspective, Kant claims that whoever might have any doubts about either such a 
unification or, above all, about the aims of ‘Nature’ for the humankind, would have no reason 
to subscribe even to the fact of sharing a philosophical problematic, a universal or 
universalisable philosophy (1994: 8-9). This is precisely the point put forward by Kant
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through an important distinction between the truth of a cosmopolitan perspective, namely the 
immanent truth of philosophy, and the imaginary view of history produced by Roman, fiction. 
“It may appear strange and silly”, Kant says, “to wish to write a history in accordance with an 
Idea” as to how the development of the world must be “if it is to lead to certain rational ends”. 
For it seems that
with such an Idea only a romance (Roman) could be written. Nevertheless, if one may 
assume that Nature, even in the play of human freedom, works not without plan or purpose, 
this Idea could still be of use. Even if we are too blind to see the secret mechanism of its 
workings, this Idea may still serve as a guiding thread for presenting as a system, at least in 
broad outlines, what would otherwise be a planless conglomeration of human actions (17841;
1998: 46).
This statement recapitulates a fundamental precept of modem thought: that human knowledge 
becomes universal so long as it subjects itself to a higher condition, a plan of Nature, which is 
itself beyond questioning and beyond contemplation, but nevertheless produces man’s 
capacity for rational and autonomous thinking. The truth of the ‘Idea’ which leads to an 
enlightened society, a “society with the greatest freedom”, begins with a denial of freedom, 
the unreflective acceptance of that very plan or purpose which is presumably the natural end 
of every social being and every community.
But what does this philosophical ‘Idea’ consist of? As Kant suggests, the guiding 
thread that reveals the secret mechanism of Nature’s working “starts with Greek history, 
through which every older or contemporaneous history has been handed down”; it continues 
with “the influence of Greek history on the construction and misconstruction of the Roman 
state”; “the Roman influence on the barbarians"; the “episodes from the national histories of 
other peoples insofar as they are known from the history of the enlightened nations”. It ends 
with “the civic constitutions and their laws”. This line, which is a line of progress, provides us 
with the fundamental “Idea”, by means of which a historiography can illuminate the reality of 
the past and the present as part of a system of interrelated events which lead towards a 
predetermined end: a cosmopolitan society in which citizens live in accordance with a 
philosophical, universal point of view (ibid.: 46). It seems then that in this inevitable course 
of history, Greco-Roman Europe, philosophy and Western history are the fundamental driving 
force, as if nature, as Derrida points out, in its rational ruse, had assigned Europe among all 
communities its very special mission:
not only that of founding history as such, and first of all as science, not only that of founding 
philosophy as such, and first of all as science, but also the mission of founding a rational 
philosophical (non-novel-like) history and that of ‘legislating some day’ for all other 
continents (1994: 12-13).
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A future vision for the true purpose of history, ultimately merges with the present: man’s 
purpose becomes identified with the tradition and the social life of a civil citizen of the late 
eighteenth-century.
An imperialist, Eurocentric move? Certainly not one that avoids the appropriation of 
all historical traditions under the name and the development of a European one. The Kantian 
‘Idea’, which was so carefully sustained as the language that speaks throughout cultures, as 
the tongue which embodies truth, becomes a law that is neither as transcendent nor as 
removed from historical reality as it may have appeared to be at first. The society Kant 
prescribes as the land of truth seems to be deeply rooted in its historical present. Thus, despite 
all appeals to a cosmopolitan perspective, the attainment of universalisable cognitions and 
judgements posits as its absolute presupposition a concrete historical reality, that is, a civic 
constitution. As Kant writes,
A perfectly just civic constitution, is the highest problem Nature assigns to the human race; 
for Nature can achieve her other purposes for mankind only upon the solution and 
completion of this assignment (17841; 1998: 42).
By this assumption philosophy, a philosophy which comes into being as the realisation of a 
perfect intercultural translation, becomes the precondition of a specific form of politics, while 
at the same time a particular political society becomes the foundation of philosophical 
thinking. What is more, this philosophy and form of politics are given the ‘natural’ right to 
embrace all others and “force” the “human race” to renounce “purposeless savagery” in order 
“to enter into civic order in which [man’s] Capacities could be developed” (ibid.: 44).
What this prophetic thesis amounts to is an obvious cancellation of the Kantian 
position that enlightened thought is the trait of a society in which men -  each man as a social 
being -  have the greatest freedom to develop autonomous thought and judgement. Instead, the 
truth of reason prescribed by Nature is evoked to sustain the imposition of the Western self- 
consciousness on others as well as the originary subjection of this chosen philosophy to a 
hidden pattern -  and the idea of the ‘hidden’ is often repeated by Kant throughout the essay -  
contrived by a power that overcomes human thought absolutely. Without the supposition of 
the ‘secret’, the ‘untouchable’ origin of this plan, the end of history and the end of man seem 
incomprehensible. Once accepted, a civil order ostensibly loses its historical status and 
becomes at once an ideal and a natural condition of social institutions.
But why does Kant need to evoke so emphatically this secret source of power in a text 
which consciously fosters and promotes human autonomy and equality? What is the role of 
Nature’s providence in this imagined society which materialises the fundamental features of
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the classical Greek polis, which Kant considers to be the origin of civil history: the freedom 
and equality of the Athenian democracy?
The key which might lead to an answer to these questions is found by Derrida in a 
minor, but nevertheless significant point: Kant’s anxiety throughout the text to distinguish his 
philosophical view of history from an imaginative historiography, to reaffirm that his ‘Idea’ is 
neither a fiction nor a novel-like story; the eagerness to confirm that philosophy is above all 
not literature, not a body of fiction, but a Truth that is unitary and transcendent. For it seems 
that “the danger of literature, of the becoming literature of philosophy”, Derrida points out, “is 
so pressing and so present to Kant, that he names and rejects it several times”(1994: 10-11). 
Indeed, in the seventh thesis of Kant’s text it is argued that however “fantastical” 
(schwärmerisch) this ‘Idea’ may seem, “and it was laughed at as fantastical by the Abbé de St. 
Pierre48 and by Rousseau”,49 we are obliged to accept it as the true understanding of Nature’s 
hidden design. Likewise, in the ninth thesis Kant suggests that “a philosophical attempt to 
work out a universal history according to a natural plan directed to achieving the civic union 
of the human race must be regarded ... as contributing to this end of Nature” and as opposed 
to fiction, "Roman” (17841; 1998: 43-44, 46). This distinction is, in Derrida’s view, both 
crucial and revealing. For it is literature, or more accurately, some events in the body of texts 
that is called ‘literature’, which constantly undermine or displace the philosophically 
established opposition between the literary, fictional and the philosophical, the event that 
claims to pertain to a sole language, a language devoid of idioms and cultural particularities 
and is at one and the same time truly cosmopolitan and the language of truth (1994: 10-11; 
Adams, Behleretal. 1996: 18-19).
Yet literature, which Kant seeks to exclude from the universal ‘other’ of philosophy, 
Derrida suggests, is in fact precisely what philosophy, the ‘Idea’ of philosophy, has always 
been. For this philosophy has never been “the unfolding responsible for a unique originary 
assignation linked to a unique language or to the place of a sole people”. It did not have one 
sole, unitary, universalisable memory. Instead,
under its Greek name and in its European memory, it has always been bastard, hybrid,
grafted, multilinear and polyglot (1994: 15).
Equally hybrid and polyglot, equally multivocal has been the social reality Kant imagines as 
an embodiment of philosophical excellence. Thus what is said here about philosophy, Derrida
* Charles-Irénée Castel, Abbé de Saint Pierre (1658-1743) in his Projet de paix perpétuelle (Utrecht, 1713). 
Transi. H. H. Bellot, London, 1927.
In his Extrait du project de paix perpétuelle de M. I ’ Abbé de St. Pierre (1760). Transi. C. E. Vaughn, A 
Lasting Peace through the Federation o f Europe. London 1917. This information is provided by Kant’s 
translator of the essay.
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argues, “can just as well be said and for the same reasons of law and rights, and of 
democracy” (ibid: 15).
The opposition between a philosophical historiography, embodied in the ‘Idea’ for a 
universal history, and the Roman is crucial in Kant’s argument. For the very truth and validity 
of his ‘Idea’ does not claim any use of reason. It is rather sustained by evoking man’s ‘natural’ 
destiny -  an argument that cannot easily be designated as a rational one -  and by opposing 
itself to what is excluded by it: the Roman. But is it actually the literary discourse, that is, a 
category and form of writing, from which this universal ‘Idea’ has to guard itself? Roman did 
not merely mean literature in eighteenth-century German. The term, which was originally 
employed to name works written in the vernacular, as opposed to Latin,50 maintained up to 
that moment strong connotations of the idea of popular imaginative literature, and prose in 
particular.51 As Ernst Behler has suggested, when Kant says in this essay that he does not want 
to engage in a Roman, he is not referring to the highest type of literature. “Roman," “novel,” 
was rather equivalent to “romanesque” prose, something popular (Adams, Behler et al. 1996: 
19).
This notion of popular and low literature does not merely contradict a conception of 
‘Man’ as a subject of a universal discourse, but the Kantian supposition of this discourse as 
the product of men qua citizens, that is, men in a society of equality and autonomy. For while 
Kant assumed that a rational and enlightened mind is the natural trait of men, he also claimed 
that the potential for enlightened thought can only take place in a particular social context, in a 
universal civil society with a “perfect constitution” ensuring the freedom and equality of its 
members. Yet the opposition between the ‘popular’ and the ‘true’ creates an obvious 
imbalance in this argument. For it constitutes the ‘universal truth’ of reason on the grounds of 
a fundamental annihilation of the social conditions of equality from which reason was initially 
supposed to emerge. It says that knowledge pre-exists the society which was supposed to 
produce it. For how can one claim that truth is only bom in a social context of equality and 
that this truth should be based on an a priori opposition between the ‘popular’ -  that is, a non- 
philosophical, socially marked term -  and the ‘true’?
This moment of imbalance is not an infelicity, a mere slip of the tongue which can 
automatically and inconsequentially be excluded from the Kantian thesis. Or, to put it more 
accurately, this imbalance is significant precisely as a ‘slip of the tongue’, as a symptom
° The word ‘roman’, as J. A. Cuddon points out, is French in origin and first denoted a vernacular language as 
opposed to Latin. In the history of literature, ‘Roman’ referred to imaginative works in the vernacular, mainly 
epic writings, and by the sixteenth century it was applied to works in prose (19761; 1991: 802).
See also: Kluge's Etymologisches Worterbuch der deutschen Sprache (1995) and Etymologisches Worterbuch 
des Deutschen (1989) s.v. ‘Roman’.
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which, by analysing, can direct us to the historical reality which made necessary its 
appearance.52 My use of the term ‘symptom’ is based on this initial assumption. It 
presupposes that the antinomy in Kant’s thesis should be interpreted as part of the constitutive 
elements of the thesis itself, rather than as being accidentally related to it. What this means is 
that Kant’s occasional objection to the inter-subjective constitution of truth in a context of 
social equality and autonomy (which would have, otherwise, been the logical outcome of his 
argument) does not consist in a contingent inability to apply the postulate of ‘universal civil 
society’ to an isolated case (so that we could simply endorse his thesis on truthfulness after 
correcting this mistake), but is an indispensable element of his suggestion that such a society 
is the legitimate end of history and simultaneously the presupposition of an historiography 
which enunciates the ‘hidden’ purpose of ‘Nature’.
The issue raised by Derrida remains. Does this symptom reveal that the appeal to 
universality -  a dual universality of historiography and history -  is disrupted by a deeper and 
largely unconscious recognition: that the truth about history has not and cannot be embodied 
in a universal tongue, that human knowledge has always been ‘bastard’ and ‘polyglot’ 
(precisely as it appears in translation) and so has been the truth o f history, or at least the 
history of a society which would realise the ideals of freedom, equality, human rights and 
democracy? Does Kant acknowledge, by this persistent reference to the Roman, that 
philosophy is threatened by the truth of literature, a truth that is neither universal nor unitary, 
but necessarily contingent and multivocal? If the reading of the Roman as ‘popular literature’ 
is valid, and if one’s emphasis can reside on the ‘popular’ rather than the ‘literary’, then 
Roman becomes more a metonymy for a social condition and less for a textual form. In this 
sense, Roman evokes a range of distinctions of ‘taste’ -  between the ‘vulgar’ and the 
‘civilised’, the ‘non-authentic’ and the ‘authentic’, the ‘common’ and the ‘distinguished’, the 
‘unrefined’ and the ‘refined’ -  which are, as Pierre Bourdieu has argued, distinctions made by 
social subjects, whose position in the context of man-made classifications is expressed or 
betrayed by their act of distinguishing. From this point of view, talking about popular 
literature articulates and sustains a social division. It is an expression of ‘taste’ which 
classifies, as Bourdieu puts it, and “it classifies the classifiers” (19791; 1984: 6).
This social classification is not made by Kant as a direct proposition. It takes the form 
of a symptom. This means, in the terms of psychoanalytic criticism, that it betrays an attempt
52 A ‘symptom’, according to Freud, appears as the outcome of a (partly successful) attempt at ‘repression’, a 
process of “turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious” as well as removing from 
consciousness any causal relation between the ‘symptom’ itself and its point of origin. Yet while this connection 
is erased from the subject’s consciousness, it is possible, Freud has suggested, to "reconstitute a conscious 
translation of the repressed” through our interpretation of symptoms (19I6-171;!991, 19151; 1991:524,526).
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to forget and conceal, to erase from memory a traumatic experience which only resides in the 
unconscious.53 This is not, however to be understood as an individual, but as a collective, 
social and, in Jameson’s terms, a political unconscious (1981). The experience at stake is not a 
personal, but an historical and social experience: it derives from the very participation of the 
subject in history, defined here as a totality which includes the speaking subject and acts as the 
ground and the invisible cause of the subject’s thoughts and actions. What then is this 
repressed experience and knowledge which makes this sudden appearance in Kant’s text?
Let us attempt to respond to this question by returning to Kant’s description of the 
community which stands at the end of history. As it is argued in the fourth thesis, the 
organising precept of a civil and enlightened society is “antagonism ... so far as this is, in the 
end, the cause of a lawful order among men”. This is again an idea that is supposed to be 
prescribed by Nature. As Kant argues, Nature demands from man the constitution of a society 
in which there is mutual opposition among the members, together with the most exact 
definition of freedom and fixing of its limits so that it may be consistent with the freedom of 
others (17841; 1998: 42)
For while men need to associate with others and form societies, Kant suggests, they are also 
inclined by Nature to isolate themselves from others, because each man finds in himself at the 
same time the characteristic of wanting to have everything go according to his own wish. The 
unavoidable social opposition, the social war that emerges from this trait is for Kant a 
desirable one. For it is this opposition which awakens man’s powers and induces “the first 
true steps from barbarism to culture, which consists in the social worth of man”. If a society is 
devoid of those characteristics from which opposition springs, if every man was not 
“propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice to achieve a rank among his fellows 
whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw”, then all talents and all worth 
would remain hidden or unborn. It can thereby be inferred, according to Kant, that
men, good-natured as the sheep they herd, would hardly reach a higher worth than their 
beasts; they would not fill the empty place in creation by achieving their end, which is 
rational nature. Thanks be to Nature, then, for the incompatibility, for heartless competitive 
vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess and to rule! Without them, all the excellent natural 
capacities of humanity would forever sleep undeveloped (ibid.: 41-42).
53 The repressed origin of the symptom, Freud wrote, consists o f “constitutional dispositions ... [which] are after­
effects of experiences by ancestors in the past" and of a traumatic experience which the ‘subject’ seeks to erase 
from memory ( 1916-171;! 991: 542-543).
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Competition and hierarchy that derives from the power to possess and to rule not only become 
naturalised in this argument; they are posited as the foundation of human progress and the 
basis of a society that develops man’s capacities in accordance with ‘truth’ and ‘reason’.54
If this were the end of history, then the future Kant envisages was his present. Yet 
Kant did not intend to give an apology for the status quo of bourgeois societies and could not 
have accepted the identity of his Utopia and the modem commercial world of the late 
eighteenth-century Europe. He saw his present as a step towards the end, but not as the end 
itself of history. He, indeed, believed that “purposeless savagery held back the development of 
the capacity of our race” which was finally “forced ... to renounce this condition and to enter 
into civic order in which those capacities could be developed”. Yet this had not yet been 
realised, in his view, by bourgeois societies, which were as detrimental for human progress as 
were the “savage” ones. Thus he argues that the development of human capacities was also 
held back “by the barbaric freedom of established states”: “through wasting the powers of the 
commonwealths in armaments”; “through devastation brought on by war”; and by holding 
themselves in readiness for war. These conditions, Kant writes, do not lead mankind toward 
its end. They instead undermine and “stunt the full development of human nature” (ibid.: 44). 
It was Kant’s genius to see how his contemporary civilisation was less civilised, less cultured, 
less enlightened than he at first claimed it was. As he argued,
To a high degree we are, through art and science, cultured. We are civilized -  perhaps too 
much for our own good -  in all sorts of social grace and decorum. But to consider ourselves 
as having reached morality -  for that much is lacking. The ideal of morality belongs to 
culture; its use for some simulacrum of morality in the love of honor and outward decorum 
constitutes mere civilization (ibid.: 44).
Yet by the same move he criticised and rejected these social features, Kant, as was argued, 
also endorsed the constitutive traits of modem civilisation (‘competition’, ‘self-interest’, ‘lust 
for power’, the ‘desire to possess and to rule’) and saw in their realisation an ideal and 
enlightened future: the end of human nature and the universal end of history.
'4 Kant was far from being alone in seeing antagonism, lust for power, possession and distinction as the hallmark 
of civilisation and enlightenment. In the British context, a similar idea is developed by the representative of the 
Scottish Enlightenment Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), whose Essay o f the History o f Civil Society, written in 
1767, also sought to suggest that the freedom to possess and compete over the acquisition of property is the key 
for the distinction between “civilised" and "barbarous" cultures. “It must appear very evident”, Ferguson argues, 
“that property is a matter of progress", so long as it is acquired and distributed in the context of a civil order. For 
in this context property requires the acquisition of method for defining possession, the industry by which it is 
gained and improved, a habit of acting with a view to distant objects and suppressing present dispositions either 
to sloth or to enjoyment (17671; 1966: 82). Likewise, the Declaration des droits de I ’homme et du citoyen 
approved by the National Assembly of France five years after the publication of Kant’s essay (26.8.1789) would 
reassert his ideals: the identity of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’; the natural rights of ‘citizens’ to liberty and equality; and 
the right of men to compete for and secure by law their acquisition of property.
Conceptions of Translatability and the Emergence of the Modern Subject 72
What is repressed in this ambiguous thesis is the knowledge that these constitutive 
traits of modem civil societies are precisely those conditions that cancel the possibility of 
enlightenment, as Kant had envisaged it: a reality of universal citizenship in a society which 
produces truth on the grounds of equality and autonomy. The forgotten connection, which 
emerges in the form of a symptom, is that between Kant’s own words and his contemporary 
society; a society which has posited as natural a condition of social divisions and inequality, 
and has idealised power-relations and man’s desire to possess and to rule. Kant’s ideal of 
incessant competition was precisely the foundation of the social world he sought to criticise 
and reject as immoral and devoid of culture. The symptom of his attempt to forget this relation 
emerges through what Slavoj Zizek has described as a logic of sublimation: a process of 
shifting the location of social hierarchies from human relations to relations between ‘things’55 
-  in this case a philosophical discourse about history and the Roman. This is the point at 
which an experience of history which resides in the unconscious emerges as refracted and 
internally divided in the text: as an ideological attempt to conceal and a means of revealing a 
suppressed truth about and of history: that of the persistence of social hierarchies and lack of 
enlightenment in the context of civil-bourgeois societies.
The crucial point in this suggestion is that the ideological nature of this discourse, 
should not merely be seen as lying in a ‘concealment’ of the historical real. For civil societies 
are, in a sense, based on the ideals of ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘democracy’. The 
ideological function is inscribed in the specific historical meaning of these concepts, and the 
social relations and practices they act to sustain and naturalise. For these concepts, as Zizek 
argues, are defined in order to evoke a universality whose realisation necessarily includes a 
specific case which breaks their unity and lays bare their falsity. That is to say, the ideal of 
‘freedom’ is a universal notion comprising a number of species (such as freedom of speech, 
consciousness, commerce and so on), but also, by means of structural necessity, a specific 
kind of freedom, that of the worker to sell freely his own labour on the market, which is 
precisely the precondition for the loss of his freedom; that is, the real content of this free act of 
sale is the worker’s enslavement to capital. The same point can be argued with regard to the 
ideal of equal competition and equivalent exchange in the context of a free market. Its 
universalisation and generalisation is necessarily accompanied by the appearance of a 
paradoxical kind of commodity, namely the labour power, which becomes the negation of 
equality, the very form of exploitation, of appropriation of surplus-value. This breaking point, 
the moment of inconsistency, is then expressed as a social symptom, i.e. as a particular
For a further discussion of this issue see Ziiek’s work The Sublime Object o f Ideology, especially chapter 1
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element, which subverts its own universal foundation, a species subverting its own genus; a 
‘mistake’ at which the truth of social relations emerges ( 19891; 1994: 306-7).
From this perspective, this is also a moment of self-denial which is directly related to 
the ‘secretness’ of nature’s assumed design. For the ‘hidden’ plan of nature, the conception of 
thought as a positivity achieved in the present and a debt to a thought which lies elsewhere, 
entails an acknowledgement of the fact that within this social present it is not possible to 
conceive of the truth of history, to write a universal, philosophical historiography. Kant 
literally writes this when he introduces the nine theses of his essay by stating that
since men in their endeavors behave, on the whole, not just instinctively like the brutes, nor 
yet like rational citizens of the world according to some agreed-on plan, no history of man 
conceived according to a plan seems to be possible (17841; 1998: 40).
For the concepts and means for such historiography and history can only emerge, as Kant 
wrote, from a society of equality and freedom -  and modem bourgeois societies have 
established neither the former nor the latter.
4. Translation in Cultures:
‘Untranslatability’ as a Critique of ‘the Order of Things’
The year that Kant wrote his essay on history, Herder (1744-1803) began a work that was also 
concerned with the philosophical representation of history: the Reflections on the Philosophy 
of the History o f Mankind (1784-17911968). Herder’s problematic started with a 
supposition that the essence of man, as he had already argued in his “Essay on the Origin of 
Language”, lies in language, which was for him identical with the capacity for thought.56 It 
followed from the diversity of languages that human nature, as it is manifested in “social 
cultures”, must also be differentiated. Thus, each linguistic community, Herder argued, 
develops a particular worldview and cultural character that pertains to the community’s 
language and history, and constitutes a unique actualisation of man’s nature. Such a division 
of humankind by languages and cultures, which coincide with the limits of national 
communities, Herder suggested, is a natural condition, and any attempt to violate it by 
political expansion and cultural oppression is posited against the plan and purposes of nature. 
As he wrote,
(1989*; 1994: 11-54).
In Herder’s view, to talk about a pre-linguistic or an a-linguistic phase of the human species (an idea held by a 
number of his contemporary thinkers) is not merely a mistaken but a meaningless hypothesis. As he argued “Man, 
endowed with a mind -  a characteristic peculiar to himself alone -  has by his very first act of spontaneous 
reflection invented language" (17721; 1969: 135). For a further discussion of this issue see Breuilly 1982: 336ff.
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Since the whole human race is not one single homogeneous group it does not speak one and 
the same language. The formation of diverse natural languages, therefore is a natural 
corollary of human diversity (17721; 1969: 165).
The conception of ‘culture’ as a distinct expression of human nature effected a 
significant break with the Kantian notion of universal knowledge and society. In contrast to 
the idea that the history of humankind was a unified process, which led to the late eighteenth- 
century European civilisation, Herder, as Raymond Williams points out, spoke of “cultures in 
plural”: “the specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods, but also the 
specific and variable cultures of social and economic groups within a nation” (19761; 1988: 
89). This was a radical idea. In a context in which it was common to distinguish cultured (i.e. 
civilised) from uncultured nations, Herder, as F. M. Barnard suggests, insisted upon a 
conception of culture as a universal phenomenon. There is no such thing, he asserted, as a 
people devoid of culture (1969: 382).
What is more, Herder spoke of cultural variety from a point of view that was 
significantly distanced from the Kantian political vocabulary. While for Kant civilisation 
could not be dissociated from the society in which it develops and the grounds of the 
civilising process were located by him in civil society,57 Herder described the idea of culture 
as a kind of collective identity, which is formed through a community’s particular language 
and history, but has no sociopolitical significance. In other words, for Kant, participants in 
civilisation are individuals as social beings, as citizens. For Herder, participants in culture are 
individuals, whose sense of identity derives from their participation in a shared soul or 
character articulated in a group’s language. In this sense, Herder’s conception of “social 
cultures” also differed from his contemporary understandings of society as the outcome of 
social contract and agreement or as a stage of development that overcomes the human 
tendency for competition and antagonism. Herder explicitly opposed both Rousseau and 
Hobbes by describing cultures as the products of the natural unity of communities, which 
begin, in his view, as kinship groups and become tribes and then nations by extending their 
organic unity. “The laws of nature”, he argued, “are more effective than all political contracts.
'7 This was not only Kant’s position. The notion of civilisation was generally related to Western European civil 
societies during the seventeenth and especially eighteenth centuries. In England the term ‘civility’, as Raymond 
Williams points out, was often used during this period where we would now expect to find the term ‘civilisation’ 
(19761; 1988: 57-58). In the context of the Scottish Enlightenment, Ferguson, as has already been argued, related 
‘civilisation’ directly to the rules for the possession of property established in civil, commercial societies, and 
opposed this notion to the ’barbarism’ of nations which have not yet established such rules (17671; 1966: 74- 
107). Broadly speaking ‘civilisation’ according to Emile Benveniste, was coined at the time in order to describe 
the civil life and organisation of modern societies which enabled the development of the sciences and arts, and 
the cultivation of a mind and polite manner of behaviour and conduct that characterised, or at least was deemed 
to be appropriate for urbane middle and upper class relations. For a further discussion of this issue see
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Rousseau and others have written many paradoxes on the origin of and the right to private 
property” as the basis of social unity. Yet the roots of such a unity. Herder suggested, lie, in 
fact, in the unifying force of a mother-tongue and a shared culture (17721; 1969: 164-166). It 
followed that men are neither predisposed to compete with each other nor artificially brought 
together by agreement. “Man”, it was argued, is neither “a Hobbesian wolf nor a lone creature 
of the forest, as Rousseau would have it; for he has a communal language in which to 
communicate” (ibid.: 167). These assumptions gave rise to a crucial difference between 
Herder’s social insights and the views of a wide number of his contemporary thinkers, who 
described society as a condition that is external to individuals and imposes on them laws that 
limit and control, but never efface, their (assumed) desire for antagonism, competition and 
power. In contrast to Hobbes, Kant, Ferguson and, in a sense, Rousseau, Herder described 
culture as a unifying power, which brings a group together in a harmonious whole. Conflict, in 
his view, can develop among but not within cultures.58
The distance between Herder and the above thinkers was founded in their different 
conceptions of the relationship between the human subject and society or social culture 
respectively. From a perspective that describes antagonism as an essential feature of human 
nature, there exists a categorical difference between society, as an organised entity and the 
social subjects which belong to it. For in such a case, a society’s organising principle, as was 
discussed in relation to Kant’s essay, is found on a fundamentally inhuman category, that is, a 
constitution which cannot be considered as co-substantial with the thought and authority of a 
human being.59 This means that society can be maintained even if conflict exists among its 
members, so long as this conflict is regulated and limited by a political constitution. On the 
contrary, for Herder the idea of culture stands in direct analogy to his conception of the 
individual subject as unified, and is, in a certain sense, a categorical extension of it. As such, it 
entails a degree of integrity and unity which is much higher than that found in a sociopolitical 
organisation.
Benveniste’s Problems in General Linguistics, chapter 28, ‘“Civilisation. A Contribution to the History of the 
Word” (1971: 289-296).
Conflict and friction, as Herder argued, must be related to the differentiation of cultures and while they can 
intensify cultural differences, they are simultaneously forces which strengthen the unity of a tribe or nation 
(17721; 1969: 167-170).
As Kant argues in the sixth and seventh theses of his essay on history, every man who lives among others of his 
kind requires a master, for he certainly abuses his freedom with respect to other men. He thus requires a master 
who will limit his selfish animal impulses and force him to obey a will that is universally valid, under which each 
can be free. But if the master is a member of the human race, then the master is himself an animal, which would 
abuse public justice and freedom. He himself therefore needs another master. The solution to this problem, which 
can continue ad infinitum without any possibility of positing a master who is not a human being, is to be found in 
the establishment of "a perfect civic constitution" (17841; 1998: 43-44).
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In this sense, it seems that the notions of the unique and distinct character of culture 
are attributed by Herder first to individual human beings and then, as if by analogy, to cultural 
entities. Each man, as is argued in his Philosophy o f History, is a unique world, which is 
different to all others, and with whom no other man coincides. As he puts it:
No two leaves of any ‘one’ tree in nature are to be found perfectly alike; and still less do two 
human faces, or human frames, resemble each other. Of what endless variety is our artful 
structure susceptible! ... “No man,” says Haller, “is exactly similar to another in his internal 
structure: the courses of the nerves and blood vessels differ in millions and millions of cases 
...”. But if the eye of the anatomist can perceive this infinite variety, how much greater must 
that be, which dwells in the invisible powers of such an artful organization! So that every 
man is ultimately a world, in external appearance indeed similar to others, but internally an 
individual being, with whom no other coincides (1784-17911; 1968:3-4).
This concept of individuality as a unified and singular entity provides Herder with the 
prototype for the notion of cultural community. The logic behind his conception of ‘cultures 
in plural’ emphasises the internal unity of each culture as much as it differentiates among 
them. As every man is, by nature, a world that is distinguished from all others, but 
nevertheless a whole world, so every culture, according to Herder, is essentially unique, but 
the various constitutive elements of it exist as inseparable parts of an overarching entity. 
Culture represents a world which is, in a sense, equivalent to the world represented by each 
individual.
What is more, the traits and development of cultures are identical to those features of 
individuals which can only be posited in the private sphere of family and personal relations: 
cultures grow or decline naturally, they have “forefathers”, “fathers” and “mothers”, they 
communicate in a mother-tongue and they exist in a sphere which is separated from the realm 
of social and political relations.60 Cultures may of course be bom or die, as with people, but 
this can only happen as a result of processes of evolution or decline (precisely as a human 
body grows old). Yet neither cultural evolution nor cultural decline are the products of social 
conditions and relations. On the contrary, cultural evolution is, according to Herder, the direct 
product of the interrelation between individuals and cultures, while it can only be prohibited 
by political processes. In his view, the proper foundation of a sense of collective identity, as F. 
M. Barnard has argued, is not the acceptance of a common sovereign power -  be it a civil 
constitution or a governor -  but the sharing of a common culture (1969a: 7). Hence the 
various cultures provide the frame of mind, habits and language which form men’s distinct
60 Terms which pertain to the realm of family and personal relations or terms that indicate an organicist 
conception of cultures that ‘grow’, ‘mature’ and ‘die’ are consistently used in Herder’s descriptions of various 
cultures in both his Philosophy o f  the History o f Mankind (1784-17911; 1968) and the "Essay on the Origin of 
Language" (17721969).
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existence, but are also, in turn, shaped by the various individuals of a generation, whose use of 
their inherited language and thought-mode affects the development of a culture as a whole. 
Each historical cultural unit then constructs, in its language, a “specific home or family idiom” 
by which it is, in turn, defined (17721; 1969: 166).
It follows that the history of mankind does not culminate for Herder either in the civil 
states or in an undifferentiated cosmopolitan society in which a unique philosophy dominates. 
Instead, what nature prescribes, in his view, is the development of infinite variety upon the 
earth, in the context of which men and cultures must communicate with each other at an 
intercultural level and develop among them the bonds of a family -  each of them being a 
unique member of the same human species. Such an “inter-national transmission of social 
cultures”, as he maintained, “is the highest form of cultural development which nature has 
elected” (ibid.: 174).
Herder’s thought was not only directed against the political philosophy of his time. 
The idea of ‘culture’ was at the same time targeted against his contemporary European 
societies, which he criticised for having effaced their own cultures and for oppressing others, 
thus acting against the natural development of humankind. The main cause of this condition 
was found by Herder in the distinct traits of bourgeois societies: the development of 
commerce and industry, the incessant pursuit of profit and the establishment of alienating 
human relations in the civil sphere. What these conditions entailed, he argued, was that the 
integrity of European cultures disintegrated and was replaced by antagonistic relations, while 
Europe became engaged in an enterprise of oppression and exploitation of other cultures. 
From this perspective, Herder took the slave-trade as his main target, which he condemned in 
strong terms as the utmost violation of the laws of nature. The “African Negros”, he wrote, 
who are taken as slaves to the West Indies belong to their own unique culture which is not 
inferior to ours. “The Arab and the Chinese, the Turk and the Persian, the Christian and the 
Jew, the Negro and the Malay, the Japanese and the Gentoo” are different from each other, but 
nevertheless remain “completely men” with whom Europeans should “enter into fraternity” 
instead of oppressing them, murdering them or stealing them from their native countries 
(1784-17911; 1968: 6-7). But even in Europe, Herder argued, “slavery has been abolished 
because it has been actually established that slaves are far more costly and far less productive 
than free men” (17741; 1969: 209). European culture has not progressed according to the 
directions required by nature. Quite the contrary; when compared to the social culture of man 
in its earlier and natural stages of development, contemporary Europeans seem to act against 
nature. For the social culture of man in those earlier stages, it is maintained, “was
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characterised by creativeness and action rather than by acquisitiveness and the desire for 
private possessions.” Thus “pride in the former” constituted “a far greater point of honour 
than the distressing pride in property of latter and more spineless periods” (17721; 1969: 168). 
Today, Herder states, the only feature that defines the condition of Europe is a “system of 
trade”:
The magnitude and uniqueness of the enterprise is manifest! Three continents devastated and 
yet policed by us; we in turn are depopulated, emasculated and debauched as a result. Such 
is the happy nature of the exchange. Who does not have a hand in this grand European 
sponging enterprise? Who does not compete as a trader even o f his own children? The old 
name ‘shepherd’ has been changed into ‘monopolist’: ‘Mammon’ is the god we all serve!
(17741; 1969: 209, my italics).
In such a condition “national character is no more!”. It has been substituted for civil manners 
and civil society. Within them, it is argued, man has lost its soul and together with it the 
capacity for genuine human relations. “We love each and everyone, or rather, we can dispense 
with love; for we simply get on with one another being all equally polite, well mannered and 
even-tempered”. But more than this, what is lost by Europeans is the social unity created by 
the force of cultures. As is emphatically asserted by Herder:
We no longer have a fatherland or any kinship feelings; instead we are all philanthropic 
citizens of the world ... National cultures where are you? (ibid.: 209, my italics)
This understanding of cultures as an alternative to the establishment of bourgeois 
societies underwrote the entire Romantic response to the Enlightenment’s conceptions of 
knowledge, society and subjectivity. The belief that each culture constitutes a unique way of 
perceiving the world called into question at once the unity of the knowing subject and the 
universal translatability of true cognitions and judgements. What was at an earlier moment a 
unified network of signs, was perceived by Herder as an infinite number of different networks, 
none of which could serve as the place of a universal philosophy and a cosmopolitan history. 
Translation became thereby a problem, rather than a given, as Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834) suggested in his essay “On the Different Methods of Translating” (18131; 1977). 
What is more, it became a problem that was assumed to pertain to every aspect of social 
intercourse and intercultural communication. We not only translate the languages of nations 
that are far from our own, Schleiermacher wrote, but also the previous phases of our own 
language, the dialects of various groups within it, and the words of other individuals who have 
a frame of mind or feeling that is different to ours (ibid.: 68).
Yet the most privileged space for considering the problem of translation was, in 
Schleiermacher’s view, that of communication between different languages and cultures. In 
the context of this space, he argued, the translator can adopt two distinct and mutually
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antithetical methods for bridging the distance between the author of a work and the target 
readership:
Either the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as possible, and moves the reader 
towards him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves the author 
towards him (ibid.: 74).
In the first case, the translator seeks to replace for the reader the understanding of the original 
language that the reader does not have. He aims to communicate “the same image, the same 
impression he himself has gained” by his knowledge of the source language. By following this 
method, the translator seeks to move readers towards the author’s point of view “which is 
essentially foreign to them”. In the second case, the translator drags the author directly into the 
world of the readers and “transforms him into their equal”. The author is changed into a 
participant in the target culture (ibid.: 74). It follows that the first of these methods, which is 
the one Schleiermacher finally endorses, prioritises the recognition and promotion of cultural 
plurality, while the second tends to efface it.
But what does the notion of ‘translation’ mean in this context? Schleiermacher seems 
particularly concerned with delimiting the field to which these two methods pertain, which is 
that of “genuine” translation and excludes other forms of linguistic transfer. For, in his view, 
it is only the genuine translator who faces the problems posited by cultural disparity and lack 
of equivalence. Outside this field of translation, however, words and concepts are easily found 
to be equal in their meaning and value (ibid.: 74, 70). What then are the limits of “genuine 
translation”? At the beginning of the essay, Schleiermacher draws a significant division from 
which his whole argument on translatability derives: that between the translator and the 
interpreter. He thus suggests that when we think of the broader domain of translation, “we 
shall be able to distinguish two different fields ... interpreting and translation”:
The interpreter plies his trade in the field of commerce; the translator proper operates mainly 
in the fields of art and scholarship (ibid.: 68).
The interpreter is at perfect ease with his task, since in the world of commerce one is generally 
faced with “obvious objects, or at least with objects defined with the greatest possible 
precision”. Commercial transactions “have an arithmetical or a mathematical character” and 
therefore “number and measure help out everywhere”. Differences among languages are here 
“unimportant” and “translating in this field is ... a mechanical activity which anyone can 
perform ... and in which there is little distinction between better and worse as long as the 
obviously wrong is avoided”. This is far from being the case with genuine translation, the 
translation of products of “art and scholarship”. In this context, words in one language do not 
correspond to words in another, and each concept of the author is embedded in networks of
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relations which differ from those relations that define concepts in the target language. 
Translation therefore ceases to be a mechanical activity and becomes an “endlessly difficult 
and complex ... problem”. For in the domains of art and scholarship it is “thought, which is 
one with the word”, while in the domain of interpreting, it is “the thing of which the word is 
only a possibly arbitrary but fixed sign [that] dominates to a greater extent” (ibid.: 70-71).
The distinction is so critical -  and Schleiermacher explicitly says so (ibid.: 70) -  that it 
is consistently employed throughout his essay and seems to underlie every argument. But how 
are we to understand the terms translation and interpreting in this context? Obviously 
Schleiermacher does not merely talk about translation and interpreting in the way we would 
normally use the terms today. The essay itself ensures that such a reading is prevented. It 
emphasises that although the opposition drawn may be seen as arbitrary by those who take 
interpreting to mean what is done orally and translating what is written, one should 
nevertheless accept it as “conveniently tailored to fit the present need” of the writer to develop 
his argument. The logic behind it, Schleiermacher explains, is that “writing is appropriate to 
the fields of art and scholarship, because writing alone gives their work endurance”. 
Interpretation in these fields “would be as useless as it seems impossible”. On the other hand, 
for commerce “writing is but a mechanical means”, while “oral bargaining is the original form 
here, and all written interpreting should really be considered the notation of oral interpreting” 
(ibid.: 69).
It follows from this position that the distinction does not merely stand for oral and 
written forms of linguistic transfer. As the repository of scholarly and artistic creation, 
‘genuine translation’ pertains for Schleiermacher to the ‘authenticity’ of cultures, while 
interpreting becomes a metonymy for the language of civil society and the commercial 
relations that develop in it. What is therefore compared in this statement is more than two 
different forms of rewriting. Instead, Schleiermacher employs a notion of translation in order 
to illustrate an antithesis between culture, as a natural and historically diversified mode of 
knowledge, and what he perceives as the flat, universalised and unified thought-mode that 
characterises human life and relations in the context of modem bourgeois societies.
Progressively the opposition takes a more concrete form, which brings the individual 
subject of Romanticism to oppose at once the civil world of commerce and the quantifying 
form of reason which seems to be related to this world. Hence the nature of language that 
pertains to ‘translation proper’ is, according to Schleiermacher, “irrational”, precisely because 
words lack direct equivalence when they are used by different speakers. On the contrary, 
interpreting produces a language which corresponds directly to the objects, since it is
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dominated by these objects instead of constituting them (ibid.: 70-71, 73). The use of the term 
‘irrationality’ establishes a crucial point. By describing the language of ‘culture’ as 
‘irrational’, Schleiermacher does not only attack the employment of reason after Descartes as 
a means of transcription and measurement; he further relates this reason to modem societies 
and suggests that such a form of quantifying rationality can only articulate and sustain a world 
in which commerce and matter (“the thing”, as he writes) dominate thought. It is against this 
condition, which is at once an intellectual and a social one, that Schleiermacher posits the 
“irrationality” of language and the individuality of perception ensured in the context of 
cultures.
The distinction becomes clearer when Schleiermacher proposes a further opposition 
which demarcates the two fields: that between universalisable and individualistic modes of 
understanding, each of which pertains respectively to lower and higher modes of writing and 
translating. He suggests that although they appear in a written form, certain categories of 
translation do not belong to the field of translation proper, but seem to be closer to the act of 
interpreting (again using the term in a completely different way to its contemporary usage), 
due to the nature of the source text in question. As Schleiermacher puts it,
The less the author himself appears in the original, the more he has merely acted as the 
perceiving organ of an object, and the more he has adhered to the order of space and time, 
the more the translation depends upon simple interpreting (ibid.: 69).
Hence when one translates “newspaper articles” or “the common literature of travel” then, as a 
translator, one is so close to interpreting that “he risks becoming ridiculous when his work 
makes greater claims and one wants to be recognised as an artist”. This is not the case when 
the author’s distinct viewpoint is expressed in and dominates the writing of his work. As it is 
argued,
the more the author’s particular way of seeing and shaping has been dominant in the 
representation, the more he has followed some freely chosen order, or an order defined by 
his impression, the more his work is a part of the higher field of art -  and the translator, too, 
must then bring other powers and abilities to bear on his work and be familiar with his 
author and his author's language in another way than the interpreter is (ibid.: 69).
While all the above oppositions between ‘civil society’ and ‘culture’, ‘reason’ and 
‘irrationality’, ‘individual’ and ‘universal understanding’ appear to be politically neutral and 
to articulate only vague axiological appraisals, Schleiermacher gives a final description of the 
two terms in question, through which all of the others are, in retrospect, qualified. Genuine 
translation, he suggests, articulates a discourse of freedom and subjective autonomy, while 
interpreting pertains to a world which erases thought and oppresses the uniqueness and 
freedom of subjectivity. Let us follow this point. Schleiermacher acknowledges first that in
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the fields of arts and scholarship “every man is in the power of the language he speaks, and all 
his thinking is a product thereof”. Thinking cannot take place “outside the limits of language”. 
On the other hand, it is important not to forget, he argues, that “every freely thinking, mentally 
self-employed human being shapes his own language”. For this is precisely the way language 
develops and “grows from its first raw state to its more perfect elaboration in scholarship and 
art”. This means that it is “the living power of the individual which creates new forms in 
language” and therefore “each free and higher speech needs to be understood twice, once out 
of the spirit of language of whose elements it is composed” and once “out of the speaker’s 
emotions, as his action, as produced and explicable only out of his own being” (ibid.: 71, my 
italics). From this perspective, the work of the translator is located in a field that rises above 
interpreting. For this is precisely the space in which the freedom of the human mind can be 
realised and the spirit of the author together with the spirit of language can reach their full 
development. As Schleiermacher argues,
The translator rises more and more above the interpreter, until he reaches his proper field, 
namely those mental products of scholarship and art in which the free idiosyncratic 
combinatory powers o f the author and the spirit o f the language which is the repository of a 
system of observations and shades of moods are everything, in which the object no longer 
dominates in any way, but is dominated by thoughts and emotions, in which indeed, the 
object has become object only through speech and is present only in conjunction with 
speech (ibid.: 69-70).
Freedom, it is suggested, is realised as the domination of the cultural spirit over worldly 
matter, the priority of ideas over the objects they are employed to describe. What this 
statement entails is not only that the realm of culture is the space par excellence, within which 
subjects can attain a political ideal, freedom; it further asserts that this ideal is attainable in a 
sphere which is constructed as the direct opposition to the Kantian civil utopia. The spirit of 
language and individuals stands, for Schleiermacher, against the civil and the political world, 
over which culture, in his view, should dominate.
Despite its obvious idealism, Schleiermacher’s position should not be read as a mere 
evocation of a new kind of philosophical or literary thought, an ‘irrational’ mode of scholarly 
or artistic production that is called for in order to replace the Kantian one. The cultural spirit 
he evokes is, in fact, much closer to social life than Schleiermacher himself would be ready to 
acknowledge -  yet it is close to an aspect of this life that seems to be distinguished from the 
public sphere: family and personal relations. It is from this point of view that the spirit of art 
and scholarship is described by him as the product of a “father” and a “mother”. As he writes, 
“if the writer’s particular spirit is the mother of works belonging to scholarship and art in a 
higher sense, his national language is the father” (ibid.: 85). Against this world stands, in his
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view, the field of the market place and, united with this, the field of politics and the language 
of “courtiers and diplomats”. This latter discourse is not characterised by “the sacred 
seriousness of language”. Instead, the discourse of politicians, as Schleiermacher points out, is 
the product of the effacement of national cultures under the pervasive influence of the market 
place. This is not the discourse of translation, but that of interpreting:
as nations appear to mix in our time to a greater extent than they did before, the market-place 
is everywhere and these [the speeches of courtiers and diplomats] are conversations of the 
market-place, whether they are social or literary or political, and really do not belong in the 
translator’s domain, but rather in that of the interpreter (ibid.: 83-4).
This statement seems impressively alert to an historical process that was hardly visible in the 
early nineteenth century, but whose truth can easily be felt in today’s context of a global 
market, within which cultural traits remain only as a means for the promotion of commerce 
and better functioning of the market itself, rather than being the marks of a distinct and 
presumably genuine mode of a community’s life. Yet at the same time, this statement seems 
also impressively limited as a proposition of an alternative to the thought-mode and social 
experience of modem bourgeois societies. For so long as this alternative is dissociated from 
social life and takes place merely in the mind of individuals and abstractly defined cultural 
entities, it is bound to appear weak and fragile, unable to counter-balance the force of the 
market in shaping the civil relations and political organisation of the societies in which it 
dominates.
Schleiermacher’s alternative does not differ from Herder’s endorsement of cultural 
plurality. What becomes, however, clear through his essay is that the glorification of cultural 
difference endorsed by both writers can be read less as an individualistic and more as a social 
and political ideal. This position takes concrete form at the end of Schleiermacher’s essay on 
translation, when he concludes that the proper task of the translator is to introduce into his 
own language the various cultural voices of foreign authors while maintaining their 
foreignness; to transplant into this language “all the treasures of foreign arts and scholarship” 
so that the target language “can thrive in all its freshness and completely develop its own 
power ... through the most manysided contacts with what is foreign” (ibid.: 88). When 
Schleiermacher describes this process as the product of a specific and new kind of language 
that pertains only to translation (ibid.: 89) he does not only speak about translation; he 
proposes a social model which is identical to Herder’s conception of the end of history: a 
language in which an infinite number of individual and cultural viewpoints is collected and 
united into a great historical whole; and thereby a society which would be free from the ethics
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and politics of the market and in which different subjectivities would coexist harmoniously in 
a broader, family-like unity.
Yet, in contrast with Herder, Schleiermacher raises a final, but highly significant 
doubt over the power and effectiveness of this ideal. He asserts that up to that moment it 
seems that translation “has contributed more than a little” to the re-establishment of a stricter 
style, a genuine language and thought that were lost with the advent of the market. And while 
up to this point his argument rejects any form of political life and any conception of the 
knowing subjects as citizens, the essay ends with a wish for a “public life” in which free 
speech is attained by the orator and in which the translator does not disappear, but is, 
however, “less needed” for the realisation of human freedom:
If ever the time should come in which we have a public life out of which develops a 
sociability of greater merit and truer to language, and in which free space is gained for the 
talent of the orator, we shall be less in need of translation for the development of language.
If only that time might come before we have rounded with dignity the whole circle of 
difficulties in translation (ibid.: 89)
The orator is a figure that belongs to the public sphere. He does not have a space in the 
atomistic world presented by the Romantic ideas of ‘culture’ and ‘genuine translation’. His 
words only make sense in a society in which citizens can listen to opinions and freely 
deliberate on what is true or false, right or wrong from a position of equality. In such a society 
the individual subject, the subject as individual does not vanish. Yet the space for the 
articulation of cognition and judgement is constituted as a public space, as the realm of a 
society in which participants are not individuals, but equal and autonomous citizens.
C h a p t e r  2
Discourses on translation, as was suggested in the previous chapter, do not only talk about 
translation. They further establish a network of relations between a certain category of 
translation employed by the target community and the broader historical context within which 
this category is produced. From this perspective, descriptions and conceptions of translation 
establish their object by also talking about human history and the history of societies and 
cultures.
Contemporary methods for translation description do not constitute an exception to 
this condition. For even those studies which self-consciously focus on the micro-level of 
textual translation choices, rather than the macro-level of social and cultural relations61 are 
sustained by theoretical assumptions -  however implicit these may be -  that propose links 
between the two levels, which can, of course, include the suggestion of ‘zero’ relations, the 
hypothesis that translation is not affected by the historical conditions of its production. From 
this point of view, Toury’s most significant question as to “what are Descriptive Studies into 
Translation Likely to Yield apart from Isolated Descriptions?” (1991: 179) already contains an 
answer within itself: descriptive studies into translation yield a lot more than isolated 
descriptions, since they do not merely account for singular translation events, but unavoidably 
suggest ways of perceiving these events in their relation to social and cultural processes, a 
means for conceptualising and understanding translation as part of a history which includes at 
once past translators and present readers.
These relations, however, do not simply emerge from the results of empiricist 
research, although they do depend on our understanding of empirical historical data.62 For 
these data, which consist of translation and metatranslation discourses of a certain time, are 
neither straightforwardly perceptible as, say, a physical object may be considered to be, nor do 
they immediately indicate their relations to their context, since no text or semiotic unit is
61 On the distinction between the micro- and macro-level of translation analysis see Tymoczko 2000.
62 Although the terms ‘empirical’ and 'empiricism' are interconnected, they also need to be distinguished from 
each other. The term ‘empirical’ denotes an idea or concept that is derived from the senses, but not a method of 
understanding. On the other hand, ‘empiricism’ denotes the view and subsequently method of research, which 
holds that our knowledge is based on experience. The roots of empiricist philosophies are found in the 
assumption that all we can know about the world is what the world gives us. The significance of this assumption 
notwithstanding, one can distinguish many kinds of empiricism, not all of which have been equally extreme in 
their claims. A radical form of empiricism would assume that the mind is a tabula rasa on which information is 
imprinted by the senses. This thesis has been criticised as incoherent, since it supposes that the mind begins from 
a position of total isolation from the world, without being able to explain how it ever manages to escape from
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produced in such forms that would conveniently make evident the links between itself and the 
historical world of which it was part. Instead the historical meaning and function of translation 
has to be supposed and reconstituted on the basis of the various critical methods and 
hypotheses of the present, each of which, as Jameson suggests, may be grasped as an 
expression of a broader interpretive code in terms of which the cultural object, be it a text, an 
historical period or culture, is allegorically rewritten. The type of codes in question, as 
Jameson points out, have been, for example, diverse forms of language or communication in 
structuralism, desire in some areas of psychoanalytic criticism, anxiety and freedom in 
existentialist philosophies, temporality in phenomenology, conceptions of human identity in 
various types of poststructuralist, ethical or meta-ethical criticism and so on (19791; 1989: 
149).63
Interpretive codes and the critical methods they evoke are themselves historical 
constitutions. They develop as the articulation of the convictions, assumptions and interests of 
a certain time and do not have an immanent validity or significance. Equally contingent and 
historical are the images of translation and translation production that are constituted by them. 
For example the employment of the notion of ‘divinity’ as the power behind the writing of the 
Septuagint or the use of the idea of an omnipresent order as the force behind the shaping of 
both languages and the natural world, which were considered, as we saw, to provide sufficient 
explanations for the production of translation, were believed to constitute the sources of 
translation choices because they were in accordance with the broader convictions, cultural 
values, and social organisation and processes of their society and time. Likewise an 
understanding of translation as the product, say, of individual inspiration, socially determined 
norms, structural necessities, cultural values, ideological discourses and so on, constitute ways 
of rewriting translation history, whose very vocabulary and assumptions are also the products 
of an historical society, and of people or groups within it. It follows that codewords employed 
in translation theory, such as ‘norms’, ‘polysystem’, ‘structure’, ‘translator’, are also 
constituted categories, in the sense that these categories bear the marks of the broader
there. There is however a wide range of philosophical positions which can be described as empiricist and have 
taken more moderate positions (Honderich 1995 s.v. ‘empirical’ and ‘empiricism’).
The evocation of the notion of ‘code’ is not suggested as equivalent to the notion of ‘concept’. While 
interpretive codes are constituted by concepts, they are not reducible to them, as they evoke a relatively coherent 
totality of interrelated concepts and postulates, each part of which is consistent with and complementary of the 
others. This distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘code’ can be grasped when we think of the mutual exclusiveness 
of interpretive frameworks, the outer limits of which may not be articulated as absolutes, but nevertheless channel 
understanding within a paradigm into certain directions and prevent, for example, one from arguing at one and 
the same time that “translation is a norm governed activity" and that “translation is the product of unconnected 
and indeterminate individual choices”. In other words, codes stand metonymically for organised, relatively 
coherent networks of interpretive hypotheses in relation to which their significance and methodological function 
are determined.
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convictions and values of their particular time and context, which they also affect and 
transform in the process. It is from this point of view that I shall subsequently discuss the 
notion of translation norms as it has been employed by a range of contemporary research
models, examine the intellectual and historical relation of these models to modem discourses
*
on translation and knowledge, and finally appraise the significance of the notion of norms for 
the understanding of translation as a social phenomenon and a socially symbolic act.
1. Norms and Social Structures in the Context of Polysystem Theory
One of the most consequential hypotheses in historical translation research, namely the 
supposition of the relative autonomy of translation from the source text, has developed around 
the idea of ‘translation norms’. The concept of ‘norms’ was introduced into the field of 
Translation Studies by Toury with the intent of moving the focus of translation studies from 
the determination of the ideal hypothetical conditions, under which an original text could be 
perceived and faithfully reproduced by a translator, to the examination of the actual historical 
factors which shape translations within the context of the target sociocultural system. In his 
work In Search o f a Theory o f Translation Toury described norms as sociocultural constraints 
on the translator’s activity, which function as the “intermediating factor between the system of 
potential equivalence relationships and the actual performance, i.e. the reason for the 
functioning of certain relationships as translation equivalence”. Toury further located norms 
within a continuum limited by two extremes: “general, relatively absolute rules”, that is 
“(more) objective norms” and “pure idiosyncrasies”, in other words, “(more) subjective (or: 
less inter-subjective) norms” (1980:50-51).
There are two interrelated hypotheses in Toury’s position, which have deeply 
influenced the employment of the notion of norms in translation research. The first 
emphasises the distinctiveness of translation norms and by extension the relative integrity and 
specificity of the field or system of translation within the context of the target society. This 
fruitful idea, which derived both inspiration and methodological support from Even-Zohar’s 
polysystem theory, does not merely suggest that translations follow general linguistic and 
cultural patterns of the target community, that they simply manifest at least that minimum set 
of rules and conventions that would make any target text comprehensible in its historical 
context; it rather seeks to account for the specific set of norms that pertain to translation per 
se\ i.e. rules which are certainly related to, but are by no means reducible to the broader 
normative patterns on which the field of cultural, linguistic and literary production of the 
target community is based. As Toury has argued,
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there is no way that the norms governing translation in their totality (that is, the overall 
normative model a translation event is subject to) will be identical to the ones operating in 
any other field, be it even a closely related one. One may of course expect correlations, 
including partial overlaps but never full identity (1999: 22).
In other words, the concept of translation norms should not be understood as a mere repetition 
of the Saussurean conception of the normativity and conventionality of linguistic systems,64 
within which translation is constituted, or of the notion of norms as determinants of social 
action that have been suggested by sociologists65 or, finally, of twentieth-century attempts to 
describe literature and ‘literariness’ by reference to normative linguistic patterns.66 For while 
all of these normative systems are related to the writing of translations and could potentially 
be studied through an analysis of translated texts, they would obviously be more 
comprehensively illuminated by an investigation of a broader corpus of cultural and social 
products, which would be the object of linguistics, sociology and literary theory. What 
Toury’s statement suggests, however, is that despite partial overlaps and influences, 
translations cannot be adequately accounted for as merely one further manifestation of 
linguistic, literary or social behaviour that is ultimately indistinguishable from others, but that 
they constitute a specific field of cultural production, formed on the basis of models that are 
not reducible to other cultural units of the target society.
This suggestion should not be taken to indicate a diminishing of the socially 
determined character of norms. On the contrary, Toury has consistently sought to point out 
that norms cannot be understood as the outcomes of individual consciousness or even of the 
field of translation taken in isolation, but as the products of an organised society, which 
determines what is right or wrong, adequate or inadequate, permissible or forbidden in a 
certain behavioural dimension (1995: 54-55). ‘Translatorship’, as he explains,
amounts first and foremost to being able to play a social role, i.e., to fulfil a function allotted 
by a community -  to the activity, its practitioners and/or their products -  in a way which is
64 The normative order of language constitutes the basis of Saussure’s distinction between language (langue) and 
speech (parole). As has been argued in the Course in General Linguistics, when “taken in its totality, speech is 
manifold and anomalous ... Language, on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification. 
Once we give it first place among the facts of speech, we introduce a natural order into an assemblage that is 
amenable to no other classification” (19161; 1959: 25).
65 Toury himself uses the work of the American sociologist Jay Jackson in his argument. The notion of norms was 
initially employed as a heuristic tool in sociology by Talcott Parsons. In The Structure o f Social Action, first 
published in 1937, Parsons used the notion of norms in order to explain how the social environment limits and 
determines the choices and acts of social agents (1937*; 1949).
’ The work of Russian formalists, to which Toury's and Even-Zohar's thought is greatly indebted, constitutes the 
first attempt at studying the development of literariness in terms of compliance with and deviation from linguistic 
norms (Cf. Lemon and Reis 1965; Erlich 19551; 1980). The directions given by Russian formalism were further 
developed in the context of the Prague School, especially by Jan Mukallovsky’s work (19361; 1979). For a 
selection of works of the Prague School see Garvin 1964). For a general account of uses of the idea of norms in 
philosophy, literature and social theory see Hjort’s edition Rules and Conventions. Literature, Philosophy, Social 
Theory (1992).
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deemed appropriate in its own terms of reference. The acquisition of a set of norms for 
determining the suitability of that kind of behaviour, and for manoeuvring between all the 
factors which might constrain it, is therefore a prerequisite for becoming a translator within a 
cultural environment (1995: 53).
Norms are thus described as social products, which are “acquired by the individual during 
his/her socialization and always imply sanctions -  actual or potential, negative as well as 
positive” (1995: 54-55). There is, of course, a possibility that translators may not comply with 
existing norms, Toury suggests. Hence, while “under normal conditions” they would tend to 
follow normative models, as they would seek “to avoid negative sanctions on ‘improper’ 
behaviour as much as obtain the rewards which go with the proper one”, their choices are 
never totally bound, never fully constrained by a predetermined direction. Or, more accurately, 
despite the existence and actual force of normative directions, the translator, in Toury’s view, 
is always granted a “freedom of choice” among preconstituted alternatives, since “it is always 
the translator herself or himself as an autonomous individual, who decides how to behave, be 
that decision fully conscious or not” (1999: 19).67
This account of the way translation norms are learned and followed is completed by an 
attempt at explaining the constitution of norms as products of “agreements” among the 
members of a social group, which gradually transform themselves into “conventions” and 
“behavioural routines”. A number of these conventions, Toury argues, acquires, after some 
time, the status of ‘appropriate’ and ‘valuable’ behaviour, and acts as the basis for the 
constitution of norms, which are then formed “as the translation of general values or ideas 
shared by a group ... into performance instructions” (1999:13-14; Cf. 1980:51; 1995:55). The 
reason behind this evolutionary constitution of normative systems lies in the absolutely 
necessary role norms have in the construction of any conceivable social institution and any 
conceivable cultural unit. As Toury argues,
norms are the key concept and focal point in any attempt to account 
for the social relevance of activities, because their existence, and the wide range 
of situations they apply to (with the conformity this implies), are the main 
factors ensuring the establishment and retention of social order. This holds for 
cultures too, or for any of the systems constituting them, which are, after all, 
social institutions ipso facto (1995: 55; Cf. Toury 1980: 52).
Norms, it is maintained, are historical and social constructs, produced by the diversified 
agreements of people in the context of historical communities, but nevertheless their existence
67 Such deviations from normative models do not automatically invalidate norms (although they can, under 
certain conditions, create new ones) and cannot themselves be shown to challenge the hypothesis that translations 
follow socially determined rules, in the framework of which non-normative choices acquire their meaning and 
cultural function (Toury 1995: 55; Cf. Hermans 1991: 162).
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should be considered as necessary for any social community and culture. Thus, no theory 
which seeks to account for translation as a social and cultural phenomenon can afford to 
exclude the notion of norms from its theoretical vocabulary.
While norms constitute an essential feature of sociocultural systems, as has been 
claimed up to this point, their specific development depends on actual decisions of translators 
in the context of various historical societies. These decisions, according to Toury, should not 
be considered as directionless and haphazard, wholly dependent on the arbitrary and 
unforeseeable agreements of individuals. On the contrary, the key to the formation of 
translation canonicities is not to be found in isolated and seemingly random choices, but rather 
in the sets of interrelations of norms at a syntagmatic level of analysis, that is to say, the 
normative networks established in the context of the target sociocultural system. For 
translation, as Toury puts it, “is intrinsically mn/ft'-dimensional: the manifold phenomena it 
presents are tightly interwoven and do not allow for easy isolation, not even for methodical 
purposes”. Thus, however natural it may at first appear to perceive norms as particular 
instances of canonical translation behaviour, translation research “should never get stuck in 
the blind alley of the ‘paradigmatic’ phase, which would at best yield lists of ‘normemes’, or 
discrete norms”. It should rather proceed to a “syntagmatic phase” which entails “the 
integration of normemes pertaining to various problem areas” or domains within a “network 
of relations”, that would ultimately establish a normative structure or model within translation 
and sociocultural systems (1995: 66-67).
In order to examine the formation of these normative structures, in the context of 
Toury’s theory of norms, it is necessary to discuss the latter in relation to the concept of the 
literary and cultural polysystem. In the early seventies, Even-Zohar suggested a conception of 
literature -  and by extension of other cultural phenomena -  as an internally structured, 
heterogeneous and stratified whole, a “polysystem”, as he termed it, which is dichotomised 
into “canonised” and “non-canonised” sub-systems.68 The term ‘canonised’ was employed in 
order to define the systems considered as “major literature”, that is, “those kinds of literary 
works accepted by the ‘literary milieu’ and usually preserved by the community as part of its 
cultural heritage”. In contrast, non-canonised literature was taken to include “those kinds of 
literary works more often than not rejected by the literary milieu as lacking ‘aesthetic value’ 
and relatively quickly forgotten, e.g. detective-fiction, sentimental novels, westerns, 
pornographic literature etc.” A polysystem (of which the translation system is a constitutive
68 The multidimensional character of the system justifies, according to Even-Zohar, the descriptive accuracy of 
the term ‘polysystem’ (1978: 11).
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part69) is structured on the basis of “hierarchical relations” among the various (sub)systems. 
This means that some of these systems “maintain a more central position than others, or that 
some are primary, while others are secondary”. What is more, the relationship between 
primary (or central) and secondary (or peripheral) systems is, according to Even-Zohar, an 
“oppositional” one, a relation of conflict and “struggle”, through which the canonised systems 
can “succeed in gaining ground”, while the non-canonised ones become marginalized (1978: 
15-18).
The hierarchical and internally conflictual structure of polysystems is presented by 
Even-Zohar as an essential and simultaneously historically manifested trait of literatures and 
cultures. This means that while all polysystems are assumed to tend towards the development 
of this structure (for without this internal opposition literary production becomes “petrified” 
and literature loses its ‘literariness’), the classification into canonised and non-canonised 
systems is made, in his view, “on factual cultural grounds”. It stems from an attempt to 
describe how cultures develop and function in historical reality instead of evaluating whether 
such divisions are just or unjust by comparison to a “democratic cultural policy”; whether they 
would have been legitimate in an “ideal welfare state”, in the context of which no group or 
aspect of cultural production “would be discriminated against because of its peculiar taste”. 
On these grounds, Even-Zohar proposes that the oppositions between the various systems 
“create an ideal literary and cultural balance within the literary polysystem”. Hence he defines 
as “fully-fledged” those polysystems which have fully developed this hierarchical structure 
(e.g. Russian or English literatures in the nineteenth century), while naming as “defective” the 
polysystems which ‘lack’ for a certain period one of the fundamental elements of their 
structure (e.g. Hebrew literature, which consisted only of a canonised system, while the non- 
canonised one was either missing or fulfilled by other literatures) (ibid.: 16-17; cf. 1990:16).
This postulate justified Even-Zohar’s attempt at formulating a preliminary set of 
universal “laws of (cultural) interference” (1978: 39-53; 1990:58-72), which were further 
extended by Toury to the field of translation (1995: 259-279). The notion of universal laws of 
translation and cross-cultural interference was, I would suggest, the logical outcome of the 
supposition that a hierarchical and conflictual structure is an essential trait of polysystems, and 
therefore all ‘defective’ polysystems would manifest a tendency towards filling in gaps either 
by ‘original’ production or by processes of cultural import and transfer.70 Let us consider, for
69 On this issue see Even-Zohar (1978: 15).
From this point of view the notion of ‘laws’ of translation is considered to be an integral part of polysystem 
theory, rather than a postulate with which the model can dispense without being completely transformed. A 
diffeient approach to this issue has been suggested by Hermans, who has pointed out that the quest for laws along 
the lines presented by Toury is at odds with itself, as it implies that "all the variables relevant to translation ... as
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example, in order to elaborate this point, Even-Zohar’s suggestion that a source literature 
tends to be selected by the target culture on the grounds of its prestige or dominance. This 
‘law’ makes sense only on the grounds that in the context of ‘defective’ systems or minority 
cultures, as Even-Zohar argues, an ‘imported’ ‘prestigious’ or ‘dominant’ literature would 
function as the ‘higher’ or ‘canonised’ system within the target context (1978: 49-50; 
1990:66-69). Without the postulate that the target system would tend towards the development 
of a ‘fully-fledged’ structure, this law remains unjustifiable and ultimately incomprehensible. 
Likewise, Even-Zohar’s suggestion that interference occurs when a system is “in need of 
items unavailable within itself’ (1978: 50; 1990: 69) also presupposes a conception of a 
‘fully-fledged’ system against which the notion of cultural ‘need’ is defined. As Even-Zohar 
puts it, the selection of items for import “is done in accordance with the interests and structure 
of the target literature. Items are not mechanically transplanted from a SLt to a TLt, but 
‘needs’ determine and guide the selection” (1978: 51-52).
It is precisely this idea which also underwrites Even-Zohar’s thesis as regards the 
position of translation within the target polysystem. For translation, as he argues, would 
maintain a primary, innovatory role
a) when the polysystem has not yet been crystallized, that is to say, when a literature is 
“young," in the process of being established; b) when a literature is either “peripheral” or 
“weak,” or both; and c) when there are turning points, crises, or literary vacuums in a 
literature” (1978: 24).
The terms ‘weak’ and ‘peripheral’, as well as the notion of ‘literary vacuum’, stem 
theoretically from the conception of stratified polysystems, which indicates that the reasons 
behind the functioning of this law at a universal level lies in the presumably universal 
structure and function of polysystems, rather than the isolated and non-universalisable 
decisions of different translators or groups of the target culture. It is on these grounds that 
Toury, who endorses this hypothesis (1995: 272) maintains that translation research can 
ultimately “transcend the study of norms, which are always limited to one societal group at the 
time, and move on to the formulation of general laws of translation behaviour”, to the
well as the relations between them can be known” and hence “assumes either that translation is an immanent 
category, an experiential given, or that its historical and geographical diversity can be gathered and reduced to a 
common denominator.” Both of these assumptions, in Hermans’ view, contradict Toury’s own starting point that 
we take translation to be what is conceived as translation in different target cultures instead of reducing the 
multiple meanings of translation to a common denominator (1999: 92). The critique is valid as regards the 
descriptive claims of Toury’s thesis, but misplaced as regards Toury’s approach to the function of translation in 
the target historical context. Toury has adopted a descriptive approach to the category of translation, that is, the 
texts assumed to be translations in the context of the target culture, but not to the ‘function’ of translation within 
the target context. As far as the latter is concerned he has generally employed precepts which have been 
developed by polysystem theory (as for example the role of translation in ‘filling in gaps’ in the target culture) on 
the basis of which the notion of translation ‘laws’ does not entail a self-contradiction, but is instead justified.
On Defining Translation Norms: Translation as a Socially Symbolic Act 93
formation of a theoretical model that would offer the possibility of supplementing exhaustive 
descriptions and viable explanations with justifiable predictions, based on probabilistic 
universal laws of translation choices (1995: 69, 267).71
From this point of view, the issue at stake is not -  or at least not only -  whether one 
can legitimately posit the idea of universal laws of translation, since this idea is sustained by a 
much more fundamental assumption of polysystem theory: the essentially hierarchical and 
oppositional structure of polysystems. The question then at stake would rather be whether one 
could accept this concept of universally hierarchical structures as an a priori in order to 
employ it, subsequently, in the formulation of explanatory hypotheses on cultural transfer and 
interrelations. But on which grounds can such a claim be accepted or refuted?
Let us first exclude a response to this question that would attempt to criticise 
polysystem theory on the grounds of a strictly empiricist argument.72 The concept of systemic 
structures cannot and was not intended to be identified with a tangible object of translation 
and cultural analysis. Systems are neither visible nor identifiable, if one attempts a strictly 
empiricist description of cultural data, which cannot by themselves make present their mutual 
interrelations, structural divisions and conceptual integrity. Polysystems theory was in fact 
suggested, as Even-Zohar points out, as an alternative to “the positivistic collection of data, 
taken bona fide on empiricist grounds and analysed on the basis of their material substance 
It rather proposed the interpretation of these data on the basis of an hypothetical set of 
relations, which could allow “the detection of the laws governing the diversity and complexity 
of phenomena rather than the registration and classification of these phenomena” (1990:9). 
Hence an assumption, say, that translations in nineteenth-century Britain constituted a 
polysystem does not depend, theoretically, on the ‘existence’ of a concrete material entity that 
can be described as the referent of the concept of ‘polysystem’. This referent is certainly 
absent as an object in-itself, and yet its absence neither proves nor disproves the objectivity of 
our assumption, in the same way that if I throw an object from a certain height I would not be 
justified in thinking that the only forces that make it fall are the ones that correspond to 
perceptible realities, i.e. my act of throwing, my physical power and the mass of the object
71 The suggestion that the notion of ‘laws’ of translation cannot be dissociated from the basic hypotheses of 
polysystems theory can only serve to explain a number of the laws suggested by Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury, 
but not all of them, at least not straightforwardly. For example Toury’s hypothesis that in translation textual 
relations obtaining in the original tend to be modified in favour of (more) habitual options offered by target 
repertoires does not seem to be directly related to the main postulates of polysystem theory. Yet this hypothesis 
has not been developed in detail, and thus its theoretical basis as well as its relation to Toury’s norms-model 
seems to me unclear at this stage.
‘ Such a critique has been developed by Anthony Pym, who questions both the notion of translation norms and 
the notion of systems on the grounds that their use necessitates a leap of faith that cannot be sustained by the 
reality of historical cultures (1998: 110-124).
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itself, since a number of forces also exercised on a falling object -  such as the law of gravity -  
are by no means directly perceptible as visible referents.71 *3 What this example is intended to 
indicate is not only that notions of systemic integrity, structure or dynamics cannot be 
denounced by evoking an absence of concrete worldly referents, but also that such hypotheses 
can make intelligible historical realities which are otherwise unintelligible or invisible to us. 
For, as Even-Zohar has pointed out, “by hypothesizing a relation as an explanation for an 
object (an entity, a process etc.) relational thinking can arrive at assuming the “existence” of 
some phenomena which have not been recognized before” (1997: 15).
Yet these hypotheses do not themselves stand outside historical time. Precepts, 
assumptions and methods of analysis develop instead as contextualised conceptual categories; 
as the convictions and thought-modes of a certain social community and particular groups 
within it. As such, our convictions regarding the nature of cultures and the function of 
products within them are not so easily universalisable. If the very idea of culture and its 
immediate corollary, heterogeneity and cultural difference, only emerged as concepts in the 
late eighteenth-century, and if the notions of high and low cultures, sociocultural antagonism 
and cultural balance in the form of opposition became the ‘natural’ features of human life in 
the same context, one is led to doubt the necessity of these features for all historical and 
potential social formations. However persistent and firm their historical appearance may seem 
to be, either in the past or in the present, one is not justified in taking this appearance as a 
transhistorical one.
The fundamental position of polysystem theory makes an assumption that underwrote 
the self-consciousness of modernity and, as will be examined, the development of liberal 
democratic thought within it: that the society which pertains most directly to human nature is 
a society of unequals, within which antagonism enables ‘lower’ cultural forms -  and 
subsequently groups -  to take the position of ‘dominant’ ones and ‘dominant’ forms to be 
marginalized. From this perspective, the notion of ‘systemic structure’, as developed in 
polysystem theory, constructs a conception of literature, culture and society, which is as 
reminiscent of Kant’s and Herder’s description of historical communities, as it is consistent
71 Still, while one cannot define systems as clear-cut objects, one cannot accept them as a posteriori invented
categories, which only exist in the writings of historians and translation theorists. While hypothetical systemic 
structures cannot be directly observed in historical societies, their specific nature and function has to be inferred 
from actual evidence of the culture and life of these societies -  in our case, the translated texts. For while the 
unity of these objects draws on the concepts we use in order to think about them, historical data, including texts, 
do not so easily lend themselves to infinite and unrestricted readings, at least not without making visible signs of
interpretive violations of our object. To give a crude example, while one can conceive of an hypothetical 
community that does not make a distinction between translations and shopping lists (a possibility which would 
make us suspicious of a universalisation of this division), it seems harder to propose that shopping lists were an
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with the ideals of democratic society that emerged in Western Europe during the nineteenth- 
century. At this point of convergence lies at once the significance and the theoretical weakness 
of the polysystem model.
Let us briefly elaborate this issue. Even-Zohar suggests that hierarchies and 
antagonism must be considered as a necessary feature of all cultures, since a non-stratified 
society, a society which is devoid of internal tensions and struggle simply does not exist. As 
he argues,
the tensions between canonized and non-canonized culture are universal. They are present in 
every human culture, because a non-stratified human society simply does not exist, not even 
in Utopia. There is no un-stratified language upon earth, even if the dominant ideology 
governing the norms of the system does not allow for an explicit consideration of any other 
than the canonized data. The same holds true for the structure of society and everything 
involved in that complex phenomenon (1990: 16).
The significance of this thesis lies in its capacity to codify the principle and force under which 
modem societies formed themselves: the constitution of internal social hierarchies, which 
were steadily sustained, but also consistently threatened by tension and antagonism. Its 
weakness lies in its inability to disengage itself from these discourses, in the ease with which 
the universality of sociocultural inequality and the naturalness of opposition are repeated at a 
theoretical level as the traits and fate of humanity, rather than the products of a certain society 
and people.
When Kant posited an antagonistic social community as the end of history, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, he was as much the product as the codifier and the producer of a 
social world whose concepts and mode of organisation are not radically different from the 
structures of contemporary capitalist societies and the discourses evoked to nourish and 
sustain them. Likewise, Herder’s notion of culture and the conception of cultural difference 
and ‘untranslatability’ that derived from it, voiced concerns, relations and identities which 
have by now acquired a global significance, precisely because of the globalisation of a market- 
oriented society Herder sought to criticise from its very first steps. A political discourse on 
‘democracy’, which developed at the same time crystallised the social and political elements 
already inherent in these ideas. What this tradition established, as was argued in the first 
chapter, and remains to be discussed as far as conceptions of ‘democracy’ are concerned, is 
the postulate that cultures and societies are ‘naturally’ classified and ‘naturally’ in a condition 
of war, that women and men are destined to live in a balance formed by struggle, sociocultural 
inequality and power relations.
integral part of the system of translations in nineteenth-century Britain and also suggest a plausible reading of
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To endorse such an assumption and present it as an a priori does not only entail a 
refusal of its historical nature. It further forgets that this postulate was also undermined, called 
into question and gradually eroded by this tradition. The words which affirmed man’s 
subjection to such a hidden and inevitable plan of nature betrayed their human origin; 
hierarchical cultures, which pronounced their immanence also made evident their historical 
constitution; translations which manifested in their formation the signs of antagonism and 
nourished through their words the belief that non-stratified social worlds cannot exist, also 
cast doubt on the stability of hierarchical social systems; and finally translation norms which 
seemed to accord with and sustain the idea that cultures would tend to develop a stratified and 
conflictual structure, showed themselves to be the products of communities; the outcomes of 
human thinking and writing within a certain society and history, rather the manifestation of a 
universal model.
2. Discerning the Subject of Translation
How is it then possible to maintain the basic notions of polysystem theory as a valid 
conceptual ground for the description of modem cultures and societies -  in our case 
nineteenth-century Britain -  without losing sight of the human and historical origin of these 
normative models in question? The first move towards such an approach would entail the 
abandonment of the deterministic and teleological assumptions regarding the evolution of 
societies and cultures, and the evocation of people as the origin of translation and cultural 
expression. For, as actualisations of historical concepts, norms and practices of translation 
seem to emerge as the products of human subjects, the work of translators, critics and theorists 
who are almost intuitively felt to be the evident source of conceptual choices, cultural 
directions and specific translation decisions. From this point of view a history of translation, 
as Lefevere (1996), Hermans (1996:26-27) and Pym (1998: 160ff.) among others have argued, 
would involve first and foremost an understanding of human thought and action, a description 
of “who is doing what for/against whom and why” rather than an exclusive focus on 
depersonalised systemic forces (Lefevere 1996: 45; Hermans 1999: 118).
This perspective seems to be sustained by a significant number of contemporary 
models for translation research, which have sought to disengage themselves from the 
deterministic suppositions of the early version of polysystem theory by drawing attention to 
the concept of the translating ‘subject’. The shared hypothesis of these models could then be 
summarised in the claim that translations, as Pym has put it, are produced by people, that they
both translations and shopping lists that is not contradicted by the texts themselves.
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are effectively brought into being by translators who are involved in diverse social activities, 
develop specific thought-modes, have needs, personal interests, inclinations, beliefs and 
values which shape to a greater or lesser extent their translation writing (1998: 160-172). 
Translators therefore, it is argued, cannot be described as passive receptors and bearers of 
systemic functions, but should be seen as active social agents, who are diversely involved in 
the shaping of conceptions, rules and practices of translation within the target cultural context 
(Hermans 1996: 26-29; Pym 1998: 157).
Their shared assumptions notwithstanding, conceptions of the translator’s subjectivity 
and agency are diverse enough to prohibit any consideration of them as a unified theoretical 
position. Hence the following discussion will treat them as forming two different groups, each 
of which enunciates a relatively distinct approach to translation history and is 
methodologically exclusive of the other. The key term for this division would be the notion of 
‘mediation’: the supposition of a link between the formation of subjective consciousness and 
the broader social discourses of the target community, which derives from the hypothesis that, 
while the connection between individual thought-modes and social knowledge is undeniable, 
the latter, that is social knowledge, is by no means reducible to the former, that is, an 
aggregation of individual modes of conception. It then seems that the first of these groups is 
predominantly defined by the absence of such a supposition, which is evident in the 
assumption of a functional homology between individual and collective thought-modes, the 
assertion of an essential accordance between the discourse of the translator and that of broader 
social units. Conversely, the second of these groups perceives of a categorical difference 
between translators as individuals and the social communities to which these translators 
belong, and thus necessitates the supposition of a mediating link, which would allow each of 
these categories to maintain its identity while simultaneously being transformable into the 
other.
2.1 The Translator as Agent
The obvious candidate for the first group would then be atomistic accounts of translation 
writing, approaches which seek to interpret specific translation choices on the basis of 
personal beliefs and interests (as these are expressed in translations themselves as well as 
‘paratexts’, such as introductions, footnotes, commentaries), historical facts which are seen as 
significant for the practice of individual translators, and, in short, every recorded aspect of a 
personal history that may be taken to illuminate or explain specific translation decisions. It is 
important to clarify that such an approach is not predominantly characterised by a reluctance
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to refer to social issues and events or to conceive of translators as both individuals and 
collectives, if only because it is not possible to describe a personal history without referring to 
institutional frameworks and cultural communities, within which individuals make sense of 
their identities, or without considering social discourses and conditions, in relation to which 
they formulate their beliefs, values and interests. The crucial assumption that justifies the 
characterisation ‘atomistic’ lies in the attribution of theoretical and methodological primacy to 
individuals, the supposition that in order to account for the shaping of translation practice in a 
given historical context it is both adequate and sufficient to account for the causal role of the 
translator’s personal thought and action, from which, it is presumed, social and cultural 
tendencies are effectively formed.
An exemplary elaboration of this thesis is found in Pym’s definition of translators as 
the “efficient cause” of translations, as the ultimate and necessary force behind the 
actualisation of all other causes: material presuppositions, such as the actual transfer of a text 
(material cause), the purpose and utility of translation (final cause), and the historical norms, 
or conceptions of translation, which allow a text to be accepted as a translation by the client, 
readership or other translators (formal cause) (1998: 148-159).74 This position should not be 
read as a retreat merely to biographical accounts of a producing subjectivity. As a theorist, 
Pym can hardly be seen as someone who ignores social and cultural groups which lie beyond 
personal will, interests or consciousness. On the contrary; he is eager to emphasise that every 
description of translation history must consider both individuals and collectives, and account 
for the multiple participation (or will for participation) of the subject-translator in various and 
possibly oppositional cultural groups, defined by nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexual 
orientation and so on.75 Yet the mechanism for the formation and reproduction of these groups 
-  and the social discourses which define them -  brings us, in Pym’s view, back to the will, 
choices and interaction of ‘people’ rather than the function of impersonal cultural forces. In 
other words, it is not people who are produced by cultures, but cultures, as well as 
translations, which are produced by the will and interests of the people. This thesis, which is 
most tellingly put forward in Pym’s analysis of historical case studies,76 is theoretically
74 Pym attributes these four causes of translation to Aristotle’s distinction of causes in Metaphysics I, 3 (Cf. Pym 
1998:148).
Hence when for example Pym examines the case of Henri Albert’s translation of Nietzsche into French, at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, he points out a number of ‘translation-causes’ related to Albert’s personal beliefs, 
interests and history (his homosexual relationship and possible misogyny, his social and literary ambitions, his 
national consciousness) for each one of which, he finally asserts, “there is a wider, social mode of causation that 
enables or accepts inner factors to leave their mark in the public world of translations” (1998: 171).
Pym’s analysis of Albert’s case is indicative, in the sense that it begins with biographical and personal elements 
and proceeds by drawing a parallel between these elements and the broader sociocul.ural tendencies of the target
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articulated in a radical dispute over “traditional models of translation”, which “take as their 
minimal link the movement from a source culture to a translator to a target culture, no matter 
which side the translator is presumed to be on”. It is thus argued that both source- and target- 
oriented approaches to translation conceive of the translator as the participant in and the basic 
link between cultures, as in the scheme “Culture 1, Tr. Culture 2”. Yet if “the translator’s 
position is considered primary”, Pym suggests, “we can formulate an alternative basic link”: 
“Trl, Culture, Tr2 ... This means that instead of starting and ending with cultures, the basic 
link pertinent to translation history could start and end with translators” (1998: 189-190). It is 
this final thesis that ultimately allows a criticism of the notion of ‘culture’ as an a priori, and 
the suggestion that we examine translators as working at the intersections of different cultures, 
at an intercultural space,77 which is defined by a multiplicity of subjectivities, and precedes, at 
least in methodological terms, “monocultures” (1998: 177-8, 190-2).
The logic of this position, as it is set up against deterministic readings of translation 
history, usefully reminds us that translations, as all forms of human activity, would have been 
unrealisable unless they were actually brought into being by active agents, by the transforming 
consciousness and practice of human subjects. Without this consciousness and practice, as 
they are articulated in acts of perception, knowledge and cultural production, there would have 
existed no culture or social reality, and in a certain sense no humanity either. From this point 
of view, the specificity of historical translations -  in our case of translations of ‘democracy’ — 
was indeed the product of active subjects, whose unique histories determined their ability to 
translate, their belief as to what is translation, their interest in it, their perception of the 
Athenian democracy, their ideas on equivalence and so on.
But just what were these subjects? What do we mean when we evoke “people as 
people” at the origin of translation production? What is the category of ‘individual’ or 
‘collective subject’ (whereas ‘collective’ indicates, from Pym’s standpoint, no qualitative 
difference from ‘individual’) on which conceptions and practices of translation or the reality 
of ‘intercultures’ so evidently seem to depend? And ‘who’ is thinking and speaking when we 
speak of the subject? These questions, it seems to me, cannot be answered (they can indeed 
hardly be asked) from a position which asserts the historical primacy of subjectivity, not least 
because any answer to them would evoke an aporia: subjects would be considered as both the
community, which are therefore taken to derive from individual beliefs, conceptions and histories (Cf. Pym 1998: 
167-172).
The notion of ‘intercultures’ poses problems whose discussion falls beyond the scope of this work. Suffice to 
mention, at this point, that, despite its claims to constitute a theoretical alternative to the notion of ‘cultures’, the 
idea of translators working at the borders and intersections of (heterogeneous) cultural units continues to 
incorporate and depend on those conceptions of translation it seeks to reject, since the very definition of 
‘intercultures’ presupposes the notion of culture(s).
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irreducible cause and the product of themselves; the ultimate origin and simultaneously the 
outcome of their subjectivity. Yet if we bracket, for the moment, the truth of this thesis (or at 
least its truth in our own tradition of thought) and question the naturalness of the category of 
‘people’, of translators as ‘people’, our scope of research is also transformed, as we can no 
longer think of the subject as the end of our enquiry, but only as one point in a still indefinable 
chain, a cause which cannot be ultimate, because it is also a result; and yet a ‘cause’ which has 
historically become, or become to be seen, as final and non-reducible. From this point of view, 
the ‘translator’ as a subject and agent becomes a constructed category, a concept which is no 
less produced to be (seen as) the origin of historical cultures, than it is productive of the 
cultures and societies which, in turn, define her.
What is more, the ‘subject’ is a category whose roots can be located with relative 
precision at the beginning of modernity and whose nature was never seen as secure and stable 
by the thinkers who codified it as it may appear in its contemporary uses. Kant could conceive 
of ‘man’ as an originating ‘subject’, on the condition that the freedom of this subject to create 
and produce derived from its prior subjection. This move, as was suggested in the previous 
chapter, was not merely the outcome of a twisted philosophical logic, which had not yet been 
dissociated from the burden of religious tradition. What Kant’s essay on universal history 
indicated, maybe despite Kant himself, was that the dual position of the subject acted to 
articulate a social subjectivity, which was itself rewritten and codified in the concept of the 
modem subject. Furthermore, Kant’s text showed that the assumed sovereignty of this 
subjectivity, man’s capacity to consider himself as the ultimate origin and cause of the order 
of things, developed as an ideological construct; a discourse which served to sustain a socially 
stratified and antagonistic society, within which subjective freedom and autonomy vanished. 
Likewise, the Romantic glorification of the individual subject and of cultures qua subjects 
was complemented by a minute, but decisive acknowledgement: that the creative subject can 
only find a place in a social context of equality and political autonomy, which was neither 
Schleiermacher’s nor ours. From this point of view, to repeat today a conception of 
subjectivity, of the translator qua subject, as the ultimate origin of translation and cultural 
production, does not only seem to be a theoretical anachronism; it constitutes a thesis which 
repeats an ideological position of modem discourses, while failing to recognise and 
incorporate those aspects of these discourses which have provided the means to grasp and 
criticise their ideological nature.
On Defining Translation Norms: Translation as a Socially Symbolic Act 101
2.2 Translation in Communication Structures
The notion of the translating subject acquires a different meaning in models for translation 
research, which have developed an increased attentiveness to the circular, mutually 
constitutive relation between translators and sociocultural communities. In the context of 
these models, the notions of ‘conventions’, ‘norms’ and ‘rules’, which unavoidably grew 
weak in individualistic theories of translation history, occupy a significant -  although varied -  
position, and are employed, as Hermans points out, in order to refer to observable regularities 
in cultural behaviour as well as the underlying mechanisms that account for the occurrence of 
these regularities. In the second sense, ‘norms’ ,78 ‘rules’ and ‘conventions’ are considered to 
provide the connection between individual translators and social communities, to “mediate 
between the individual and the collective, between the individual’s intentions, choices and 
actions, and collectively held beliefs, values and preferences” (1999: 80). While these notions 
appear to echo the conviction expressed in the earlier phase of polysystem model that norms 
function as directives and ‘constraints’ on the translators’ activity, but are not effectively 
determined by them (as they derive from internal systemic tendencies which are merely 
carried out by people79), they are in several ways distanced from it. For norms, in this context, 
are not seen as merely the outcome of systemic functions and necessities (although cultural 
systems are granted a relative autonomy and ability for self-reproduction), but as the product 
of intersubjective communication and social interaction. They are both a human and a ‘non­
human’ (that is, discursive and communicative) construct. Such a conception of norms can be 
found in two interconnected and mutually complementary models of cultural and translation 
research, one developed by Even-Zohar and Toury as a revision of polysystems theory (Even- 
Zohar 1997; Toury 1999) and the other suggested by Hermans (1996; 1996a; 1997; 1999).
According to Hermans, “translation, like any other use of language, is a matter of 
communication, i.e. a form of social behaviour, which requires a degree of interaction, of co­
operation, among those involved”. Conventions and norms arise as answers to problems of the 
interpersonal co-ordination required for communication to take place, in the sense that “they 
restrict the number of practically available options in recurrent situations of a given type by 
offering a particular option as the one known to be preferred by everyone involved” or, in the
78 For the sake of brevity I shall occasionally use the term ‘norms’ in order to refer to the whole range of 
canonicities from conventions to rules and decrees. This choice does not imply a dispute of the differences 
among them, but nevertheless indicates that I consider these differences as quantitative rather than qualitative, in 
the sense that in each of these categories (including conventions) one finds a (degree of) social obligation, the 
expression of a stronger or weaker social rule. A detailed codification and description of the meaning and 
interrelations of ‘conventions’, ‘norms’, ‘rules’ and ‘decrees’ can be found in Hermans 1996.
People in this sense do not act as the cause of translation norms, but as the means for the actualisation of 
systemic functions and tendencies.
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case of norms, by establishing an option as ‘proper’, ‘correct’ or ‘appropriate’ (1997: 7-8; Cf. 
Hermans 1996: 29; 1999: 80-81). That is to say, if translation-conventions prove to be 
effective for the purposes of communication for long enough, they acquire a relative stability 
and form a ‘horizon of normative expectations’, a matrix of prescriptions, through which 
people learn to understand and practise translation within a given social context. So the 
“content” of norms is formed, Hermans suggests, as the “intersubjective sense of what is 
correct”, of the course of action that should be adopted by the members of a community in a 
given situation (1997: 13-14; 1996: 31; 1999: 82, 142). The establishment of this content as 
(relatively) stabilised is considered to be a precondition for the conception and practice of 
translation. As it is argued,
we can translate because there are translations which we recognize as translations and 
because, when we translate or speak about translation, we routinely take account of the 
conditioning factors governing the concepts and practices which count as ‘translation’ in our 
world (1999: 142).
The crucial point in this suggestion is that our individual ability to understand translation is 
not ‘inhibited’, but is actually formed and sustained by a system of norms, in the sense that 
outside this system we lack a conceptual framework, through which we can realise what 
translation is and how it can be practised.80 In other words the constitution of the translator’s 
‘personal’ cognitive potential, her capacity for choice, affirmation as well as negation of 
existing normative structures is fundamentally shaped by norms, without which this capacity 
is unrealisable as the translating subject lacks a conception of its/an object.
This hypothesis does not imply, according to Hermans, that normative structures are 
independent of the beliefs, will and intentions of translators. As he points out, considering the 
conception and practice of translation as constituted by socially defined modes of cognition 
and judgement, shared expectations and historical contingency as well as personal selection 
among a multiplicity of conflicting alternatives enables us to bring into focus not only the 
institutionalised aspect of translation, but also the human agents who talk about and practise 
translation, take up positions within existing socio-political structures, negotiate social 
imperatives according to their needs, goals and interests, and may choose to confirm or 
challenge already existing normative models (1997: 10-11). What is nevertheless implied -  
and this is a point that distances Hermans’ from Pym’s description of agency -  is that despite 
their ultimately human origin, social systems, including the system of translation, are not 
reducible to individualities, in the sense that their generation and mechanisms for self­
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reproduction indicate that their constitutive elements are not simply ‘people’, but people as 
social beings (i.e. people interacting within a network of sociocultural relations, institutions, 
social structures, political forces), who can determine translation and cultural norms only on 
the condition that they are themselves co-determined by their acts of cognition and judgement.
It would then follow that, in order to describe the production of translation of a certain 
community, we should account, on the one hand for the contextual identity of these subjects 
and, on the other hand, for the socio-semiotic and historical conditions, within which 
conceptions and acts of translation are collectively determined. The first step in such an 
attempt would be to delineate the categories of social factors, which are involved in this 
production, to seek to describe the target sociocultural and translation fields ‘in situation’, and 
thus conceive of subjectivities and translation practices as integral parts of a broader context, 
which is inscribed in them as much as it is produced and transformed by the translators’ 
thought and action.
A theoretical framework which provides precisely a means for the determination of 
these categories, while simultaneously emphasising their communicative, intersubjective 
constitution, has been suggested by Even-Zohar’s revision of polysystem theory, as developed 
in a number of articles written since 1997.80 1 The revised version of polysystem model takes as 
its methodological starting point Roman Jakobson’s communication model and adapts it for 
the “analysis of cultural events in general”. Thus, Even-Zohar suggests the following scheme 





80 This suggestion seeks to emphasise the social character of all concepts by which we make sense of translation 
(as both a category and a practice), without however excluding the possibility of the functioning of translation 
norms as explicit impositions, as for example in the case of censorship.
81 Cf. Even-Zohar 1997; 1998. As Even-Zohar has emphasised, the revised version of polysystem theory should
not be taken to constitute a radical break in his thought, in the sense that the majority of concepts employed by
him during the last years ( ‘repertoire’, ‘market’ etc) had already been introduced into polysystems theory -  or
were implicit in it -  since earlier stages of the model (1998: 363). Yet it seems that these concepts are used in 
Even-Zohar’s later writings in order to sustain a theoretical framework which differs in many ways from previous 
models of polysystems theory, or at least introduces some significant innovations, as José Lambert points out 
(1998): an increased emphasis on the interrelations of cultural production to social conditions, institutions and 
agency as well as a gradual abandonment of the opposition between ‘fully-fledged’ and ‘defective’ polysystem, 
and the subsequent attempt at historicising oppositions between canonised and non-canonised cultural 
subsystems.
' ‘The ‘institution’ consists of the aggregate of factors involved with the control of culture. It is the institution 
which governs the norms, sanctioning some and rejecting others. It also remunerates and reprimands producers 
and agents" (Even-Zohar 1997: 31).
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Market86
Product87
The employment of a communication model for the purposes of socio-cultural analysis is not, 
strictly speaking, identical to the suggestion that cultures consist of communication systems, 
but nevertheless indicates that the relationships between the factors implicated in the 
production and reception of cultural works can be viewed along the lines of verbal, 
communicative acts; that the constitutive elements of cultures are conceived of and actualised 
in a context of socio-semiotic relations, whose structure can be seen as parallel to or, in a 
sense, identical to the structure of (verbal) communication.88 This idea initially indicates that 
each of these factors should be recognised as dependent on and simultaneously constitutive of 
all the others. As Even-Zohar suggests “none of the factors enumerated can be described to 
function in isolation, and the kind of relations that may be detected run across all possible 
axes of the scheme (1997: 20). Most significantly though for the purposes of our analysis, this 
hypothesis draws attention to the existence of a medium, through which ‘producers’, 
‘consumers’, ‘institutions’, ‘repertoires’, ‘markets’ and ‘products’ interact and 
‘communicate’; a ‘code’ which makes possible the interconnection of seemingly fragmented 
entities and thus allows us to perceive them as an “assumed historical totality” (ibid.: 18)
This ‘code’ is designated, in Even-Zohar’s scheme, by the notion of ‘repertoire’, which 
corresponds to the semiotic term ‘code’ employed by Jakobson, in order to indicate both the 
means for and a constitutive element of verbal communication.87 ‘Repertoire’ then plays a 
dual role in this context; on the one hand, it is considered to function as one of the factors 
which condition the shaping of cultural production, and, on the other hand, as the means that
"’“‘Repertoire' designates the aggregate of rules and materials which govern both the making and the handling, 
or production and consumption of any given product (Even-Zohar 1997: 20).
84 “A 'producer', an actor, is an individual who produces, by actively operating a repertoire, either repetitively 
producible or ‘new’ products" (Even-Zohar 1997: 30).
“A ‘consumer is an individual' who handles an already made product by passively operating a repertoire. ‘To 
passively operate’ basically means to identify relations (connections) between the product and one’s knowledge 
of a repertoire” (Even-Zohar 1997: 31).
86 ‘The ‘market’ is the aggregate of factors involved with the selling and buying of the repertoire of culture, i.e. 
with the promotion of types of consumption (Even-Zohar 1997: 33).
87 “By ‘product’”, Even-Zohar writes, "I mean any performed set of signs and/or materials, i.e., including a given 
behavior. Thus, any outcome of any action, or activity, can be considered 'a product,’ whatever its ontological 
manifestation may be, be it a semiotic or a physical ‘object:’ an utterance, a text, an artifact, an edifice, an 
image,’ or an ‘event.’ In other terms, the product, the item negotiated and handled between the participating 
factors in a culture, is the concrete instance of culture" (Even-Zohar 1997: 27).
This suggestion accords with Even-Zohar’s presentation of Jakobson's conception of the verbal act as 
intrinsically related to social and cultural conditions and his consequent claim that the study of language should 
not be seen as parallel to the study of ‘pragmatic’ and social conditions of the communication event, but as 
already including both awareness and consideration of these conditions (Even-Zohar 1997: 20).
As Even-Zohar points out the communicational term adopted by Jakobson, i.e. code, could have perfectly 
served as a substitute for the notion of repertoire were it not for existing traditions for which a 'code' applies to 
‘rules’ only, not to ‘materials’ ( ‘elements,’ items,’ i.e., ‘stock’ or ‘lexicon’) (1997: 20).
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enables the conception, interrelation and co-determination of all of the above factors 
(including itself)- For the ‘repertoire’, or more accurately the various ‘repertoires’ of a socio- 
semiotic system,90 are assumed to provide the range of ‘models’91 which are necessary for 
producers and consumers in order to ‘create’ and ‘interpret’ (i.e. decipher, understand) cultural 
products, for institutions in order to judge and control existing cultural rules or constitute new 
ones, and for the market in order to produce and implement types of consumption (ibid.: 20 - 
33). From this point of view Even-Zohar also designates the relationship between the social 
production of repertoires and the action of human agents as reciprocal. Repertoires, he argues, 
are “conceived of as spontaneous creations of ‘society’” and, in certain historical cases, as 
“the deliberate action of individuals”, while simultaneously being the means for “creating a 
‘sense of self,’ or ‘collective identity’” of people; for establishing the relations between 
‘individuals’ and ‘objects’; and for determining the range of alternative options through which 
individuals shape cultural production (ibid.: 26-28).92
Now I have to admit that while I find Hermans’ and Even-Zohar’s communicative 
approaches to translation production (which I understand as mutually complementary for the 
purposes of my work93) to be more persuasive and, in a sense, more justified than previous 
suppositions of polysystem theory, the results of my historical research, as will become clear 
in the next chapters, also appear to confirm Even-Zohar’s early theoretical suggestions 
regarding the structure of polysystems. For both conceptions of translatability and the norms 
governing the import and practice of translations of ‘democracy’ in the context of nineteenth- 
century Britain acted to reinforce, each one from a different perspective, a belief in the 
inevitability of socio-cultural divisions and hierarchies, at the very moment they further 
established the essential contestability of social subjects and discourses positioned within their 
structures.
It then seems to me that while there is ostensibly no incompatibility between the idea 
that the British polysystem was shaped intersubjectively, co-operatively, and the supposition 
that this polysystem developed a stratified sociocultural structure, the co-articulation of the
K Even-Zohar emphasises that due to the heterogeneity of sociosemiotic systems, there is never a situation where 
only one repertoire may function for each possible set of circumstances in a society. Conversely, “different 
options constitute competing and conflicting repertoires” (1997: 21)
“Analytically, models are the combination of elements + rules + the syntagmatic (‘temporal’) relations 
imposable on the product. If the case in question is an ‘event,’ then the ‘model’ means ‘the elements + rules 
applicable to the given type of event + the potential relations which may be implemented during actual 
performance" (Even-Zohar 1997: 22-23).
‘ A similar point has been suggested by Toury in relation to the translator’s potential to choose among a range of 
predetermined norms (1999: 19).
By describing these models as ‘mutually complementary’ I refer to the fact that Hermans analyses at great 
length the communicative and intersubjective nature of cultural systems, while Even-Zohar offers a detailed 
definition and structuring of the factors of which these systems consist.
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two claims brings to light an aporetic proposition. That is to say, if we define norms in terms 
of sociocultural co-ordination and communication, and thus disengage our analysis from all 
suppositions of historical determinism, how can we account for the fact that participants in the 
British polysystem tended to co-ordinate their action and shape their thought-modes in a way 
that would establish these particular structural features? In other words, how can we account 
for the fact that all factors involved in the production of translation in the context in question 
co-determined a repertoire, which acted in turn to enable institutions, producers, consumers, 
and cultural writings to synchronise their function towards the creation of the specific socio- 
semiotic conditions among a presumably unlimited number of potential alternatives? 94 The 
same question can be put in more general terms: how can we accommodate in the same 
historiographic discourse a total rejection of polysystem’s determinism and the presentation of 
such an orderly development of repertoires, institutions and translation norms; a mode of 
signification and practice which appears as if it had been drafted in advance by an invisible 
historical necessity (only discernible in retrospect); a cause that not only made intentional acts 
and cultural events cohere in time and space, but also incorporated historical ‘accidents’ and 
‘chances’, the totality of which appears now as the actualisation of a preconceived story, a 
‘plan’, whose ‘logic’ and ‘intentions’ evolved as already beyond the ‘logic’ and ‘intentions’ of 
people? We could, of course, attribute this ‘order’ to the systemic traits and function of an 
intersubjective social discourse, which is, as has been indicated by both Hermans and Even- 
Zohar, essentially capable of maintaining and reproducing itself. Yet the question remains: 
why does this discourse appear as if every aspect and part of it tended towards the 
establishment of a particular system, a system of self-contested inequality, instead of doing 
otherwise?
3. Translation, Social Consensus and Ideology
The conception of repertoires as “spontaneous creations of ‘society’” (Even-Zohar 1997: 26) 
cannot possibly provide an answer to these questions, not because such a postulate is 
fundamentally wrong (since all conceivable societies would indeed establish a canonisation of 
their cultural production), but because it lacks both the specificity and the generalising power 
that would enable us to account for the concrete historical manifestations of this spontaneous 
tendency: specificity in order to illuminate the conditions, which brought into being particular 
formations of repertoires in certain historical communities, and generalising power in order to
n The same issue emerges when we enquire into the reasons for the historical transition from one socioscmiotic 
system into another.
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position these formations in the context of a range of potential alternatives, possibilities that 
were excluded, suppressed or marginalized. To say that ‘cultures’ are ‘spontaneously’ created 
by social communities indicates an essential trait, a distinctive feature of human societies, but 
does not account either for the diversity of modes by which these cultures are organised or for 
the historical mechanisms and processes by which one form of organisation evolves and gets 
to be chosen instead of another.
The alternative suggestion, that normative expectations grow out of conventions, when 
the latter have been agreed upon and judged to be effective for long enough by the participants 
in (social) communication processes (Hermans 1996: 31; 1997: 8-9; Cf. Toury 1999: 13-14) is 
more concrete, and thus directs us to see a reason behind the constitution of norms: the need 
of every society to create a minimum space for ‘agreement’ among its members, and provide 
thereby effective solutions to problems in the fulfilment of communal needs, interests and 
purposes. Yet the moment we attribute norms to a collective conception of effectiveness, we 
also presuppose an understanding of human communities as predominantly purposeful rather 
than social categories. We suggest that the members of a community must see some measure 
of joint action towards a minimally shared purpose as being in their interests -  allowing of 
course for the possibility that in diversified societies subjects may have one or various 
collective purposes and, in the second case, the possibility that these purposes may not be 
fully compatible with one another (Swanson 1992: 177, 182) -  and at the same time that this 
conception of minimum compatibility of purpose is a definitive feature of a group qua 
community.95 That this perspective presents social communities as predominantly 
‘purposeful’ categories and is therefore reductive of the meaning of the ‘social’ is suggested 
on the grounds that historical societies -  in our case nineteenth-century Britain -  may well 
consist of groups whose interests are not merely diverse and still minimally communal, but 
diametrically oppositional and antagonistic; in which case norms cannot be taken to be the 
outcome of coordination, unless we expand the notion to such an extent that it includes all 
forms of social relations, say from coercion to ideological imposition. Instead, norms in such a 
context develop as the outcome of social conflict and its historical resolutions.96 For, unless 
we hypothesise the existence of conflict and antagonism, it seems that it is impossible to
” This conception of society is not without support in the field of social and political theory. Guy E. Swanson, 
whose work gives an illuminating presentation of this thesis, has defined society in similar terms, arguing that “a 
group is different from an aggregation of people in being a collectivity -  some people trying to do something 
together -  and in these peoples’ having some arrangements for taking coordinated action in matters of common 
interest” (1992: 179).
This suggestion does not claim that conflict is an essential feature of every conceivable human society -  quite 
the contrary -  but that it has been the historical trait of the social organisation in question, i.e. nineteenth-century
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explain why a social community would prioritise as ‘effective’ a matrix of norms, which 
legitimises the division of people into enlightened subjects and the populace, and its cultural 
products into central and peripheral, ‘high’ and ‘low’, when such divisions cannot be seen as 
serving the interests (and subsequent purposes) of all members of this community, i.e. all 
participants in (social) communication processes.
It may be argued, against this position, that translations of ancient Greek texts are not 
to be considered as an expression of the repertoire of British society, but of only one repertoire 
(or network of norms) among others; yet one which has been appropriated by institutional 
forces and dominant groups, and has thereby been established as a ‘canonical’ mode of 
cultural production (Cf. Even-Zohar 1997: 27). That such an answer cannot adequately 
explain the formation of the range of norms and practices in question can be shown if we 
think of the mediating role of ‘repertoire’ for socio-cultural systems, and thus its function as 
the very means for the formation of sociocultural identities and the structural positions of 
‘high’ and ‘low’ cultural products and groups. This implies that conditions of domination are 
not defined by non-significatory processes that lie outside or beyond repertoires, but are 
conceived of, negotiated and consolidated through them. They are “inscribed”, as Hermans 
argues, “in all the multiple networks of norms and conventions” (1999: 82), which posit 
‘true’, ‘appropriate’, ‘ethical’ and ‘sanctioned’ ways of doing things, of working, consuming 
and producing, following laws, defining subjectivities and experiencing social structures and 
relations throughout the entire social body. It follows that, in order to function as a means for 
the imposition of sociocultural inequality and relations of domination, a repertoire is not 
merely given a dominant position, but itself produces the distinction between ‘dominant’ and 
‘dominated’, in a way that this distinction would be recognised as legitimate by both ruling 
and subaltern groups. In our case, translations of classical Greek texts were not only related to 
the cultural production of dominant social groups; they further articulated the validity of social 
distinctions and cultural hierarchies by their very wording, by norm-governed and norm- 
producing translation choices, which thereby expressed the features of both ruling and 
subordinated consciousness and cultural practice. This argument does not seek to imply that 
cultural production is identified with dominant discourses, but to emphasise that, at least in 
modem bourgeois societies, a dominant repertoire has to elicit a degree of acceptance from 
dominated groups in order to secure and legitimise its domination. It has to establish its 
hegemonic status throughout society as a whole and thus be somewhat co-produced by 
diversified and mutually opposed social voices.
Britain, and by extension of the social communities that have developed similar sociocultural structures and
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This point is precisely developed by Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’, which 
is defined as the establishment of an intellectual, moral, social and political order which is not 
only materialised by formulating directives, but by creating at the same time the instruments 
by which the directives themselves will be ‘imposed’ and by which their execution will be 
verified (1929-351; 1971: 266). Hegemony then, as Eagleton explains, implies for Gramsci the 
diffusion of a worldview which is particular to a group or class throughout the entire fabric of 
society, thus equating this group’s interests and purposes with the interests of society at large 
(1991: 116). This process, which pertains, according to Gramsci, to the hierarchical social 
organisation of bourgeois societies, functions as a means for legitimising conceptions of 
‘appropriateness’ that fulfil the interests of dominant social groups, while simultaneously 
acting against the interests of others, so that each individual can govern himself in accordance 
with these conceptions, without his self-government entering into conflict with the function of 
political society, but rather becoming its normal continuation, its organic complement (1929- 
351; 1971: 268). From this point of view, hegemony should be understood as denoting a very 
specific form of ‘consensus’, which is also an act of imposition and violence, a kind of 
cooperation which emerges precisely because of the impossibility of cooperative relations, as 
a means of reconceptualising social conflict and antagonism and transforming them into 
agreement and coordination.97
Yet the most important objection to an argument which suggests the origin of norms in 
antagonistic social relations, in the context of which co-operation and consensus could only 
emerge as the expression of ideological forces, lies in the necessity of establishing a criterion 
by which the ‘reality’ of needs and interests of social agents would be defined. For if we assert 
that a range of translation norms served the interests of a specific social group and acted 
against the interests of others (as I seek to suggest at this point), while the very existence of 
these norms indicates an ostensible social accordance, an apparent condition of peace out of 
which conceptions of translation ‘rightness’ did come into historical being, we make the 
assumption that we are in a position to understand and appraise what the ‘real’ needs of these 
different groups were, while implying, by the same move, that these groups were unable to 
conceptualise and pursue them. But where could the criterion for this judgement be found? 
How can one contend that it is not in the nature of human societies to evolve on the basis of 
conflict, that it is not beneficial for an entire community to establish a condition in which
modes of organisation.
As Perry Anderson has argued, there is a relative inconsistency in Gramsci’s conception of ‘hegemony’, which 
is sometimes used to mean consent rather than coercion, while at different points is employed as a synthesis of 
both. Anderson argues for the latter reading and suggests that Gramsci's relative lack of emphasis on the coercive 
aspect of hegemony relates, among other things, to the practical conditions of prison-censorship (1976a: 49).
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competition enables excellence to be recognised and the ‘less qualified’ members of the 
community to benefit from obeying it? 98 And, in the last instance, how securely can one 
distinguish a discourse that claims to illuminate the ideological violence of history from the 
thought-modes that are posited against it as authoritarian and oppressive, as seeking to 
legitimise a world-perception that does not emerge communicatively and cooperatively, but is 
somewhat ‘imposed’ on social groups, as the ‘truth’ of the subject who knows? In short, how 
securely can one distinguish between an ‘ideological’ and a ‘critical’ consciousness? 
Admittedly, not very. For so long as our ‘objective’ account of human needs is not reduced to 
an inadequate repetition of the traits of living entities (breathing, eating and reproducing 
themselves)99 its assertions would unavoidably rely on a conception of human nature and 
society that would evoke a universal validity. Its claims would assume a possession of ‘truth’ 
that would be oblivious of its own contingency; a truth which the subjects of history 
presumably lacked. But is not this critical move that effectively marks our disengagement 
from ideology, precisely the same move which brings our contemplation back into it? Is not 
an assumed “awareness of ideology”, as Linda Hutcheon has written, “as much an ideological 
stand as common-sense lack of awareness of it”? (1988: 180).
The paradox that is inscribed in every critique of ideology, 100 which makes “the 
stepping out of (what we experience as) ideology the very form of our enslavement to it” 
(Zizek 1994a: 6), has an objective historical status, which can neither be ignored nor 
exaggerated. To believe that a personal consciousness can overcome its contingency and posit 
itself against ideological discourses is to ignore the roots of this consciousness in a thought­
mode that has precluded in advance the certainty of truth-claims both philosophically and 
politically. It is to forget the embeddedness of consciousness in a society, which declared itself 
to be the source of its knowledge at the cost of negating the articulation of incontestable 
cognitions and judgements. But more than this, it is to forget that in the context of 
contemporary capitalist societies, that is, a context formed by social hierarchies and relations 
of domination, a personal consciousness is intrinsically bound to be ideological, precisely
98 In was only eight years ago that Francis Fukuyama suggested that liberal democracy is the “end point of 
mankind’s ideological evolution” and “the final form of human government”, that the conditions of social 
hierarchy and competition that have developed in the Western world are precisely those conditions which would 
enable individuals to realise their natural desire for recognition and eminence, and fulfil their potential. Hence 
History, in Fukuyama’s view, “understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process” finds its future potential in 
the actuality of the present (1992: xi-xii).
This assertion may not, after all, be as superfluous and repetitive as it initially appears to be, especially when it 
is thought of in the context of a social world that has hardly established these basic preconditions of life for all 
human beings, despite its unquestionable material capacity to do so.
The concept of ‘Critique of Ideology' derives from the philosophical problematic of the Frankfurt School and 
its attempt to justify a ‘Critical Theory’ that can elucidate the ideological ‘misrecognition’ of reality, while
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because it is bound to its social position within a framework of class-antagonism and 
conflicting interests. To claim, on the other hand, that knowledge is always manifested as an 
ideological imposition, that it comes to be seen as knowledge at the very moment it articulates 
oppression, the moment it asserts itself as desire for domination and power, is to be deluded 
by hyperbole: to endorse an understanding of Western thought as alarmingly coherent and 
one-dimensional, a conception of modernity as an incessant pursuit of egotistic, self-centred 
interests, which has left no space intact by a commercialised logic of power and profit­
making, no sphere in which human beings and human history could be conceived of as being 
otherwise.
That this was far from being the case becomes evident not only in the development of 
modem conceptions of knowledge and translatability, as we examined in the previous chapter, 
but also in the translated texts which constitute my case study. For what these texts indicate, 
as will be argued in the next pages, is the dual and inherently ambiguous position of the 
knowing subject in modem bourgeois societies. A position marked, at one and the same time, 
by limits and potentials, blindness and lucidity, social truths and ideological misrecognition.
Most importantly though, what these translation discourses bring to light is that 
translations do not only constitute abstract conceptions of knowledge, subjectivity and literary 
or cultural propriety. Instead they emerge as enunciations of historical subjectivities and the 
social structures within which these subjectivities are produced. That is to say, translations 
come into being as signifying practices, which are not only conceivable within the context of 
organised, structured social units, but also articulate social structures, they “present”, as 
Althusser has argued, in their very form, the organisation of the societies which brought them 
into being (Althusser and Balibar 19681; 1970: 189), and therefore the identities and positions 
of subjects and groups within these societies. From this point of view, translations and 
translation norms are not only seen as the products of social relations, but also as an 
expression of their social and historical context, and thus an index which can render this 
context visible for the present reader.
This is not to say that translations follow or faithfully mirror the social world of which 
they are part. Despite the methodological convenience of a model which would assume the 
structural homology between society and cultural or textual representation, 1,11 and even despite
emphasising simultaneously the paradoxes and aporias that are inherent in such an attempt. On the issue see Jay 
(19731; 1996: 253-280) and Geuss (1981).
An argument for the homology of social and cultural-translation structures has been developed by Jean-Marc 
Gouanvic in relation to the translation of American science-fiction in France during the 1950s. Gouanvic relates 
these translations to the rise of a technophile petite bourgeoisie in the target society, which is seen as parallel to 
the technophile American middle-class of the 1920s (1997). The notion of such a homology between literary and 
social structures was originally suggested by Lucien Goldmann’s work Towards a Sociology o f the Novel (1964).
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its undeniable significance as a reminder of the unity of social and cultural life, such an 
assumption, as Jameson has argued, seems misguided. For any supposition of a static 
homology, isomorphism or structural parallelism between social organisation and literary, 
translation or cultural production seems to be underwritten by the tacit assumption of the 
mechanical determination of the latter by the former, and as such fails to recognise the relative 
autonomy of the cultural field, which does not only enable the development of its own rules 
and modes of reproduction, but also constitutes a novel historical act, which allows cultural 
forms to stand at a distance from the social world and give voice to various critiques of it 
(1981:41-44).
In contrast to such an assumption, Jameson suggests a reading of cultural works as 
parts of a symbolic network of meanings and forms, which are not to be seen as the direct and 
predictable outcomes of a social structure, nor as disengaged from society either. Instead, 
cultural works, he maintains, are formed through a process of restructuring, refraction and 
transformation of the social reality within which writers and translators are positioned. This 
means that the text, be it translation or original literature, is not viewed as a copy or an 
allegory of society as a whole. It rather stands as an integral part of a social life and 
simultaneously as the space in which social agents make sense of, seek to defend, justify, 
manage, control, criticise or refute this life. From this perspective, cultural texts stand as much 
in a relation of accordance with as in a relation of tension and opposition to historical social 
formations which constitute their precondition (ibid. 32-49, 76-77, 81-82).
The main supposition in Jameson’s suggestion is that while texts express and 
articulate historical social structures and relations, they never do so in a direct way. The key 
notion Jameson uses to clarify this point is that of the ‘political unconscious’; a term whose 
full significance is not relevant to my work, 102 but whose underlying logic can provide an 
illuminating perspective for the reading of translations and translation norms as social 
phenomena. Although it is borrowed from psychoanalysis, the term ‘political unconscious’ is 
for Jameson not an individual, but a collective unconscious, in which those aspects of history 
and social reality that are not conceptualised by the various individual consciousness and 
remain unexpressed or concealed in ideological discourses are gathered as sediments. This 
unconscious ‘knowledge’, in Jameson’s view, is reinserted in cultural products in the form of 
contradictions, aporias or antinomies, that is, as symptoms of repression, projection, 
compensation or displacement of the reality of society and history (ibid. 44). Behind the
102 Jameson writes as a literary theorist. He therefore relates the notion of the ‘political unconscious' to the 
narrative form. This idea is proposed, as he argues, in an attempt “to restructure the problematics of ideology, of
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textual form, narrative structure or translation choices, it is suggested, one can then read -  or, 
more accurately, interpret and reconstruct -  a prior “subtext”, which is not to be understood as 
denoting a thing-in-itself, an immediately visible, common-sense, external reality, which 
perseveres inertly into the written form. Rather, this reality becomes attainable only as a form 
of reconstruction, as a rewriting or transcoding of the given text, which shows the text itself to 
be a rewriting: an expression and transformation of the social real within which and because 
of which the text was brought into being, and which is also carried within the text, drawn into 
the textual form (ibid. 80-81).
Two closely interrelated aspects of the notion of the ‘political unconscious’ are 
particularly important for our discussion: the first is Jameson’s emphasis on the role of the 
political unconscious in the constitution of the intrinsically dialogical nature of the cultural 
text (an idea that is, of course, attributed to Bakhtin’s and Volosinov’s work103), which is not, 
however, grasped as a mere pluralism of voices, but acquires, in his work, a social and 
political significance (ibid.: 84). The second is his employment of the notion of a collective 
unconscious as a means to read through the text a “subtext” of history, thus defining the 
historical ‘Real’, which stands as the cause of particular textual choices as an “absent cause”; 
a cause which is not reducible to texts, but is nevertheless imperceptible and inaccessible to us 
except in textual form: “our approach to it”, as Jameson writes, “necessarily passes through its 
prior textualisation, its narrativisation in the political unconscious” (ibid.: 35) 104
The first of these points has already emerged in our discussion of modem conceptions 
of translation and knowledge and will guide my subsequent analysis of translations, both as a 
structured, norm-governed system and as texts. As part of the polysystem of the target society 
in question, the subsystem of translations from the classics exhibits, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter, a structure and relation to its context which justifies all assumptions of early 
polysystem theory: translated literature is imported to fill in a perceived ‘gap’ in the target 
culture, it stands in a context of hierarchical and antagonistic relations within this culture, it is
the unconscious and of desire, of representation, of history, and of cultural production, around the all-informing 
process of narrative” (1981: 13).
Both Bakhtin and VoloSinov view the text as intrinsically “heteroglossic” and “dialogical”, an expression of 
the “social multiaccentuality” of language, in which one does not merely discern pure ideological and 
manipulative forces, but the co-existence of social voices, the inscription of social conflicts and antagonism, as 
well as the capacity of historical societies to propose alternatives to their historical reality (Bakhtin 1934-351; 
1981; VoloSinov 19291; 1986: 23)
This position is based on Althusser’s notion of Darstellung. This concept is employed by Althusser in order to 
designate a model of historical causality in which the ‘structure’, which acts as the ‘cause’ of articulation is 
immanently, totally present in its effects (in discourses, repertoires), it has no other existence but in its re­
presentation, while being simultaneously irreducible to it. It is thus argued by Althusser that "the structure is 
immanent in its effects, a cause immanent in its effects in the Spinozist sense of the term, that the whole existence 
of the structure consists of its effects, in short that the structure, which is merely a specific combination of its 
peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects” (Althusser and Balibar 19681; 1970: 189).
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defined by the prestige and status of the source literature and so on. Yet it further seems that 
this very structure and the norms which determine its formation are shaped and produced by 
the discourses of the target social community: both by conceptions of translation and the 
translated texts in question.
What the latter develop is then a dual position. On the one hand, they articulate and 
seek to sustain the necessity of social and cultural divisions, the presumably beneficial 
consequences -  or at least inevitability -  of antagonistic relations, and the need to constitute 
society and culture as an organic whole which enables its groups and cultural forms to 
compete with each other, but maintains and sustains its hierarchical structure. On the other 
hand, there emerges another aspect of these translations, which interrupts their certainty and 
comes to oppose the naturalness and validity of their claims. This second voice not only 
indicates a kind of awareness or, an ‘unconscious knowledge’ of the ideology inscribed in the 
apparent meaning of the texts; it further directs us, as readers, from this meaning to the 
historical conditions of antagonism and hierarchies that define modem bourgeois societies. It 
thus enables us to read the claims put forward by the translated texts as the expression and 
legitimation of a certain social structure and organisation; an attempt to displace and conceal 
social inequality and opposition that develop as an inherent feature of social relations in 
modem capitalism, by naturalising them; and simultaneously a means to criticise and question 
the legitimacy of their social context, rather than the outcomes of either a universal structure 
or of agreement. What these translations then indicate, by their very duality, is that the norms 
which determine the target polysystem in question are related to the actual social stratification, 
oppositions and antagonism of the target context, and thus cannot be seen as the products of 
consensus among all participants in social communication, but as the outcomes and the means 
of advancing an imaginary consensus, which attempts to retain unity in an historically split 
and divided society.
Yet the ‘Real’ to which these translations direct us -  and this point brings us to the 
second aspect of the ‘political unconscious’ -  does not seem to be reducible to a history of 
domination, oppression, exploitation, as if human nature and human societies were essentially 
bound to evoke ideals of autonomy and equality only as ideological constitutions. Instead, 
what is concomitantly made evident through the reading of these texts is a different subtext: 
along with justifications of inequality and social divisions emerges a quest for another form of 
collective life; a need for a society which is not formed by social divisions, but is based on 
and acts to sustain equality, human solidarity and autonomy, and forms its knowledge of right 
and wrong through a process of collective self-institution. If then the ‘Real’ of a society can be
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conceived in psychoanalytic terms, as an experience which is impossible to assimilate and 
introduce into language (the symbolic order) ,105 an experience which is impossible to say, but 
nevertheless “returns” in the form of self-interruption, contradictions and aporias, 106 then this 
Real, the limit modem consciousness runs against, is not only the truth of our societies’ 
‘inhuman’ nature, the reality of our “barbarism”.107 It is also the truth of a civilisation, which 
emerges through the lines of existing ones, but can only be realised in a social reality that is 
different to the present.
105 As Sean Homer explains, the Lacanian concept of the ‘Real’ functions as the limit of the other two Lacanian 
orders, i.e., the ‘Symbolic’ and the ‘Imaginary’. Real, in Lacan’s terms, is what resists symbolisation absolutely. 
The Real for the trauma, for example, is what the subject cannot assimilate, while the Real of repression is that 
which it is impossible to say. In other words, the Real does not have a substance or meaning, and, in this sense, 
all of its characteristics are purely negative (1998: 51).
The ‘Real’ appears in this form precisely because it does not ‘mean’, but only functions, as ¿iiek  has pointed 
out. It is its ambiguous function, as that which supports and interrupts the symbolic order that makes its presence 
perceptible. The ambiguity of the Lacanian Real, ¿iiek  suggests, lies in the fact that it “is not merely a 
nonsymbolized kernel that makes a sudden appearance in the symbolic order, in the form of traumatic ‘returns’ 
and ‘answers’.’’ The Real is, at the one and the same time, the non-symbolised kernel which becomes present in 
the form of errors and contradictions, and also that which is contained in the very symbolic form. The Real is 
then “immediately rendered by this form" (in Homer 1998: 51). For a further discussion of Jameson’s use of 
Lacan see Jameson’s article “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan" (19771988).
This point refers to Walter Benjamin’s dictum that “there is no document of civilisation which is not at one 
and the same time a document of barbarism” (19501; 1992: 248).
C h a p t e r  3
T r a n s l a t io n s  o f  t h e  C o n c e p t  o f  ‘D e m o c r a c y ’ in  t h e  P o l y s y s t e m  o f  
N in e t e e n t h -C e n t u r y  B r it a in
One of the most significant images of Athenian democracy was included in Thucydides’s 
History. When fifth-century Athens came to the end o f  the first year of the Peloponnesian 
war, Thucydides writes, Pericles, political and military leader of the city, delivered his 
famous “Funeral Speech”, which presented a glorifying image of the Athenian polity. The 
speech began by defining the name and features of this polity:
xai ovopa pev 6ia t 6  ah ¿5 6X17011; dXX’ 6; nXEtova; oixetv 6ripoxpcma xixXTytai (II. 
xxxvii).
“Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of 
the whole people”, as Rex Warner wrote in his translation of the passage (19541; 1972:145). 
Warner's translation stems from the assumption that democracy entails the bestowal o f power 
on the people; the postulate that at the root of all conceptions of democracy, as Anthony 
Arblaster has argued, “lies the idea of popular power, or a situation in which power and 
perhaps authority too, rests with the people” (19871; 1993: 8).
From such a perspective, a different translation of Thucydides’ History, written by 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in 1629, appears to distort the real image of the Athenian 
polity:
We have a form of government . which, because in the administration it hath respect not to 
a few. but to the multitude, is called a democracy (I6291; 1843 8 191, my italics)
The essence of democracy in this translation is found not in the power of the people, but in 
the fact that government has regard to the multitude1014 (“hath respect to” 109), that is, it has 
consideration for the majority in the administration of social issues. In other words, people do 
not govern themselves, but their views and interests are taken into account by the 
government.
A translation mistake, one may argue, if one could afford to ignore its constant 
repetition until at least the end of the nineteenth century. Hobbes’ work, which was reprinted 
three times from the seventeenth to the middle-eighteenth century (1634; 1676; 1723), was 
succeeded by William Smith’s translation. Smith suggested the following rewriting of the
passage:
™ On the negative connotations of the word ‘multitude’ see Williams’s Keywords 19761; 1988 192-197.
According to the OED the phrase “to have respect for” meant “to have regard for” or “reference to 
something" (Cf OED s v. ‘respect’) I am grateful to Joanne Collie for drawing my attention to the meaning of 
the term
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our form [of government] as committed not to the few, but to the whole body of the 
people is called a democracy (17531; 1831: 1. 167).
The translation presents again a division between the government and the people, but 
expresses in clearer terms the commitment of democratic governors to the entire social body 
What is more, Smith does not relate democracy to the multitude, as Hobbes’ translation did, 
but to the society as a whole, that is, to the well-being and interests of both the social elite and 
the majority. This choice does not, however, entail a conception of democracy as based on a 
condition of social equality. As Smith writes, classical democracy was only the product of “a 
love of Liberty”, which was “warm and active in every Athenian”, but had nevertheless 
“erroneously been supposed to thrive and flourish best in a democrática! government” (1753: 
a, my italics).
Such a denial of what many of us would tend to recognise as the core of Athenian 
democracy, namely the sovereignty and equality of the people, becomes more meaningful 
when related to conceptions of democracy before the twentieth century, when political 
consensus in Western thought was based, as C. B. Macpherson notes, on negative appraisals 
of democratic constitutions:
Democracy used to be a bad word Everybody who was anybody knew that democracy, in 
its original sense o f rule by the people or government in accordance with the will o f the bulk 
o f the /Kople would be a bad thing fatal to individual freedom and to all the graces o f 
civilized living That was the position taken by pretty nearly all men of intelligence from the 
earliest historical times down a hundred years ago (1966:1, my italics).
For the translators in question, democracy, defined as a form of government bestowing power 
and authority on the people, was not an institution which establishes political and social 
justice, but a menace to social order and coherence, threatening both prosperity and progress 
Then, after the first decades of the nineteenth century and within a period of fifty years, 
democracy, as Macpherson points out, “became a good thing” (ibid.: 1) and translators of 
classical Greek texts became one of the predominant agents of this transformation in Britain.
1. The Emergence of a Problematic on Democracy
The tradition of negative appraisals of classical democracy was initially manifested in 
Thomas Elyot’s description of the Athenian city as a “monster with many heads” lacking 
stability and social coherence (15311; 1883: 1. 9-10), and found one of its most famous 
expressions in Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides. Hobbes’ introduction to this translation 
described the ancient historian as “most hostile to democracy ”, on the grounds that social 
order and consistency would be damaged by following the demagogically susceptible political 
judgement of the common people ( 16291; 1843: 8 xvi-xvii). The same belief was inscribed in
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Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides’ phrase “6 ia  t o  |x t| ¿5  6 X.iyovc; aXX' ¿5  Jikeiovac; olxeiv”, 
which establishes a distinction between the multitude and the government that is absent from 
the source text, thus defining democracy as that specific form of government which does not 
stem from the political power of the majority, but nevertheless takes the multitude’ into 
account when considering political matters. This line of thought, which either implied an 
unequivocal conviction of democracy or the reduction of democratic institutions to a matter 
of administration that takes the majorities into account appears in both major translations of 
Thucydides from the seventeenth until the late eighteenth century, i.e. Hobbes’ and 
Smith’s.11" It thus enables us to speak of a canonical pattern and a form of normatively 
determined behaviour.
The viewpoint expressed in these translations was further sustained by a wide number 
of other rewritings and representations of Greek political thought. Hence the choice to 
interpret classical writers in ways that negated democratic values was theoretically sustained 
by Edmund Burke (1729-1797), who referred to Aristotle in order to argue that “democracy 
has many striking points of resemblance with a tyranny” (17901; 1910: 121). The same 
position underwrote the translations of the Scottish historian and classicist John Gillies. More 
specifically, Gillies’ translation of Aristotle’s Politics was introduced as an attack on 
government based on consent, while the “true sense” of Aristotle’s work was limited to the 
justification of the natural right of monarchic leaders to govern. Aristotle’s description of man 
as a “political animal” was thus explained in the introduction and comments to the translation 
as an indication of the "natural” disposition of men to form political societies based on the 
authoritative power of monarchy and the strict separation of the main body of citizens and 
their government (1797: 2.3-6) In the same spirit, Gillies’ translations of Lysias and Isocrates 
claimed to present an illustration of the unhappiness generated by republican polity and the 
turbulent life in “democracies”, which were “deprived at once of civil liberty and national 
independence” (1778: l.lxii-lxiii).
in a similar spirit, Gillies’ History o f  Ancient Greece intended “to explore the 
dangerous turbulence of Democracy”, describe “the incurable evils inherent in every form of 
Republican polity”, and evince “the inestimable benefits” of “hereditary Kings and the steady 
operations of well-regulated Monarchy” (17861; 1792: l.iii). Likewise, William Mitford’s
" ’ To my knowledge, no other book-length translation of Thucydides’ History was published during this period 
There is only one translation of selected passages of the source text, which refer to the plague (i.e the illness) that 
affected Athens during the Peloponnesian war, written by Tho Sprat [sic] and published in 1679 Before the 
publication of Hobbes’ translation, only one translation of Thucydides’ text was available, made by Thomas 
Nicholls (1550) This work, which used a French translation of Thucydides as a source text, was never printed
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History o f Greece (the first major work on the topic in English111) stressed the “uncertainty 
and turbulence of democratic rule”, the inherent tendency of ancient democracies to 
encourage “ambitious individuals to make popular passion serve their private purposes” and 
the evident undermining of the Athenian democracy by the “want of one supreme authority” 
whenever the city encountered serious problems and difficulties (17781835: 1. 326, 2. 104- 
105).112 While Mitford was willing to stress that the cultural development of fifth-century 
Athens had reached a “perfection that no country hath since surpassed” (ibid.: 2. 299), he 
considered classical civilisation as the result of a “peculiar felicity” that happened to bring at 
the time the most competent of men in the ‘right’ positions and was not connected to 
democratic politics. As he stated,
It was the peculiar felicity of Athens in this period that, of the constellation of great men 
which arose there, each was singularly fitted for the situation in which the circumstances of 
the time required him to act (ibid 2: 251-252).
What was perceived by the Athenians themselves and, as will be seen, by several liberal 
translators of the nineteenth century as the foundation of classical culture, namely the 
democratic institutions and polity, was described by Mitford as detrimental to the 
development of literature, arts and philosophy, on the grounds that democracy failed to 
promote excellence and social cohesion:
That form of government compelled the men to associate all with all The general assembly 
necessarily called all together; and the vote of the meanest citizen being there of equal value 
with that of the highest, the more numerous body o f the poor was always formidable to the 
wealthy few (ibid : 2. 301 ).1,3
Their internal diversity notwithstanding, translations and rewritings of classical 
democracy from the sixteenth until the late eighteenth century appear to have been defined by 
the denial of any value democracy may be considered to have and/or the tendency to 
dissociate classical culture from institutions establishing the liberty, equality and sovereignty 
of the Athenian citizens. Yet, while it is clear that none of these works bestowed a 
definitively positive value on the concept of democracy, the central issue regarding the period 
opened up by Hobbes' translation is that representations of classical Athens provided a space.
again after that time This information was found in Foster’s bibliographical survey (1918 117-118). 1 have not 
been able to view either of these translations 
111 On this issue see Momigliano 1952: 12-14.
The first volume of Mitford's History appeared in 1776, while the completed work (four volumes) was 
published in 1778 This was the most widely read book on the topic until the publication of George Grote’s 
History o f Greece in the middle of the nineteenth century
It is worth noting, at this point. Mitford’s description of the position of women in Athens The historian 
presents the exclusion of women from the public realm as their conscious effort to avoid democratic society a 
society which presumably compels every man to associate with all others As Mitford puts it, "the ladies, to avoid 
a society which their fathers and husbands could not avoid, lived with their female slaves” (ibid : 2 301)
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within which democracy was spoken about, a field for discussion, which sought to illuminate 
the political features of the Athenian society through historical writings and reproduce the 
cultural and intellectual voices that grew out o f democratic institutions through the translation 
of classical texts. No doubt, this discussion was initiated by emphasising the distance of 
modem societies from democratic ideas and politics. Still, after the sixteenth or seventeenth 
century, both translations and other forms of rewriting classical culture became engaged in an 
attempt at demarcating this distance as lucidly as possible; at pointing out one by one all of 
the features of the Athenian democracy; at giving reasons for the rejection or the 
reformulation of its values; and finally, at examining in all details the implications of 
democratic practices for modem social organisations. Such a proliferation of discourses, as 
Foucault has emphasised (19761; 1990), cannot merely be examined as a negation of 
democratic principles; an attempt at oppressing the political power of the majority and 
suppressing its potential for political participation. For apart from asserting the dangers of 
democratic institutions, or more accurately, irrespective of the expression of negative or 
positive appraisals, these writings acted to introduce the notion of ‘democracy’ into the 
political thought of their time and determined (among other factors) its subsequent range of 
meanings and significance. In this sense, they constituted the conceptual frameworks within 
which democracy was revived at the time and accepted as a positive concept and a legitimate 
form of government during the next centuries.
The question then at stake, as Foucault’s methodological position clarities, is not 
merely to state whether these texts say yes or no to democracy, whether they assert or deny its 
importance, but to account for the fact that democracy is (for the first time after the ancient 
classical years) extensively spoken about, “to discover who does the speaking, the positions 
and viewpoints from which they speak, the institutions which prompt people to speak about it 
and which store and distribute the things that are said” (ibid.: 11). Most significantly, one is 
required to understand the words and concepts through which these discourses are 
constituted, illuminate their relations to their intellectual and cultural past and find, as 
Reinhard Koselleck holds, the language experiences that are stored in them (1998: 35). From 
such a perspective, one can then proceed to examine the position of these discourses in the 
broader conceptual frameworks of their time and seek to reconstruct, through their reading, 
the historical conditions that necessitated their constitution and were articulated in them.
In this sense, one can initially identity two interrelated notions evoked by these works: 
that of the individual, civil subject, and that of social hierarchies. Hobbes’ translation, which 
was considered to have a deep and lasting influence on the development of the philosopher’s
thought and language, " 4 expressed a concept that was hardly an established part of his 
contemporary political discourses and was destined to become the central assumption of 
liberal democratic thought14 15 in the next centuries: that of the ‘subject’, who is able to 
contemplate and discuss social matters, and has the right to be a ‘citizen’ of a state. This idea 
was most clearly conveyed by the translation of the debates that took place in the Athenian 
Ecclesia (Assembly) and constitute a significant part of Thucydides’ books. These debates 
portray a model foT political organisation, based on reasoned discussion and deliberation 
among (male) citizens, who are given full freedom to speak and decide on issues of public 
concern, while being considered in this context as moral and political equals. The translation 
of these passages did not merely record the speeches and dialogues o f the source text. It rather 
functioned metonymically, as an evocation of the broader social and political life of classical 
Athens. 116 In other words, Hobbes’ translation did not merely transfer the source text as an 
historical document, but presented a model for political institution and social organisation.
In this capacity, this work became an integral part of a wider seventeenth-century 
problematic over the legitimacy of religious authorities, the status of monarchic power and 
the feudal system of property rights. Written only thirteen years before the outbreak of the 
English civil war in 1642, in a context which was marked by radical economic and social 
changes -  the passage from feudalism to a capitalist mode of production, and the subsequent 
constitution of the bourgeois classes, represented in the House of Commons -  this evocation 
of democratic polity set up the traits of a political model, which could fulfil the needs of the 
newly emergent bourgeoisie to contest previously established hierarchies and articulate a 
range of values and ideals that would legitimise its social position and power. The key 
concept in this process was that of the ‘individual’: the ‘self-conscious’ human being, who 
does not automatically subject himself [sic] to a social condition prescribed by God (and 
materialised by the representatives of God on earth, the monarch, the aristocracy and church- 
authorities), but can freely formulate his own political opinion and will. It was due to this 
radical idea of ‘individuality’, which was further elaborated in the Leviathan (16511; 1968), 
that Hobbes can be described, in Foucault’s terms, as a “founder of discursivity” (19691;
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114 On the issue see Rossini 1987:303
115 The meaning of ‘liberal democracy’ has not remained stable in different historical periods and political 
contexts The concept will be employed in two interrelated ways in this work a) descriptively, in the sense that it 
will be taken to signify the ways liberal discourses describe their “attempt to uphold the values of freedom of 
choice, reason and toleration in the face of tyranny, the absolutist system and religious intolerance” (Held 1996: 
74 Cf. Dunn 1979: 28-54) and b) critically, in the sense that it will be taken to signify an ideological conception 
of liberty, reason and toleration, which acts to reinforce socioeconomic hierarchies and asymmetrical power 
relations.
16 For a discussion of the metonymic function of translation see Tymoczko 1999: 41-61
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1998: 216-220), who set up, in conjunction with his main theoretical opponent, John Locke 
(1632-1704), the “rules of formation” of liberal democratic discourses.
Hobbes’ individuals were essentially self-interested, uncultivated and unable to solve 
by themselves social conflicts and oppositions. Hence their freedom had to be surrendered to 
the power o f a sovereign governor. Yet this move of subjection could only be legitimised 
once individuals decided to establish this power and agreed \o obey it. 117 What is more, this 
form of sovereign government was no longer the expression of the will of God. It was 
described in the Leviathan as ‘representative’ of the will of the people. As Hobbes puts it, 
a Multitude of men are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, 
Represented; so that it be done with the consent o f  every one o f  that Multitude in particular 
(1651 *; 1968: 220, my italics)
This conception of representation, which bestowed a limited and controlled political freedom 
on the social body, but implied simultaneously the exclusion of the people from political 
constitution and government, dictated the transformation of one of the most renowned 
features of the Athenian democracy in Hobbes’ translation: the direct participation of all 
citizens in the common affairs and political decisions of the city. The Athenian citizens, as 
Thucydides writes, were all equally responsible for the political government of the city: 
fvi te to t ;  avrrol; oixeicuv apa  xa'i txokixixiBv ¿txipekeia xai exfpoiq jxpo; Epya 
xexpappevoi? tci Jiokixixa pt) ivbewg yvuivac povot yap xov xe pt|6ev to>v6e pexe'xovxa 
oux drtQdypova, &kk' axpelov vopitlopev, xai auxoi fjxoi xpfvopev ye fj ¿v0upotipe0a 
6p0fi>c; xa  jxpaypaxa (II. xl).
Hobbes translated the passage as follows:
Moreover there is in the same men, a care both of their own and the public affairs, and a 
sufficient bum-ledge of state matters, even in those that labour with their hands For we only 
think one that is utterly ignorant therein, to be a man, not that meddles with nothing, but is 
good for nothing We likewise weigh what we undertake, and apprehend it perfectly in our 
minds (16291; 1843:8, 194, my italics)
The most striking transformation of the source text is found in the rendering of the phrase 
“gdvoi yixp x 6 \  xe ptibfev xtbvbe pex^xovxa ovx ¿urpdypova, d/peiov vopt^opcv”, 
which says that the Athenian people considered a man who did not participate in politics (xov 
te pribfev xfbvde pexixovxa) to be worthless and incompetent (&XQ£i°vK into a much milder 
renunciation o f apolitical men as "utterly ignorant” of public affairs and state matters. 
Hobbes’ position was further sustained by the translation of the phrase “x a i ¿xipotc; Jipog 
fpya texpanpivoK id  jroLmxd pfi ¿vbeuic yvcovai”, which says that the people who are
117 For a further discussion of this issue see Held 1996: 76-78
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chiefly involved in work (jipoq ggya) have “no lack of insight into political matters”,118 by 
the statement that there is “sufficient knowledge of state matters, even in those that labour 
with their hands”. The translated phrase not only diminishes the involvement of the Athenian 
people in politics, by suggesting that citizens have merely “sufficient knowledge” of political 
issues, but also introduces the idea that those “who labour with their hands” and are 
presumably the least likely to be involved in politics are in possession of this knowledge. 
Historically speaking, the closest equivalent of Hobbes’ conception of manual labour in the 
Athenian context would probably be slaves, not workers, and this is the reason why the 
original talks about £pya, that is ‘work’ in general, rather than manual work."9 A final 
change can be found in the translation of the last phrase of the passage, which says, according 
to Charles Foster Smith’s translation, that “we Athenians decide public questions for 
ourselves” (1956: 329).120 Hobbes’ translation does not bestow a political connotation on this 
statement. It describes, instead, a process of intellectual evaluation and apprehension (“We 
likewise weigh what we undertake, and apprehend it perfectly in our minds”), which is not 
related to “public questions” and political decisions, as is the case in the source text
If Hobbes was reluctant to recognise individual sovereignty, Locke, at the end of the 
seventeenth century, employed the concept of man’, in order to celebrate the rationality of 
individuals as well as their natural property of “Lives, Liberties and Estates”, and the 
obligation of political government to protect this property (16901; 1988: 350). The work of 
both of these thinkers was appropriated by the founders of the American constitution and 
became the basis for the ambivalent disposition of American revolutionary thought towards 
the Athenian democracy. Despite some general appeals to classical antiquity, the founding of 
the United States of America manifested a self-distancing of republican thought from 
"purely” democratic affiliations, on the grounds that the exercise of political power by the 
commons would violate the principle of mixed government and endanger individual liberty 
and rights. “Pure democracies”, as Madison wrote in the l ederalisl in 1788 (no 10), 
have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention, have ever been found incompatible 
with personal security or the rights of property, and have in general been as short in their 
lives as they have been violent in their deaths (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1787-17881; 1987:
126)
The reason for the presumed failure of democratic institutions was claimed to be the 
“naturally” self-interested character of the people, which stands at the root of an all-pervasive
"* The translation used is Charles Forster Smith’s (1956: 329).
Cf. C. F, Smith's translation of the phrase as those “who give attention chiefly to business” (1956:329).
Cf Warner's translation “We Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to 
proper discussions” (19541972: 174)
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conflict and antagonism in every social community. Madison followed Hobbes in believing 
that the pursuit of pre-eminence, power and personal profit are the inescapable features of 
human nature, which “have divided mankind ... inflamed them Ipeople] with mutual 
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co­
operate for the common good”. But the most durable source of antagonism, Madison states, 
has always been “the various and unequal distribution of property”, since those who hold 
unequal proportions of property consistently form groups with “distinct interests in society” 
(ibid.: 124). The assumption that human societies are naturally based on socioeconomic 
inequality and conflicting interests (which is profoundly contradicted by Madison’s assertion 
that social opposition has a social cause, namely the unequal distribution of property) 
necessitated, for Madison, the abandonment of democratic ideals and the adherence to a 
“republican” political organisation, which was sharply distinguished from the idea of direct 
bestowal of power on the people. In this context, as Russell Hanson explains, “a democracy 
represented rule by the commons' or demos”, while “a republic was ruled in common for the 
commonweal” (1985:77; cf. Hanson 1989';1995).
The establishment of this semantic distinction was crucial for the subsequent 
transformation of ‘democracy’ into a positive term and the reappraisal of the Athenian polity. 
As Jennifer Roberts has argued, by coopting republican principles for liberal ends, Madison 
managed both to detach the democratic discourse from republicanism and to establish a 
redefinition of terms whereby an aristocratic theory of politics was couched in sufficiently 
democratic language, so that the founders would later be claimed as the originators of 
American democracy At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Jefferson was able to assert 
that “we in America are self-consciously ... democrats”. This new conception o f ‘democracy’, 
as Roberts points out, had been made possible by the reiteration in the Federalist of the 
destructive or irrelevant nature of the Athenian political system. This semantic transformation 
would enable the far more enthusiastic picture of classical democracy that emerged in the 
nineteenth century in both Europe and the United States of America (1994:186).
Democracy began to be described in positive terms, once it ceased to evoke ideals of a 
fully realised equality and popular power, and was, instead, related to a liberal form of polity, 
the establishment of basic civil rights and parliamentary representation, which left secure the 
hierarchical social structures of modem bourgeois societies. In the course of the nineteenth 
century democracy was equated with a political system based on extended and later universal 
adult suffrage, together with the protection o f civil rights -  freedom of speech and political 
association, and security of life and property -  as well as the equality of citizens before the
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law. These tiaits, which were forcefully asserted by the French Declaration o f  the Rights o f  
Man and Citizen in 1789, and were gradually accepted as legitimate throughout Western 
Europe, transformed democracy into a matter of legal and political administration, which was 
strictly dissociated from the unequal positions from which social agents were able to 
participate in social institutions and politics. This move, as Raymond Williams points out, 
involved a substantial de-radicalisation of democratic thought. For it implied the dissociation 
of democracy from connotations of popular power and thus its distancing from a political 
system in which the interests of the majority are both exercised and controlled by the majority 
itself (19761; 1988: 96). In many ways Hobbes’ and Smith’s translations provide us with the 
key concepts employed in this redefinition of democratic polity: a) the concept of the 
relatively autonomous ‘individual’, defined as an abstract, universal figure, who stands 
against the political government of society and is accountable to the rule of laws, irrespective 
of his or her social position and power to affect this government and the laws that sustain it; 
b) the concept of social hierarchies -  implied in Hobbes’ use of the term ‘multitude’; c) the 
idea that these distinctions entail conflicting aims and interests, which must be taken into 
account and reconciled by a democratic government; and d) the division between the ‘people’ 
of a community -  what would be subsequently named by translators as ‘civil society’ -  and a 
system of political institutions and government.
The development of these ideas was interwoven with the establishment of industrial 
capitalist societies and the values employed in order to conceptualise and sustain them. 
Liberal democracy and capitalism, as Macpherson points out, go together:
Liberal democracy is found only in countries whose economic system is wholly or 
predominantly that of capitalist enterprise And, with few and mostly temporary exceptions, 
every capitalist country has a liberal democratic political system (1966: 4).
This coexistence is not coincidental. The key features of liberal democracy, which establish 
the essential contestability of fixed social hierarchies and the idealisation of competition, but 
nevertheless posit social inequality as the basis of political freedom and civil rights stand in 
total accordance, as Marx argued, with the logic of commodity production and the rules of the 
capitalist market. The capitalist mode of production, as Marx’s work has shown, is based on 
and acts to construct a condition of socioeconomic inequality, which is neither the obvious 
outcome of all forms of political economy nor the natural feature of all historical or 
conceivable societies. Inequality has rather developed as the feature of a specific mode of 
economic and social organisation, in the context of which different classes acquire distinct 
and hierarchically stratified economic and social positions -  defined by Marx in relation to 
the possession of productive resources -  from which they participate in exchange relations
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that perpetuate and strengthen these inequalities.121 Likewise, the idea of ‘competition’, as 
Marx explains in the Grundrisse, has historically developed to mean the abolition of a certain 
range of obstacles and limits peculiar to the levels of production that obtained before the 
development of capital (a condition described by the physiocrats as laissez faire, laissez 
passer) and came to represent the clash between individuals released from social and political 
bonds and acting only in their own interests. In this sense, the very prerequisite o f  this form of 
free competition has been the domination of capitalist production. “Free competition”, Marx 
writes, is “the relation of capital to itself as another capital, i.e. it is the real behaviour of 
capital as such”, which becomes conceived of as the freedom of individuals. In other words, 
free competition is a condition that stems from the nature of capitalist economy and is thereby 
expressed conceptually as an external necessity. It becomes (rather than is) the natural 
condition of social development, at the cost of effacing its engendering in a certain kind of 
economic, political and social organisation (19531; 1977: 371-373).
Let us further elaborate this point. The concepts and rules that arise in the context of 
the capitalist market, as Marx has maintained, play a fundamental role in the conception of 
other aspects of social life and set up the conditions for the construction o f a political 
framework, by which social and economic relations are canonised and directed. Hence, the 
individual freedom to participate in commodity exchange and pursue profit, without being 
bound by restrictions imposed by the feudal system of stratification and property rights, but 
also the freedom of the working classes to sell their labour and thus subject themselves to 
capital as well as the formal equality of opportunity, which not only conceals the unequal 
social positions from which people pursue their goals, but is also bound to result in 
antagonistic relations and socioeconomic inequality, are notions that emerged in the 
functioning of the market and were redefined in relation to the organisation of the social and 
cultural life of modem bourgeois societies 122 Still the most significant notion that developed 
in this context and was evidenced in the translations in question was the opposition between 
‘civil society’ and ‘political society’, i.e. the presumably representative institutions of the 
democratic state Civil society, according to Marx and Engels, emerged in the eighteenth 
century as that aspect of social organisation which embraced the whole range o f commercial 
intercourse, industrial development and cultural life and was presumed to be opposed to or at 
least dissociated from the political realm. In the context of civil society human beings were 
understood as individuals, rather than citizens, and thereby the civil context was
' ” For a further analysis o f this issue see the first volume of Capital (18831, 1970)
See Marx and Engels' I he (icrman Ideology, especially parts I -3 (19651; 1974: 39-81).
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conceptualised as antithetical to political society and to a conception of man as a political 
subject.12' This antithesis became the foundation of representative democratic institutions and 
politics. Democracy was defined as that form of political government which is separated from 
the social body in order to protect and secure the ‘civil rights’ of individuals, irrespective of 
the latter’s position within social and cultural hierarchies. Hence the democratic state, as 
Marx maintains, abolishes the distinctions established by birth, social rank, education, 
occupation, “when it decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation are rum-political 
distinctions; when it proclaims, without regard to these distinctions, that every member of 
society is an equal partner in popular sovereignty”. It is only on this condition that this state 
can assert to represent and pursue the common interests of the society as a whole (18431; 
1975: 219). Yet social hierarchies are not effaced, because they are claimed to be non- 
relevant to political organisation and institutions. Neither do they leave this organisation and 
institutions unaffected. How can wealth or social rank be non-political, as C. J. Arthur 
remarks, when they provide access to the means of political persuasion and influence? And 
how can the uneducated man be in the same position as the educated one with respect to 
formulating meaningful politics? Or how can the political opportunities of a man of leisure be 
the same as those of less privileged members of a community? (1974: 10-11) In other words, 
how can these divisions be considered as politically insignificant simply because they are 
claimed to be so?
As the following reading of translations will seek to argue, the ideals of civil rights to 
freedom, security and property that formed the basis of liberal democracy not only developed 
as the outcome of the specific institutions and organisation of bourgeois societies; they further 
acted to silence the historical and political foundations of these societies, thus presenting the 
social structures and politics of their historical context as given and natural. But more than 
this, the democratic ideals of freedom and equality, which were presumably policed by the 
government were, in this social context, essentially unrealisable The conditions that 
guaranteed for each individual the conservation of his person, rights and property, as Marx 
has suggested, could not have enabled the actual establishment of freedom and equality, since 
they prevented civil society from rising above the self-interested and egotistic behaviour that 
define the capitalist market. On the contrary, the security provided by the values, norms and 
political laws of the democratic state became the guarantee of the society’s divisions, 
suppression of freedom and egoism ( 18431; 1975: 230).
m See Marx and Engels I9651; 1974 57-60, Marx 18431; 1975
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In this framework, the nineteenth-century turn to classical Athens, which was not only 
a British, but a wider cultural phenomenon in Western Europe,124 and the rewriting of the 
concept of ‘democracy’ specifically, developed as a discursive field which articulated and 
legitimised these ambiguous ideals by projecting them onto the political institutions of 
classical Athens. In this sense, translations of the ancient Greek concept of ‘democracy’, as 
will be examined, became integrated into the political thought of the period and acted to 
nourish and sustain the social conditions within which they emerged. These very conditions, 
however, did not only entail the establishment of social inequality, opposition and relations of 
domination and exploitation. Their attainment was rooted in a logic that was inherently 
capable of transforming and transcending itself; a thought-mode that stemmed, according to 
Marx, from the constant need to revolutionise the socioeconomic conditions on which it was 
based, and thus provided the foundations for the questioning of all conceptions of the social 
world, including those which fostered its maintenance. Capitalist societies, Marx suggested, 
and the predominant agent of their development, the bourgeoisie, “cannot exist without 
constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of 
production and with them the whole relations of society” (18481; 1978: 476). This necessity 
stands then as the precondition and the instigator of a perpetual self-transformation and 
problématisation of social, cultural and political givens:
Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones 
All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away, all new formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify All 
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned (ibid 476)
This image depicts a context of instability, which provides the conditions for self-critique and 
does not allow for the acceptance of a social, moral or cultural order as transcendent. In the 
framework of bourgeois societies, it is argued, values, ideals and beliefs are objects for 
questioning and consideration propelled by the absence of all immanent standards that may 
uphold them. No aspect of social life remains untouchable by the dynamics of this critique 
However firmly positions, politics and ideals may be put in the place of traditional 
authorities, their triumph can neither be secured nor stabilised. Its power can only be short­
lived, precarious and ultimately self-subversive.
124 For a further discussion of this issue see Sandys’ history of classical scholarship (1903-I9081; 1964), Lloyd’s 
discussion of classical influences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (1982), Pfeiffer's study of the history of 
classical scholarship in Italy. France and Germany (1976), and Turner’s discussion of the role of classical thought 
in nineteenth-century Europe 1981: 1-3.
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This questioning of principles by which social and political life is understood, which 
was described by Marshall Berman as the most prominent feature of the experience of 
modernity (1982), stood as the foundation of democratic thought and defined the ambivalent 
standpoint of modem interpretations and translations of classical democracy. In all of these 
works we will find that any attempt to justify and present as immanent an historical social 
structure generates a possibility for its own self-critique; it is compelled to doubt itself; to 
acknowledge that social and cultural life can always develop to be otherwise.
2. The Position of Translations in the Historical Context of Nineteenth-Century Britain
After the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British interest in classical culture and 
politics was remarkably intensified. Hobbes’ translation was reprinted five times (1812; 1822; 
1824; 1841; 1843),12:1 and Smith’s translation six times throughout the century (1805, 1812, 
1815, 1831, 1892; 1898). A significant proportion of these publications were initiated and/or 
endorsed by utilitarian thinkers, while a number of Hobbes’ translations was edited under the 
auspices of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Bentham was the political philosopher who 
formulated, together with James Mill (1773-1836), the basic principles of nineteenth-century 
English liberalism (Held 1996: 95) and, in Macpherson’s terms, the “founding model for 
democracy for a modem industrial society” (1977: 43). Bentham, James Mill and the 
Utilitarians in general, as Held suggests, developed at the time one of the clearest 
justifications for the liberal democratic state, which creates the conditions necessary for 
individuals "to pursue their private interests without the risk of arbitrary political interference, 
to participate ‘freely’ in economic transactions, to exchange labour and goods on the market 
and to appropriate resources privately” (1996: 95). The extended appeal of Hobbes’ 
translation during the first decades of the nineteenth century was part of this significant turn 
in the British philosophical and political thought, which entailed the appropriation of classical 
‘democracy’ by utilitarian and liberal discourses.
In the context of this turn, the meaning of democracy no longer evoked an idea of 
social equality and actual political sovereignty. Bentham’s and Mill’s focus on the individual 
as the most important entity in politics125 26 was not a recognition of a fully materialised 
subjective freedom and autonomy. Liberal democracy, as Macpherson explains, is a system 
“by which people can be governed", that is, made to do things they may not otherwise do and
125 During the same period (1839-45) Hobbes’ entire corpus was collected and edited by Sir W Molesworth This 
information was found in The Westminster Review ( 1867a: 344)
’ For a further discussion of this issue see Francis and Morrow 1994: 58-59.
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refrain from things they otherwise may have done So long that this government is not 
controlled by the people themselves, “democracy ... is then a system by which power is 
exerted by the state over individuals and groups”. Most significantly though, a democratic 
government exists to uphold and enforce a certain kind of society, and therefore a certain 
range of relations among individuals, a certain set of rights and claims that people have on 
each other, both directly and indirectly through their rights to property. These relations, as 
Macpherson argues, are relations of power: they stem from the conditions c f  social, economic 
and cultural inequality that are established in capitalist societies, while acting, in turn, to 
nourish and strengthen these conditions (1966: 4. Cf. 35-45).127
In such a framework, the reading of Hobbes’ and Smith’s work, and the translations 
which followed them, no longer evoked a revolutionary conception of the Athenian 
democracy, against which modem societies had to guard themselves. Far from asserting a 
radical challenge to the utilitarian and liberal ideals of the time, this representation of the 
Athenian polity was able to support their values, articulate their opposition to monarchic 
regimes, sustain their commitment to an individualistic politics, and legitimise their 
intrinsically ambivalent and self-contradictory ideals o f ‘liberty’ and equality’.
2.1 The Target Polysystem as a Political Construct
Parallel and interrelated to the change in political theorising was the development of a wider 
European interest in classical Greece. As Turner points out, this was manifested in an 
unprecedented enthusiasm for Greek cultural production, evidenced in literature, arts, 
scholarly discourses and -  I would add -  translation. The turn towards ancient Greece was a 
novel phenomenon in European intellectual life. Until the late eighteenth century, according 
to Turner, most European thinkers conceived of their culture as Roman and Christian in 
origin, having only an indirect relation to classical Greece.12* The search for new cultural 
roots in Greek antiquity, which was initiated by German Hellenists such as Winckelmann, 
Lessing, Goethe, Schiller and Hölderlin,127 assumed major intellectual significance in both
In the context o f liberal-democratic societies power relations should not be considered as confined to the 
constitution of a legal framework by which social rights and duties were determined As Foucault has argued in 
Discipline and Punish, the development of liberal-utilitarian thought during this period presents an exemplary 
case of a highly effective disciplinary mechanism that extends beyond the legal force of the state This mechanism, 
which was codified, according to Foucault, in Bentham's idea for the ‘Panopticon’, defined “power relations in 
terms o f the everyday life of men”, in the determination of appropriate, permissible and inappropriate modes of 
behaviour that defined personal and social life and relations (19751; 1977 : 205, Cf. Foucault 1977,1980)
'* The issue is further discussed by Turner in his article "Why the Greeks and not the Romans in Victorian 
Britain” (1989). For a meticulously documented presentation and analysis of the nineteenth-century British 
interest in classical Greek antiquity see Turner 1981 and Jenkyns 1980
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Europe and the United States of America, when ideas, beliefs and institutions inherited from 
the Roman and Christian past became problematical and Western intellectuals felt the need 
“to understand and articulate the disruptive political, social, and intellectual experience that 
Europeans confronted in the wake of the Enlightenment and of revolution” (1981: 1-3).
In the British context this newly acquired authority of Greek antiquity was sustained 
by an increasingly dominant position of Greek studies in the educational institutions of the 
period.1,0 Since the medieval times and until the early eighteenth century the education in the 
British public schools, Oxford and Cambridge focused on the Latin tradition Throughout the 
eighteenth century Oxford’s programmes were dedicated to Latin and to a much lesser extent 
to Greek, while at Cambridge equal attention was paid to both literatures, but the university’s 
work was predominantly directed toward the study of mathematics. A stronger interest in 
Greek antiquity was expressed after the middle eighteenth century and was evidenced in the 
reception of the work of two travel writers, James Stuart and Nicholas Revett, The Antiquities 
o f  Athens (1761), which became one of the most popular books among the literary and 
scholarly circles of the time (Jenkyns 1980: 3-4). After the first years of the nineteenth 
century, the study of the Greek classics was substantially strengthened at the public schools 
and became the predominant focus of the new programme of Literae Humuniores at Oxford 
(1807) and, after 1824, of the study programmes at Cambridge.1 ’1
This institutional shift was sustained by a discourse which claimed the contemporary 
relevance and value of classical education, whose purpose was conceived to be the cultivation 
of “manliness, patriotism and a love of liberty”, the teaching of “the love of Goodness”, the 
"devotion to the welfare of one’s country" and the constitution of “valuable moral lessons” 
(Clarke 1945:12-13). Greek thought, as D. H. Urquhart’ s Commentaries on Classical 
Learning indicate, was presented as valuable to men of all professions and ranks: "the 
lawyer”, “the physician”, the “naval and military officer”, “the statesman”, “the artist” and 
“the merchant” (1803: 6-66). A similar viewpoint was expressed by schoolmasters in the 
public schools, including Samuel Butler, B. A. Kennedy, and Thomas Arnold, whose work 
stressed the need to relate classical learning to contemporary interests and understand the 
implications of Greek thought for the students’ own life and experience, instead of pursuing a 10
110 For a further discussion of this issue see Clarke 1959: 74-127. The following information on the classical 
education in Britain is largely based on Clarke’s work, unless it is noted otherwise
As Clarke points out, by the 1840s three separate Honours programmes had been established at Oxford a) a 
science programme consisting of Aristotle’s Ethics, Politics, ttheloric, and Poetics b) a history programme, 
consisting o f Herodotus. Thucydides, Xenophon, Livy and Tacitus and c) a poetry programme, consisting o f 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Pindar, Homer and Hesiod It is during this period that Oxford 
and Cambridge established the knowledge of Greek literature as an educational requirement for admission for
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traditional study of texts only as models of style.1’2 As Thomas Arnold wrote in the 
introduction to his edition of Thucydides:
The history of Greece .is  not an idle inquiry about remote ages and forgotten institutions, 
but a living picture of things present, fitted not so much for the curiosity of the scholar, as for 
the instruction of the statesman and the citizen (1835:3.xviii, xxii)
Likewise a student of Samuel Butler praised his teacher for succeeding in making him believe 
that the study of the classics is “one thing worth living for” (Clarke 1959: 78).'”
The educational programmes in the public and grammar schools were in fact far from 
materialising such goals, not least because they were predominantly based on pedantic 
translation exercises, which could not have significantly contributed to the learning of, let 
alone interest of the students in classical literature.1’4 It is hardly surprising that in 1835 an 
anonymous writer in The Monthly Magazine considered that not more than one in fifty 
students remembered anything of their classical education, since the dullness of their school 
experience ruined any beauty ancient literature may have had for them (Romberg 1981: 31). 
A similar point is made by Bulwer Lytton in 1883, who wrote that the main clients in the 
public schools, that is, the upwardly mobile middle classes (which he named ‘minor 
aristocracy’) and the boys from traditional aristocracy, are wasting their money when they pay 
“for the Greek which (their sons] will never know” and affirmed that boys leave the public 
schools in general “with little Latin and no Greek” (Bowen 1989: 179). While there were 
certainly attempts at improving these educational standards, among which Arnold’s, Butler’s 
and Dr. Keate’s work1”  were the most notable examples, it seems that an adequate learning 
of Greek could be achieved only in some of the public schools or alternatively through private
every degree (1959: 98-127). Knowledge of Greek continued to be a requirement for admission to Oxford and 
Cambridge until after the First World War (Turner 1981: 5)
112 On the issue see Clarke 1959: 74-97.
1,3 This idea remains strong in the British context for the entire nineteenth century In the middle of the century 
John Stuart Blackie's inaugural lecture at the University of F.dinburgh was devoted to the justification of the 
uselulness of ancient Greek to every educational programme, from the study o f law and theology to the study of 
medicine (1852: 10-24).
'14 Clarke points out that the use of translation in the teaching o f ancient Greek was based on an insistence on 
accuracy, which entailed that the students had to translate each word of the original separately, in order to 
proceed to a translation into continuous English Such translation exercises constituted an integral part of classical 
learning from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century (1959: 53-54, 77, 89) Margaret Kerr von Romberg 
mentions a number of writers, among whom Lord Byron, Bryan Waller Procter (Barry Cornwall), Coleridge, 
Charles Lamb, who were particularly critical o f  their classical education and asserted in later years that they had 
hardly learned any Greek from it or developed a genuine interest in the classics (1981: 25-37). Nicholas G Round 
also describes the detrimental role of ‘literal’ translations and translation exercises, which remained part o f the 
domain of traditional Greek and Latin teaching in Britain for a great part of the twentieth century (1998) C. O. 
Brink confirms that classical education in Britain was predominantly based on exercises in translation, unseen 
translation, as well as composition in Greek, but nevertheless describes them in rather positive terms, as a source 
of creativity and learning (1985: 126-129),
Dr Keate was headmaster at Eton from 1809 to 1834 and his lectures were described as being of exceptionally 
high quality and value (Lyte 1875 339-367).
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tuition116 and for the students who went on to higher education, at Oxford and Cambridge. In 
the programmes of these universities translation was employed as a teaching method only 
during the first part of the students’ education, while at more advanced stages there was a 
“tendency to study the classics not in and for themselves, but in relation to modem thought 
and life”, as R. W. Livingstone wrote in 1932 (Turner 1981: 6).
The increase of translations from ancient Greek into English after the late eighteenth 
century, which was substantially prompted by the actual use and writing of translations in 
educational institutions, is striking. As the bibliographical survey of Finley M. K.. Foster 
(1918) indicates, the majority of the translations printed from 1484 to 1916 were published 
during these years. More specifically, Foster’s research shows that the total number of 
translations up to 1780 was 312, while book-length translations published from 1780 to 1900 
reached 1259 117 The growing interest in translations of the classics produced at the time a 
new form of publication, namely the classical library. The first of these libraries, as Foster 
points out, was The Works o f  the Greek and Roman Poets, Translated into English Verse in 
eighteen volumes (1809-1812), followed by Valpy's Family Classical Library (1830-1834) 
and then Bohn’s Classical Library (1848-1863), which became the definitive edition for the 
nineteenth century and was only surpassed in popularity by the Loeb Classical Library, which 
began in 1912 (Foster 1918: xx).|3x Given the condition of classical studies in British 
educational institutions, which seems to validate Richard Jenkyns’ argument that only a tiny 
minority of the British population could actually read Greek in the original (1980: 64),1, 7 it is 
legitimate to assume that a great proportion of the knowledge of classical Greece at the time 
was acquired through translations Hence when R Ogilvie speaks of the nineteenth century as 
a time when “in every walk of life we find men reading and re-reading the ... great classics” 
(1964: 103), we can justifiably take this statement to assert not the importance of Greek 
literature per se, but the influence that translations of Greek literature exercised at the time. 136
136 John Stuart Mill is a notable example of a privately educated scholar, who began learning Greek under the 
supervision of his father at the rather unusual age of three (Mill 1873*; 1969: 5).
13 As Foster explains in the preface to his book, these figures do not include “solitary translations of excerpts 
from Greek literature” or “adaptations, paraphrases and the like” (1918:xi) Despite this assertion Foster’s survey 
is, to my knowledge, the most extensive and well-documented work on the topic, and fortunately the writer does 
not adopt a very strict’ definition of translation, despite his assertions Still, the criteria he puts for the selection 
of translated texts should prevent us from overstating the results of statistical estimations based on the numbers 
presented in his work
1 18 In addition to the translations published in purely Greek Collections, many translations were included in 
general collections of books such as Morley's Universal Library (1884) Cassell's National Library (1887) 
t.ubhock's Hundred tiesI Rooks (1891) temple ( 'lassies (1897) among others (Cf Foster 1918 xx-xxi)
The same point is argued by K.J. Dover in the introduction to his work Perception o f the Ancient Greeks, in 
which the author maintains that the perception of ancient Greece by the British people “was no perception at all, 
for the Greeks did not enter their consciousness” (1992: xi).
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This change of preliminary norms that determined the translation from classical 
Greek14" seems to confirm Even-Zohar’s supposition of a ‘crisis’ as a significant cause of the 
expansion of translation activity and the structural transformation of a polysystem. The turn 
towards Greece can be understood as the outcome of a crisis that emerged at multiple levels 
of the target context: cultural, economic, social and political. Since already the previous 
centuries Europe had witnessed the breakdown of rural societies, the growth of commerce 
and industry, together with the expansion of the cities and the constitution of the middle 
classes, which challenged the ruling power of traditional aristocracy and the church, and 
became the agents of a radical transformation of the sciences, intellectual life, social 
structures and relations, and political institutions. The industrial revolution brought about in 
nineteenth-century Britain more than anywhere else the collapse of agrarian social 
organisation and the subsequent opposition to the aristocratic elite, which developed, on the 
one hand by the new classes of manufacturers, merchants and traders and, on the other hand, 
by the working classes.
British intellectual and cultural life was profoundly shaped by the attempt of the 
middle classes to challenge a system o f values that had been established by feudal societies 
and construct a discourse that would uphold and legitimise modem capitalist order and their 
hegemonic position within it. A previously established system of convictions and values, 
which presented the feudal world as immanently given and unquestionable, was no longer 
considered as relevant to the needs and concerns of the time. Instead, the spirit which shaped 
the knowledge of this period developed to be strongly individualistic: man, as an individual 
and presumably sovereign being, became the measure of all truths and values, while 
competition set up the standards by which knowledge and ethical claims could be appraised 
and justified. Conceptions of the world as existing in a static and stable order, prescribed to 
men by God, had already began to fade since the end of the previous century.140 41 Their 
authority was in crisis. Yet this crisis was historical, rather than formal in nature. Its 
foundations were laid by the establishment of a new form of social organisation, whose 
functioning and modes of development made traditional dominant models obsolete and 
necessitated the production of new ones. In other words, the crisis of the British polysystem 
was instigated by the social and historical conditions within which this polysystem was 
constituted and was not the outcome of a universalisable law, tendency or structure.
140 Preliminary norms, according lo Toury, “have to do with two main sets of considerations which are often 
interconnected: those regarding the existence and actual nature of a definite translation policy, and those related 
to the directness of translation” ( 1995: 58).
141 For a further discussion of this issue see chapter I
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In this context, the turn towards classical Greece and the extended engagement with 
the translation of classical literature presented a twofold resolution to this crisis. On the one 
hand, translations o f Greek texts provided a widely legitimised past, which was historically 
dissociated from religious dogmatism and authority, but could nevertheless provide some 
stable grounds, by which a changing social world could be conceptualised, understood and 
controlled. This move could not, however, be materialised without the radical transformation 
of previous translations of the classics and a concomitant change of the source texts 
themselves. Hence, norms for the translation of democracy underwent a substantial change 
during this period. Translators moved from the assertion of a negative appraisal of democratic 
polity and the rewriting of Greek works as endorsements of an immanent system of truth and 
justice to an interpretation that sought to question and negate these ideas As the century 
progressed, translations tended to idealise a model of intellectual plurality and relativism that 
became a key feature of liberal democracy. They suggested that all forms of enquiry and 
understanding, and all constitutions of laws derive from human thought and action. This 
condition made laws fragile and contingent, it prevented their authoritative imposition and 
necessitated their subjection to criticism, self-reflection and change. On the other hand, 
ancient Greek works were employed as a model for the establishment of new standards of 
authority, which expressed the positivistic, utilitarian and liberal convictions of their writers 
and affirmed the necessity of social inequality, the privileged position of ‘meritorious’ 
individuals in the constitution of politics and the desirability of antagonistic social relations. 
These two lines o f interpretation articulated, in their interconnection, a new ideal of 
sociocultural order, that became interwoven with the political discourses of the penod and 
developed to accord with the historical conditions of its production.
This new conception of society and politics was initially articulated by the very 
positioning of translations from the Greek within the polysystem of nineteenth-century 
Britain. The introduction of these works into the target polysystem entailed their location in a 
dominant position, which was sharply distinguished from the status of other cultural forms, 
and bestowed on these translations a value and authority, which other intellectual and cultural 
products were presumed to lack. By the same token, the reading, writing and rewriting of 
Greek constituted a form of cultural capital,M:) which was available only to certain social 142
142 ‘Cultural capital' is a term suggested by Pierre Bourdieu and has been defined as the competence in cultural 
codes, which is unequally possessed by the different classes of a society In “The Forms of Capital" (1986) 
Bourdieu distinguishes three forms of capital, the ‘economic’, ‘cultural’ and ’social’ and the same terms are 
employed in Distinction (I9791, 1984). In his essay "What Makes a Social Class” he distinguishes "firstly, 
economic capital, in its various kinds, secondly, cultural capital or better informational capital, again in its 
different kinds, and thirdly two forms of capital that are very strongly correlated, social capital, which consists of
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groups, and whose possession entailed the valorisation of these groups’ social status and 
authority.143
It seems that despite all assertions regarding the importance of Greek literature, which 
came predominantly from the scholars who initiated the massive translation enterprise of this 
period, the idea that every woman and man of nineteenth-century Britain was reading the 
classics, as Ogilvie wrote (above), is historically inaccurate In fact, only few British people 
had the luxury, time or education to read Greek literature, even in translation. The first group 
that should be excluded from this category is the working class As Richard Altick’s study 
The English Common Reader points out, working class women and men did not always have 
the capacity to read in their adulthood, due to lack of proper education, and even those who 
did were unlikely to think that Greek literature was of any relevance to their lives and 
interests (1957: 141-172). Moreover, books that could have been bought by them, as Romberg 
suggests, were circumscribed by their poverty, and even when the cheap popular libraries 
appeared at the price of five shillings per volume and contributed to the transformation of the 
book trade,144 most working class people could not spend a week's wages on buying a 
translation of Plato or Thucydides (1981: 60; Cf. Altick 1957: 252-254). It goes without 
saying that no working class women or men produced any translations o f ancient Greek at the 
time, and no obvious aspect of working class culture was in any way associated with 
nineteenth-century rewritings of classical thought.
The situation was different with the sons of middle-class families, whose education in 
Greek was in general considered useless for their future careers in trade and business, but 
many of whom developed a notable interest in classical literature, that was predominantly 
directed towards the reading and publication of translations. Romberg informs us of an 
interesting case of the successful publisher John Murray II, whose father explicitly requested 
the exclusion of Greek from his education, but whose personal interest in classical literature 
entailed his engagement with the publication of some of the most important translations and 
editions of Greek classics during the first half of the century (1981: 65-66).14:1 The publication 
of numerous partial translations of and articles on Greek literature in periodicals that were 
addressed to a broad audience, including The Edinburgh Review, The Quarterly Review, The 
Westminster Review and The New Monthly Magazine, as well as the appearance of the series
resources based on connections and group membership, and symbolic capital, which is the form the different 
types of capital take once they are perceived and recognised as legitimate (1987: 4)
The notion of cultural capital has been related to translation by Lefevere ( 1998)
144 On this issue see Altick ¡957: 240-317.
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of classical libraries, indicate that, despite their lack of knowledge of Greek, a significant 
number of middle class men read translations and followed an ongoing discussion on the 
classics. The reviewer of Valpy’s Family Classical Library in the New Monthly Magazine 
confirms this point by emphasising that the value of the Library, which was neither “too 
bulky” nor “too expensive”, lay precisely in its capacity to attract readers from “the 
multitudes who have been called in early youth to mercantile or agricultural pursuits, or to the 
bewitching dissipations and all-engrossing duties o f the army and the navy” (1830: 142).146 
Improvements in popular education after the 1840s and especially after the 1870s (when the 
parliament passed England’s Elementary Education Bill and proceeded to the establishment 
of mandatory school-attendance in 1880) must have contributed to the strengthening of 
middle-class interest in Greek literature, given the significance of classical education in the 
organisation of the curriculum.147 * Still, only a limited number of men whose social 
background can be located in the middle classes became active translators of Greek works: 
those who were able to avoid an involvement in business and commerce, and pursue instead 
scholarly interests.
As for women of the middle- and upper-classes, one can quickly conclude that they 
did not normally acquire a knowledge of Greek. Well-known cases of women with good 
classical education, such as Elizabeth Barrett, Sara Coleridge and Mary Shelley, are 
exceptions to the conditions of the period. It seems, however, that a fair number of women 
felt the need to familiarise themselves with Greek literature, not least because of the prestige 
classical studies acquired during the century. Thus, they also chose to read translations, 
especially those published in the so-called “Family libraries”.I4S Reviewers of such 
collections considered women as a significant readership they needed to address; the 
anonymous reviewer of Valpy’s library, for example, stressed the role of the publication in 
the cultivation of “the minds of women” and its contribution to the improvement of a 
domestic life that pertains to a civilized social context (1830: 143). Women who ventured to 
translate from the Greek were disappointingly few during the nineteenth century,149 especially
147 Murray published several new translations of Greek poetry among which were Bland's translations in the 
(j'reek Anthology ( 18131 ; 1833), T. Mitchell’s successful translations of Aristophanes (1820) and Sotheby’s 
translation of the ///W (1831) This information is taken from Romberg 1981: 65-66
l4<’ While this issue has not been the object of systematic research, it is 1 think justified to accept Romberg’s 
suggestion that it seems unlikely that the most successful periodicals of the nineteenth century and the best 
publishers of the time would have continued to publish such numbers of articles on Greek literature as well as 
Greek literature in translation, unless these works could attract the interest of a wider public located in the middle 
classes (1981: 67).
147 On this issue see Clarke 1959: 74-97, Bowen 1989: 171-172.
"* On this issue see Romberg 1981: 67-82 and Jenkyns 1980: 63-64
147 It is not always easy to identify women as translators in a period when the names of translators do not always 
appear in full and in many cases are omitted According to a preliminary research, based on Foster's bibliography.
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when compared to women writers of original literature150 or translators from modem 
languages.151
The first of the above groups, i.e. the traditional aristocracy and gentry, had long ago 
considered some knowledge of the classics as part of its education at the public schools, 
Oxford and Cambridge. But more than this, many aspects of Greek literature had been 
rewritten and translated during the previous centuries in ways that accorded with this group’s 
dominant position in the context of an authoritarian social organisation and politics. The 
interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics and Sophocles’ Antigone from a Christian perspective152 or 
the rewriting of ‘democracy’ as a condition of anarchy are indicative examples of an 
approach to Greek literature which survived during the first part of the nineteenth century and 
was closely connected with the worldview, interests and social status of the aristocratic ruling 
classes.
This approach, however, will be found to be short-lived. Since already the first 
decades of the century translations of classical Greek works shaped a discursive space that 
became associated with the ideology and interests o f middle-class men in two interrelated 
ways: as articulations of a thought-mode that could challenge the authoritative power of the 
aristocratic elite and as a form of cultural capital that could be appropriated by the middle- 
classes. Translations acquired a central position in the target polysystem through a move by 
which classical Greek culture and polity, and conceptions of democracy’ in particular, came 
to express precisely those values and ideas that strengthened the reorganisation of the target 
society and the social role of the middle classes within it.
The agents of this move, i.e. translators of ancient Greek, cannot, however, be merely 
identified with the bourgeoisie, not least because the overwhelming majority of middle class 
men lacked any knowledge of the source language and was predominantly engaged in
the catalogues of the British Library and information collected from secondary sources, I could identify the 
following translations written by women during the nineteenth century, which are, with only one exception, all 
translations of poetry, and chiefly tragedy: [Barrett Elizabeth] (1833) Prometheus Bound. Translated from  the 
Greek o f Aeschylus, and Miscellaneous Poems by the Translator, Author o f 'An Essay on M ind etc. London 
(Reprinted 1896); Swanwick, Anna (1848) The Dramas o f Aeschylus London: Bohn Classical Library, 
Swanwick, Anna (1865) the Agamemnon, Choephori, and Eumenides o f Aeschylus London (Agamemnon only 
was reprinted in 1900); Weber Augusta (1866) Prometheus Vinctus ed by Thomas Webster; Weber Augusta 
(1868) Euripides' Medea Translated into English Verse., [Vardil, Anna Jane] (1809) Poems and Translations 
from  the Minor Greek Poets, and Others: Written Chiefly between the Ages o f Ten and Sixteen By a Lady 
London, Ware [Mary] of Warehill (1809) Poems, Consisting o f Translations from  the Greek, lo a n  and Italian, 
with some Originals London; Chatterton (1862) Selections ¡from Plato I by Iody Chatterton. London Although 
this list does not claim to be complete, its length -  even as the result of preliminary research -  is indicative of the 
absence of a substantial number of women translators of the classics during this period To my knowledge, there 
is no systematic work on the topic 
150 Cf. Leighton 1996; Stevenson 1993.
|51 Cf. Stark 1999
This issue will be analysed in chapters 5 and 6.
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occupations which were hardly compatible with this kind of intellectual enterprise.153 The 
writers of translations could more accurately be defined as a different group, which does not 
develop outside class divisions, but nevertheless entertains a distinct and non-direct relation 
to them: that of the ‘men of letters’ or ‘intellectuals’. The ‘intellectual’ (a category that was 
established in this period, both as a concept and as a social group154) was someone who was 
presumed to possess “a high degree of understanding” 1' '  and to entertain a relation to truth 
and justice that is at once higher to that of the majorities and unrestricted by political interests 
or biases. As Foucault puts it, the intellectual is the figure who is produced within modem 
discourses as a master of truth and value which can and must be applied universally. He is 
“the man of justice, the man of law, who counterposes to power, despotism and the abuses 
and arrogance of wealth the universality of justice and the equity of an ideal law” (1980: 128).
Translators of classical texts are accurately described by this definition. Their work 
was assumed to express a conception of truth and justice that was dissociated from partial 
social interests and could be accepted as legitimate by the society as a whole. Such a 
conviction was extensively articulated by a persistent evocation of translation- 
fidelity,l5'which enabled the appropriation of the authority of the source texts, on the grounds 
of an assumed transparencyl57and neutrality of the translation process John Stuart Mill’s 
description of his translations of Plato’s Dialogues is indicative of approaches to this issue 
during the nineteenth century: “It is the object of these papers”, Mill wrote, “not to explain or 
criticise Plato, but to allow him to speak for himself' (18341; 1978: 60 my italics). From a 
similar perspective, Matthew Arnold’s essay on the translation of Homer employed a 
religious vocabulary in order to stress at once the fidelity and transcendence o f  a good
1,1 The position of the classics in the educational institutions of the period should not be taken to entail an 
incontestable interest in the subject or an unquestionable conviction as regards the usefulness of classical learning 
in the training of future businessmen or manufacturers During the nineteenth-century the government was 
frequently criticised for the narrowness and ineffectiveness of an almost exclusively classical curriculum and 
towards the middle of the century there was a strong demand for the systematic introduction of sciences in 
secondary education. At the beginning of the 1860s a committee that was appointed in order to deal with this 
issue (Westminster and Edinburgh committee) recognised the need to introduce science in the school curriculum, 
but also declared its conviction “that the best material available to Englishmen are furnished by the languages 
and literature o f Greece and Rome” (Bowen 1989: 172).
"4 As Raymond Williams maintains, intellectual' as a noun to indicate a particular kind of person who is doing a 
particular kind of work, that is, a category of people, dates effectively from the early nineteenth century (I9761; 
1988: 169) T W Heyck endorses this view when he argues that “the Victorian years witnessed the origin of 
the idea as well as the vocabulary of the intellectuals'” (1982 15). According to the OED the first use of the 
term with this meaning dates back to 1819. (s v. ‘intellectual’).
1,5 Cf. OED s v ‘intellectual’
154 For a further discussion of conceptions of translation fidelity during this period see Bassnett I9801, 1991: 68- 
73.
1,7 My use of the term is different to the notion of transparency as is defined by Venuti in terms o f ‘domestication’ 
and ‘naturalisation’ of translations (1995:1-42) The term is here employed in order to refer to a metatranslation 
discourse, which describes translation as a means through which one can see the original, rather than a 
‘domesticating’ translation practice
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translation. Arnold defined an ideal translation of Homer by drawing a parallel between the 
“union of the translator with his original” and the “union of the human soul with the divine 
essence”, which could take place, in his view, “when the mist which stands between them 
[the translator and the original] — the mist of alien modes o f thinking, speaking, and feeling 
on the translator’s part -  ‘defecates to a pure transparency’, and disappears” (1860-611960: 
103). What this vocabulary ensured was not merely the presumed accuracy of translations. In 
a context that was profoundly marked by social insecurity, conflict and ideological turmoil, 
Mill’s and Arnold’s metatranslation discourse gave a promise of truth that could prescribe 
and regulate social relations by virtue of its supposedly universal legitimacy. The status of the 
source texts together with claims to translation fidelity were evoked in order to ascertain the 
translation’s capacity to articulate and codify this truth, to recover a discourse of 
transcendence.
In many ways the claim to universality was more significant for nineteenth-century 
intellectuals than assertions of faithfulness, and the latter was often sacrificed for the sake of 
the former As the translator of Plato, Benjamin Jowett, stated towards the end of the century, 
a good translation should be faithful only to the extent that the source text itself satisfies an 
ideal of transcendence. This means that the translator should be allowed to change and 
correct the original in order to avoid reproducing signs of partiality or intellectual weakness 
He should be able to rewrite the source text as the author would have written it, had he 
constantly fulfilled the requirements of a universal model:
In some cases, where the order is contused, the expression feeble, the emphasis misplaced, or 
the sense somewhat faulty, he [the translator] will not strive in his rendering to reproduce 
these characteristics, but will re-write the passage as the author [Plato] would have written it 
at first, had he not been ‘nodding’ (1892: xvi).
The role of these statements was crucial for both the canonisation of translations 
within the British polysystem and their function as a moral and political standard in the target 
society. Evocations of universality not only legitimised the dominant position of these works 
in the target cultural context; they further acted to present the translations as expressions of a 
social model that could provide a disoriented, ideologically confused and still uncertain 
audience with lines of intellectual, moral and political guidance. In a period in which fixed 
social standards and relations were constantly challenged and questioned, the role of men of 
letters, as T.W. Heyck and Eagleton suggest, was precisely to help their readership through
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the troubles of economic, social and religious change, by providing models of stability and 
harmony in a society that was deeply marked by internal conflict and instability.158
Formed within and by conditions of social antagonism, such a discourse was far from 
being able to fulfil its promises: it was far from being either faithful to the originals or 
universalisable. Despite claims to the contrary, translations from the classics changed and 
rewrote the source texts in ways that will be found to articulate the thought-mode and values 
that pertain to modem bourgeois societies and the social interests of the middle classes within 
them. From this perspective, translators of classical texts sustain Gramsci’s conception of 
‘organic intellectuals’: the thinkers who are not isolated from historical societies and political 
interests within them, but are created together with a social group, emerge “organically” out 
o f it, and “give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the 
economic, but also in the social and political fields (1929-351; 1971: 5).
Hence, the work of these translators, as will be argued in the next sections, developed 
as an answer to a necessity: it aimed to till in a gap, an absence of a discourse which could 
justify the social and political domination of the middle classes, by providing them with an 
authoritative predecessor and a legitimate model for the social and political organisation of 
the target society. This gap was not, however, the product of a structural, but of an historical 
necessity: the need of a newly constructed bourgeoisie to imagine a past for a social world 
that had, up to that moment, no tradition upon which it could lean back and no authorised 
ancestors which could justify its validity. But more than this, translations from the classics 
stemmed from the necessity to establish a unifying and consolidating discourse in a class 
society that was not only formed on the basis of social opposition, but was also in possession 
of the conceptual means, by which this opposition could be grounded on historical causes and 
be resolved in ways that would transform existing social structures and relations. The 
presumably unmediated and privileged access of the translations to the source texts together 
with their assumed capacity to transfer these texts intact in the target context enabled them to 
build up models of social balance that acted to elicit the ‘consensus’ of the wider reading 
public as regards the constitution of a social order, which the majority of this community had 
both objective needs and reasons to change.
2.2 Altering Norms, Translation and Politics: The Establishment of Liberal Democracy
After the beginning of the nineteenth century, English translations of Greek literature 
constituted a prototypical expression of the duality of the discourses of modem bourgeois
138 For a further discussion of this issue see Eagleton 1984; 45-49; Heyck 1982: 36-38
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societies, in the sense that they oscillated between authoritarian social ideals and the 
convictions of an enlightened and liberal politics.
The first translation of Thucydides’ History during this period was written by S. T. 
Bloomfield in 1829. Unlike both Hobbes and Smith, the translator was not overtly hostile to 
democratic politics. He rather presented his work as an endorsement of the political mixture 
of aristocracy and democracy achieved by the British constitution. His translation, as he 
stated, aimed
to illustrate the evils of unbalanced democracy, and to show the necessity of that happily- 
attempted mixture of aristocracy and democracy, which however might float in the 
imaginations of ancient theorists, was never actually embodied, but in the British 
Constitution (1829: vi).
From this perspective, Bloomfield rewrote Pericles’ definition o f democracy as follows:
From the government being administered, not for the few, but for the many [our institution] 
is denominated a democracy (ibid. 366-7).
The rendering of the ‘many’ by the term ‘multitude’ (suggested by Hobbes) is missing from 
this translation and will not appear again in translations of the passage. What is more, 
Bloomfield did not describe democracy as a government which has regard for the many as 
much as the few or makes political decisions in accordance with the interests of the society as 
a whole (as had been suggested by Smith’s translation). In his work, a democratic government 
is claimed to be administered not for the few, but for the many. That is to say, democracy is 
not only posited in a social context in which the aims of the few are opposed to those of the 
many, but also seeks to prioritise the latter over the former.
Bloomfield’s emphasis on this opposition, which played a less crucial role in 
translations written during the previous centuries, expresses a significant change in European 
conceptions of society and politics, which was crystallised in the British context after the 
French Revolution. Before 1789, British intellectuals and political theorists were able to 
perceive of and represent their immediate reality of social conflict (as Hobbes most evidently 
did in the Leviathan), but nevertheless believed that it would be possible to resolve this 
conflict by moderate reforms, which would establish a political alliance between the 
aristocracy and the middle classes without being threatening to the existing status quo. The 
outbreak of the revolution, the September massacres of 1792, the execution of Louis XVI in 
1793 and the images of the Terror dispersed this idea.159 Since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, conceptions of democracy indicated an understanding of Western societies as
159 For a further discussion of the impact of the French revolution on British scholarly and literary circles see 
Dawson 1993: 50-53.
fragmented and divided; as structured on the basis of conflictual rather than harmonious and 
reconcilable interests. By that moment, it had become evident that the goals o f the many in 
modem bourgeois societies could not easily accord with the goals of the few.
This realisation did not, however, entail an immediate endorsement of democratic 
ideas. Quite the contrary; the more the ‘many’ seemed to claim social recognition and power, 
the stronger the negations of a fully developed democracy became.k,u Hence, Bloomfield’s 
translation o f Thucydides not only repeated the distinction between the government and the 
governed that was established by Hobbes’ and Smith’s works; it further denied that classical 
Athens was really a democratic polity. The translation of the passage in question was then 
further qualified by a footnote, which suggested that Pericles’ description “might be a good 
definition of the Athenian government as far as it was supposed to be”. Yet the Athenian 
polity was only “a democracy in name”, Broomfield pointed out. “In fact” it was “a 
modification of aristocracy called elective monarchy” (ibid.: 367).160 61
As the century progressed, the fear of the people and of revolution became weaker. 
While this fear did not vanish before the end of the century, as Eric Hobsbawm has argued, it 
was recognised already before the 1850s that liberal democracy, whose political form would 
be a parliamentary constitution based on a wide suffrage, was “inevitable, but also that it 
would probably be a nuisance but politically harmless” (1975: 15). In this context, 
Bloomfield’s dispute of the Athenian polity was not repeated until the end o f the century. 
Instead, classical democracy became the central reference of liberal and utilitarian thinkers, 
in whose writings the Athenian society was transformed from an object of fear and denial into 
a model for imitation.
This turn was substantially advanced by a significant publication on the History o f  
Greece, written by George Grote over a period of ten years, from 1846 to 1856. Grote’s 
History had an unprecedented success in the British and European intellectual circles, and 
was quickly recognised as a major contribution to both classical scholarship and the fostering 
of democratic ideals (Cf. Momigliano 1952: 13; Turner 1981: 213-214).162 In this work, Grote 
not only presented extensive translated passages in order to sustain his appraisal of 
democratic Athens; he also employed translation in the formation of his historical vocabulary,
160 It is not a coincidence that this period witnesses the coinage of terms which indicate the fear o f the ‘mob’, such 
as mobocracy. Cf. OED s.v. ‘mobocracy’.
161 A similar idea is presented in T. Mitchell’s introduction to his translation of the Comedies of Aristophanes
Mitchell presents his translations as a testimony o f the dangers of democratic politics, against which one should 
juxtapose, in his view, “a constitution so nicely balanced as our own”, which carefully avoids “any exclusive view 
of politics” and prevents social conflicts and divisions (1820: xii-xiii).
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and described, for example, Pericles as the “prime minister” of the Athenian Assembly, and 
the Athenian politics as defined by the oppositions among the “conservative party” and the 
party of “reformers” (1846-561; 1888: 4. 454). As a result, the Athenian democracy was 
perceived as a mirror-image of English society and politics, it lost previous connotations of 
anarchy and injustice, and provided, as Turner suggested, frequent occasion for political 
narcissism (1981: 234).
Grote’s History became so influential at the time that after the middle of the 
nineteenth century most portrayals of classical Athens were inclined to employ a vocabulary 
that assimilated the classical to the modem world and viewed Athens as the infant stage of 
nineteenth-century civil culture and liberal politics. As James Talboys Wheeler wrote in 1855, 
Athens represents the history of
a richly endowed people, learning the arts of self-government and free inquiry with the 
rapidity of an infant prodigy, and springing in a little more than a century from the depths of 
ignorance and political degradation to the loftiest heights of intellectual greatness and 
constitutional freedom (1855, 1: 247-248)
John Stuart Mill wrote two eulogising reviews of Grote’s History, both of which fostered an 
association between the modem world and the Athenian democracy. In the first of these 
works, Mill stated that the roots of modem European nations do not lie with their natural 
ancestors, but with the Greeks: the “originators of political freedom and the grand exemplars 
and sources of it to modem Europe”. The battle of Marathon, he argued, “even as an event in 
English history is more important than the battle of Hastings” (18461; 1978: 273).163 Athens 
came to be seen as both a cultural and political model for British society. What is more, these 
two aspects of the Athenian society, i.e. culture and politics, were for the first time 
understood as closely interrelated. Democracy was conceived of as the basis of classical 
civilisation, while the latter was described as the natural outcome of democratic politics: the 
progress of Athens in the arts, sciences and philosophy, as Mill argued, had been shown by 
Grote to be the result of the Athenian democratic polity, which established “liberty” and “the 
unimpeded authority of law” (18531978: 316).
But what did democracy mean for these writers? And how did translations of ancient 
Greek texts serve to sustain its meaning? Mill’s appraisal of Athens in the above reviews was 
justified by the quotation of a further translation of Thucydides (ibid.: 317-319), which had 162
162 Grote himself was actively involved in nineteenth-century politics and became a member of the House of 
Commons in 1833, as part of the circle of the philosophic radicals which included Jeremy Bentham, James and 
John Stuart Mill On this issue see Hamburger’s Intellectuals in Politics (1965) and Clarke 1962.
For a further discussion of conceptions of the Athenian democracy by the English Utilitarians see Pappe 1979
Translations of the Concept of Democracy in the Polysystem of Nineteenth-Century Britain 145
been made by Grote himself and had been included in his History o f Greece. This work 
defined democracy as follows:
It [our constitution] is called a democracy, since its (>ermanent aim tends towards the Many 
and not towards the lew  (1846-561; 1888:5. 67 my italics)
The translation transforms the original phrase “xal Svopa gev 6ta to gr| ic. dkiyonc &X.X’ ¿c 
tiXeiovac; olxelv 6i]goxeaua xixkt)Tai” into the rather vague assertion that democracy is a 
form of government whose “permanent aim tends towards the Many and not towards the 
Few”. This means that it differs from Hobbes’ work, since it recognises the majority as the 
"aim” of democratic government, while Hobbes restricted democratic processes to a 
government’s ‘consideration’ of the needs of the multitude. Yet it also follows its 
predecessors, by suggesting that this ‘aim’ would not be sought by the ‘many’, but by an 
institution that is strictly separated from the social body of citizens, i.e. the government.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Henry Dale wrote a similar translation of the 
source text:
In name, from its not being administered for the benefit of the tew, but of the many, it [our 
form o f government] is called a democracy (1848 112).
Dale’s work introduced into this definition the notion of ‘benefit’, which had been more 
implied than said in all of the previous translations, and suggested that democracy’s aim must 
serve the benefit of the many. Still it continued to set up a distinction between the ‘many’, 
who do not actively pursue this benefit, and the government itself. In a partial translation of 
Pericles’ speech, Ernest Jones followed Dale’s rendering of the passage, without, however, 
acknowledging his source (1867*; 1885: 47). Subsequently, Richard Crawley’s translation 
defined the Athenian polity as founded on a government "whose administration ...favours the 
many instead of the few” (1876:1.121).
Neither the source text nor the history of classical Athens could justify such a division 
between the few and the many The Athenian democracy was administered on the basis of 
direct participation of citizens in the Assembly, which decided on all significant political 
issues, from legislation to finance and military matters. In the context of the Assembly, the 
Athenian citizens (i.e male and Athenian bom adults over the age of 20) were considered as 
moral and political equals and were all responsible for the government of the city. It follows 
that in the source context the concept of democracy conveyed the idea of direct, free and 
equal participation of all citizens in the institution o f public affairs.IM This meaning was not
IM This point does not imply that classical democracy was not formed on the basis of an exclusionist politics The 
many’ in classical Athens were still the ‘minority’ o f  the population of the city, since women and slaves were 
deprived of any political rights Slaves were not ‘citizens’, while Athenian free women were regarded as ‘citizens’ 
only in order to legitimate the recognition of their citizen-sons, and had no right to participate in politics These
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reproduced in the translations. From Hobbes’ to Crawley’s works, democracy was represented 
as a form of political organisation by which the majorities are governed in a way that takes 
into consideration or prioritises their interests, but do not themselves acquire political power 
After the first decades of the nineteenth century this transformation did not, however, 
entail a negation of the value or existence of the Athenian democracy. It rather crystallised a 
significant change of the meaning of the concept, which brought about the identification of 
classical democracy with the principles of liberal democratic politics. What this 
transformation implied was that democracy was dissociated at once from the idea of social 
equality and the notion of popular political power. The key concept that defined its meaning 
became individual liberty: the freedom to participate in elections and articulate political 
opinions publicly, as well as the liberty to pursue one’s goals and secure one’s rights in the 
context of civil society. These forms of liberty were described by Crawley’s introduction to 
his translation as the main features of the Athenian democracy. As he stated, the reader of his 
work could find in the presentation of Athens “the political freedom which he glories in, and 
the social liberty which he sometimes sighs for” (1876: 1. xi, my italics). Equality became 
thereby understood as electoral equality (political freedom) and equality of opportunity 
(social liberty): the right of all people to compete over the attainment of social status, political 
power or economic growth, irrespective of their initial social position or rank. As Mill put it 
in theoretical terms in his “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform”,
In a democracy there is no contended poverty. No one being forced to remain poor; many 
who were poor daily becoming rich, and the comforts of life being apparently within the 
reach of all, the desire to appropriate them descends to the very lowest rank (18591, 1875:
53).
Democracy, in other words, was defined as the political system which secures the conditions 
for social mobility and imposes no apparent obstacles to people’s desire to appropriate goods, 
reach higher social positions or attain political power. This system was not incompatible with 
poverty itself and the existence of social and political divisions. Mill only opposes “forced” 
poverty: the restriction of the right to seek individual advancement and profit. The 
establishment of this social and material freedom, as Arthur Partridge pointed out in his work
exclusions notwithstanding, the Athenian Assembly, to which Pericles refers in Thucydides’ text, was indeed the 
key political body of Athens and was responsible for the government of the city. For a further discussion of 
citizenship' and ‘participation’ in classical Athens see Sinclair 1988: 24-135 An historical approach to the 
Athenian democracy which focuses on the institutional and social conditions that enabled the establishment of 
democratic polity can be found in Davies I9781; 1993: 87-116; Stockton 1990: 57-116; 165-188, and Glotz 1929: 
117-263. For a social history of classical democracy see Croix 1981: 3-30; 205-326; Jones 1957: 3-20, and 
Anderson P 1974: 29-44 For a discussion o f the ideological aspects of ancient democratic thought see 
Boegehold and Scafuro 1994 For a discussion of the social and political status o f women in classical Athens see
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On Democracy (published one year before the Second Reform Act) stands as the foundation 
of democratic equality in modem societies:
Material freedom means also equality It means freedom to get, to spend and to save wealth 
In other words, freedom of trade, direct taxation, and economical and honest government 
All three are inextricably bound together as a free system (1866: 349).
It was precisely this understanding of democracy that enabled Grote to state in his 
translation that the Athenian city did not bestow political and constitutional power on the 
people, but enabled social advancement and chose only those citizens o f  “real worth” as 
governors. As the source text reads:
... piTEOTi 6b x ara  pbv robe vopouc npdc sb t5ia bidqopa :uSoi t6 faov, x a t a  6e tqv 
cb; Exaatog £v rip Eiiboxipei oOx (mb pbpov; to xXbov ¿5 ta  xo iva  f) (m' 
dpETtl5 npotipfiTai (II. xxxvii).
Grote translated the passage as follows:
As to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man, while in regard to 
public affairs and to claims o f individual influence, every man's chance o f advancement is 
determined not by party favour hut by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his 
own particular department (1846-561; 1888:5 67 my italics).165 
The translation maintained the meaning of the first phrase of the passage, which refers to the 
equality of citizens before the laws as regards private disputes. The rest o f  the passage was 
substantially transformed by the employment of the concept of "individual influence”, which 
is absent from the source text, and the use o f the phrase “every man’s chance of advancement 
is determined ... by real worth ...”, which rewrote the source-text idea that every man’s 
chance of attaining a position of political responsibility is determined by his ability to 
perform the particular task. Both of these choices stem from an understanding of democracy 
that pertains more to nineteenth-century liberal convictions than to classical political 
institutions. For the Athenians, to be in positions of political responsibility was not equivalent 
to the idea of personal advancement or influence. The members of the Athenian Voule, a 
body of five hundred citizens who were responsible for the administration o f  issues that were 
not discussed in the Ecclessia, were elected by lot. Their position was considered as 
predominantly administrative, had a relatively low salary and did not entail the attainment of 
political power, since all important decisions on public matters had to be endorsed by the 
Ecclisia. Participation in the supreme court of justice, the Heliaia was open to every
Pomeroy 1975: 57-119, and Walker 1983 For the development of democratic politics after the fifth century sec 
Hansen 1991, For a comparison between ancient and modem democracies see Finley 19731; 1985 
165 Compare to: “When it is a question of putting one person before another in positions o f public responsibility, 
what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses” (Warner 
1954'; 1972: 145)
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Athenian citizen over the age of thirty. The Ecclesia had the absolute right to force citizens to 
leave public positions, i f  they were deemed to be unfit for their responsibilities. What is more, 
no citizen had the right to attain a position in the public administration more than once or -  in 
the case of participants in the Voule -  twice in his lifetime. This law prohibited the 
association of such positions with the fulfilment of political ambitions of individuals.166 It 
follows that Grate’s idea that democracy enables "individual advancement”, irrespective of 
political affiliations (“party favour”) and the social status that pertains to them, could only 
make sense against the background of liberal politics, which conceived of democracy as 
identical to the establishment of freedom for competition, rather than the Athenian historical 
context.
But more than this, Grate’s translation entailed the negation of the source-text’s idea 
that all members of a democratic community have both the right and obligation for equal 
participation in politics. The Athenian political model was based on the assumption that men 
could fulfil themselves only in and through the polis, on the maxim that the "virtue of the 
individual is the same as the virtue of the citizen” (Jäger 19331; 1965: 2.157). The rights and 
obligations of citizens in Athenian society followed, as Held puts it, from their existence qua 
citizens. They were not individual, but public rights and duties (1996:17). This decisive trait 
of classical democracy was testified, as I argued, by Thucydides’ description of the Athenian 
citizen as a man who "participates” in the institution of the polis (II. xl). Grote translated the 
passage in question as follows:
the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on 
public affairs For we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter not 
as harmless, but as useless Moreover we always hear and pronounce on public matters 
when discussed by our leaders, or perhaps strike out fo r  ourselves correct reasoning about 
them (1846-561; 1888: 5. 69).167
Unlike Hobbes, Grate maintained the idea that the Athenians regarded as useless any man 
who abstained from public affairs. Yet his rewriting of the last phrase of the passage (which 
states that "we Athenians take our own decisions on policy or submit them to proper 
discussion”168) by the assertion that the Athenians hear and pronounce on public matters 
when discussed by their leaders or may develop for themselves correct reasoning about them, 
effected a significant transformation of the source text. The Athenians were presented in the 
translation as having a passive role in the determination of political issues, as a community 
which listens and chooses, but does not actively plan a certain politics. It hears and endorses,
IM For a further discussion o f  these issues see Glotz (1929), especially chapters 4 and 6. 
Ir’7 The source text is quoted in the first part of this chapter
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but does not participate in political discussions. No aspect of the source text could legitimise 
such a division between the “leaders” of the city and the people who abstain from political 
deliberation.
It is important to understand that the logic that informed Grate’s translation was in 
accordance with the ideals of liberal democracy and was not considered to entail an 
oppression of the people or the establishment of an authoritarian politics. The key notion that 
defined liberal politics was ‘freedom’, not equality. Egalitarian and libertarian politics, as 
Norberto Bobbio has argued, may have converged at marginal points, but are also rooted in 
profoundly oppositional conceptions of human beings and society, namely conceptions which 
have been individualistic, conflictual and pluralistic for the liberal; totalising, harmonious and 
monistic for the egalitarian. In other words, the chief goal for the liberal is the happiness of 
the individual, even if the wealthier and more talented achieve this happiness at the expense 
of poorer and less gifted. On the contrary, the chief goal for the egalitarian is the 
advancement of an entire community, which may often entail significant constrictions in the 
sphere of individual freedom (19881; 1990: 32-33). Hence from Grate’s perspective, the two 
main ideas articulated in his translation, that is, the relation of democracy to free’ social 
advancement (which implied the integration of liberal democracy into a system of social 
hierarchies) as well as the dissociation of democratic politics from the actual bestowal of 
power on the people, constituted the very meaning of democracy and were not antithetical to 
it. On the same grounds, Grate totally identified the Athenian democracy with liberal 
aristocracy, when he stated in an anonymously published review that
it is to democracy alone (and to that sort o f open aristocracy which is, practically, very 
similar to it) that we owe that unparalleled brilliance and diversity of individual talent which 
constitutes the charm and glory of Grecian history (1826: 280, my italics).
Likewise, John Stuart Mill was convinced that democracy should not entail the self-institution 
of a community, but the consensual establishment of an educated and progressive elite as the 
political and cultural leader of a people. “The idea of a rational democracy”, he asserted, “is 
not that the people themselves govern, but that they have security for good government... the 
best government (need it be said?) must be the government of the wisest, and these must 
always be a few” (Bums 1969:294).
Two main arguments justified this position. The first was that social liberty was not 
compatible with a political system that ensured the full and equal participation of all citizens 
in political government. For such a system, it was argued, would act to oppress the rights of 168
168 This translation is made by Warner 19541; 1972. 147
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minorities and become detrimental for the progress of the entire social body, by 
institutionalising as laws the will and intentions of the most uneducated and less worthy of its 
members. Secondly, it was suggested that the true interests of the majorities could neither be 
discerned nor pursued by them, but had to be defined and reconciled with the interests of 
minorities by a representative government that was trained for the purpose. Hence the 
reasoning behind Grote’s argument was that democracy itself had to be protected from its 
inherent tendency to bring about a tyranny of the mob.
This idea, which underlay the various traditions of European liberalism, was initially 
expressed by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) in his highly influential book169 Democracy 
in America. In this work Tocqueville drew attention to the dangerous and despotic nature of 
the multitude in a democracy, which is unable to distance itself from petty pleasures and 
banal interests, and is always in need of a protective power that would secure it from its 
passions:
I am trying to imagine under what novel features despotism may appear in the world In the 
first place, I see an innumerable multitude of men, alike and equal, constantly circling around 
in pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their souls (1835-18401,
1968: 2. 898).
From a similar perspective, Mill, who often praised Tocqueville’s work (Cf. Mill 18401; 
1859), asserted that “the tyranny of the majority is now generally included among the evils 
against which society requires to be on its guard" (18591; 1989: 8) and argued for the 
necessity of political divisions (which he extended to the field of electoral rights) in any 
political system that sought to protect democracy and liberty. As he maintained in his 
“Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform”,
There is no such thing in morals as a right to power over others, and the electoral suffrage is 
that power When all have votes, it will be both just in principle and necessary in fact, that 
some mode be adopted of giving greater weight to the suffrage of the educated voter, some 
means by which the more intrinsically valuable member of society be singled out, and 
allowed a superiority of influence proportioned to his higher qualifications (18591, 1875: 21) 
Democracy, it was stated, is a system of government which does not only leave intact 
historical distinctions between ‘educated’ and ‘uneducated’, ‘valuable’ and ‘worthless’, 
‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ members of the social body; it further necessitates the bestowal of 
greater electoral power on citizens who are “intrinsically valuable” and better qualified, in 
order to avoid the imposition of the power of the uneducated majority on others.
169 On thè reception of Tocqueville’s work at thè time see Mayer 1968
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This form of political organisation accorded, in Mill’s view, with the will and interests 
of the entire social body, since it authorised the most capable members of the community to 
handle public affairs for the benefit of the less educated ones. “There is no one”, Mill argued, 
“who would not rather have his affairs managed by a person of greater knowledge and 
intelligence, than by one of less.” “There is no one who, if he was obliged to confide his 
interest jointly to both, would not desire to give a more potential voice to the more educated 
and more cultivated of the two” (ibid.: 20). What is more, liberal democracy, as Mill 
suggested in his review of Tocqueville’s book, ensures the development of the society as a 
whole, by enabling the development of industry and commerce and the increase of profit for 
the greatest numbers: “A nation is advancing in prosperity”, Mill argued, when the industry is 
expanding, ... its capital rapidly augmenting [and] the number of those who possess capital 
increases”. Such a growing “equality”, which is secured by a democratic polity, “is one of the 
features of progressive civilisation” (18401; 1859: 63). From this point of view, democracy 
was defined in precisely those terms that were expressed in Grote’s translation: the system 
that secures the attainment of “individual influence”, social and economic “advancement” for 
all o f its members who do not possess privileges by rank or status, but have the means to 
pursue their goals, accumulate profit and compete over the attainment of positions of power.
Two fundamental suppositions underwrote this view of society and politics: the 
necessity of social hierarchies and the desirability of free competition and antagonism. These 
were considered by Mill as the basis of democratic politics and the foundation of social and 
cultural progress. No community, he argued, can avoid stagnation, backwardness and inertia, 
no community “has ever long continued to be progressive, but while a conflict was going on 
between the stronger power in the community and some rival power”:
between the spiritual and temporal authorities; the military or territorial and the industrious 
classes; the king and the people; the orthodox and the religious reformers ( 1861 '; 1972;
268).
Hobbes and Madison after him conceived of conflict as an inevitable, yet detrimental feature 
of social communities that had to be controlled and restricted by the authority of the 
government. Grote and Mill saw conflict as the basis of social freedom and the source of 
cultural and political development. Their vocabulary is strongly reminiscent of Kant’s 
understanding o f antagonism as the natural feature of human societies and the means for the 
realisation of a free and civilised community From a similar perspective, Grote and Mill 
conceived of conflict as the key for the establishment of freedom and civil rights (the right to 
oppose absolute authority and pursue one’s goals irrespective of restraints imposed by class 
divisions) and the means to instigate intellectual and material progress. Democracy, as was
L
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stated by Grote’s translation and Mill’s rewritings, could set up the rightful political 
framework for the development of this conflict and the distribution of political power on the 
basis of free competition among citizens presumed to be moral and political equals.
When posited against a context of actual historical inequalities of British society -  a 
context which established neither the freedom nor the equal chances of participants in 
competitive social relations -  the above claims seem suspiciously distanced from the radical 
potentials of modem democratic ideals. Democracy, liberty and equality are restricted and 
reformed in ways that question their very validity and come to oppose their meaning and 
function. They form and sustain a social system that is fraught by tensions and contradictions, 
since its founding premises are intrinsically threatened by the conditions they themselves 
articulate and legitimise: a division of labour accompanied by the establishment of certain 
occupations as more valuable than others and a legitimation of social as well as political 
distinctions and hierarchies.
These ideals, we are told, form a model of politics that is addressed to all social 
members: governors and governed, privileged and oppressed, dominant and dominated. The 
key feature of democracy is claimed to be found in its assumed neutrality, its roots in a 
thought-mode that serves no partial interests, participates in no conflict, and pertains to an 
overarching condition of civilisation and social progress for the society as a whole. Yet by 
identifying civilisation with civil society and by endorsing divisions established in the civil 
context, such conceptions of democracy did not speak for the interests of all members o f a 
community. Instead, they set up a model of social organisation that was based on social 
hierarchies, inequality and the profound loss of freedom for the majority of its members. Such 
a condition, as Mill pointed out in his Representative Government, was seen as a necessary 
“price” for a civilised society, which had to prepare the material and intellectual world of 
civilisation by “continuous labour of an unexciting kind” undertaken by the majorities. 
Without such an arrangement, Mill claimed, there can be neither social progress nor the 
material conditions required by civilisation. Hence the society which would choose to limit 
the freedom of the least capable and qualified citizens is ultimately justified by Mill on the 
grounds that this measure leads to the attainment of a higher freedom and a more civilised 
community:
even personal slavery, by giving a commencement to industrial life, and enforcing it as the
exclusive occupation of the most numerous portion of the community, may accelerate the
transition to a better freedom than of lighting and rapine (1861 ', 1972: 198)
The crucial point not to be missed in this statement is that personal slavery is not the fate of 
all social members. In Mill’s view, it pertains to the work and life of the lower classes, the
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most numerous portion of the community, which must ensure that democracy is not 
dissociated from its natural context o f “civilised society” (ibid.: 200). Thus, democratic 
politics come to sustain “civilisation” by justifying those rules that enable the development of 
industry and commerce and the means for the peaceful regulation of social conflict and 
antagonism: laws “for protecting persons and property ... [which] are sufficiently perfect to 
maintain peace” among citizens and “induce the bulk of the community to rely for their 
security mainly upon social arrangements” (18361; 1859: 162). Democracy is thereby called 
to sustain those very conditions that establish and perpetuate sociopolitical inequality in 
modem bourgeois societies: the right to private property, the division of labour and the 
distinction between political government and the majority of the people.
2.3 A Model for Social Assent: Ancient Greek Culture as a Unifying Social Force
Nineteenth-century thought on democracy is best described not in terms of a linear 
development, but as a range of intersecting, complementary, but also antithetical discursive 
formations. The spirit of liberal reform that defined democratic ideals during the first part of 
the century became stronger and more powerful in the period that preceded the Second 
Reform Act in 1867. Democracy was recognised at the time as the inevitable outcome of 
social progress and the central corollary of modem civilisation. As an anonymous writer of 
The Westminster Review argued,
The organisation of democracy is the work which the past has made ready for the present and 
the future to complete Since the first signs of decay appeared in the feudal system, the whole 
course of Western civilisation has tended toward the end: every scientific discovery [and] 
every political advance has assisted in its turn to level ranks and to diffuse power ( 1867b:
479).
A similar position was argued by Matthew Arnold in his lecture “Democracy”, which 
suggested that the rapid expansion o f democracy in Europe is an operation of nature that 
“merits neither blame nor praise”. It nevertheless requires adequate preparation for its 
establishment. This could be achieved, in Arnold’s view, through the appropriate education of 
the chief agents of démocratisation, i.e. the middle and lower classes ( 18611 ; 1962: 7-8, 20- 
21).
In this context a new role was bestowed on the classical tradition. Greek literature was 
established as the source o f ‘higher’ political ideals (which were claimed to be missing from 
the education of the majorities) and the field at which aristocratic and bourgeois classes could 
reconcile and partly harmonise their social claims Arnold expressed the key features of this 
tendercy, which was articulated as an anxiety to direct and instruct the masses so that they
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could advance democratic reforms in ways that would not be threatening to social unity and 
coherence. For Arnold, the main problem posited by the advent of democracy in modem 
times was “how to find and keep high ideals”, given that the people are
the bulk of them, persons who need to follow an ideal, not to set one, and the ideal of 
greatness, high feeling, and fine culture, which an aristocracy once supplied them, they lose 
by the very fact of ceasing to be a lower order, and becoming a democracy (ibid.: 17-18).
The task of modem politics was not to stop this move, Arnold argued, but to put it into the 
right direction: to employ the ideals of an uncorrupted and thriving aristocracy which could 
no longer be found in the English society in order to shape and elevate the thought-mode of 
the middle classes. The source material for such an attempt was located by him in the 
writings of Homer and the means for making this material accessible to modem 
consciousness was deemed to be translation: a translation that would preserve and reproduce 
the grand and noble style of the original (1860-1 *; 1906: 237-238).
Arnold began his lecture on “Democracy” by a reference to Homer. He argued that the 
“grand style” of the Homeric poems is an exemplary expression of a high-minded and 
rigorous aristocracy, whose administrative and political power can exert a beneficial 
influence upon the people. The Homeric style, he pointed out, illustrates “that elevation of 
character, that noble way of thinking and behaving” which is often “generated in whole 
classes of men . . . by the possession of power, by the importance and responsibility of high 
station, by habitual dealing with great things, by being placed above the necessity of 
constantly struggling for little things” (1861 1962: 5-6). These were precisely the features
that tended to vanish, in Arnold’s view, by démocratisation. As he put it:
Our society is probably destined to become more democratic Who will give a high tone to 
the nation then? (ibid.: 18)
The English aristocratic elite was deemed to be unfit for this role: “It is becoming impossible 
for the Aristocracy of England to conduct and wield the English nation any longer”, Arnold 
asserted (18611962 :  6). But neither could such difficult a task be undertaken by the 
uneducated majority. Hence Arnold turned to the state and the capacity of official education 
to advance a civilized spirit “which the stock of knowledge and judgement in [the] middle 
classes is not of itself at present able to supply” (ibid.: 22). A central instrument for such an 
attempt was the literature and culture of ancient Greece.
Arnold’s theory of Homeric translation, which was developed in the same period with 
his essay “Democracy”, set up the principles by which ancient Greek culture could be 
employed for this purpose. The predominant idea behind Arnold’s argument was that Homer 
should not be seen as part of an ancient civilisation, but as an everlasting and unalterable
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cultural creation. As he pointed out at the outset of his lectures “On Translating Homer”, the 
contemporary study of Homer should not regard the epics “as part of a classical course, but as 
the most important poetical monument existing”, an enduring achievement of high culture 
(1860-1 ; 1906: 210). Homer did not produce an historical but a timeless work, he suggested, 
a literature which pertains no less to the modem than to the ancient Greek world. For this 
reason, any attempt to translate the epics for a contemporary audience could avoid, in his 
view, wondering in vain what Homer meant to the Greeks. It should rather be based on the 
modem guardians of high culture, namely the scholars. “The Greeks are dead”, Arnold 
affirmed, “the unlearned Englishman has not the data for judging” a translation, while the 
translator himself cannot “safely confide in his own single judgement o f his own work” The 
only tribunal he can trust is the opinion of those “who both know Greek and can appreciate 
poetry” (ibid.: 212).
The choice of scholars as the only legitimate judge of Homeric translation appears as 
a direct attack on ideals of cultural equality and for this reason Arnold’s translation theory has 
often been described as “antidemocratic”. This thesis has been extensively argued by Venuti, 
on the grounds that Arnold’s focus on a presumably “correct scholarly opinion” as the only 
source for a faithful translation of the epics evidences a view of translation as “a means to 
empower an academic elite” and “endow it with national cultural authority”, while 
simultaneously seeking to impose “scholarly values on other cultural constituencies” (1995: 
119-120, 132). For the same purpose, in Venuti’s view, Arnold considers “nobility” as the 
main Homeric feature a translation ought to preserve, thus assimilating the Greek text to 
scholarly cultural conventions, while marginalizing and excluding popular culture (ibid.: 
133). Against this elitism, Venuti argues, one can posit a more democratic theory of 
translation developed by Arnold’s contemporary, Francis Newman; a scholar who favoured a 
populist approach to Homer17" by using in his translation the style of the English ballad171 and 
fostered liberal democratic ideals by choosing a foreignising and therefore self-distancing and 
potentially reflexive translating method177 (ibid.: 119-124).
17,1 Arnold’s and Newman’s thought on the translation of Homer should not be understood as a personal debate It 
was developed in the context of a widespread problematic on the issue, which touched upon a variety of 
philological, historical and philosophical aspects of the topic On this issue see Gladstone (1858), Anonymous 
j Blackie John Stuart] 1861, Anonymous [Whewell William] 1862, Anonymous [Reynolds S H ] 1862, Blackie 
1866a; Butcher and Lang 18791; 1929
171 By "ballad-poetry” Newman and Arnold meant the traditional folk English ballads, those collected by Bishop 
Thomas Percy in his ReUques o f AncienI Fnglixh Poetry (1765), and songs and ballads collected by Sir Walter 
Scott On the Victorian re-appraisal of the folk ballad see Bold (1979), Bratton (1975), Friedman (1961); Fowler 
(1968).
1 2 Newman's (1805-1897) translation of the Iliad, first published in 1856, employed the literary form of English 
folk ballads as well as an archaic and often eccentric vocabulary The choice of ballad-form was part of a broader 
historical turn in the study of Homer at the time, which was more inspired by a Ronuntic reappraisal of the folk
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While certainly elitist, Arnold’s approach to Homer cannot be described as 
antidemocratic. It expresses a semantic and political change, a turn in liberal conceptions of 
both democracy and ancient Greece, but not an attack on democratic ideals. Nineteenth- 
century liberal writers, as has been argued, were never hostile to the idea of social and 
cultural inequality, so long as these were the product of ‘free’ and ‘unrestricted’ competition 
rather than fixed conventions and hierarchies. The key element of liberal democracy, as it 
emerges from Grote’s, Crawley’s and Mill’s rewritings, was individual freedom, rather than 
social equality. Arnold followed, but also transformed this conception. He began from the 
same abstract ideal o f individuality that was employed by liberals and utilitarians during the 
first part of the century, but sought to redefine it as part of a model that promoted social unity 
and coherence instead of a supposedly self-regulating social competition.
The value o f  individuality was central in Arnold’s approach to Homer. The main 
feature of Homer’s nobility, he argued, derives precisely from the spirit of a gifted individual: 
it bears “the magic stamp of a master”, the sign of an unrivalled talent which stands above the 
mediocrity of the majorities. The Iliad is nothing less than such a “masterwork”, the outcome 
of a supreme mind that has guaranteed the epic’s uniqueness. It has “a great master’s genuine 
stamp, and that stamp is the grand style". On the contrary, the ballad style, that was used in 
Homeric translations by Newman and others, pertains, in Arnold’s view, to the spirit of the 
majority. For it is a style which may exhibit, at its best, the vigour of its employer, but also 
manages to conceal the weaknesses of the bulk of the people, at the inevitable cost of 
resigning all pretensions to the highest and grand manner of great authors (1860-1 1906:
237-238).
The expansion of democracy, Arnold suggested, intensified the social need for such 
civilized manner and style. Yet while in the ancient times these pertained to the thought-mode 
and habits of a particular social class, namely the aristocracy (above), they could now be 
found throughout the entire social body. Herein emerged the role of the scholars, of the men 
of culture: one o f selection, naming and cultivation The scholars, in Arnold’s view, are 
responsible for examining the products of different groups and classes, judging their value 
and refining them, when necessary, in order to transform them into the genuine source of
national traditions rather than a radical democratic agenda (On the issue see Foerster 1947 and 1962). Newman's 
use of antiquated and foreignising vocabulary expresses a form of self-criticism which is more directed towards an 
exaltation of a romanticised individuality, than the development of a social and political problematic As Newman 
himself stated, his choice was informed by an attempt to deviate from contemporary literary standards, which 
were mechanically inclined to exalt the apparatus of prose-composition, in order to advance a standard that was 
"far more absolute" and derived from the old canonical writings and dialects o f the English national tradition 
(1856: xvii). For a contemporary discussion of the language of Homer, which considers the Homeric idiom an
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social education. This move, he pointed out, is not adverse to democracy Quite contrary; “the 
men of culture are true apostles of equality”:
The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diflusing, for making prevail, 
for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge the best ideas of their 
time; who have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, 
abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the 
cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of their time, and a 
true source therefore of sweetness and light (18691; 19752, 1993 ; 70).
Such an attempt could be nothing less than a “social mission”, as Chris Baldick has put it,174 
whose aims would not be “satisfied” till “all [men] come to a perfect man”, till “the whole of 
society is in the fullest measure permeated by thought, sensible to beauty, intelligent and 
alive” (ibid: 69).
The most important aspect of Arnold’s argument is not the claim that an intellectual 
elite would canonise and impose the ideals of culture on the rest of the people, but the 
presentation of both this elite and its cultural products as socially and politically neutral. 
Unlike the Homeric times, Arnold stated, the spirit of culture is today universal and timeless. 
It is not related to a social class and does not articulate partisan values or interests. The 
scholars who are capable of judging Homeric rewritings must be devoid of class-affiliations 
Their very authority is fundamentally based on their social neutrality. In contrast to existing 
candidates for power, that is, the Barbarians (aristocratic class), Philistines (middle class) and 
Populace (working class), each of which is entangled in petty interests and perspectivist 
views, the scholars, according to Arnold, could provide a state-education with the norms of a 
universal rationality and cultural perfection. They can create “a firmer and sounder basis for 
future practice” which can be materialised in an institution that stands essentially above and 
beyond social classes, namely the state. Such an institution, Arnold suggested, would then 
consist of those few members of the different classes, who are essentially “alien” to their 
social origin, in the sense that they are “persons who are mainly led not by their class 
consciousness and interest, but by a general humane spirit, by the love of human perfection” 
which bestows on them the “paramount authority of right reason” (ibid.: 109). Their 
knowledge can then act as the ground for social assent and the source of a much desired 
social unity, stability and coherence.174
“artificial" linguistic construct that draws on as much as transforms the Greek dialects and the folk tradition see 
Bowra 1968, Palmer 1962, and Shipp 19531; 1972.
174 For a fUrther discussion of this issue see Baldick 1983: 18-85
The social neutrality o f ‘real’ culture and its ‘guardians was explicitly praised by Arnold in his essay on “The 
Function of Criticism” in which he argued that “Criticism, real criticism obeys an instinct prompting it to try to
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Homer in translation becomes thereby the symbol of a culture that has been 
dissociated from historical social needs, conflicts and interests; the articulation of a 
transcendent authority that can be recognised as true and valuable by the society as a whole. 
At the same time though, Homeric translation assumes a clearly social role, which comes to 
contradict its presumed neutrality. It becomes the means for advancing stability and unity in a 
society that is explicitly realised to be divided and threatened by conflict and antagonism. 
What is more, this unity is based on precisely those principles that would secure and reinforce 
existing social relations, thus consolidating the dominant position and power of the middle 
classes. Hence the key trait of the Homeric grandeur and the notion that must define 
translation before all others is claimed by Arnold to be “a Greek virtue [that is] by no means 
common among the modems in general and the English in particular: moderation". This 
feature is considered important enough to be presented at the conclusion of Arnold’s lecture 
on Homeric translation. “Homer”, he advised the translator, “has not only the English vigour, 
he has the Greek grace”, the grace exhibited in “moderation”. The grandeur of the epics “is 
not the mixed and turbid grandeur of the great poets of the north ... it is a perfect, a lovely 
grandeur”. There is no doubt that Homeric poetry “has all the energy and power of our ruder 
climates; but it has, besides, the pure lines of an Ionian horizon” that must be reproduced by 
the translator (1860-61'; 1906: 274-5).
Moderation, as it is defined in this context, is an essentially negative concept. Devoid 
of any relation to social life, it stands for a vaguely delineated cultural model, whose 
"perfection” derives from its dissociation from worldly conditions, its capacity to separate 
itself from actual human needs and relations, in order to redefine as “humane” an utterly 
dehumanised, abstracted cultural spirit. This purified, totally idealised culture provides 
simultaneously the grounds for a restrained and submissive social conduct, which restricts 
itself to a self-perpetuating intellectual enterprise that is far from being either radical or 
revolutionary. Instead it acknowledges as given and unquestionable the social conditions that 
surround it while advising moderation regarding one’s approach to these conditions. Such a 
culture prohibits the imagining of social alternatives. Enclosed in the limits of theoretical 
speculation, it annihilates radical social questioning and is by definition antithetical to 
political action. As such, it promotes an ideal of complacent acceptance of the status quo and 
one’s position within it, without enquiring into the social function, repercussions and 
potential alternatives to this position.
know the best that is known and thought in the world, irrespectively of practice, politics and everything of the 
kind” (1887a: 38).
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This ideal of culture as the basis of social stability and harmony was certainly 
distanced from the exaltations of free competition, social mobility and change of the previous 
period. Yet far from being a substantial alternative to liberal discourses, it developed as an 
integral part of and a necessary complement of the concept of democracy in modem 
bourgeois societies, which required as much the establishment of ‘free’ conditions for 
competition and exchange as the designation of rules by which this competition would be 
directed and canonised, so that it would not threaten the existing social organisation and 
structures. Such a danger was not, of course, perceived when the bourgeoisie sought to 
challenge a previously established social order and consolidate its power. Yet its emergence 
became clear when this power was felt to be unstable and precarious, endangered by the 
expansion and claims of a majority whose interests were adverse to those of both the 
bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, namely the “Populace”, the working class. This group, whose 
basic “defect”, according to Arnold, lay in its “bright powers of sympathy and ready powers 
of action” seemed “so fast growing and rising” that it was by then able to assert “an 
Englishman’s heaven-bom privilege of doing as he likes”. Hence the Populace began “to 
perplex us”, Arnold wrote, “by marching where it likes, meeting where it likes, bawling what 
it likes, breaking what it likes” (18691; 19752; 1993: 100, 105). The threat from this move, 
which was strategically designated as a threat of "anarchy”, necessitated, in Arnold’s view, an 
authoritative centre that would canonise the conduct of this majority and restrict its potential 
for action. This centre, which was identified with the power of the state, was not defined as a 
source of oppression. Its role, according to Arnold, was to bring about a “genuinely humane” 
spirit that pertains to people of all classes in the context of a class society, naturally structured 
by social and economic hierarchies. 175 As he put it,
It is clear that the very absence of any powerful authority amongst us, and the prevalent 
doctrine of the duty and happiness of doing as one likes, and asserting our personal liberty, 
must tend to prevent the erection of any very strict standard of excellence, the belief in any 
very paramount authority of right reason (ibid : 109)
This authority defined a standard of excellence which could remain unaffected by the 
conditions of human debasement and destitution within which it thrived. (One need only 
recall the extent of child-labour, a constantly evoked problem in nineteenth-century Britain, 
in order to justify this point). It sought to establish “a common basis of human nature”, an 
ideal of “perfection” in the social body as a whole, in the context of these conditions and 
“under all ... class divisions” and oppositions (ibid.: 105).
175 On this issue see Arnold 18691; 19752; 1993: 105-106
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This model of social harmony informed a new appraisal of classical thought that 
accentuated the privileged role of a “cultivated”, “perfected” middle class in the organisation 
and coherence of the Athenian society. As Arnold suggested,
Ancient Athens has such profound interest for a rational man, that is the spectacle of the 
culture of a people It is not an aristocracy, leavening with its own high spirit the multitude 
which it wields, but leaving it the unformed multitude still; it is not a democracy, acute and 
energetic, but tasteless, narrow-minded, and ignoble; it is the middle and lower classes in the 
highest development of their humanity that these classes have yet reached (18611; 1962: 25).
The “culture of a people”, which is so emphatically evoked by Arnold, is attained once the 
populace is excluded and marginalized: it is not a democracy, that is, the domination of the 
ignoble working class,l7f> but a domination of a bourgeoisie that has developed at most its 
‘humane’ nature and character, and in accordance with these sets up a high tone for all other 
classes.
In this context, the ideal of liberty, which informed liberal discourses on democracy 
during the earlier years, became qualified and complemented by a seemingly antithetical 
notion, namely ‘order’. Culture was for Arnold an apolitical, merely intellectual 
advancement, but was also the main weapon against the threat of anarchy. Likewise, the 
classicist John Stuart Blackie described “civilisation” as the means for “the imposition of 
restraints upon liberty” and the establishment of “order” as the grand distinctive principle of 
civil society. For liberty in itself, that is, liberty that is not regulated by a higher authority, 
Blackie argued, would be catastrophic for both individuals and the entire social body:
Liberty is a wild horse which can only be made serviceable to the commonwealth by being 
saddled and bridled by the great master. Order; it is a wine which, unless carefully used under 
the prescription of a wise physician, lifts a man for a moment into an imaginary heaven, only 
that it may plunge him into real hell (I8671; 1885: 10).
As was the case with Arnold’s argument, this restriction of liberty was only ostensibly 
directed towards the whole of the people. Its main target, as Blackie’s essay stresses, was that 
multitude which acts “only as a quantitative force without any regard to quality” and for this 
reason is not only unable to “perform the functions of self-government”, but also threatens to 
force its will on the whole of the society by the mere force of numbers and the power 
bestowed on it by démocratisation. As Blackie puts it, “the working classes in congregation 
assembled, merely because they can outvote the rest o f the community by seven to three, have 
no immunity from the common frailties of human nature.” What is more, it is their increasing 
power o f numbers and capacity to enforce their views that necessitates both the restriction of
l7>’ Arnold uses the term democracy in his entire essay as equivalent to the term populace, as is also evident by the 
passage quoted here
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their freedom and their appropriate education in order to conform to and respect the rules of a 
rational order. Left to its natural tendencies this multitude cannot but resolve into confusion 
or rush into perdition (ibid.: 1 2 , 18).
Two main aspects o f  Arnold’s and Blackie’s thought seem to have affected the 
translation of Pericles’ description of classical democracy towards the end of the century: the 
conviction that the majority (which is no longer identified with the bourgeoisie) may or could 
possibly attain a ruling political position and the creed that such a prospect is neither 
desirable nor compatible with the ideals of civilisation and progress. Hence the translation of 
the passage in question by the Victorian scholar and professor at Oxford Benjamin Jowett 
(1817-1893) emphasised that democracy entails the handling of social issues by the many. He 
nevertheless sought to dissociate this form of government from the Athenian polity and 
suggested that the Athenian city was only ‘called’ a democracy. Yet, in reality, Athens was 
governed by an aristocratic élite chosen by merit:
It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many 
and not of the few Hut while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private 
disputes, the claim o f excellence is also recognised, and when a citizen is in any way 
distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege but as the 
reward of merit ( 1881:1.117-118 my italics) 177
Jowett’s understanding of the Thucydidean text is made explicit in the notes that follow his 
translation of the passage:
though we bear the name o f democracy, this name is an inadequate description o f the 
Athenian commonwealth. For before the law all men (including the few) are equal, while at 
the same time there is an aristocracy o f merit at the service of the state (1881: 2 106, my 
italics).
Unlike all other translations made since the seventeenth century, 178 which referred to 
democracy as a form of public administration performed with regard to or in the interest of 
the many, Jowett actually renders the source-text idea that democracy is a polity by which 
political power is “in the hands of the many and not of the few”. Yet his work immediately 
disputes the institution of democracy in classical Athens (“it is true that we are called a 
democracy ... but ...”). For a democracy, for Jowett, lacks the means to recognise excellence 
and treats all people as equals, irrespective of their actual inequality in terms of capacities,
177 The source text is quoted in the second part of this chapter (section 2.2).
Apart from the translations examined above, two further book-length translations of Thucydides were 
published during this period, written by Collier (1857) and Collins (1878) Collier selected only those passages of 
the source which refer to the “Plague of Athens” (i.e the illness) and was intended to be a contribution to
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worth and potentials.n> Such a condition was, however, unknown to the classical city, Jowett 
suggests, which only established equality before the law, but simultaneously elected an 
“aristocracy of merit” that was put at the service of the state.
From this perspective, Jowett proceeds to translate Pericles’ assertion that all citizens 
“participate” in politics by the idea that an Athenian citizen is fairly aware of political issues. 
As he writes,
An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household, 
and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fa ir idea o f politics .. and if 
few  are originators, we are all sound judges o f a polity  (1881: 1.119 my italics) .1*0 
This translation not only changes the source-text’s representation of the Athenian citizens as 
actively engaged in the political institution of the city; it further introduces a distinction 
between “originators” and “judges” of political matters, which is clearly absent from the 
source phrase “x a i atitoi fjxoi xpivopiv ye vj ¿vGupovgeBa 6q0o)c xa Jigdynaxa”; stating 
“we Athenians decide public questions for ourselves” (Smith 1956: 329).
These choices do not stem from the source text. They articulate the conviction of late 
nineteenth-century intellectuals that democracy must be dissociated from all claims to social 
equality and be reconciled with a society, whose unity is not threatened, but is rather 
nourished and sustain by distinctions and inequalities. Such a society, it was argued, avoids 
the dangers of a radical democracy which is dominated by the masses, and responds, instead 
to the demands of civilisation and the laws of nature A society of equality, as Blackie stated, 
is only the dream o f the “thorough democrat [who] is the swom enemy of all eminence" and 
“hates to hear any man praised as in any way superior to the crowd”. Yet by evoking such an 
ideal, Blackie maintained, the “thorough democrat” puts himself in “a state of open rebellion 
against the laws o f nature and the institution of God” which have created people to be 
unequal:
Everywhere in Nature, in every organic society, as well as in all societies, there is a high and 
a low, a controlling and a ministrant power, a dominant and a subordinate, a part formed to 
govern, and a part formed to obey (I8671; 1885 11)
The basic criterion by which these authorities were claimed to be recognised had been 
clearly articulated by Arnold, Jowett, and Blackie himself: “culture” and personal
“practical science" (1857: v) The passages in question were not included in this translation 1 have not been able 
to view Collins’ translation
l7> The same assumption informed Jowett’s reading and translation of Aristotle's Politics, which emphasised in 
the introduction to the text that the ancient philosopher “advises caution” regarding the idea of equality of 
mankind He warns us against the confusion and perhaps destruction which an idea at present so impracticable 
end so incapable of being confined by law as equality among unequals may bring upon the world” (1885:1. 
Ixxxix).
180 The source text is quoted in the first part of this chapter
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“excellence”. Yet the moment these writers enquired into the roots of this “excellence”, the 
evocation of “Nature” as the source of differences in worth and capacity was frankly 
complemented by the acknowledgement of the social basis o f such divisions: the difference 
between people in respect of natural talents, Blackie argued, is immeasurable; “in respect to 
acquired worth even greater; and it is this acquired worth much more than native talent, 
which renders a man fit to take any share beneficially in the conduct of public business” 
(ibid.: 10). The crucial point in this statement is that the division between “originators” and 
“judges” of a policy, between a social group “formed to govern” and one “formed to obey” is 
at one and the same time attributed to nature and located in already existing social 
hierarchies, which allow only some parts of a social body to “acquire” education and culture.
Still it is not ultimately mere knowledge that sets up the criterion for these divisions 
For “a direct knowledge qualification”, Blackie argues, i.e. a qualification which can always 
be attained by the masses, “would result in a portentous system o f artificial cramming which 
would be no genuine test of real knowledge”. What is instead required in the process of 
granting political power is a safe criterion by which personal excellence can be recognised. 
This is identified by him with a property qualification:
What we want is wisdom, clear-headness, discretion, moderation, coolness, independence, 
moral courage, experience of life, and position in society Of these qualities a property 
qualification may afford a certain rough guarantee, a knowledge qualification may afford 
none (ibid.: 19).
Blackie’s claim articulates the very logic that informed both Arnold’s and Jowett’s 
conceptions of society, in which an abstractly defined cultural eminence was evoked in order 
to displace the historical roots of social distinctions and the different potentials these implied 
for individuals. What is more, this claim puts forward the basic precept by which liberal 
democracy was conceptualised and institutionally enforced at the time: a political system 
which apparently offers the potential for choice to all, while simultaneously concealing out all 
choices for the majority of a social body.
It was only after this semantic transformation of democracy’, which dissociated 
democratic politics from the ideal of social equality, that the concept was defined in purely 
positive terms at the beginning of the twentieth century. Hence in the years of the outbreak of 
the first world war, Alfred Zimmem was able to declare that
Greek ideas and Greek inspiration can help us to-day in the work of deepening and 
extending the range and the meaning of Democracy and Citizenship, Liberty and Law, which 
would seem to be the chief political task before mankind (19111; 1914: 5).
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By this moment, the Athenian democracy was perceived as the embodiment of modem 
culture, civility and justice, whose ‘Other’ was projected onto the tyrannical and authoritarian 
oppression o f national sovereignty. What was nevertheless silenced by this noble call to 
“mankind” is the highly problematic nature of the binary opposition between ‘democracy’ 
and authoritarianism’ and the firm location of the ‘other’ within the ‘self of modem 
bourgeois societies.
C h a p t e r  4
T h e  V a n is h in g  S u b je c t  o f  D e m o c r a t ic  P o l it ic s :
In s c r ip t io n s  o f  S u b j e c t iv it y  in  T r a n s l a t io n s  o f  P l a t o ’s P r o t a g o r a s
When John Stuart Mill translated Plato’s dialogue Protagoras in 1834 he claimed to have had 
a twofold purpose. On the one hand he sought to respond to the “remarkable fact’’ that despite 
the “almost boundless reputation o f [his] writings”, Plato had not merely been scarcely 
understood, but scarcely even been read in Britain, not least due to the lack of good 
translations (18341; 1978: 39, 42).1x1 On the other hand he thought that of all of the Platonic 
Dialogues this particular one, with which he began his translation writings, was the most 
relevant to the spirit of his time, as it did not seek to assert a particular set of philosophical 
opinions, but to present an exemplary exercise in the art of investigating truth, that is, a mode 
of enquiry which is essentially dialogic rather than affirmative and involves the interrogation 
and sifting of opinions, thereby arriving at a form of understanding, which the delivery of 
doctrines from master to student absolutely precludes. This method, which pertained to the 
institutions o f freedom and equality that were first established by the Athenian democracy, is 
marked, according to Mill, by the refusal to adopt fixed creeds concerning the truth, thus 
allowing for any result or belief to be the object of further investigation, of deeper and 
broader critical judgements (18341978: 42-44,60-61).
This perspective shapes the translator’s position towards the two main figures in the 
dialogue, i.e. Socrates and Protagoras, whose opinions on the nature of political virtue 
juxtapose in the translated text two antithetical thought-modes. The first, expressed by the 
Sophist, is a support of relativist thought, a determination of political virtue as primarily 
contingent rather than essential, in the sense that this virtue can only be defined by reference 
to historical human knowledges and evaluation rather than any immanent standards. For 
Protagoras -  or more accurately for Protagoras in Mill’s translation -  truth can only be 
human, and justice, politics and ethics have man as their measure. The argument developed 
by Socrates is more complex and ambiguous, as it is primarily defined by the depreciation of 
human’, temporal truths and seeks to identify the indelible traits of political knowledge, 18
181 *ii •Mill translated eight dialogues of Plato, four of which were published in the 1830s (Protagoras, Phaedrus, 
Gorgias, A/xilogy) The Protagoras was the first of these translations to appear in print, published in the Monthly 
Repository (viii, February and March 1834) Mill’s critique as regards the absence of translations was repeated by 
an anonymous article in the Edinburgh Review published in 1848 in which the reviewer maintains that given the 
“great genius of Plato”, it is surprising to see that “so little justice has been done [to his works] by English 
translators" (1848: 322). Towards the end o f the next decade, John Stuart Blackie endorsed Mill’s critical claim 
"Between Plato and the English nation”, he observed, “there is in fact a gulf that cannot be passed” (1857: 6)
The Vanishing Subject of Democratic Politics 166
while at the same time relating this knowledge to the fulfilment of personal pleasure and 
interests, thus depriving it of its immanent status.
The Protagorean idea that human knowledges should be considered as the only 
legitimate measure of political virtue could justify, for Mill, not only the acquisition of 
freedom and the potential for political participation, but also the renunciation of unquestioned 
obedience to political authority lying outside worldly standards for critique and judgement In 
order to sustain this point and refer to Protagoras as a predecessor of modem democracy, 182 
Mill was first obliged to transform the image o f  Protagoras in his time, to argue against the 
widespread conception of the Sophistic movement as mischievous, debased and immoral, 
while demonstrating its unity with nineteenth-century social and political struggles on 
democratisation. His translation was thereby located within a broader debate which was 
continued and intensified in the following decades and sought to appraise the Sophists’ 
thought-mode in comparison to the political and moral significance of Socratic ideas.
1. Protagoras' Absolutism: Democracy and Residual Political Traditions
One of the most important works in which this issue was formulated was Thomas Taylor’s 
(and partly Floyer Sydenham’s183) translation o f Plato’s dialogues published in 1804 This 
publication, which was the first complete translation of Plato into English (and the second 
into a European vernacular, an Italian translation being the first184) took shape under the spirit 
of a self-conscious idealism which accommodated Socratic philosophy as the realisation of 
spiritual perfection, while giving the Sophists no other intellectual space but that of the 
merchants and corrupters of knowledge, the mere spokesmen of popular judgement who are 
unworthy of the name of philosopher For Taylor the translation of Plato’s works could 
provide a much needed antidote, found in the Socratic doctrine, to this judgement, to the 
“two-fold ignorance’’ that marks “the disease o f the many”: ignorance with respect “to the 
sublimest knowledge” and ignorance of their condition of ignorance, which does not allow 
them even to “suspect their want of understanding” (1804: 1. cxiii). Against this context, 
philosophy, Taylor writes, “is the purification and perfection of human life. It is the 
purification indeed, from material ¡nationality and the mortal body; but the perfection, in 
consequence of being the resumption of our proper felicity, and a reascent to divine likeness”.
1,2 It is important to note that Mill’s translation was among the first texts in which this idea was developed There 
is a significant number of works which continued this problematic, among which is Cynthia Farrar’s work the 
Origins o f Democratic Thinking ( 1988)
The dialogues that had initially been translated by Sydenham were according to Taylor “The First and Second 
Alcibiades, The Greater and Lesser Hippias, The Banquet [sic] (except the speech of Alcibiades), the Philebus, the 
Meno, the lo, and the Rivals [sic]” (Taylor 1804: I cvi)
184 Cf Turner 1981. 371.
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This philosophy, it is argued, which is “august, magnificent, and divine” “first shone forth 
with occult and venerable splendor” in Plato’s writings and may truly be seen as “the greatest 
good in which man can participate: for it purifies us from the defilements of the passions and 
assimilates us to Divinity, it confers on us the proper felicity o f our nature” (1804: 1. iii).
Unsurprisingly, Taylor expressed nothing but contempt for the sophistic thought-mode 
which articulated for him a “material irrationalism” that bore no relationship to real 
philosophical contemplation. Hence when he comes to translate Protagoras he reconstructs 
this image of the Sophist by employing a vocabulary that pertains to commercial transactions, 
to a world moved by interest and desire for profit, and by suggesting, subsequently, the 
artificiality and deceitfulness of this vocabulary. This image was sustained in certain cases by 
the Platonic text itself,IKS but in most passages was produced by its transformation. Thus, 
when Protagoras says in the original that he has arranged that a student should pay him only if 
he chooses to do so and explains that
¿jiEibav Y<ip xig Tap' £goi pdOq, th v  pfev Poukrixai, <5eio6£6<«xev 6 tyin npdxxopat 
¿tpYiipiov (328b)
Taylor translated the passage as follows:
Hence this is the bargain which /  usually make when any one has learnt from me, if he is 
willing, he pays me the sum of money which I require (1804: 5. 122 my italics)
The phrase “this is the bargain which I usually make” is introduced by the translator and 
cannot be read in the source text, which is only descriptive of the process of payment of the 
Sophist Protagoras says only “if one learns from me, he would pay me the money I ask, if he 
wants to do so”, but does not in any way refer to this arrangement as a bargain. Likewise, 
when Protagoras answers Socrates’ question regarding what will happen to the young student 
Hippocrates if he associates with him, he says
Xi veavioxe, foxai xoivuv ooi, tixv ¿got auvfig, f| av rjgepct ¿po\ ovyyivy\, 6m£vai 
ofxabe PeXxiovi yfyov6xi, xat ¿v Tf| uaxEpaiq tauth xaOxa- (318a)
The passage is translated as follows:
O young man, the advantage which yim will derive from associating with me is this, that on 
the day in which you come to me you will go home better than you was (sic) before (Taylor 
1804: 5. 112 my italics)185 86
The phrase “the advantage which you will derive from ...” is absent from the original, but 
does not transform its denotative meaning, in the sense that, despite the fact that Protagoras 
does not explicitly says so, he certainly seeks to suggest that his teaching is beneficial and
185 Cf Protagoras 313c-d; Taylor 1804: 5 108
186 Compare with “Young man, if you associate with me, on the very first day you will return home a better man 
than you came" (Jowett 1892 143)
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advantageous for his students. Yet the addition of this phrase in the translated text presents 
Protagoras speaking at a register which is again suggestive of merchandise, o f  a calculative 
mode of thought that focuses on profits and losses, and thereby judges as right and true the 
advantageous and the useful. It follows that words which sound as if they were articulated as 
a merchant’s discourse would share more traits with the logic and practice of commerce than 
with the modes of philosophical enquiry 1X7
That this is a logic that not only fails to advance knowledge, but is also intended to 
deceive and conceal truth is asserted by the translation at the point the Sophist, in the source 
text, describes his work and claims to teach men the art of politics; that is to say, to teach 
them how best to lead their private lives and how to speak and act in the most successful way 
in the context of the city-state:
TÓ 6fe nóOripá éaxiv eüpouXía itepi te ttov oixei'ojv, Smu; &v fipiaxa xqv avixoO oixiav 
Sioixot, xdi Jiepi xd)V tf|5 jióXeui?, fijuug xa xf|; Jidkeio; buvaxióxaxo; &v efn xai 
npaxxsiv xai kéyziv. Xq\  Eqqv ¿ycó, fcxonai aov  x<¡> Xóyip: 6oxei; yáp poi Xéyeiv xqv 
.xoXixixqv xéxvriv xai vtuaxvElofiai ttoiElv fivÓQa; áya0ovs JtoXíxag. Aúxo (tev o iv  
xoCxó écmv, écfq, á> Eióxpaxe;, xó éjróyyeXpa, 6 éjiaYYÍXXopai. ’H xaXóv, í|v 6’ éyió, 
xéxvTiga &pa xexTqoai, EÍnep x¿XTT|Oai’ oú yáp t i  fiXXo xpóg ye o e  Eiprjoexai f) aitEp 
voúj (318e-319b).
The passage is translated as follows:
The discipline too which he acquires irom me is the ability of consulting well about his 
domestic affairs, so that he may govern his house in the best manner, and so that he may he 
capable o f saying and doing all that is advantageous for his country. -  I understand you, I 
replied for you appear to me to speak of the political an  and to profess to make men good 
citizens -  This said he, is the profession which 1 announce -  What a beautiful artifice, said I, 
you profess\ If you do profess it For nothing else is to he said to you than that which I 
conceive. (1804: 5. 113, my italics)18*
1X1 To be sure Protagoras’ doctrine did focus on how to live well in the city-state, on the capacity to lead a 
successful life as a citizen Yet this did not imply the cancellation of an evaluative vocabulary, which was not 
taken to be fixed and stabilised, bul was nevertheless determinable by the ethical and political codes of the 
particular cities (Cf. MacIntyre I9661, 1998:12-13). To describe this doctrine as identical with a utilitarian, 
commercialised morality is to forget that the concept for living well in ancient Greek (Eu&aipovia) is a concept 
that was not used to refer to someone who makes 'profits’ and gains material advantages (not least because these 
were to some extent given for the citizens) Despite the different conceptions of happiness by ancient Greek 
writers, a point of agreement among them is that such forms of welfare are only a preliminary and, in every 
respect, inadequate presupposition for doing the things that would make one happy, and certainly not the feature 
of a happy life.
1X8 Compare with “I teach them what they come to learn, viz , how they may best manage their own families, and 
how best to speak and act in the affairs of the state.” -  “You teach politics then, and profess to make men good 
citizens ” -  “I do so ” -  “You possess an admirable art, if you do indeed possess it, which I know not how to 
disbelieve” (Mill I8341; 1978 48) In the translation of the last phrase of the passage oil yáp Ti fiXXo Jipó? ye ok 
EiprjoETai f) ftticp v<xo it is Mill who changes the source text by translating it as “which I know not how to 
disbelief’ and not Taylor
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The translation changes the meaning o f the source phrase “xai Jtep't tujv xf|c ndXzvK, 8110)5 
xb xf|5 jidkecog bvvaxaixaxoc fiv etr| xa'i jxpdxxeiv xai Xiytiv” (how to be the strongest 
(best) in speaking and acting in the context of the city) by introducing an idea which is not 
only foreign to the source passage, but also appears odd when it is thought of as a Protagorean 
claim: that his students may be capable of saying and doing all that is advantageous for their 
country.I>w If we suppose that this is not the result of a misreading of the syntax of the text,19" 
it would appear that this rendering constitutes for Taylor a positive statement: instead of 
seeking personal success and recognition, as the source text says, Protagoras seems to be 
devoted to a presumably higher ideal, the good of the country. Yet it is only in the next phrase 
that this claim is disputed as pretentious and false by the choice to translate xexvnpa by 
‘artifice’; a noun which denotes on the one hand the product of craftsmanship, a handicraft, 
and on the other hand a device that is intended to deceive, a strategem that is inherently 
disingenuous. 191 The same effect is produced by the translation of the verb KEKrijaai (possess) 
by the verb profess’. For the former refers to an actual condition of things (one either has 
something or not) while the latter to a speech performance, a claim that can further be 
implied to be insincere. 192 Thus when Socrates in the source text says “you possess a beautiful 
art, if you do indeed possess it” 193 he articulates doubt and distrust over the truthfulness of the 
assertion that the Sophist can teach men to be virtuous citizens What he questions however is 
not the Protagorean conception of political virtue, that is, the content of Protagoras’ claim, 
but his ability to teach this art, and as we shall see, any man’s ability to teach virtue. 194 In the 
development of the speech in the source text Protagoras may well prove that he possesses this 
teaching ability and that he can make men good citizens. In the translation such a possibility 
is precluded, since it is the entire thought of Protagoras that is portrayed as pretentious and
1119 A basic premise of the Sophistic doctrine in general and of Protagoras’ in particular is to explain, as MacIntyre 
points out, how to live well -  that is effectively -  in a city-state While the ability to act for the benefit of the city 
and contribute to its advancement was a prerequisite of a good social life and was therefore not antithetical to this 
premise, it is unlikely that Protagoras would have posited it as an end in itself rather than a means for the 
constitution of a good life (Cf. MacIntyre 1966; 1998: 14)
110 If Taylor's knowledge of Greek was not adequate, as a number of his reviewers seem to suggest, then he could 
have considered the noun ta  Ttj; ndkeu>; as the subject of the fiv efq and the ouvarojiaroc; as predicate while 
ignoring that the latter is in nominative case In my view, it would be difficult for someone who knows enough 
Greek to translate Plato to make such a mistake, not least because of the adjective Suvartotaxoi; which, being 
masculine, enables the reader to see that it is related to the subject as predicate Still the Platonic text presents a 
syntactic structure which is often contusing for learners of ancient Greek, and thus a misreading is a possibility in 
this case
191 Cf OED s.v. ’artifice’
192 Cf. OED s.v. ‘profess’
1,1 The word TE%vqpa means both a skill, a workmanship and the results of this skill, the products of 
workmanship W K C Guthrie suggests the following translation of the passage “Then it is a truly splendid 
accomplishment that you have mastered, said I, if indeed you have mastered it” (1956: 50)
194 I shall come back to this point in the analysis o f Mill's translation
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mystifying, the very content of his claims that constitutes a trickery, an artifice, a deceptive 
profession.
Taylor’s translation was not welcomed by reviewers. The Edinburgh Review published 
a fervent critique of the work in which the reviewer (possibly James Mill) wrote that Taylor 
“has not translated Plato; he has travestied him ... He has not elucidated, but covered him in 
the most cruel and abominable manner”. In particular the reviewer attacked Taylor’s 
intellectual debt to “Proclus and the other philosophers of the Alexandrian school”, his 
“stiff’, “awkward” and “uncouth” language, 191 and his many grammatical, lexical and 
syntactical mistakes, the majority of which are attributed to the translator’s lack of knowledge 
of ancient Greek (Anonymous 1809: 190, 191-2, 201).'1*’ Most of the examples of Taylor’s 
“mistranslations” are taken from the translation of Protagoras, but are disappointingly 
restricted to pointing out grammatical, lexical and stylistic ‘errors’ of mainly philological 
interest, having as their only purpose to show “Mr Taylor’s lamentable deficiency in every 
requisite for the performance of his arduous task”, as it is claimed by the reviewer (1809: 
211). The most revealing part of the review is an attack on Taylor’s “Neoplatonist idealism”, 
a critique, which is developed over several pages and indicates, according to Kathleen Raine 
and George Mills Harper, that the real motives of this attack can be found in Taylor’s 
theoretical distance from the Scottish school of philosophy (1969: 23). This distance, as will 
be discussed, emerged with further specificity in the re-translation of Protagoras by John 
Stuart Mill and the writings of George Grote on Plato published in the middle of the
197century.
In spite of this reception, the image of the sophist as a merchant of knowledge, 
presented in Taylor’s translation, became significantly popular among British intellectuals of 
the time. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) wrote that a sophist should be considered as 195
195 Taylor’s language has been often criticised in similar terms As his editors Raine and Harper have observed “if 
Taylor had written better English his translations might have been more widely read ” Yeats called his style 
atrocious while Coleridge wrote that Taylor translated from “difficult Greek into incomprehensible English” 
(Raine and Harper 1969: 18)
' The same accusations are repeated in another review (also attributed to James Mill) published in the Literary 
Journal in 1804 and an article on Plato published in The Tdinhurgh Review in the middle of the century In the 
latter work the writer deplored the absence of any full translation of Plato’s work into English apart from that 
published by “the notorious Taylor; in which, while incorporating the labours of previous translations, he has 
managed to mar them by his professed emendations, and to give the remainder in a form in which no reader of 
Plato could by possibility recognise the mutilated original" (Anonymous 1848: 325-326). Another review 
published in The Hlackwood’s Magazine (Edinburgh) was equally dismissive As the reviewer wrote (Taylor is] 
“an ass, in the first place, secondly he knows nothing of the religion of which he is so great a fool as to profess 
himself a votary And thirdly he knows less than nothing of the language about which he is continually writing ” 
(Anonymous 1825: 737).
John Stuart Mill was also dismissive of Taylor’s translation As he wrote in the introduction to his own 
translation of Protagoras “the only complete translation [of Plato] which exists in our own language is fiill of 
faults, and often with difficulty understood even by those who can read the original” (I8341; 1978: 42).
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nothing more than “a market man, in moral and intellectual knowledges”, “a wholesale and 
retail dealer in wisdom -  a wisdom-monger, in the same sense as we say, an iron-monger” 
(1809-10, 1 8 1 21969 : 1. 436). This commercialisation of knowledge, he was quick to 
suggest, is detrimental, as it implies the perversion of truth and the submission to the deceitful 
power of perception:
The understanding was to be corrupted by the perversion of the reason, and the feelings 
through the medium of the understanding For this purpose all the fixed principles, whether 
grounded on reason, religion, law, or antiquity, were to be undermined, and then, as now, 
chiefly by the sophistry of submitting all positions alike, however heterogeneous, to the 
criterion of the mere understanding, disguising or concealing the fact, that the rules which 
alone they applied, were abstracted from the objects of the senses, and applicable exclusively 
to things of quantity and relation (ibid : 1 439).
Treating knowledge and truth as an object for sale, Coleridge holds, not only corrupts reason 
by undermining all the fixed principles which sustain it; it further employs a mode of 
understanding that pertains to the process of counting and relating the objects of the senses, 
namely the truth of appearances. It thereby reduces knowledge to the precarious perception of 
the human gaze. The consequences of this process are not only catastrophic for science and 
philosophy, but also, Thomas Arnold suggests in his edition of Thucydides History, for the 
constitution of morality. While Arnold reserved a moderate praise for the “Greek Sophists” 
for “strong critical and inquiring spirit” of the Sophists, he immediately completed this 
statement by describing the Sophistic move as the greatest expression of immorality and 
wickedness:
Not the wildest extravagance of atheistic wickedness in modem times can go further than the 
sophists o f Greece went before them; whatever audacity can dare and subtilty contrive to 
make the words ‘good’ and ‘evil' change their meaning, has been already tried in the days of 
Plato, and by his eloquence, and wisdom, and faith unshaken, has been put to shame (1835:
3. xxi).
The Sophists did not only damage knowledge; they blurred a far more important distinction, 
Arnold claims, that between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. What they endangered first and foremost was 
the morals’ which sustain appropriate social conduct, rather than the intellectual endeavour 
of the attainment of truth.
2. Protagoras' Liberalism: Democracy and Subjectivation
In this context, John Stuart Mill’s translation became one of the first texts that sought to 
constitute a positive image of the sophistic movement, and Protagoras in particular. As the
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translator emphasised in the introduction to this work, the ancient notion of ‘sophist’ had 
“misleadingly” become “significative of quibbling and deceit”, even since the time of Plato 
himself. Thus the ‘restitution’ of its real meaning became one of the main purposes of his 
translation (18341; 1978: 43). Mill suggested that the term ‘Sophist’ originally referred to “a 
teacher o f wisdom” and explicitly endorsed Protagoras’ political insight and contemporary 
relevance. As he argued,
although Protagoras is confuted, and made to contradict himself again and again [in the 
dialogue] [...] what he utters is by no means either absurd or immoral, but, on the contrary, 
sound and useful good sense, forcibly expressed, or, at the lowest, an able pleading in favour 
o f the side he espouses (18341; 1978: 44).
Mill seems to be attracted to Protagoras' relativist conception of knowledge, morality and 
political virtue, while being hesitant before Socrates’ arguments His genuine hostility to a 
life submitted to blind obedience and intellectual apathy in the face of authority, and his 
commitment to the ideal o f autonomous political thought and action are expressed in the 
meticulous translation of Protagoras’ speech on the nature of “political virtue” (320d-328d) 
and simultaneous omission o f significant parts of Socrates’ objections to him. The Sophist’s 
argument initially defends the idea that the main components of political virtue, i.e. “justice” 
(8iKaiocruvr|) and “wisdom and moderation” (acocppocnivi)) ,199 can be expected from all 
men reared in human society and constitute an indispensable presupposition of their 
collective existence and development. Based on the Athenian example, he states precisely this 
point:
[ot te  fiikkoi xcu A0r|vaioi] S tav 6b ei; oup(JouX.riv .aokiTixf); ¿tpetfi; uooiv, fjv 6ei 6ia 
bixaioaijvT); n&aav ibvai xai ouxpQoouvri;, uxdxiuc; 5:xavxog 6v6q6? Avfxovxai, dj; 
xavx'i .Tpoarixov xauxti? ye pete'xeiv xf|S 6petf|5, fj ph elvai (323a).
Mill follows the passage relatively closely in his translation, changing only the notion of 
political into social virtue:
The Athenians and others are ready, when the subject is social virtue, which depends 
wholly upon justice and prudence, to listen to all advisers, because o f this virtue all should 
he partakers, or stales cannot exist ( 18341; 1978 49, my italics)
1 shall return to the significance of this change in the following pages The idea expressed in 
Protagoras’ argument that all citizens (i.e. people who are taught to be virtuous by growing in 
a social community) are partakers of ‘Sucaioowri’ and ooHppoouvt]’, and all are therefore
1 A similar image of the sophists is presented by Thomas Mitchell in his introduction to 7he Comedies o f 
Aristophanes (1820 xlvi-lxxxi) and the 6th and 7* edition of the Kncyclo/xiedia Britannica (s v ‘Sophists’)
The term ouxppoouvT) is very difficult to translate into English as it means a) soundness of mind and b) 
moderation while simultaneously indicating the intimate relation between the two that a mind inclined towards 
moderation is sound and soundness necessitates moderation (Cf Liddell-Scott Greek-hjtplish Lexicon s v 
oiotfpoouvt)).
The Vanishing Subject of Democratic Politics 173
worthy advisors when it comes to public issues obviously supported Mill’s political creeds 
and principles. This idea, which recurs frequently in Protagoras’ speech, is thus rendered by 
the translator, in opposition to parts of Socrates’ thought, which are either condensed or 
entirely omitted.
In particular, Mill compresses a speech of considerable length (332a-334c) into a short 
sentence, in which he informs his readers that “Socrates forces Protagoras ... to admit that 
ooxppooúvii is the same thing with wisdom, that is the same thing with justice, or at least 
inseparable from it” (18341; 1978:54), condenses a line of Socratic argument that is based on 
the distinction between ’being’ and ‘becoming’ good (343c-347a), in which Socrates seeks to 
demonstrate on the one hand the divinity of goodness (being good) and on the other hand that 
man can ‘become’ good by getting to know what good is200, and further omits a passage in 
which Socrates refers to this process of knowing as performed by each man alone and only 
subsequently communicated to others (348a-348e).201 These passages constitute important 
steps in a complex Socratic argument which states, paradoxically, that while ‘political virtue’ 
is teachable, men cannot teach it. The resolution to this paradox is provided, as McIntyre 
suggests, by the Socratic thesis that knowledge of virtue is already present in man and has 
only to be brought to birth by a philosophical midwife, with the concomitant supposition that 
virtue is reducible to this knowledge (19661; 1998: 21). That this was a position with which 
Mill did not quite agree -  and hence chose to omit it in the translation -  will be made clear if 
we analyse the development of Socrates’ argument in the source text.
In the original Protagoras Socrates suggests an initial reduction of all components of 
virtue to knowledge and then seeks to demonstrate that if men get to know what is ‘good’ and 
what 'bad’/‘evil’, they would choose to do the former instead o f the latter. To be virtuous in 
other words is considered to be identical to the knowledge of virtue, in the sense that if one 
has this knowledge it follows that one would act in accordance with virtue.202 Yet as Socrates
2I<’ The translation rewrites in a sentence the first part of the Socratic suggestion (“it is not difficult to be a good 
man -  it is impossible, the gods alone are capable of actually realising the conception of goodness”) while entirely 
omitting the second part as well as most of Socrates' points that sustain both It thereby presents a line of 
argument which is confusing and incoherent (Mill I8341; 1978: 55).
2" There are further omissions in the translation which are not analysed here, since they are not relevant to my 
argument (as for example the omission of parts which describe the setting and the acts of interlocutors) A 
comparison of the two texts gives the following picture: 309a-3l0a omitted, to 312a summarised, to 314b 
translated; to 322d summarised, to 323c translated; to 330c omitted, to 332a translated with occasional 
omissions, to 334c summarised, to 338c omitted, 343c translated with omissions, to 346c translated with several 
omissions, to 347c omitted, to 348a summarised, to 348e omitted, to 349d summarised; to 351c translated, to 
352a omitted, to 353a translated, to 353b omitted, to 354d translated, to 355a omitted, 356c translated with 
occasional omissions
02 For Socrates, as MacIntyre points out, this knowledge involves not only beliefs that such and such is the case 
but also a capacity for recognising relevant distinctions and an ability to act, to put principles into practical
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makes clear both in the Protagoras and other dialogues, in asserting this point he does not 
refer to any kind of knowledge, but only to ¿jnanjpTi, the knowledge of truth, in opposition to 
contingent conceptions of reality held in the different cities by the common people, i.e. 8o£,a 
Hence it is argued that while 5o4a can be taught -  and it is precisely what the Sophists teach, 
Socrates implies in the Protagoras as well as in the Thearetus and the Gorgias -  without 
nevertheless revealing anything about ‘truth’, ¿mottipri pertains to each man’s capacity to 
approach a ‘reality’ that lies beyond this world and beyond the ‘knowledges’ produced in it; a 
capacity that is already present in man and has to be brought into being through philosophical 
contemplation. ’Em.aTijpr| is the knowledge o f virtue in its immanent form, and this is the 
only kind of knowledge that effaces the distinction between wisdom and justice, pertains to 
divine ‘being’ and to personal human ‘becoming’
Mill’s thought could not accommodate such a strict opposition between ¿jnaxfjpTj and 
564a. Thus, while he was far from being hostile to the privileged position knowledge 
occupied in Socrates’ argument, he was keen to reject a definition of this knowledge in terms 
of transcendence, as a system of absolute truths, which are not produced by man, but are 
revealed to him in their immanent existence To this idea Mill juxtaposed Protagoras’ 
glorification of human capacity to reach and teach knowledge, the belief that “ji&vtec; 
6 i6doxakoi eloiv ¿tpETfjc;” (327e): “it is thus with virtue: all men can teach it” (18341; 1978: 
51). This crucial assertion did not only confirm that knowledge is teachable — a belief that 
Socrates and the Sophist shared -  but also that there exist teachers of it; an argument by 
which Mill intended more to dissociate knowledge from an absolutist logic, than to suggest 
that all men are indeed equally capable teachers.
Mill’s reappraisal of the Sophists was followed by Grote, who suggested in his History 
o f Greece that the term ‘Sophist’ had been misinterpreted by his contemporaries, as it 
originally denoted “a wise man -  a clever man one who stood prominently before the public 
as distinguished for intellect or talent of some kind” and was the natural product of a 
democratic society. Furthermore, Grote argued for the inextricable connection between 
Socrates and the Sophists in the context of democratic Athens, holding that any Athenian 
would not hesitate to classify Socrates among the Sophists of his time (1846-18561; 1888: 7: 
32; 4: 484-485).204 This idea developed into a surprising identification of the Socratic and the
application It is both ¿maTTjpr) (knowledge as intellectual activity) and reyvr] (practical capacity) (19661; 1998: 
21) .
Cf. the passages that were omitted in Mill's translation
This polemical assertion was felt to be controversial, especially by writers who did not share Grote's political 
convictions Blackie's essay on “Plato” criticised Grote’s work as “completely marred for historical purposes by 
the violent polemical attitude which this writer constantly assumes”. “His pages” on Plato and the Sophists,
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Sophistic doctrines in the work Plato, and the Other Companions o f  Socrates (1865), in 
which Grote presents an image of Socrates that is far more radical than that constituted by 
Mill’s translation. Following his practice to include in his writings significant extracts of 
ancient Greek texts in translation, which was first adopted in his History o f  Greece, this 
image is constructed by a full translation of Protagoras, which is included in Grote’s chapter 
on Protagoras and is followed by a short analysis.205
In this work Grote seems to be in full agreement with the Protagorean idea that all 
people are competent at teaching virtue and translates the original phrase which states this 
point as “all of us are teachers of virtue” (1865: 2. 44). Nevertheless he does not quite see 
Socrates’ thought as opposed to this claim. On the contrary, Grote suggests that the arguments 
of Protagoras must be treated as a unity, whose overall aim was to establish the method of 
rational investigation, that is, the dialogue, and the value of cross-interrogation among equal 
interlocutors, all o f whom are equally ignorant (ibid.: 71) Fascinated by the Protagorean 
conception of "man as measure” Grote sought to read in Crito the same idea as the basis of 
Socrates’ philosophical thought,21*’ suggesting that for Socrates reason and understanding 
were dependent on the perspective from which individuals approached truth.2'17 For Grote 
perhaps more than Mill, the relativism that characterises Protagoras was the fundamental 
presupposition of democratic politics, as it established the “equal right of private judgement 
to each man for himself’ while precluding the suppression of some opinions for the benefit of 
others (ibid.: 362). As he argued in a passage that presents a remarkable similarity to Kant’s 
definition of the Enlightenment, “whoever denies the Protagorean autonomy of the individual 
judgement, must propound as his counter-theory some heteronomy”:
If you pronounce a man unfit to be the measure of truth for himself, you constitute yourself 
the measure, in his place: either directly as a lawgiver -  or by dominating censors according 
to your own judgement You cannot get out of the region of individual judgements, more
Blackie argued, “sound often like reports of an emphatic party-speech delivered in Parliament, rather than the 
^rave verdict of a historian” (1857: 7).
05 Grote’s chapter devotes 40 out of 60 pages in the translation of the Dialogue, a practice which is followed in 
the presentation of other Platonic Dialogues No other writer of the period seems to provide so clear an example 
of that kind of writing named by Lefevere as rewriting Grote’s philosophical, historical and political discussions 
of classical Greece are consistently sustained by extensive translations which become part of his own narrative -  
and it is only because of the ‘invisible’ status of translation today that this aspect o f his work has hardly been 
observed by contemporary scholarship.
20'’ Most reviewers of this work -  with the exception of John Stuart Mill -  were critical of this attempt and 
described Grote’s rewriting of Plato as a very poor justification of his utilitarian and democratic creeds On the 
issue see the following reviews of the book Bain (1865a, 1865b); Caird (1865); Cambell (1866), Whewell 
(1865); Lewes (1866); Mill, J. S (1866).
As he argues "here [in Crito] we have the Protagorean dogma. Homo Mensura proclaimed by Socrates 
himself As things appear to me So they are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you My reason and 
conscience is the measure to me: yours for you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine (1865: I 
305).
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or fewer in number: the King, the Pope, the Priest, the Judges or Censors, the author of some 
book, or the promulgator o f such and such doctrine. The infallible measure which you 
undertake to provide must be found in some person or persons -  if it can be found at all: in 
some person selected by yourself- that is, in the last result, yourself ( 1865: 2. 358-9).
While Kant completed his exaltation of autonomous judgement by the assertion that in the 
context of civil life one must argue at an intellectual level, but nevertheless obey the rules of 
the community as they are given by official authorities,2lm Mill’s and Grote’s endorsement of 
“private judgement” was complemented by its explicit violation, the consideration of the 
judgements of certain individuals (selected by merit) as more legitimate than those others.
This point, which was explicitly expressed by Mill in his theoretical works,2"9 
becomes evident in two fundamental choices in his translation of Protagoras: the rewriting o f 
the concept of ‘citizen’ by the concept o f the ‘individual’ -  a choice which is intimately 
related to Grote’s idealisation of ‘private judgement’ -  and the subsequent distinction 
between those individuals who produce and those who merely possess knowledge of the laws 
of the city; a division which is absent from the source text. Thus, in Plato’s Protagoras, man 
is a measure of judgement as citizen, that is to say, he develops the capacity to appraise and 
define virtue only by having learned what is considered to be virtue in the context of the city- 
state. This is evidenced in the two examples of acquisition of virtue provided by Protagoras, 
the first evoking the bestowal of political virtue on people by Zeus only at the moment they 
form societies (322c) and the second arguing that children learn to be competent judges of 
political issues through their education in accordance with the city’s laws, precisely as in an 
imaginary city, in which the ability to play the tlute is considered essential for people’s 
survival, everyone becomes a competent flute-player (326e-327e). Thus, for Protagoras it is 
only those men who have been brought up to be citizens who are able to cultivate political 
virtue. As he says in the dialogue, each of these men, even the most unjust, would appear both 
just and capable of determining justice, when compared to those who had no education, no 
courts, no laws, in short, no social context in which they could be educated and act as 
citizens:
Scm; ooi &6txujxaxo? cpai'vExai fivOpuirtoq xu>v ¿v vdpot; xai &v0pa>jioic XE0paupevu)v,
6ixaiov aiixbv Eivai xai bTigiovpybv xovxov xoO npdyuaxoc, e! 6£oi avxbv xpiveo0at 
jxpo; AvOpujjxou;, ol; prjxe Jiaifieia ¿axi prjxE Sixaoxqpia prjxE vopoi prj6fe ¿vdyxr) 
pTi&epia 6i& Jiavxb; hw ayvAtpvaa ¿pexf|g £junEkElo0ai, txlX  eIev &ypio( xtve? (327d). 2089
208 As Kant wrote “in some alfairs which affect the interests of the commonwealth, we require a certain 
mechanism whereby some members of the commonwealth must behave purely passively, so that they may, by an 
artificial common agreement, be employed by the government for public ends (or at least deterred from vitiating 
them) It is, of course, impermissible to argue in such cases, obedience is imperative ( 17841, 1991: 56).
209 On this issue see chapter 3.
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Mill translated this passage as follows:
All civilised men, even the most unjust, if compared with men among whom there is no 
training, no tribunals, no laws, with the wild men [of whom poets tell us,] would appear a 
perfect master in virtue (18341; 1978: 51, my italics).
The translation introduces two significant transformations of the source text. Mill uses the 
notion of “civilised men” in order to render the Protagorean description of men reared within 
laws and society (x£bv 6v vdjioic; xcn dv0Qujjioig TE0pa[ip€vcov)210 and he further substitutes 
the idea that each of these men is educated to be himself “just” as well as “creator” 
(6t][uouqy6v ) of justice for the assertion that a civilised man “would appear a perfect master 
in virtue”. The use o f the term “master (in)” in the translation evokes the idea of expertise on 
judging political issues, the image of a man of learning and capacity,211 who does not 
however 'produce' the laws by which virtue is determined. To be a perfect master in virtue 
means to know what is considered as virtue in a certain social context, but not to participate, 
actively, in the establishment of this context, in the creation of rules for judgement.
Grote’s translation betrays a similar logic:
The very worst man brought up in your society and its public and private training would 
appear to you a  craftsman in these endowments, if you compared him with men who had 
been brought up without education, without laws, without dikasteries (sic) [courts of justice] 
without any general social pressure bearing on them, to enforce virtue: such men as the 
savages (1865: 44, my italics)
This translation does not explicitly take justice as the topic of the 'discussion’ but the 
“endowments” of virtuous men, as Grote writes. Furthermore Grote translates the phrase 
bixaiov auxov elvat xdi 6t)[uovqyov tovtov tou jtQdYnaToc by the idea that even the 
worst man of the Athenian (your, that is Socrates’) society would appear a “craftsman” in 
virtue. The notion o f craftsmanship does convey the idea of making' or 'producing’, but is 
nevertheless related to a rather vague conception of virtuous endowments, instead of ‘justice’ 
and the production o f laws. The notion o f ‘civilised’ men is not explicitly present in the 
translation but can easily be read in the opposition between the men brought up by training 
and the “savages” who lack education, institutions of justice and the social pressure which 
would enforce virtue on them. It goes almost without saying that the idea that public opinion 
“enforces” virtue on citizens is absent from the source text and Greek thought in general.
The omission of the idea of 'political creation’ seems to accord with Mill’s 
conviction that democratic government requires the agreement rather than the participation of
210 The source text’s phrase “tv  v<5poi; xai Av0p<67tois” literally reads as “in the context of laws and people” 
That the term 'people' refers to society rather than an aggregate of men is evident from the context of this phrase
211 Cf. OED s.v master, mastery
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the governed in politics, his dedication to a participatory form of democracy, which requires 
the consensus of the governed, but ensures that an educated minority is responsible for 
people’s “good government” 212 *From this point of view Mill described Plato’s elitism -  as 
expressed in Socrates’ thought -  as an “exaggerated protest against the notion that any man is 
fit for any duty” to which there was “more or less tendency in all popular governments”; a 
protest which is seen by Mill as ultimately justifiable, since its results are beneficial for both 
the governed and the governing (18661; 1978: 406). This thesis leads precisely to the 
distinction between subjects who are capable of producing the laws of a community and 
subjects who are aware of these laws but are not fit for contributing to their (collective) 
institution, that is, a distinction between originating and -  to use a term suggested by Balibar 
-  “subjected” subjectivities (1994). Likewise, Grote qualified his admiration of Protagoras, by 
pointing out how the opinion of the common people, which he represents in the dialogue, 
“neither defines, nor analyses, nor submits to debate” what virtue is. Protagoras, Grote argues 
contradicting his previous thoughts, "manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis: 
he accepts the ground already prepared for him”, he takes virtue as “a known and familiar 
datum” and he is therefore himself subjected to the “King-Nomos” (1865: 72). From this 
perspective both Grote and Mill concede that “the enemy against whom Plato fought”, as Mill 
put it, “was not Sophistry but the commonplace”, the knowledge of the multitude (18661; 
1978: 403).
Certainly Mill and Grote suggested no other criterion for the establishment of this 
division in a democratic society apart from ‘merit’, they only endorsed the bestowal of 
political authority on people of actual ability, education and talent, on the additional 
condition that all men and women should be given an equal opportunity to demonstrate this 
merit 21’ Still this position, which appears to be sustained by the omission o f the source 
phrase ‘political creation’, articulates a conception of democracy, which cannot be found in 
the source text. For while Protagoras’ description of the Athenian polity emphasises the 
essential ability of all citizens to determine the meaning of justice, Mill conceives of this 
ability as the privilege of a limited number of people and reduces the virtue of the majority to 
the knowledge of laws and the subsequent potential of being just, the capacity of being 
subjected to the rules of justice.
This assertion establishes a hierarchical division of subjects, which comes to 
contradict Mill’s and Grote’s exaltation of private judgement, their conviction that no man
212 For a further discussion of this issue see chapter 3.
21 ’ For a further discussion of this issue see chapter 3.
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can assume the position of a lawgiver without simultaneously evoking an authority that can 
never be fully legitimised, since it has no other measure for affirming its truth apart from 
itself, that is, apart from a fundamentally arbitrary process of self-justification. But how can 
one glorify individual autonomy and a relativisation of justice -  however moderate and 
conditional - and argue, at the same time, that only a minority of individuals are qualified to 
become producers of social laws, that a number of private judgements are somewhat wiser 
and more just than the judgement of others? Mill did not -  and from his position could not 
perhaps -  provide a satisfactory answer to this question. He did however seek to resolve this 
contradiction by suggesting in his translation the dissociation of ‘virtue’ from the political 
order of the city-state and its relocation in the context of civil society; in other words by 
proposing a definition of virtue as a personal achievement of individuals rather than a trait of 
‘citizens’. Let us follow the development of this point by comparing the source and target 
text. For the Athenians, as is suggested by Protagoras, the ideal of ‘political creation’ was 
constitutive of a conception of man as citizen, whose education derives precisely from his 
participation in the political processes of the community and who is able to express -  as part 
of a social body -  moral and political judgements as well as establish the criteria for the 
distinction between the ‘just’ and ‘unjust’, ‘virtuous’ and the amoral’, the worthy’ and, as 
Thucydides maintained, the debased and apolitical’. Yet for Mill it is not the citizen but the 
“civilised man”, as he writes in his translation, who is the subject of virtue, and thereby the 
“civilised and civil” society is not only distinguished from the political, but becomes the 
collective sphere par excellence in which man’s intellectual and moral potential can develop 
It is precisely this idea that informs Mill’s translation o f  “Kokuucri dgexfi” (political virtue) 
by “social virtue” in the passage quoted above: a substitution of the political for the social 
realm which did not merely imply a disjunction of these two orders of social life, but their 
direct opposition; the constitution of a civil social order as the field in which the subject can 
be realised by being dissociated from political responsibility, by denouncing the capacity to 
create the laws of its collective existence.
While this translation can be traced back to the Latin and Roman-Christian 
interpretations of Greek politics214 it is only in the context of modem bourgeois societies that
214 According to Arendt, the transformation of the Greek concept o f the ‘political’ into the concept of the ‘social’ 
goes back to Seneca’s translation of Aristotle’s £<&ov Jtokitixriv by animat socialis, which then became the 
standard translation through Thomas Aquinas homo esi naturahter polilicu.s, id  esl, socialis This unconscious 
substitution of the social for the political, Arendt argues, betrays the gradual loss of the Greek understanding of 
politics, which is still present in the Latin use of the term social (socielas in Latin also originally had a political 
meaning as it indicated an alliance between people for a specific purpose) but disappears in the concept of a 
societas generis hiimam by which the term ‘social’ begins to acquire the meaning of a ‘‘fundamental human 
condition": that men cannot live without the company of their species While neither Plato nor Aristotle ignored
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the appropriation of the political by the civil realm and the subsequent recognition of the 
former as the responsibility of the state (or the representatives of the state) rather than the 
people is articulated as an attempt at human emancipation, a condition which presumably 
safeguards and promotes individual autonomy and freedom -  that distinctively modem kind 
of freedom which Arendt would successfully name as “freedom from politics” (1963: 280). 
Yet, this freedom, as we read in Mill’s translation, acquired its meaning through a silent 
deprivation of the subject; it was articulated at the very moment man lost an essential 
political autonomy, the moment he was considered unable to participate in a self-instituted 
society and was subjected to laws created by others. What the rendering of Protagoras 
indicates is therefore that it was the loss of political freedom, the emergence of individuality 
at the cost of citizenship, that brought into being civil virtue and autonomy, the ‘social’ space 
in which a presumably ‘free’, ‘self-determined’ subjectivity could be conceived of and 
realised.
Here again we encounter the same ideological motif we observed in Thucydides’ 
translations: the move by which an ideal is supposedly reached and actualised passes through 
its partial cancellation: ‘virtue’ is achieved by the cancellation of ‘political creation’, the 
erasure of ‘political virtue’; freedom by the negation of its political aspects; subjectivity by 
opposing itself to the subject as political being, by the antithesis between the subject and the 
citizen. What emerged from this motif was a form of political authority which was justified 
on the grounds that it no longer violated the sphere of subjectivity, it was not imposed on civil 
society, but contrariwise existed as its ultimate regulator and protector. That this form of 
authority, which defined the organisation of modem bourgeois societies, was by far removed 
from Protagoras’ relativist claims becomes clear by the distance between the source text and 
nineteenth-century translations. These set up a final appraisal of the Sophists that stressed the 
intellectual and political division between ancient relativism and modem sensibility. Hence 
Mill’s initial defence of Protagoras was completed by the claim that “on the whole they [the 
Sophists] left the science of mind and of virtue in an extremely unsatisfactory state”, while 
Plato shows in Protagoras “that it was possible to go much beyond the point which they had 
attained in moral and political philosophy” (18341; 1978). Likewise George Henry Lewes, in 
his Biographical History o f  Philosophy, endorsed Grote’s and Mill’s positive appraisal of the 
Sophists and Protagoras in particular (1855'; 1857: 1.87-103), but also stressed the danger of
this condition, which man shares for them with animals, they did not think of it as the distinctive feature of 
humanity For them man was different from animals not because of this natural association with other men (whose 
centre is the home, oiicia) but because of another life, besides this one, which was ¡hex; jtoXmicdi;, a life as a 
citizen, whose centre was the noXu;, the city (1958', 1998: 23-24).
The Vanishing Subject of Democratic Politics 181
their scepticism for the universal validity of laws. He thus maintained that for the Sophists 
“all law is but convention” and hence “the convention of each State is therefore just for it". 
But more than this, since for them “any such convention must necessarily be ordained by the 
strongest party, i.e. must be the will of the many” one can conclude that “justice is but the 
advantage of the strongest” (ibid.: 102). This was not, however, the meaning justice acquired 
in the context of Socrates’ thought and of modem science and positivist philosophy, Lewes 
suggested, from the perspective of which the Sophistic scepticism seems to be only the 
beginning rather than the culmination of an enquiring mind. The Sophists, he argued, 
were the natural production of the opinions of the epoch In them we see the first energetic 
protest against the possibility of metaphysical science This protest, however, must not be 
confounded with the protest of Bacon -  must not be mistaken for the germ of positive 
philosophy It was the protest of baffled minds The science of the day led to scepticism 
[But] the scepticism of the Sophists was a scepticism with which no great speculative 
intellect could be contended Accordingly with Socrates Philosophy again re-asserted its 
empire (ibid.: 1.102-103).
Despite their justified reaction against a worldview defined by metaphysical philosophy, it 
was argued by both Mill and Lewes, the Sophists did not -  could not at the time provide the 
moral and political precepts which would not be taken as an a prion, but would nevertheless 
be stable enough to determine the rules for a shared social and political life.
But where could a liberal-democratic society find these precepts? If individuals not 
only lacked the capacity to create political laws, but also conceived of this lack in positive 
terms, as an ability to realise civil virtue, where could the authority of shared political rules be 
based? Given the erasure of both a public and a divine sphere of episteme and ethics, who or 
what could subsequently provide the locus of political justice and virtue, the source o f 
political institution? Mill’s theoretical answer to this question is already known to us: a 
number of distinguished, educated individuals who could prove themselves capable o f 
contributing to ‘political creation’. That this response is in fact fraught with contradictions 
becomes evident if we consider Mill’s conception of virtue as ‘civil’, personal’ achievement, 
which provides no criteria for the bestowal of political excellence, leaves no space for the 
emergence of personalised political authority, even if this is to be limited to a small number 
of individuals. If the ideal of man’s subjectivity is reduced to the sphere of civil rights and 
duties, within which women and men act as personal agents -  members of the family, 
jobholders, participants in personal relations and so on -  how can one define the traits o f 
excellence required for the constitution of political virtue, of the ‘meritorious’ individual who 
can constitute political laws?
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In contrast with his theoretical writings215 Mill’s response to this issue in the 
translation is unambiguous: in the context of liberal democracy, the subject as an embodiment 
of political excellence is conspicuously absent; man as a ‘creator’ of politics, as a participant 
in society’s self-institution vanishes. “All civilised men” Mill writes “would appear a perfect 
master in virtue” while reserving no place for the source-text’s conception of man as a 
lawgiver. What emerges in this deletion of the political subjectivity is precisely what the 
translated text literally says: that a ‘no-body’, an absence of the subject stands at the roots of 
liberal-democratic politics, that despite its persistent emphasis on individuality, the Law of 
democracy is articulated as a subjectless law -  that is to say it is realised as the legitimacy of 
a structure of relations, not as the bestowal of authority on a person or group that is 
inextricably related to a dominant political position. Democratic society, as Lefort has 
remarked, is thus “instituted as a society without a body, as a society which undermines the 
representation of an organic totality”. For the locus of power is “an empty place, it cannot be 
occupied”, and thus power and authority are somewhat de-substantialised, they cannot be 
represented as unified entities. People are only the mechanisms for the exercise of power, 
"the mere mortals who hold political authority”, while no individual and no group can be 
cosubstantial with it (1988: 18, 17). But this de-materialised, impersonal power does not 
cease to rule, as Arendt reminds us, “for having lost its personality”. As can become 
immediately evident from the most ‘social’ form of government, bureaucracy, the rule by 
nobody does not in any way imply the absence of rule, the disintegration of law. On the 
contrary, it may be indeed constituted as one of its cruellest and most tyrannical forms (19581; 
1988: 40). To say that authority became ‘disembodied' and non-representable does not mean 
that it resided in society and thus lost its essential quality as authority, that it became social, 
collective will. It means that it emerged in forms which functioned beyond the consciousness 
of subjectivities, but which nevertheless appeared in the outcomes of these forces, that is to 
say, in discourse and, in our case, in translations
3. Is There a Subject in a Liberal-Democratic Society?
In the context of nineteenth-century Britain, the idea of political authority emerges in two 
interrelated and yet apparently antithetical forms, both of which become evidenced in 
translations of Protagoras. The first o f these forms is located no further than civil society 
itself: it lies in the very logic that governs this society’s socio-economic relations, which is 
expressed in the principle of utility, the maxim that pleasure or happiness is the only
213 For a further discussion of Mill’s theoretical approach to this issue see chapter 3
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legitimate measure for the judgement of political virtue. For John Stuart Mill -  as for the 
originators of utilitarianism, James Mill and Jeremy Bentham -  utility, the quest for 
maximisation of individual pleasure and fulfilment of personal desire, gives meaning to an 
authority which is deemed to stand above originating political consciousness, a law to which 
both ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ groups must be subjected. The principle of the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number is for them the only justified criterion for evaluating 
political virtue and justice, and the fundamental Law that governs a democratic society. 
Conversely, the second form of authority, which becomes evident in Jowett’s translation of 
Protagoras (written during the second half of the century), appeared as a direct opposition to 
utilitarian ideas and sought to reintroduce the notion of a supreme good as a unifying social 
force: a presumably universal moral code according to which civil duties and rights must be 
canonised in ways that they would foster social unity and coherence. While this suggestion 
employed an explicitly religious vocabulary and identified ‘good’ and ‘virtue’ with ‘divine 
will’, its historical formulation, as will be argued, did not develop as a mere resurrection of 
Christian ideals, but employed a secularised concept of the ‘Law’ as a reaction to and a 
resolution to the social conflicts and instability that defined the target society.
3.1 P rotagoras’ Utilitarianism: Democracy and the Market
In the debate between Socrates and Protagoras, the definition of the meaning of ‘good’ plays 
a central role in their inquiry into the nature of political virtue. In the course of their 
discussion Socrates makes Protagoras acknowledge the identity of all elements of virtue and 
their absolute dependence on ooMppo<ruvr|, the capacity of a sound mind that is founded on 
moderation Subsequently Socrates asks whether a pleasant life is to be identified with the 
good’, and after a short discussion, in which he finds his interlocutor to be in agreement with 
him, Socrates draws the following conclusion:
T o O x ' fip a  f|Y£to6' e lv a i x a x o v , xi|v L u j ii iv , x a i  d y a O o v  T p v  f|6ovr)v, ¿jxe'i x a i a iix b  TO 
X a ig e iv  xbxe \iyziz x a x b v  e lv a i, 5 x a v  p e itb vio v  f)6ova)v Anooxepfi fj 6 a a ;  a iix b  Eyzi, fj 
X.vijtas nei^oug n a p a o x e u b C jl t o iv  ¿v  aiixqj pb ovaiv  (3 54c).
Mill translates the passage as follows:
pleasure is the same thing with good, and pain with evil and if a pleasure is bad, then it is 
because it prevents a greater pleasure, or causes a pain which exceeds the pleasure: if a pain 
is good, it is because it prevents a greater pain, or leads to a greater pleasure (I8341;
1978:58).
The translation stays close to the source text. Yet the idea expressed by Socrates at this point 
is part of a broader argument developed in the dialogue, which ultimately seeks to question 
the relativism implied in the idendfication of ‘good’ with ‘pleasure’ and ‘evil’ with pain’,
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and maintain, as we have already seen, that political qualities are intrinsically ‘good’, as 
expressions of an a priori truth, rather than judged as good by such temporal and contingent 
standards. It is only by omitting a substantial part of this argument, as mentioned above, that 
Mill is able to declare, when commenting on Socrates’ thought at the end of his translation, 
that
the principle of utility, -  the doctrine that all things are good or evil, by virtue solely of the 
pleasure or the pain which they produce, -  is as broadly stated, and as emphatically 
maintained against Protagoras by Socrates, as it ever was by Epicurus or Bentham (18341;
1978: 61).
The doctrine of utilitarianism, which Mill reads in the Platonic text articulates a moral 
and political position that was inconceivable in the ancient Greek polis, while being most 
readily linked with the ideals that defined civil social relations and the capitalist market 
economy of nineteenth-century Britain. Utility is associated with individual pleasure and pain, 
and when it is used as the measure of general happiness it leads to the assumption that the 
accumulation of various subjective happiness would result in the maximisation of the 
common good. Yet despite frequent evocations of the well being of the community, 
utilitarianism, as Ross Poole has pointed out, feeds on the disjunction between personal 
motivation and social consequence, and thus finds itself unable to explain why individuals 
might be motivated by a concern for the general happiness when this happiness is not related 
to their own interests (1991: 17). In the context of ancient Greece, even the most fervent 
critics of the Athenian democracy could not conceptualise such a disjunction. The well being 
of the citizen, as Greek philosophers, artists and historians have depicted it, is directly 
connected to the common good, it is rooted in the good of the city. This did not imply that the 
city was a political entity whose ‘will’ was imposed on its members The city consisted of its 
members in their collective existence, it created no distinction between the political and the 
social sphere, at least in the limited space defined by legitimate citizenship. The well being of 
the polis was therefore nothing more and nothing less than the well being of citizens. There 
was no conceivable distinction, let alone opposition, between the former and the latter. The 
city, Aristotle remarked in Politics, does not merely come into being for the sake of living, 
but for the sake of living well (iii v. 10 )
To equate this conception of happiness (eubaipovia) with utilitarian definitions of 
pleasure, as were articulated in Bentham’s and James Mill’s writings, was not only an 
anachronism, but a complete appropriation of classical philosophy and history. It was 
nevertheless an appropriation that was in total accordance with a line of thought, which 
identified ‘civilisation’ with civil society and described the traits of a capitalist social order as
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the results of historical progress and development. For the principle of utility emerged as the 
direct outcome of an intellectual tradition that saw the accumulation of profit, the propensity 
for self-interested social conduct, the right to private property, the glorification of 
competition, the maximisation of production, and the social division of labour as the 
necessary presuppositions of a civilised way of life, as the social features that distinguished 
‘us’ from ‘rude’ and ‘barbaric’ nations, ‘still’ trapped in ‘previous’ forms of social and 
cultural organisation.21'’ It is not difficult to see how this tradition defined a philosophical 
framework which was directly relatable to the logic and needs of the market economy and 
social structures o f the period. In a sense the ‘glory’ of the market, as Poole has observed, is 
the extent to which it manages to minimise effort and maximise production. If therefore the 
satisfaction of wants is happiness and effort is pain, and the excess of happiness over pain can 
be defined as utility, then “utility seems to be just what the market provides and utilitarianism 
just what it needs” (1991: 8 ).
Yet, defined in this way, ‘virtue’ becomes radically different from the meaning of the 
term in the source text. If the appropriateness of social conduct is determined in terms of 
utility and private interests, and these interests are conceived of merely in terms of 
maximisation of profit, then it becomes impossible to develop a conduct that aims towards 
the well being of others. For others’ become means for the realisation of my own ends, and if 
I consider them as something different than means, these ends will not be realised. If, say, I, 
as the owner of a company show consistent compassion towards the personal circumstances 
of my employees and run the company in accordance with them, choosing for example not to 
make a number of them redundant in order to minimise my costs, or if I consider the wider 
social implications of my products (for example the impact of the use of models in 
advertising on the formation of women’s and men’s self-perception) as more important than 
my own interest, I shall not be able to maximise my profit either. In other words it is only to 
the extent that individuals are ready to act with a certain impersonality and lack of altruism, if 
not ruthlessness, with respect to each other, and to the common good, as Poole remarks, “that 
the market as a whole will exhibit the beneficent tendencies which have been its glory” 
(1991: 7). But if it is the principle of utility that posits the Law of a sociopolitical order, as 
Mill’s translation maintains, is it not ultimately ‘profit’ rather than virtue’ which sets the 
measure for politics and morality? For it is profit, or as Bentham put it, it is money, which is 
the instrument for the measurement of ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’, and thus the standard for the 
judgement o f ‘politics’ and morality’. As Bentham wrote,
‘ * On the issue see the discussion on Kant's and Ferguson's writings in chapter I, section 3.
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1 speak and prompt mankind to speak a mercenary language The thermometer is the 
instrument for measuring the heat of the weather, the barometer for measuring the pressure 
of the air Those who are not satisfied with the accuracy of these instruments must find out 
others that shall be more accurate, or bid adieu to Natural Philosophy Money is the 
instrument for measuring the quantity of pain and pleasure Those who are not satisfied with 
the accuracy of this instrument must find out some other that shall be more accurate, or bid 
adieu to Politics and Morals (1973: 123).
The law of an economy becomes thereby a political and moral law, the maximisation of 
individual interests and pleasure, and the minimisation of pain becomes a rule which not only 
functions above and beyond subjects; it annihilates subjects altogether. It provides no space 
either for the emergence of ‘excellent’, virtuous’ individuals or for the consideration of 
others as subjectivities.
From this point o f view, does not Mill’s equation of Socrates’ position with utilitarian 
principles bring about a far more pervasive transformation of the Socratic doctrine, namely 
the effective dispersal of virtue? Does not the conception of good’ as ‘useful’ further dispel 
the very criterion by which Socrates establishes such a distinction and thereby defines virtue, 
namely truth? For the truth by which the Socratic good’ can be appraised is not merely 
antithetical, but totally irrelevant to the concept of utility. As many critics of utilitarianism 
have argued, the postulate of utility and even the principle of the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number do not provide any means for defining good’, but can only be established in 
a society in which such a definition stems from a different ethical code The concept of public 
happiness, as MacIntyre has pointed out,
has obviously legitimate application in a society where the consensus is that the public 
happiness consists in more and better hospitals and schools, but what application has it in a 
society where the public happiness is found by the public itself to consist in the mass murder 
of Jews? (19661; 1998 . 238)
Mill could never of course have accepted the legitimacy of this latter choice, and this is why 
MacIntyre astutely describes him as a utilitarian who was painfully aware of the problems of 
his position, but could not conceive of abandoning it either (I9661; 1998: 235). His thought 
on virtue appears inherently ambiguous, intrinsically divided. Mill was as keen on defining 
moral standards, on limiting egotistic behaviour and establishing a collective happiness as he 
was eager to endorse the right of individuals to pursue their personal goals and interests What 
he could not recognise -  and this is the point at which his thought becomes ideological -  was 
the essential antithesis between these propositions, the fact that the ‘right’ to pursue 
pleasure’ in a society in which pleasure is equivalent with individual profit can only bring 
about an absence of morality and a lack of collective happiness.
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To be sure, an intellect as sensitive towards human needs and perceptive of political 
issues as Mill’s could not be left unaffected by the resonance of the creeds he consciously 
espoused. A doubt regarding his own thought, a latent dispute of his position emerges in the 
translation of Protagoras when he encounters a concept which he deems to be untranslatable: 
atixppoowti. The Greek word, he writes,217 was in very popular use in the source context and 
conveyed to the mind of a Greek associations o f  the highest praise, a combination of moral 
and intellectual qualities. It is however “untranslatable into English, because we have no 
single word by which we are accustomed to express the same combination of qualities and of 
feelings”. Mill cites several translations of the term: “prudence”, “temperance”, “decency”, 
“decorousness”, “considerateness”, “good sense” without being able to deem any of them as 
appropriate (18341; 1978: 53). His final choice o f  the word ‘prudence’, which appears in the 
translation of the passage analysed above (323a), is therefore reluctant, and in a few other 
cases Mill uses the Greek word in his translation.
But why does the choice of the term prudence' posit such a significant problem for 
Mill as a translator? Which were for him the qualities’ denoted by the source concept that 
could not be rewritten in modem English? In his attempt to explain aoxppooúvrj Mill suggests 
that it “denoted all the qualities or habits which were considered most contrary to 
licentiousness of morals and manners, in the largest sense of the term”. This concept, he 
writes, developed in a social context which had not yet fully established laws for the 
protection of person and property (although these laws were more effective in Athens than 
other cities), and thus needed a moral ideal that would promote the habits of self-restrained 
and regulated life:
In a state o f society in which the control of law was as yet extremely weak, in which the 
restraints of opinion, even in the democratic states, acted with little force upon any but those 
who were ambitious of public honours, and in which everywhere (even at Athens where 
person and property were far more effectually protected than in the other states of Greece) 
the unbridled excesses of all sorts committed by the youth of the higher classes, endangered 
the personal security and comfort of every man, it is not wonderful that self-restraint, and the 
habits of a thoughtful and regulated life, should be held in peculiarly high esteem (18341;
1978 33-34).
The interpretation of ooMppórruvrj given in this passage is quite reductive of the meaning of 
the source term, which also evoked the idea of good sense and wisdom, while being in fact 
much closer to the meaning of Mill’s rejected translation, ‘prudence’ .218 The latter term
217 A commentary of almost two pages on the word acixppocnjvri is written as part of the translated text itself 
rather than being introduced in the form of paratext
Grote translated the concept by the term ‘moderation’ (1865: 50)
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denotes precisely the opposite of excessive, inconsiderate behaviour, the ability to choose a 
suitable course of action especially as regards conduct; it evokes the idea of practical wisdom 
and discretion in a social context. Yet besides this meaning, ‘prudence’ also refers to the 
ability to choose a profitable course of action,219 it has been connected with ‘thrift’, as 
MacIntyre points out, and especially thrift in monetary matters. A ‘prudent man’ has 
“something of the flavour of being cautious and calculating in one’s own interest”, he 
possesses that peculiar kind o f ‘virtue’ that is “embodied in life insurance” (19661; 1998: 74). 
Bentham’s writings articulate explicitly this connotation of the term. ‘Prudence’, as he argues, 
“consists in the sacrifice of the present to the future” insofar as this sacrifice can promise a 
maximisation of future pleasure or a minimisation of future pain. Yet “to give up any the least 
particle of pleasure for any other purpose”, Bentham maintains, “is not virtue, but folly” 
(1973. 94-95).
The second meaning of the term, which evokes the notions of thrift and calculation, 
would not have been consciously endorsed by Mill and for this reason he described the source 
concept as untranslatable. ‘Prudence’ as the capacity for self-constrained social conduct is a 
fairly accurate translation of a term that is supposed to evoke the habits of regulated life. It is 
prudence’ as thrift, as the capacity for calculation of interests, which is rejected as an 
equivalent of the source concept.
Mill’s implicit self-criticism was not merely an instance of personal doubt What his 
hesitance indicates is that the concepts of ‘individuality’ and ‘virtue’, that developed in the 
discourses of liberal democracy, acted to enunciate at once a critique and a reinforcement of 
their social context. In this sense, they were ideological insofar as they constituted an image 
of the subject, which was produced in order to manipulate and displace an existing emptiness, 
to conceal the impossibility of subjectivation in the context of modem bourgeois societies. 
Yet their emphasis on the priority o f man in a framework which essentially annihilated 
subjectivity was already a move towards a self-critique and a break with this framework. For 
it is only on the basis of this priority, of the supposition of the value of man, that one can 
discern the actual absence of the subject and criticise the substitution of human beings for the 
value of utility and profit prescribed by the laws of the market. It is far from being 
coincidental that it was the same idea of man as a sovereign being that was employed by 
Marx in his early writings in order to articulate one of the most fervent critiques of bourgeois 
democracies for the alienation of subjectivity and the absence of human conditions:
219Cf. OED s.v. 'prudence'
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Political democracy regards man -  not merely one man but every man -  as a sovereign 
and supreme being; but man in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect, man in his contingent 
existence, man just as he is, man as has been corrupted, lost to himself, sold and exposed to 
the rule of inhuman conditions and elements, by the entire organisation of our society -  in a 
word man who is not yet a true species-being (18431; 1975: 225-6).
This thesis does not only take the ‘individual' as an ideological object against which it posits 
itself. On the contrary, it finds in the mystifying character, in the ideological appearance of 
this object, a truth that constitutes its most fundamental presupposition, the means for the 
critique of the subject qua ‘individual’ in order to constitute it anew qua social and genuinely 
sovereign subject.
3.2 Protagoras' Authoritarianism: Democracy and Subjection
Based on this idealisation of interest, the liberal glorification of individuality was inherently 
inclined to lead to an authoritarian political viewpoint, when it came to the resolution of 
conflicting interests within a social community. Having sustained a social world based on 
inequalities and asymmetrical power relations, liberal-democratic institutions had to reconcile 
the oppositional claims of diversified and hierarchically stratified groups, each o f  which 
sought either the transformation or the perpetuation of existing social divisions. Without 
recourse to an ethics of political responsibility, which can only characterise a social 
community based on equality and political integration of its citizens, such reconciliation was 
established by the reconstitution of an absolutist vocabulary, which aimed to naturalise 
hierarchical social structures and legitimise the authority of dominant groups as indispensable 
to the maintenance of social coherence and reproduction. Thus a belief in the “naturalness” of 
human inequality was furthered after the middle of the nineteenth century and was fervently 
endorsed in Jowett’s significant publication of translations of Plato in 187 1 220
Jowett’s work was explicitly directed against Mill’s and Grote’s readings of the 
ancient philosopher. It sought “to represent Plato as the father of Idealism, who is not to be 
measured by the standard of utilitarianism or any other modem philosophical system”, but 
could provide an alternative to individualistic ethics and lack of authority, which was deemed 
to be a menace to social order and coherence (1892:l.xi). From this perspective, Jowett’s 
translation o f Protagoras established a strong division between the two main interlocutors of 
the dialogue. It represented Protagoras as the advocate of a common and contingent
22(1 Jowett’s first translation of the Dialogues appeared in 1871 A further edition, in which the writer revised both 
the translation, the introduction and the commentaries was published in 1875 A third edition, which was again 
revised, was published in 1892 Each of these editions is listed separately in the bibliography under the name of 
the translator
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knowledge, the “average public opinion”, and Socrates as the seeker of increased clearness, 
eternal truths, and unity of ideas (1892: 1.122). Jowett expressed his clear preference for the 
latter: “The truth of Protagoras”, he argued,
is based on common sense and common maxims of morality, while that o f  Socrates is 
paradoxical or transcendental, and though full o f meaning and insight, hardly intelligible to 
the rest o f mankind (1892: 1.122).
The argument of Socrates, it is suggested, delineates a moral code that surpasses 
commonsensical, trivialised truths; it illustrates a process through which “we pass from old 
conventional morality to a higher conception of virtue and knowledge” (1892: 1. 126).221
In opposition to Mill’s translation, which calls into question the idea of a universal 
unity of the ‘Good’ by omitting or summarising a few passages of the original, the higher 
truth which Jowett evokes indicates the unifying source of this morality -  a postulate which is 
taken to posit the main purpose and meaning of the Platonic dialogue: “The aim of Socrates, 
and the Dialogue, is to show the unity of virtue. In the determination of this question the 
identity of virtue and knowledge is found to be involved” (1892: 1.123). Consequently, 
Jowett’s translation follows meticulously all of the passages of the original that were left out 
by Mill and could lead to such conclusion. This choice does not, however, lead to the close 
adherence of the translation to the source text. For despite the reproduction of the Socratic 
arguments, Jowett invited his audience to read Protagoras from the perspective of Christian 
beliefs and saw in Plato’s ideas a predecessor and surrogate of a religious ethical code. Thus 
the Platonic ‘good’, which stands at the origin of human virtue, was identified by Jowett with 
divine transcendence. As he argued,
The Good must represent a unity, in which all time and all existence were gathered up It was 
the truth o f all things, and also the light in which they shone forth and became evident to 
intelligence, human and divine It was the cause o f all things, the power by which they were 
brought into being It was the universal reason divested o f human personality. It was the life 
as well as the light o f the world, all knowledge and all power were comprehended by it ... To 
ask whether God was the maker o f  it, or made by it, would be like asking whether God am id  
be conceived apart from goodness, or goodness apart from God (1892: 3 xcvii-xcviii, my 
italics).222
221 A similar position was advanced by Blackie, who argued that “Socrates and Plato were not teachers who 
taught the art o f influencing democratic assemblies by spoken words for hire, they taught a much loftier and more 
difficult art, the art o f self-culture, as the ultimate and only sufficient end for a rational being to pursue" On the 
other hand “the Sophists must often have been exactly what they are represented to be in Plato’s dialogues, 
teachers o f  a very superficial wisdom and o f  a very worldly morality” (1857: 19).
“ 2 The relation between Plato and Christianity was accentuated by a significant number o f Platonists since the late 
fifties. As Blackie stated in 1858 “(it does not] require a very profound glance to see how Platonic philosophy and 
Christian faith, in their grand outlines, characteristic tendencies, and indwelling spirit, are identical" (1857: 9)
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Unlike both Grate and Mill, Jowett did not understand Protagoras as an exaltation of a 
dialogic enquiry into truth, in the context of which the ‘right' and the ‘good’ can never be 
determined in advance, but are established by the rational investigation of equal interlocutors. 
A code of knowledge and moral propriety is given, in his view, by the authority of divine 
knowledge and transcendent morality. For it is only through the light offered by Christian 
thought, he argues, that the human mind can dissociate itself from its mortal bonds and attain 
the transcendent, universal truth that was invested by God in man. For this reason, Jowett 
consciously chose to employ in his translation the language and rhetoric of the Authorised 
Version of the Bible, “which allowed [the translated texts] to strike a responsive chord among 
the religiously minded”, as Turner has pointed out (1981: 415), and indicated the intimate 
relation of the Truth which Plato sought through reason to the truth revealed to Christian 
believers by the Gospel221
Yet this choice did not entail the transformation of Protagoras into a religious text. 
Conversely, this stylistic appropriation of Platonic philosophy acted at the time to sustain 
Christian faith by suggesting that the truth attained by the ancient Greeks through the power 
of rational enquiry was in fact identical with the truth of religion. Instead of merely 
christianising and domesticating Plato, Jowett’s work, as Turner has argued, transformed a 
liberal Christianity into a moral stance which sought to legitimise itself by an appeal to the 
wisdom of Plato (ibid : 415). From this perspective, Jowett’s translation seems to accord with 
the larger body of writings which appear to be deeply enmeshed in the paradoxical effort to 
advance a non-dogmatic defence of Christian dogma In his purely theological texts, Jowett is 
no less critical a reader of the Bible than a great majority of liberal sceptics of his time. His 
essay “On the Interpretation of the Scripture” recognised that "modes of interpreting” the 
Biblical text “vary as time goes on” and “partake of the general state of literature or 
knowledge” of an epoch (1861: 331). What this condition implies is that "the present 
circumstances which surround us pre-occupy our thoughts” in any effort to read the Scripture. 
It follows then “quite naturally, almost by a law o f the human mind” that “the application of 
Scripture takes the place of its original meaning”. Yet “the question is not how to get rid of 
this natural tendency, but how we may have the true use of it” (ibid.: 412). Jowett’s aim is to 
understand religious truths from a contemporary point of view in order accept them as a
221 A number o f reviewers were critical of Jowett’s appropriation of Plato’s texts, although all o f them generally 
characterised his translations as a major contribution to nineteenth-century English literature As Abbott and 
Campbell asserted at the end of the nineteenth century, after Jowett’s translation “everyone acknowledged that 
Plato was now an English book” (1897: 1(2). 7) Reviews of Jow ett’s translation of Plato include the review o f his 
student and Aristotelian scholar Alexander Grant (1871); the review of David Binning Munro (1871), and an 
anonymous review published in 1871 in the Macmillan v Magazine
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dogma, rather than seeking their eternal truth by means o f revelation -  and it is for this 
purpose that he turns to Greek philosophy. Plato provides a method of enquiry and judgement 
for him that was unavoidably missing from Christian faith, but could in turn be employed in 
order to justify religious truth and morality.
What then was the social role of this renewed justification of Christian doctrines? And 
how did this role, which necessitated the use of reason for the defence of dogma, affect the 
meaning and function of Christian faith? Jowett’s writings make clear that his translation of 
Plato was not intended to be a merely philological or academic enterprise While he used this 
text extensively to teach students of Greek at Oxford, his intention in writing it, as he 
suggests, could not be reduced to academic interests. Instead, his aim was to revive Plato’s 
thought as an alternative to a world within which “knowledge is reduced to sensation”, 
“virtue is reduced to feeling” and “happiness or good to pleasure”; to a society within which 
“human nature is dried up”; to a philosophy within which “ideals of a whole or of a state, or 
of a law of duty, or of a divine perfection” have become out o f  place ( 1892: 4. 173). In short, 
he sought to employ Plato as an alternative to both the commercial reality of modem 
bourgeois societies and the liberal-utilitarian ideology that sustained these societies. Platonic 
idealism (the characterisation is Jowett’s) could serve him for this purpose because Plato had 
reacted, in his view, against the same form of moral and social debasement, Jowett himself 
sought to question.224 As he put it,
the great enemy o f  Plato is the world, not exactly in the theological sense, yet in one not 
wholly different -  the world as the hater o f truth and lover o f appearance, occupied in the 
pursuit o f  gain and pleasure rather than o f knowledge, banded together against the few good 
and wise men, and devoid of true education (1892: 4 287) 225 
These statements are only partly an attack on utilitarian philosophers Their real aim is 
precisely the nineteenth-century world to which Jowett refers: a society which understands 
itself merely in terms of utility and which cannot maintain higher ideals; which orients its 
everyday practice in accordance with the pursuit of gain and pleasure; which can no longer
Jowett’s position was again presaged by Blackie’s thought, who described his contemporary world as deluded 
by “a surface morality”, “a morality o f convenience and utility" with which “the popular Greek Sophist in Plato’s 
day was perfectly contended”, but against which Plato reacted Blackie further suggested that Plato's hostility to 
the Athenian democracy stemmed precisely from this attempt at criticising such a superficial society “which he 
regarded as based on principles fundamentally vicious, and contrary to the eternal proprieties o f  the universe For 
this reason, his thought must be embraced and carefully studied by our nation, Blackie suggested, a nation which 
is not altogether one o f “shopkeepers", but seeks to believe “in something better than the mere mass o f material 
production’ which is the idol o f certain schools and political economies” (1858: 38, 41).
That view had a significant impact on late nineteenth-century readings o f  Plato can be found in a number of 
school and university editions o f the Platonic works The editor George Stock, for example, described Socrates as 
a martyr for philosophy whose Apology from the pen of Plato “shows us philosophy tried before the bar o f 
passing public opinion, condemned to drink the bitter juice of the hemlock, and justified before the ages” (1887:
5)
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judge the good and the right, as it is totally devoid of genuine education. It is against this 
society, Jowett writes, that the translation is directed, and in particular against those aspects 
of society which seem to resemble and reenergize the “debased” and “dishonest” Sophistic 
spirit. For the ancient Sophist, Jowett asserted, resembles “a Proteus”, “who takes the 
likeness” o f “rhetoricians, lawyers, statesmen, poets” -  in short all o f those men who corrupt 
the world as much as they are corrupted by it (ibid.: 287).
If Jowett had no belief in the common man, whom he saw as plagued by a self- 
interested individualism that left him unable to pursue high ideals, it is because he totally 
identified the ‘common people’ with the nineteenth-century middle classes. In the habits and 
values of these classes he recognised the thought-mode and ethics o f all majorities. For this 
reason his political contemplation stood not only against liberal-democratic ideas, but also 
against any kind of egalitarian politics. The people, according to Jowett, cannot have an 
active and creative role in the political life of a community, precisely because they lack true 
knowledge and ethics. At best, the common man, described, as we saw, by Protagoras as a 
“creator o f justice”, becomes in Jowett’s translation an “artificer” o f it, subjected to moral 
and political principles which transcend his potential for judgement and choice. As the 
translation states in relation to the Athenian citizens,
he who appears to you to be the worst o f  those who have been brought up in laws and 
human society, would appear to be a just man and an artificer o f justice if he were to be 
compared with men who had no education, or courts o f justice, or laws, or any constraints 
forcing them incessantly to the practice o f virtue -  with savages (1875: 152)226 
The translation renders the source concept ¿>t)(uouqyov by the term “artificer”, which evokes 
the idea of a “craftsman” and a “maker” (especially one who follows an industrial handicraft) 
but also the notion o f a cunning person, a trickster and a deviser227 -  a rewriting which is 
hardly relatable to the idea of a creator of justice. Jowett revised this choice in the third 
edition of his translation, in which he used Mill’s phrase master of justice’, but translated the 
source notion o f ‘human society’ by the term ‘humanities’. As he writes,
he who appears to you to be the worst o f those who have been brought up in laws and 
humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master o f justice if he were to be compared 
with men who had no education, no courts o f  justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them 
which compelled them to practice virtue -  with the savages for example ... (1892: 1. 148- 
149)
The phrase ‘master of justice’ does not have the negative connotations of the term artificer’. 
Yet, by presenting the Athenians as people who have been brought up “in laws and
2-6 The source text is quoted above 
‘2’ C f OED s.v. ‘artificer’, ‘artifice’
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humanities” rather than human society (as the original says) the translator distinguishes them 
from the rest of the ‘common people’ and makes the statement inapplicable to the majorities 
he wishes to criticise.
A similar logic informed the second translation of Protagoras during this period, 
made by Cary Henry. As this stated,
the man who appears to you the most unjust o f those who are trained in the laws, and 
among civilized men, is just and a proficient in justice when compared with men, who have 
neither instruction no courts o f justice, nor laws, nor any necessity that constantly compels 
them to attend to virtue, but may be considered as savages (1888 150-151)
The translation initially transforms the source phrase ¿v ... (WBqcojtoic Te0Qapp£vu)v, by the 
employment of the concept of “civilized men”, thus locating Protagoras’ social model within 
the civil rather than the political sphere. But more than, this Henry also deletes the 
Protagorean representation of the people of Athens as “creators” of justice. His work talks 
instead about proficiency; the capacity to understand and follow the laws constituted by 
authorities. Thus, while he acknowledged that all men who are brought up in a ‘civilised’ 
society could attain a proficient knowledge of justice, he was also convinced that no common 
man is able to set up the standards and establish the ideals by which justice and virtue should 
be defined.
If then the nineteenth-century social world was in need of such standards and the 
people of the time were claimed unable to define them, how could these be established and 
cultivated? In his answer to this question Jowett finds himself in full agreement with Matthew 
Arnold. Both these writers found in the ‘State’ the only locus of social truth, justice and 
morality."1* This conviction provides Jowett with the key to an interpretation of Plato’s 
philosophy, in the context of which
justice is the order o f the State, and the State is the visible embodiment o f justice, under the 
conditions o f  human society The one is the soul and the other is the body, and the Greek 
ideal o f the State, as o f the individual, is a fair mind and a fair body In Hegelian phraseology, 
the state is the reality o f which justice is the idea ( 1892: 3. vi)
This assertion is not taken to contradict Jowett’s idealisation of Christianity. On the contrary, 
it posits the ‘State’ as the realisation of a transcendent, divinely established justice, and 
religious truth as the soul that animates the body of the state.
It is precisely this belief that informs Jowett’s translation of a description of the 
Athenian democracy by Protagoras, in which the Sophist points out that the Athenian city
n * It is not coincidental that Jowett believed that o f  all o f the works o f  Plato only the law:; “shows so deep an 
insight into the sources o f  human evil” (1871: 4 .17).
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teaches its young members its laws and constrains them both to govern and be governed 
according to them:
f) juSX.15 av  Tow; xe vdpov; ¿tvayy-d^ei pavbdveiv xa i x a ta  xouxou; ^fjv xaeansQ  
raxpdbeiYua ... xa't f| tuSXic, vopovc ujtoypdntiaaa x ax a  xouxov? dvayxdi^Ei xdl 
fipXEtv xai &QX£0 0 a r  8? 6’ dv ¿xx6? Pai'vri touxatv, xoXdtfi, xai 6vopa xfj xoXaoei 
xauxT) xdl jtotp* vptv x a i fiXXoOi :xoX,X.axoO, to; eu0vvov>otis xfj; bixtis, eiiODvat (326d- 
e).
Jowett translated the passage as follows:
the stale compels them [the children] to learn the laws [and] the city outlines the laws 
and compels us to exercise and obey authority in accordance with those and he who 
transgresses [the laws] is to be corrected, or, in other words called into account, which is a 
term used seeing that justice calls men to  account( 1875:151, my italics).
The translation introduces some substantial changes into the source text. By replacing the 
notion o f the city by the notion of the state in the first phrase of the passage, it constitutes a 
distinction between the state as a locus of power, and the main body of a social community, 
which was absent in Protagoras’ description o f the Athenian democracy. Consequently Jowett 
transformed the characterisation of the Athenian citizens as capable of governing and being 
governed according to laws (xai &qx£iv x a i &QXEO0ai), by presenting them as compelled to 
“exercise and obey authority” -  a term that is not found in the source text. Finally, in the 
translation it is not the city, i.e. the social community, which is both the source and the 
guardian of its laws, as is asserted in the source text. What is implied by the use of the passive 
voice (he who transgresses [the laws] is to be corrected, or, in other words called to account) 
and the replacement of the jioXig -  which is the subject of punishment in the original -  by the 
notion of “justice”, is the location of legal authority in an abstract conception of justice, 
whose binding power exists irrespective of the political thought and action of the city itself. 
The revision of the translation in the third edition of Protagoras brings the source text even 
closer to the late nineteenth-century pursuit of authoritative ideals and further from the 
conditions of Athenian democracy. As the translator writes.
The state compels them to learn the laws, and live after the pattern which they furnish 
and not after their own fancies, the city draws the laws these are given to the young 
man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying, and he 
who transgresses them is to be corrected, o r in other words called into account, which is a 
term used seeing that justice calls men into account (1892:147-148)
The effect of the phrase “not after their own fancies”, which is absent from the source text, is 
to indicate that the people would tend to pursue a life that lacks any form of order and social 
respect, unless they are ‘compelled’ (the term is repeated several times in the translation) by 
the state to follow the laws. Furthermore the translation of the phrase “f) Jidkic; vdpou?
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tmoyQdtjtaoa ... x a td  Tovtouq xai ¿tQxeiv xa'i dQxeoBai” (which emphasises
that in the context of the city the same citizens would both exercise and (xal) obey the 
authority of the social body) introduces by the use of the disjunctive ‘or’ (as a translation of 
‘and’) a sharp division between those people who would command’ and those who would 
‘obey’ in the functioning of the state; an idea which can only be attributed to Jowett’s belief 
in the necessity of social hierarchies and not to Protagoras’ description of the Athenian 
democracy.
Cary’s translation ostensibly maintained the idea that the people govern and are 
simultaneously governed in a democratic society. Yet it did so by substantially qualifying the 
Protagorean statement, through the translation of the source term x6A.k; by the concept of the 
‘state’:
The stale still further compels them [the children] to learn the laws, and to live with them as a 
pattern, that they may not act at random [sic] after their own inclinations the state having 
prescribed laws compels them both to govern and be governed according to these, but 
whoso transgresses them it punishes, and the name given to this chastisement . is 
correction, since punishment corrects (1888 149-150, my italics).
The translation radically transforms the idea that the ‘city’, that is, the people as an 
institutionalised collective prescribe laws, canonise the education of the youth in accordance 
with them and punish whoever transgresses them. In Cary’s translation, it is again the ‘state’, 
as an institution that is not only separated from the social body, but also stands above and 
beyond the judgement of the people, that is responsible for the establishment and enforcement 
of law and justice.
Jowett’s and Cary’s translations project onto Protagoras an authoritarian and 
oppressive viewpoint which cannot be found in the source text Their position, as will be 
further discussed in the next chapter, voices the concerns of a great number of nineteenth- 
century intellectuals who were not theoretically opposed to the idea of autonomous pursuit of 
knowledge that had been advanced since the previous century, but were nevertheless 
genuinely convinced that within the world that surrounded them no ‘common people’ could 
be successfully engaged in determining the ‘truths’ and ‘morality’ of a social body. Their 
perception and critique of their society exhibits a clarity that is largely missing from the 
writings o f utilitarians and liberals, who were certainly more reluctant to dispute the 
presumed sovereignty and value of individuals When Jowett writes in his comments on 
Plato’s translations that “we boast of an individualism which is not freedom, but rather an 
artificial result of the industrial state of modem Europe” (1892: 3. clxxviii) he seems to he far 
more aware of the constituted nature and historical limits of the individual in bourgeois
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societies than both Mill and Grote. His crucial mistake, however, is that instead of seeing the 
‘man’ he criticises as indeed the historical product of the industrial state of modem Europe, 
he takes him as an absolute, and then seeks an alternative to him in an authority that 
transcends man absolutely. From a position of such an enlightened idealism, Jowett’s political 
conclusions become confused and contradictory. He values a social system within which the 
highest education is available to all and every human being is able to develop freely while 
rejecting utilitarian interests in profit and power. He nevertheless visualises this utopian 
alternative as the product of an 'idea of good’ that is determined in advance and establishes 
an order that does not derive from the will and judgement of the people. Thus, in the 
introduction to his translation of the Gorgias he delineates the features of the "true 
statesman” who would materialise his ideas as someone
who brings order out o f disorder His thoughts are fixed not on the power or riches or 
extension o f territory, but on an ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of 
health and life, and the highest education is within the reach o f all, and the moral and 
intellectual qualities o f every individual are freely developed, and ‘the idea of good’ is the 
animating pnnciple o f the whole ( 1892: 5 308-309).
The true statesman does not stand as a metonymy for a subject. His crucial feature lies in his 
capacity to bring order and organise a social whole The power behind him is the power of 
state-authority which is imposed on individuals irrespective of their will or capacity for 
criticism. As such, the “true statesman” stands as the embodiment of an authoritarian figure. 
Yet the ideals attributed to this figure articulate, at the same time, a far more pervasive 
critique of the oppression, alienation and annihilation of subjectivity in bourgeois societies 
than all previous evocations of utilitarian principles.
C h a p t e r  5
F r o m  a n  ‘ Et h ic s  o f  V ir t u e ’ t o  a n  ‘E t h ic s  o f  D u t y ’:
T r a n s l a t io n s  o f  A r i s t o t l e ’s N ic o m a c h e a n  E t h ic s  a n d  t h e  C o n s t it u t io n  o f  C iv il
M o r a l it y
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was among the most influential philosophical treatises on 
ethics in nineteenth-century Britain and certainly the most frequently translated and discussed 
Greek philosophical text o f  the time. If the limited study and translations of Plato until the 
last decades of the century justified Mill’s and Blackie’s complaints regarding the lack of 
Platonic scholarship, this was by no means the case with the Ethics, which acquired a 
significant position in the curriculum of Literae Humaniores at Oxford (Clarke 1959: 101) 
and was constantly translated and discussed throughout the century 2W
The number of translations of the treatise is impressive, especially when compared to 
the translations of Platonic writings. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ethics 
was read mainly in John Gillies’ and, less frequently, in Thomas Taylor’s translation. Gillies 
translated the Ethics and Politics together in 1797 and his work, which was reprinted four 
times during the nineteenth century (1804; 1813; 1823; 1893), was very influential for all 
other translators (with the exception of Taylor) until the middle of the century. Taylor’s 
translation was only published once (1818) and did not enjoy major popularity (for reasons 
that are related to the criticism of his translation o f Plato230) although it did receive a glowing 
review by an important Oxford scholar, Edward Copleston.2,1 These works were followed by 
two anonymous translations written in 1819 (re-edited with revisions in 1826) and 1846,232 
both published at Oxford, and then by D. P. Chase’s translation in 1847, which was reprinted 
three times (1861; 1866; 1877) and revised by George Henry Lewes (1890). The first part of 
the century closes with R W. Browne’s translation written in 1850. This period is marked by 
a publication of major significance for the study of Aristotle, Alexander Grant’s annotated 
edition of the Ethics, which appeared in two volumes, published in 1857 and 1858 
respectively, and was published again another three times, each one with revisions of both the 21
221 With the exception of Poetics, the Logic and (at the end o f the century) the Politics no other work o f Aristotle 
seems to have been particularly important for nineteenth-century scholarly interests, and even discussions on these 
works cannot measure up either to  the length or influence o f the debate on Aristotle’s ethical thought (Cf. Turner 
1981: 322-326).
2,0 For a further discussion of this issue see chapter 4
Copleston praised Taylor for both faithfulness and his plainness' and ‘integrity’ in his writing o f the target 
language As he wrote “I perceive in your translation, whenever I examine it, that prime virtue o f  a translator, a 
complete subordination and subserviency to his original, -  no tampering with the exact meaning in order to evade 
a difficulty, or to round a period There is also manly plainness and integrity which commands respect” (Taylor 
1818: vi).
2121 have not been able to view this translation.
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essays and the commentary on the Greek text (1866; 1874; 1885). Grant’s work was not a 
translation, but a critical edition with commentary, accompanied by a number o f essays on 
Aristotle’s ethical thought. It nevertheless offered an interpretation of the Ethics that had an 
immense influence on subsequent translators and commentators, and also provided many 
translations of isolated passages in the extended footnotes that followed the original These 
constituted the beginnings of Grant’s attempt to offer a complete translation of the Ethics, as 
he promised at the end of the second volume, which was, however, never realised. Nine 
further translations were published during the second part of the nineteenth century and one 
in the first years of the twentieth. Robert Williams translated the Ethics in 1869 and his work 
was reprinted twice, in 1876 and 1891. Rev. Giles’ translation^' appeared in 1870 and was 
followed by Walter M. Hatch’s translation in 1879, George Stock’s partial translation of the 
Ethics (books i-iv and x) in 1886, Frank H. Peters’ translation in 1881 (reprinted in 1886), 
Basford de Wilson’s partial translation (books i-iv, x) in 1884, Samuel H. Jeyes’ partial 
translation (books i-iv, x) in 1890, and James E. C. Welldon’s translation in 1892. In the same 
year J. A. Stewart published his Notes on the ‘Nicomachean Ethics ' o f  Aristotle ( 1892) which 
was -  and for many still is -  the most extensive treatment of the work in English (Turner 
1981: 366). It was followed by Franklin Harvey’s partial translation (books i-iv, x) in 1897 
and finally L. H. G. Greenwood’s translation in 1909.2,4 All of these works, as we shall 
shortly discuss, were written in the context of an extended, often passionate debate on the 
meaning and modem significance of Aristotle’s ethical precepts which lasted until the end of 
the century.
But why did the Ethics become so important for nineteenth-century thought? Turner 
provides us with a useful framework towards an answer to this question. He suggests that the 
Ethics particularly suited the ideal of “education of character" that was emphasised and 
pursued in Oxford at the time As a means of training young men for careers in church, 
politics and the civil services, it not only offered a reading of “charm” and “good sense”, but 
was also a work which upheld the social elitism that was so evidently part of Oxford life at 
the time. Most significantly though, Turner suggests, the Ethics was a “safe” book, in contrast 
perhaps with some of the Platonic dialogues. Aristotle did not stir youthful mystical 
imagination and left people secure in holding onto their property and living with the 
conventions of their family circles. He praised a collective social life without erasing 
individuality for the sake of the collective, he encouraged citizens to improve their society in
2”  This translation was obviously written for the use o f  pupils and students as it cites short phrases o f  the original 
and gives a literal rendering right next to them
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its existing structures, and also to uphold the prescriptive role of current social opinion' as 
the basis of moral behaviour; ideas which could only serve to maintain and sustain the status 
quo of the age (1981; 324-325). Clarke’s historical account o f the educational programmes of 
the period seems to confirm this position. “It was the pride of Oxford”, Clarke argued
that her students did not learn their philosophy from men who might mislead the young with
ideas o f their own, but by the regular and docile study o f a fixed theory ', that is to say. o f
Aristotle's Kthus (1959: 101)
From the first decades of the nineteenth-century Aristotle’s ethical philosophy became 
a significant alternative to utilitarian precepts and was steadily employed as a model for the 
advancement of social awareness, respect for authority, self-discipline and compliance with 
duty. While in the course of the century the text was appropriated by a wide variety of 
discourses, which were not always compatible with each other in terms of their aims and 
social function, the great majority of them took as their starting point a conception of moral 
subjects as personally and socially responsible agents, rather than self-interested individuals. 
The meaning of Aristotle’s work was thus read by translators from the perspective of an 
ethics of duty: the attempt to establish a set of universal principles that determine personal 
and social behaviour on the grounds of what is ‘right’, irrespective of the relation of this right 
to the agent’s interests in a strict sense of the term. In other words, what was important in this 
context was to determine how people should live in order to avoid socially wrong and amoral 
behaviour, even if such a definition of moral propriety was in sharp contrast with men's 
personal well-being.
While many tenets of the Ethics were in accordance with the particular meanings 
bestowed on "duty’ by nineteenth-century rewriters and translators, the logic and purposes 
that underwrote the ancient work could not have been further from those of an ethics of duty. 
For Aristotle the ethical aim of human life was ‘enSaipovia’, a term that is normally 
translated into English as ‘happiness’ (and this is the translation I shall use to render the 
term), but originally meant something different to what is commonly understood today by 
happiness. EvSaigoviu evoked as inseparable the ideas of ‘acting well’ and ‘well-being’; it 
entailed that ethics should be able to teach men how to pursue a life that leads to ‘happiness’ 
rather than morality in the modem sense of the term. Therein lay precisely the distance 
between Greek and modem ethics: a distance between ‘well-being’ and ‘right’ For while the 
Greek ethics, as MacIntyre has argued, asks “what am 1 to do if I am to fare well?” and 
conceives the attainment of ‘virtue’ as a contribution to this purpose, modem ethics asks 214
214 The full titles u  the .e translations can be found in the bibliography under the name o f  the translators
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"what am I to do if I am to do right?” and it asks the question in a way that implies that doing 
what is right is quite independent from faring well (19661; 1998: 84, 59). It was this distance 
that nineteenth-century translators sought to confront, manipulate and, to some extent, bridge 
To be sure, Aristotle did not seek to equate ethics with pleasure and was not less eager 
to articulate some norms for the appraisal of social behaviour than his nineteenth-century 
British rewnters. On the contrary, his work voices the concerns of a time that was precisely in 
need of such norms, of criteria by which the ‘good’ for human beings could be defined in 
umversalisable terms. In contrast to the ethics of the Homeric period, in the framework of 
which central judgements that could be passed upon men, as MacIntyre explains, pertained 
exclusively to the way men fulfilled their allocated social role, and therefore precluded an 
evaluative vocabulary of wider application (ibid : 5-13), in the context of the democratic polls 
in which Anstotle writes, such social distinctions continued to play a significant role in the 
appraisal of virtue, but had nevertheless to be reconciled with a novel human trait that was 
dissociated from them, namely citizenship. While in the years that preceded the classical era 
the direct object and addressee of ethical discourse is man as a king, a lyre-player, a sculptor, 
a warrior and so on, in Athens, these categories are maintained, but also complemented and 
transformed, by their relation to the overarching notion of the citizen. The object of 
Aristotle’s thought becomes man as a social being, as a member of the polls Aristotle’s main 
concern throughout the Ethics is therefore how man should live in the context of the city in 
order to attain happiness and virtue -  the two terms cannot be dissociated - as a social and 
political being. Let us then study how this concern was understood and rewritten in the 
context o f nineteenth-century Britain
1. An Attainment of Transcendence?
From a Christianised Ethics to a Secularised Christianity
For the first part of the nineteenth century the overwhelming majority of translations and 
rewritings of the Ethics read the text from the perspective of an explicitly Christian morality. 
Most translators sought to find in Aristotle an early proponent of Christian values, to 
demonstrate that the Ethics, as the Aristotelian scholar Renn Dickson Hampden wrote, 
contain nothing which a Christian may dispense with, no precept o f life which is not an 
element of the Christian character, and that they only fail in elevating the heart and mind to 
objects which it needed Divine Wisdom to reveal, and a Divine Example to realise to the life 
(1831 *, 1862: 123)
The ancient treatise, it was stated, was admittedly “incomplete", as it was directed “solely to 
the improvement of man in this present life”, Hampden suggests, but nevertheless provided
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precisely those principles that are identical to the Christian ethos and “tend to elevate [man] 
to the perfection of his nature” (ibid.: 123). As was the case with Jowett’s Platonic 
translations, this parallel provided at first a renewed justification of religious certainty. For if 
it could be proved that the Truth revealed by God was identical to the truth Aristotle discovers 
through rational contemplation, then Christianity could find a strong and rather unexpected 
ally against all doubts over the validity of its truths and ethical tenets. Thus while all the 
translators of the period recognised that, unlike Christian doctrines, Aristotle’s work was 
bound to concerns of the earthly world, they sought in his philosophy one further support of 
the immortal truth of the Gospel. This is precisely the logic by which Gillies introduces his 
translation of the Ethics and Politics:
In Aristotle’s philosophy, man is the judge of man. in Christianity, the judge of man is God 
Philosophy confines itself to the perishing interests o f the present world; Christianity, looking 
beyond those interests, takes a loftier aim, inspires the mind with nobler motives and 
promises to adorn it with perfections, worthy of its inestimably valuable rewards Yet to the 
man of piety, it may be a matter o f edification, to compare the virtue o f philosophical 
firmness with the grace of Christian patience, and to observe how nearly the rutes discovered 
hy reason and experience, as most conducive to the happiness o f our present state, coincide 
with those precepts which are given in the Gospel in order to fit us for a better (1797 1 174 
my italics)
Such an attempt to find reason at the heart of religious dogma had its roots in the 
philosophy of Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752), whose Analogy o f Religion (1736), as 
Turner points out, proposed a similar parallel between the revealed and the natural world, and 
sought to argue that the Christians believed nothing by revelation that they did not also 
already believe according to reason; that “the modes of reasoning used in regard to nature 
were the same as those used in regard to the doctrines of revealed religion” (1981: 330). 
Butler was at the time as significant in academic institutions, and particularly at Oxford, as 
Aristotle was. and his book was the only modem text included in the reading list of Literae 
Humaniores2,5 Most significantly, Butler’s work was explicitly related to Aristotelian 
philosophy and his name was mentioned in the same breath with that of Aristotle: “We at 
Oxford”, as Matthew Arnold wrote, “used to read our Aristotle or our Butler with the same 
absolute faith in the classicality of their matter as in the classicality of Homer’s forms’"
(18761; 1972: 12). In this context, it is hardly coincidental that almost all of the translators of 
the Ethics during this period felt the need to use Butler in order to discuss Aristotle’s thought 
either in the footnotes or in the introductions to the translated texts.
235This information is taken from Turner 1981 327
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But how exactly were the Ethics related to Christian morality? The first point that 
emerges from the translations is the claim that ethical precepts are innate in human nature, 
and thus every individual can truly fulfil nature by performing his moral, i.e. Christian, 
immanent duty. This postulate implied that there is no essential difference between duty and 
real human interests, in the sense that the performance of duty must be recognised as the 
utmost interest of every human being, the only means by which man can attain eternal 
happiness. It did not however mean that people are capable of realising this interest 
independently of God’s revelation. Quite the contrary; what was maintained was that while all 
men desire the ‘good’ promised to them by divinity, the rules and goals by which they lead 
their lives are not necessarily compatible with it, unless the ‘supreme’, ‘ultimate Good’ is 
revealed to them by faith.
1.1 The ‘Good’ as a Divine Concept: The Emergence of an ‘Ethics of Duty’
At the very beginning of the Ethics Aristotle delineates the relation between things at which 
we aim and things which are good, and seeks to suggest that there is an inextricable 
connection between the two, that the meaning of ‘good’ should be conceived of in terms of 
people’s goals and purposes. As he writes
n a o a  texvti xai Jt&aa peBobo?, 6poiu>; te xai Jipoaipeais, 670600 TIV05
ftpieoBai 6oxei‘ 616 xaXiuq 6nECff)vavTo xriyaBbv ov Jiavt' ¿qiEtai (i.i. 1).
“Every craft and every inquiry, and similarly every action and project, seems to aim at some 
good, hence the good has been well defined as that at which everything aims” as MacIntyre 
writes in a translation of the passage.236 What this opening phrase of the Ethics clarifies is 
that the good’ should be defined in terms of what men seek and desire. As MacIntyre 
suggests, it is the “good in the sense in which it appears in human language” and “cannot be 
the name of a transcendent object”. This means that to call an act or a state of affairs good is 
to place it as “a proper object of desire”; an equation that sustains the Aristotelian 
identification of the good with happiness in the sense of ‘evSaipovia’ (19661; 1998: 57, 
61 ).237
16 See also Ross’, Ackrill’s and Urmson’s translation: “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and 
pursuit, is thought to aim at some good, and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which 
all things aim (19801; 1998:1).
2,7 MacIntyre provides an illuminating example in order to explain this point if we imagine that we are trying to 
learn the language o f a strange tribe and a linguist points at one o f  the words o f this tribe as the word that is to be 
translated by ‘gotxf in Aristotle's sense, but this word is never applied to what was pursued, although its use is 
always accompanied, say, by smiles, then we would know in advance that the linguist was wrong (19661, 1998: 
58)
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The first translation of the passage during the period in question, written by Gillies 
(1747-1836) at the end of the eighteenth-century and reprinted consistently until the 1830s, 
rewrote the Aristotelian statement as follows:
Since every art and every kind of knowledge, as well as all the actions and deliberations of 
men, constantly aim at something which they call good, good in general may be justly 
defined as "that which all things desire (1797: I 149 my italics)
The translation introduces an important alteration to the meaning of the source text. While 
Aristotle indicates that the ’good’ is inseparable from human pursuits, Gillies' translation 
suggests that art, knowledge, actions and deliberations of men aim at something which “they 
call good", thus introducing a division between the 'good' as a human aim and another kind 
of ‘good’, which is not defined by people’s goals. This idea is further sustained by the 
translation of the second phrase of the passage, which transforms the source-text’s assertion 
that “the good is that at which all things aim” into the statement that the ‘good’ can be 
defined as that which all things (i.e. human thought and action) ‘desire’, but at which they do 
not necessarily aim.
A similar logic seems to inform an anonymous translation of the Ethics written in 
1819, in which the translator chooses to qualify the Aristotelian statement by redefining the 
■good' of the source text as the 'sum m um  h o n u m ', the ‘supreme good', and substituting the 
idea that every inquiry aims at some good for the creed that ‘every institution' does so As the 
translator wrote
Every art and every institution, and in like manner every action as well as predilection, seems 
to aim at some good wherefore men well defined the good (or summum honum] to be “that 
which all things desire” (1819 1)
Chase's translation, written at the middle of the century follows a similar pattern As the 
translator writes:
Every art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like manner every action and 
moral choice, aims, it is thought at some good for which reason a common and by no means 
a bad description of the Chief Good is, “that which all things aim at” ( 1847 I )
Chase translates the source term ‘the good' by ‘the Chief Good’ and substitutes the 
Aristotelian idea that every premeditated, deliberate choice (Jtpoaipeoic) aims at the good for 
the assertion that only a ‘moral choice’ can do so. What is more, the definitive statement that 
“the good has been well defined as that at which everything aims” is somewhat put into 
question by its characterisation as “a common and by no means a bad description”; a phrase 
which does not deny the Aristotelian assertion but nevertheless implies that there may be a 
more sufficient definition o f ‘good’ and the ‘Chief Good’
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The only translator who does not follow this pattern during this period is Taylor, 
whose work does substitute the verb ‘aim at’ for the verb 'desire' and italicises ‘the good’ in 
the second phrase of the passage (a choice which may have implied a distinction between the 
‘good’ and the ‘supreme good’), but nevertheless avoids an explicit evocation o f a notion of 
‘chief good’ and maintains the definition of good as identical with human goals and 
aspirations As Taylor writes.
Every art and every method, and in like manner every action and deliberate choice, appear to 
aspire after a certain good Hence, it is well said, that the good is that which all things desire 
(1818 3)
Taylor, as is known from his biography, was the least interested in ideas of transcendence 
articulated in the context o f  Christian religion and used every opportunity to attack 
Christianity and declare his pagan creed (Raine 1969 3-48). Contrariwise, the rest of the 
translations written during the first decades of the century seem to adapt the obviously secular 
meaning o f ‘good’ that appears in Aristotle’s work to the idea o f ‘good’ that is derived from 
divine revelation. Unlike the good which is found in human languages, the ‘supreme good’ is 
fully determined by a power which lies beyond the judgement of people and societies. Thus 
Aristotle’s Ethics becomes a text which established the precepts of an essentially Christian 
morality in a pre-Christian context. Hampden gave a succinct justification of such reading by 
arguing that
the ethical writings of Aristotle, composed amidst the darkness o f heathen superstition, 
abound with pure and just sentiments [and] tend to elevate [man] to the perfection o f  his 
nature They are directed, it must be allowed, solely to the improvement of man in his 
present life But so just are the principles on which he builds that improvement, that w e may 
readily extend them to those higher views o f our nature and condition to which our eyes, by 
the light o f Divine Revelation, have been opened (18311, 1862 122-123)
Aristotle drew a distinction between the ‘good’ and the ‘best of goods’ or 'perfect 
good’, which is defined in the Ethics as that thing which we pursue for its own sake and is not 
a means for the achievement o f other goals (i.ii.l; i .vi .9). Yet this assumption did not imply in 
his philosophy that the ‘best o f goods’ should be identified with an immanent entity, which 
would have been identified, in the ancient Greek context, with the Platonic concept of the 
Form of ‘good’ Aristotle is clear in his disagreement with Plato. Even if this transcendent 
‘good’ existed, he writes, even if there were some unitary being which is the ‘Good’ that 
stands as separated from human conceptions, as an absolute, it would certainly not have been 
practicable or attainable by man. It thus falls outside our enquiries and interests. For the good 
which we are now seeking, he argues, is precisely a good that stands within human reach (i.vi. 
13).
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If there is then an attainable goal, Aristotle suggests, which we desire and pursue for 
its own sake and do not choose it for the sake of something else, that would plainly be the 
‘good’ and indeed the ‘best of goods’ (i.ii.l). Having delineated these features of the ‘perfect 
good’, Aristotle’s argument advances by giving the name of the 'perfect good’: suSaipovia. 
tf)v yap evibatpoviav xa'i oi itokkol xa'i oi xaptEVxe? kiyovcnv, xo 6' ev Chv xa'i tb eu 
xpatTEiv xaiixov vjxokappbvoucn xqi svbaipovElv. .xepi 6e tt); EuSaipovtac. xi ¿otiv, 
aiupiaprirotioi, xai oiiy 6goiu>; oi jxokko'i xot? aoipoi; 6:to6i6daaiv (i.iv.1-2).
Both the educated and the ‘many’ call this good Ev6ai[iovict -  and regard the life of a man 
who "fares well’ and ‘acts well’ as happy. Yet what constitutes happiness, Aristotle writes, is 
a matter of dispute and the opinion of the many is not identical to the view of men of wisdom.
The passage, which articulates one of the most significant postulates of the Ethics, 
was translated by Gillies as follows:
Its name is universally acknowledged; both the learned and the multitude call it happiness 
But as to the thing itself, there is a wide diversity o f  opinion between philosophers and the 
vulgar (1797: 1. 152)
The translation completely omits the source-text’s definition of evbaipovia as a condition of 
‘faring well’ and ‘acting well’. Contrariwise, it points out that it is only the name of the 
supreme good’ on which both the learned’ and the ‘multitude’ agree at a universal level. 
Gillies’ translation proceeds by arguing that the ‘vulgar’ “place happiness”
in things visible and palpable in pleasure, wealth, honour; some philosophers again think 
that besides all these particular and relative goods, there is a good in itself absolutely, the 
cause of this quality in other things, which deserve to be called good merely because they 
participate in this absolute goodness (1797: I 152 my italics)
This is the translation of the following Aristotelian passage:
OI piv yb.Q xfiiv ivapyoiv xi xa'i cpavepuiv, olov t|6ovt)v 5) itkoOxov f) xipqv ... Evioi 6’ 
yiovxo txapa xa xo'kXb. xaOxa &ya6a fikko xi xa0’ aitxo eivai, 6 xa'i xoiixoic txfitoiv 
aixiov ¿0x1 xou Eivai aya0h (i.iv.3)2’*
The translation follows the distinction that is made in the source text between the opinion of 
the many and that of the few. It adds however the characterisation of the good’ that is 
perceived by the few as an absolute and hence suggests that all other things acquire the name 
and quality of being ‘good’ by participating in this “absolute goodness”. The ‘Good’ in this 
rendering becomes an obvious metonymy for ‘Divinity’, which actualises an immanent and
23* (  f- “Ordinary people identify it [happiness] with some obvious and visible good, such as pleasure or wealth or 
honour and it has been held by some thinkers that beside the many good things we have mentioned, there exists 
another Good, that is good in itself, and stands to all those goods as the cause of their being good” (Rackham 
1934 II)  See also “for the former [the many] think it [happiness] is a plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, 
wealth, or honour; Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is good in 
itself and causes the goodness o f  ail these as well” (Ross, Ackrill and Urmson 1980‘;I998 5)
universal standard of virtue, while for Aristotle the ‘best of goods’ is that specific human aim 
which is pursued for its own sake, that ‘thing’ which is the cause of happiness in itself and 
cannot be sought for the purpose o f something else Most importantly, since this passage 
takes, in the translation, the place of Aristotle’s definition of happiness that is omitted by 
Gillies, it conveys the idea that happiness consists of a life lived in accordance with “absolute 
goodness”, irrespective of whether this is a life that is happy or miserable. Consistent with 
this choice Gillies omits in his translation the last sections of Book Seven of the Ethics, which 
examine the issue of pleasure, although he does translate the sections on pleasure of the tenth 
book. In these parts of his work Aristotle does not identify happiness with pleasure in a trivial 
sense of the term, but nevertheless stresses that no man suffering distress and misfortunes 
throughout his life can be called evbaipovtov This idea disappears in Gillies’ translation.
Taylor relates the ‘perfect good’ to ‘earthly’ happiness, but is equally doubtful of the 
Aristotelian meaning of eiibaipovta. As he puts it,
By name, therefore, it is nearly acknowledged by most men; for both the vulgar and the 
learned call it felicity. But they conceive that to live well and to act welt are the same thing 
as to be happy Concerning felicity, however, what it is, they are dubious (1818 8 my italics)
The use of the term ‘felicity’, which conveyed the connotations of prosperity and worldly 
success,239 seems to be closer to that aspect of the source-text’s meaning that evoked the 
value of ‘well-being’. Yet in the very next sentence of the translation Taylor renders
From an ‘Ethics of Virtue’ to an ‘Ethics of Duty’ 207
Aristotle’s text in such a way that this precept is disputed; “But they conceive that to live well 
and to act well are the same thing as to be happy”, the translator writes, implying by the 
addition of the word but’ that this conception of happiness’ is evidently a wrong one, or at 
least one from which Aristotle sought to distance himself.
Browne’s translation, written in 1850, follows the pattern established by Gillies’ work. 
It suggests that while the name of the ‘supreme good’ is an issue on which both the ‘vulgar’ 
and the ‘educated’ agree, they merely suppose that to live well and do well have the same 
meaning as happiness:
As to its name, indeed, almost all men are agreed, for both the vulgar and the educated call it 
happiness but they suppose that to live well and do well are synonymous with being happy 
But concerning the nature o f happiness they are at variance, and the vulgar do not give the 
same definition o f  it as the educated (1850: 5)
As was the case with the previous renderings, this translation presents linguistic features 
which do not allow the reader to understand eiibaigovia as a condition of ‘faring well’: the 
beginning of the second phrase of the passage with the word ‘but’ and the use of the verb
m  C f OED s v. felicity’
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‘suppose’ imply that it is only the common people who believe that an Eubcupcov man leads a 
‘good’ and ‘moral’ life. The real meaning of happiness’ as the best of goods’, it is 
suggested, is nevertheless a different one.
The change in the source text introduced by these translations is by no means an 
insignificant one. Given the centrality of the concept o f ‘eobciipovia’ in the Ethics, the 
translators in question bring about a radical transformation o f Aristotle’s position. No matter 
how closely they may subsequently adhere to the description of the particularised features of 
virtue and happiness, the whole perspective by which Aristotle delineates these features is 
radically altered. In the Ethics happiness is not related to moral propriety, let alone an 
externally imposed duty to conform to the ‘Good’. If a man is virtuous and simultaneously 
wretched, as MacIntyre observes, this man is certainly not eobaipovoav in Aristotelian terms. 
From this point o f view the Ethics challenges not only Plato but also the Kantians and 
puritans to come. It does not begin by seeking an account o f  goodness, which can be applied 
to a man suffering, say, torture or injustice. On the contrary, it seeks an ethics which begins 
with an entirely different question: “in what form of life doing well and faring well may be 
found together”, so that man can achieve worldly happiness? (19661; 1998: 60). The 
translations we examine ask instead: in what form of life does man act in accordance with a 
transcendent ‘Good’, so that his acts can be judged as moral?
The answer Aristotle gives to the question he raises is straightforward. We can arrive 
at what happiness is for man by ascertaining what is man’s distinctive feature and function as 
a species-being and how these determine his ultimate end, his purpose (teAoq). The virtuous 
man would be the one who accomplishes this in the best possible way. For as the goodness of 
a flute-player or a sculptor is thought to reside in their particular work and function, Aristotle 
argues, so the good of man may be said to reside in the specific work and function of man as 
a distinctive and unitary ‘kind’ (i. vii.9-10). What then is this feature which pertains to man 
and distinguishes him from all other entities? After excluding the acts of living and 
perception, which man shares with other living creatures, Aristotle concludes that
X.ei'rtetai 6t| jieaxtixfj tig tot) kbyov fxovxo; (tovtov 6e t6 p 'ev 105 kbyip, xb
6’ d); f/ov  x a t biavooupcvov) (i. iv. 13).
What remains, it is argued, is activity of the rational part o f man, which is itself twofold: 
contemplative, that is, the activity of thinking itself, and those other kinds of acts which are 
distinguished from pure thought, but follow rational precepts.240
240 For this reading see MacIntyre 19661, 1998: 64 Ross’ Ackrill’s and Urmson’s translation renders the passage 
as follows “There remains, then an activity o f the element that has a rational principle, o f this, one part has such a 
principle in the sense o f  being obedient to one, the other in the sense o f  possessing one and exercising thought”
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Gillies translated the passage as follows:
There remains then a life o f rational action; whether he exercises reason himself, or obeys the 
reason o f another (1797: 1 160 my italics)
The change of the source text is striking. Aristotle suggests a division between rational 
thought and practice (that is, activities that obey the principles of reason) implying that both 
of these aspects of rationality, taken as a unity, constitute the exclusive characteristic of 
humanity. Nowhere in the source text is there an argument that says that a life that fulfils 
man's function is to obey the reason of another, as Gillies writes -  an idea which does not 
make much sense if one originally assumes that rationality is an essential trait of all human 
beings.
As with possession by the few, a life guided by reason was not taken by Gillies to 
constitute the highest and self-sufficient purpose of man. As a trait of the human intellect, 
reason, in his view, was itself subsumed to a ‘supreme good', a purpose that stood beyond 
human limits and connected man to divinity. Virtue was thus conceived as that form of 
activity that is guided by an immanent source of the Good, namely God. Let us examine how 
this creed is articulated in the translation. Aristotle’s text provides a complex explanation of a 
life that actualises man’s rational capacity, which suggests that
6ixxu>; 6e xa'i Tauxt); Xeyoii€vtic xi)v xax‘ EvepyEiav 0exeov- xvpuoteqov yap aO tti 
6oxe1 ieyeadai. ei 6t) 6ax'iv fpyov dvQpuircou q»uxf|S ¿VEpyEia xaxa X,6yov i) nr) aveu 
X.6you, x6 &' aiixo (papev fpyov eivai xfi) yevEi to06e xa'i toCSe ojtovbaiou (uiattEp 
xi0apioxot) xai atiouSaiov xi0apioxoO, xai 6cnX.fi); 6V) toOt' fail -xavxiov) 
7tpooTi0EiiEvr)c tf)c x a t' &pett)v vjiepoxfi; Jtpoc; x6 Epyov (xi0apiatoO |iev yap to 
xiOapi^Eiv, ojxou&aiov 6e t6 ev )- ei &T) ovxidc, &v0pfi>jtou bi. xiOegev ipyov tu)f)v Tiva. 
xauxT)v liniyf); ivipyeiav xa'i rcp&ij-eic; gExit \6yov. cmovbaiov 6’ 6v6p6; evi Tatixa 
xa'i xaXfi); ixaorov  6’ e i xaxa xr)v oixeiav dpExriv dnoxE/.Eixai' eI 6i) oiSxco, xb 
6v0pujiuvov 6ya06v Hiuyfi; t v ipysia yivExai xax- dpExf|v. e! 6'e xXeioij;  a i dpExaf, 
xaxa xr)v dpioxr)v xai XEX.£ioxaxr)v. fxi 6‘ 6v pifi) XEX.Eicn (i.vii. 14-16).241 
Gillies’ translated the passage as follows:
(I9801, 1998 13) See also Rackham's translation "There remains therefore what may be called the practical life 
of the rational part o f man (This part has two divisions, one rational as obedient to principle, the other as 
possessing principle and exercising intelligence) ” (1934 31-33)
41 “And, as ‘life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is 
what we mean, for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term Now if the function o f man is an activity of 
soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'a so-and-so' and a good so-and-so' have a 
function which is the same in kind, e g a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all 
cases, eminence in respect o f goodness being added to the name of the function (for the function of the lyre player 
is to play the lyre, and that o f a good lyre-player is to do so well) if this is the case [and we state the function of 
man to be a certain kind o f life, and this to be an activity or actions o f the soul implying a rational principle, and 
the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance o f these, and if any action is well performed 
when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence if this is the case), human good turns out to 
be activity o f  soul exhibiting excellence, and if there are more than one excellence, in accordance with the best and 
most complete” (Ross, Ackrill and Urmson I980',1998 13-14). 41
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In such a life his real business consists, and that man does his business the best, who ads 
most rationally through Ufe, the virtue o f each individual o f  a species, depending on the 
excellence with which he performs the work peculiar to that species alone The proper good 
o f man consists then in virtuous energies, that is. in the exercise o f virtue continued ihrtntgh 
life (1797 1 160 my italics)
The greatest part of Aristotle’s argument is omitted in the translation. The source text begins 
by stating that the ultimate purpose of man is activity o f the ‘soul’ (the meaning of the 
concept was somewhat equivalent to what we name as 'personality” 4“) in accordance with 
reason. Given this assumption, Aristotle writes, we can distinguish between different levels of 
the same kind of activity of which there is a ‘best’ or ‘excellent’. This is virtuous or excellent 
activity and it can be of different kinds: a good lyre-player, for example, accomplishes a 
specific kind of excellence, he performs his work in accordance with a kind of virtue. Thus if 
the subject of activity is man as a social being and if man’s distinct purpose is the rational 
activity of the soul, then good for man is the performance of this activity at an excellent level, 
that is, in accordance with its own specific virtue. The crucial point not to be missed in this 
argument is that Aristotle’s notion of ‘virtue’ does not posit a moralising principle; it stands 
for excellence in the activity of reason. That is to say, the meaning of virtue is exclusively 
related to the standards of reason and thus the good for man is defined as activity in 
accordance with the perfect exercise of reason throughout life. By omitting this part of the 
argument, Gillies' translation presents rationality and ‘human virtue' as two separate 
categories, which are somewhat linked by leading towards the same purpose: the Good. In 
other words man’s virtue no longer derives from his rational capacity, but from a source that 
is itself constituted outside man’s essence and function. Thus, while it is argued that “that 
man does his business the best, who acts most rationally through life”, the "proper good for 
man” does not merely pertain to reason, but to “virtuous energies”, that is, to “the exercise of 
virtue through life”. Both ‘rational activity’ and ‘virtuous energies’ stand in harmony, the 
translation suggests, by ending both sentences which refer to these concepts with the same 
phrase ("through life”). For ‘Energy’, as Gillies explains, “is a link in the grand chain, by 
which [Aristotle] connects the earth with the heavens, and nature with the Deity” (ibid.: 132). 
“The prime mover” behind all manifestations of energy, “Divinity”, “is necessarily 
immaterial; and therefore indivisible, immoveable [sic] impassive, and invariable”. This 
Divinity sets the measure for human magnitude and excellence, but is not measured by it. God 24
242 As MacIntyre points out, for Aristotle ‘soul’ should be understood as “form to the body's matter” and we can 
normally retain the meaning o f the concept by speaking of what we name today as ‘personality' (I9661, 1998 64)
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is not “comprehensible by magnitude ... He ever is what he is, existing in energy before time 
began, since time is only an affection of motion, of which God is the author” (ibid.: 135).
What man loses in the translation is his autonomy. While in the Ethics rationality is 
both the source of and the only criterion for the judgement of what is good’, in Gillies’ 
rendering the origin of ‘virtue’ stands beyond any species-being; it is absolutely unthinkable 
by worldly standards. Aristotle is convinced that it is man who is “the origin of his action”, 
that “&v0qo)3toc Given «0X^ 1 to&v iipd^ecov” (3.3.15). Gillies puts God in this position and 
thereby omits this statement in his translation. What man gains in the translation is a power 
that can verify the truth of his being and morality beyond all contests and doubts God 
embodies and reveals to man the ‘Supreme Good’ which does not only posit the rules of an 
‘appropriate’ mode of life, but also the road for ‘real’ human happiness. Human beings are 
freed from the burden of choice and responsibility. They are assured that the right choice has 
already been made for them and so long as they voluntarily follow this choice, their life must 
be lived as a self-justifying and happy one -  not happy in a mundane and secular sense, but as 
the realisation of man’s true and divine purpose. The ‘prooP of such a certainty, we are told, 
is given by Aristotle himself. The ‘fact’ that the Aristotelian philosophy provides us with the 
same idea of ‘Good’ that is prescribed in the Bible, it is argued by William Fitzgerald in his 
edition o f the Ethics, demonstrates the unity of the author of Christian faith and of reason, and 
therefore the universality of man’s duty and purpose. For we can clearly see that even with the 
power of “unassisted [by revelation] reason” the Ethics “can furnish us with some knowledge 
of duty” that is “conformable ... in all the most fundamental points to the morality of the 
Gospel”. If then
the author o f the universe and the Author o f  Christianity, the Giver o f  reason and revelation, 
be. as we contend, the same Being, it is to  be expected that the declarations o f His will which 
we meet with in revelation should correspond with the dictates o f  the highest and most 
perfect reason; and the testimony of the heathen moralists prove, that such is the fact (1850 
40)
It seems unlikely that such preposterous appropriation of the Ethics could have been 
conceived of, had it not been sustained by the translations under consideration.
The ideal of a ‘transcendent’ Good which can be applied universally is obviously far 
from Aristotle’s thought. Yet what was its position in the context of the target community? 
Or, to put the same issue in different terms, with whom, apart from Aristotle, did translators 
of the Ethics converse during this period? And what was the social function of their thought 
in the context of this conversation?
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1.2 The Meaning of the ‘Supreme Good’ in a Commercial Society
As was examined in previous chapters, the first decades of the nineteenth century were 
marked by the advancement of liberal and utilitarian discourses, which emphatically 
positioned 'man' as the origin of truth and justice (however qualified this statement may have 
been), and considered the maximisation of ‘happiness’ as the only justified purpose of 
individual and social action. Utilitarian ideas, as I sought to suggest, developed on the basis of 
an ethical vacuum, in the sense that they prioritised an ideal of self-interest which could not 
form the basis of a moral vocabulary; that is, an ethical code which would include as much 
the notion of the "self as that of the ‘other’. What is more, utilitarianism stemmed from the 
division between individual acts of self-interest and their social implications, and thus 
provided no other basis for social conduct apart from a cynical adherence to egotistic 
principles. In this context, evocations of a Christian duty appear at first to have constituted a 
kind of anachronism What could, indeed, be the role of a transcendent good in a 
disenchanted world, which recognised man as its only centre and origin, and money as the 
measure of happiness?
Yet a closer reading of the translations indicates that they were not as isolated from 
their social context as they may initially appear to have been. Instead, translators and 
rewriters of the Ethics seem to have been as much engaged with the concerns of their time as 
they were dedicated to an attempt at providing alternatives to them. The most crucial of these 
concerns pertains to the idea of personal ‘interest’ and ‘self-love’. Despite their severe 
critiques of self-interested behaviour the translations in question seek to emphasise that there 
exists no disjunction between interests and morality, since both act to realise man’s divine 
nature. This argument already introduces a minor, but still crucial break in the dogmatic 
character of Christian faith. In the context of a dogma one is supposed to follow divine 
doctrines because they are divine, not because it is in one’s interests to do so. So long as one 
regards faith as a kind of investment, the origin of this faith loses by necessity its transcendent 
position; it becomes the object of contemplation by which man judges that believing in God is 
a profitable course of action and thus God ceases to be an immanent and untouchable source 
of truth and judgement. Let us then follow the development of this position in the text of the 
translations.
One of the important distinctions drawn in Aristotle’s Ethics is that between voluntary 
and non-voluntary action the former following from deliberation and the latter being the 
outcome of compulsion or ignorance. It is only voluntary actions, Aristotle argues, which can 
be appraised in ethical terms, since only these render the agent responsible for his doing
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Ignorance, it is explained, denotes a lack of knowledge of some conditions which would have 
affected one’s choice, but not a lack of knowledge of the ‘good’ (iii.i-xii). For Anstotle 
“moral ignorance -  ignorance of what constitutes virtue and vice -  is not exculpatory”, as 
MacIntyre points out, “but is indeed what constitutes vice” (1966’;1998: 70). As it is argued 
in the Ethics
T6 6’ &XOVCHOV poukexcti Liyeaeac oux et xi; Ayvoet tft auiitp^povxcc oi> yap f| ¿v xfi 
.xpoatpioEi fiyvoia aixia xofi Axovoiov (bXt.h xf|c uoySripia;) (iii i 15)241 
Chase translated the passage as follows:
Again we do not usually apply the term involuntary when a man is ignorant o f his own 
interest, because ignorance which affects moral choice constitutes depravity, but not 
involuntariness ( 1847 75)
The Greek term oupcpipovTci derives from the verb ovgtpepu) (-open), whose literal meaning 
is ‘to bring together’, ‘to gather’ or ‘collect’ (ovv-<p£pu)). A metaphorical extension of this 
meaning conveyed the notion of ‘being in harmony with’, agreeing with’, ‘suiting’. 
EtipcpipovTct are those things which are ‘fitting’ and ‘suitable’ and only in this sense are they 
also ‘expedient’ and ‘useful’.243 44 Thus in the context of Aristotle’s thought the term 
cnigtpipovTCi evokes those actions or things which stand in agreement with man’s nature, the 
kind of behaviour which is in harmony with man’s distinct trait of rationality and constitutes 
‘virtue’. Chase's translation of the concept auptpipovta by the term ‘interest’ seems to 
convey the notion of ‘beneficial’ and ultimately ‘profitable’, it denotes a condition which 
works to one’s advantage, irrespective of whether this is a condition that accords with or 
stands against rational precepts. What is more, the term is used by Chase in order to connect a 
concept of ‘virtue’ that derives from man’s immanent duty to a notion o f earthly advantages 
and gains. As he writes in the footnotes that follow the translation:
Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral Government of the World) also the 
interest o f Man, or to express it in Bp Butler’s manner. Conscience and Reasonable Self- 
love are the two principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest, and 
these two lead in point o f fact to the same course o f action (Sermon II) (ibid 75n)
To perform one’s duty, it is suggested, is not only a requirement of moral laws; it is also the 
means of pursuing one’s interests and caring for oneself. For the universal rules that define 
this duty are those that aim at man’s personal advantage and benefits. Thus compliance with 
duty is, in the last instance, a profitable course of action
243 “But the term ‘involuntary’ tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage -  for it is not 
mistaken purpose that makes an action involuntary (it makes men wicked) (Ross, Ackrill and Urmson 1980 ,1998
51)
244 C f Liddell and Scott Greek-English lexicon s v ‘oi>u<f6p<u’.
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The establishment of a moral code which focuses on the notion of duty' constituted a 
contribution of these translations to their contemporary moral vocabulary that was in many 
respects far more pervasive and consequential than their religious assertions. As we shall 
shortly examine, the basic precepts of this code were maintained in translations of Aristotle 
(as well as the broader moral discourses of the subsequent decades), even when ideals of 
Christianity seemed to many to be marginalized and socially irrelevant. What is more, the 
translations in question posited (among other works) the very logic by which the notion of 
duty would set up an indisputable moral imperative and would appropriate the ancient Greek 
code of virtue-ethics This was a logic which took as an a priori the absolute necessity to 
comply with one’s obligations, irrespective of whether these were considered as compatible 
or incompatible with personal perceptions of truth, value or interest. What was then argued 
was that duty compels human behaviour qua duty, and it is in this capacity that it requires 
man’s submission to it.
As such an ethics of duty seems to have developed as a distinct alternative to strictly 
utilitarian precepts and even at the moments it evoked the idea of self-interest, it ostensibly 
stood in sharp contrast with the disjunction between individual choices and those social laws 
and obligations that may limit one’s profit-seeking activities. From this point of view, the 
translations in question attempted to till in the gap’ of morality created by utilitarian social 
practice by constituting an ideal of the ’Good’ which aimed as much towards individual 
salvation as it was directed towards social unity and coherence As Fitzgerald wrote in the 
introduction to his edition of the Ethics
It will be proper to mark distinctly the point o f difference between the system of Aristotle 
and that o f the modem Utilitarians It is not that Aristotle doubts or denies the tendency of 
virtuous conduct to produce the greatest attainable happiness of man, or that a reasonable 
being requires to be satisfied, that in pursuing virtue, he pursues happiness But it is that he 
denies this tendency to produce happiness to be that which constitutes actions virtuous, or a 
regard to it the motive from which the virtuous man, as such, acts virtuously The happiness 
o f which he speaks is the happiness which springs from the pursuit of virtue for its own sake 
(1850 13).
This was not. however, merely an individual pursuit of happiness. Aristotle, Fitzgerald 
continues “sets out with considering man as framed by nature for civil society and 
incapable of fully developing his energies without it”. The only “defect” of the ancient 
philosopher in this attempt was his “atheism”. Thus his moral doctrines can “furnish us with 
some knowledge o f duty" which can be complemented by Christian thought in order to
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constitute “a better country”, “a city ... whose builder and maker is god”, “a community of 
saints” (1850: 32-34, 40 my italics).
What Fitzgerald wishes and concomitantly prescribes, as the repetitive use of the 
terms referring to the notion of the community indicate, is an alternative to his contemporary 
social order, rather than a road to personal salvation. He looks forward to a country, a city, a 
social context which would distinguish itself from utilitarianism and realise the transcendent 
ideal o f ‘Good’. Yet how distinct was this alternative from the utilitarian precepts it sought to 
reject? How adverse was an ‘ethics of duty’ to a morality that was bom out of the mles of the 
capitalist market? And to what extent was this ethics radically incompatible with the laws and 
functioning of this market?
In his analysis of Kantian ethics, which stands as the paradigmatic expression of an 
‘ethics of duty’, Poole suggests that Kant provided a route to market morality that was in 
many ways much more efficient than the code suggested by utilitarianism. For while 
utilitarianism took as its starting point the beneficial consequence of market behaviour, 
Kant’s ethics of duty addressed more directly the role of the agent that was necessary to 
secure these consequences. The modem capitalist market, as Poole explains, is based on a 
framework of property and contract and thus of rights and duties. Ownership for example 
involves the possession of certain rights (to use, to sell) with respect to an object and implies 
a set of correlative duties, that is to respect these rights on all other individuals. To enter into 
a contract similarly involves the transfer or exchange of such rights, and may entail a 
commitment to perform this transfer in the future. If individuals were totally self-concerned, 
they would have had no reason to keep such a commitment (especially where it turned out to 
conflict with self-interest) because it is a commitment. Neither would they have any reason to 
respect another’s property, simply because it is property There would therefore be “no 
practice of doing one’s duty because it is one’s duty. In which case the concept of duty would 
have no application, nor would the correlative concept of a right” (1991: 17-18). Yet the order 
of modem commercial societies makes it necessary for individuals not only to be engaged in 
self-interested activities, but also to recognise their duty to respect ownership and agreements. 
Such individuals, as Poole puts it, “must be free from  complete determination by their self- 
interest and thus free to act as morality requires” (ibid.. 18). While it was Kant’s genius to 
develop an ethics in which the notions of ‘duty’ and ‘freedom’ were central, as Poole points 
out, such an ethics was also at work (in some cases under Kant’s influence) in the broader 
moral discourses of the time, and, as far as the British context is concerned, in translations
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and rewritings of Aristotle’s Ethics. Let us then return to the development of the idea of 
‘social-ethical duty’ as it develops in the translated texts.
While in order to convey the idea of the ‘Supreme Good’ as a religious concept, 
translators had to make radical transformations of Aristotle’s text, the evocation of man’s 
duty to conform to this good could be more easily sustained by the Ethics, or at least those 
parts of the Ethics which cease to be engaged with theoretical contemplation and give us a 
method to apprehend virtue as the “mean” (pfiooxiy;) between two extremes, and a 
disappointing list of virtues, many parts of which endorse socially submissive behaviour, an 
unquestionable compliance with laws and an unqualified acceptance of social hierarchies. For 
the list of virtues given in the Ethics as representing the desirable moral ‘mean’ and the 
‘extremes’ man should avoid reflects, as MacIntyre suggests, what Aristotle takes to be “the 
code of a gentleman” in contemporary Greek society, which he seems to endorse. Precisely as 
in his analysis of political institutions, he treats Greek society as normative, so “in explaining 
the virtues” Aristotle “treats upper-class Greek life as normative” (19661; 1998: 67). This part 
of the source text required only minor changes in order to fit in and reaffirm modem relations 
of domination, hierarchy and submission.
After establishing that only voluntary acts can be the object of moral appraisals 
Aristotle sought to make clear that not all voluntary acts are the products of deliberation and 
rational choice. Thus not all of these acts can be seen as realisations of virtue. Only those 
chosen acts, which represent the mean’ among the extremes of vices, are virtuous. For the 
mean’ is what reason defines as good’ and the paradigmatic embodiment of reason can be 
found in the deliberate choices of the prudent’ (ippovipoq) man:
"Eotiv &pa f) ¿tpetri K;c; npoaipetixti, iv heo6tt]ti ouaa rf) .apo; fin&i, (bptopivji kdytp 
xat d>; fiv 6 cpp<5vipo; 6pioeiev (ii.vi. 15).245
The key concept of the passage for nineteenth-century translators is that of ‘(ppovqcn;’, 
prudence. MacIntyre draws our attention to the problems entailed by contemporary 
translations of the passage Opovr|m?, he suggests, is accurately rendered by the Latin term 
priuientia, but not by the English term ‘prudence’, which conveyed, as has been already 
discussed, the notion of ‘thrift’, especially in monetary issues. The verb ippovd) evoked in 
Greek the idea of being wise in relation to one’s practical life.24*’ Likewise, in Aristotle’s 
philosophy tppovqcm;, according to MacIntyre, is “the virtue of practical intelligence, of
245 “Virtue, then, is a state o f character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this 
being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would 
determine it” (Ross, Ackrill and Urmson 1980 , 1998: 39) “Virtue then is a settled disposition o f the mind 
determining the choice o f actions and emotions consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, 
this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it” (Rackham 1934: 95)
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knowing how to apply general principles in particular situations.” It is not the ability to think 
rationally, to formulate ethical principles or deduce what ought to be done. It is the ability to 
act so principles would take a concrete form (19661; 1998: 74).
The term is translated as prudence’ by the majority of nineteenth-century translators. 
Browne’s translation is indicative of the renderings of the passage during this period:
Virtue, therefore, is a habit, accompanied with deliberate preference, in the relative mean, 
defined by reason, and as the prudent man would define it (1850: 45)
The translation does not effect any major change of the source text apart from the use of the 
term ‘prudent’ as the equivalent of the source concept of «ppovipoi;. But what is the meaning 
of the "prudent man' in a discourse which is developed as an opposition to utilitarian ideas? 
The first point that is clarified by translators and rewriters is that the ‘prudence’ of which 
Aristotle speaks is not to be confused with a conception of ‘thrift’ and ‘self-interest’. Instead 
it should be understood as the direct outcome of man’s ‘natural conscience’, which 
determines what is right and wrong by standing beyond the secular precepts of a commercial 
society. As Hampden wrote,
the Prudence which he [Aristotle] teaches is no calculation o f consequences It is a practical 
philosophy o f the heart, inseparably connected with the love of that conduct which it 
suggests Whereas, when we are taught to act on the ground o f interest, the prudence then 
inculcated is a mere intellectual foresight o f  consequences, independent o f  any exercise o f the 
heart” (18311; 1862: 139).
To evoke a “philosophy of the heart” as the standard of morality entails a presumable division 
between civil conceptions of the good’ and the consciousness of the ‘supreme good’ given to 
men by God. It is the good of a consciousness which is formed and animated by the higher 
truth o f divinity, thus standing in opposition to conventional conceptions of profit and 
interest. The latter, as it is argued, can only be proved to be futile as “a guide to duty” (ibid.: 
139). Yet this transcendent ideal is immediately brought much closer to the civil standards of 
morality by being identified, according to Hampden, with “public opinion”. It is thereby 
possible for Hampden to argue that the eminence of “public opinion” in Aristotle’s thought 
constituted
a standard of right and wrong inherent in human nature, or what is equivalent to a 
Conscience If all agree in praising a certain modification o f  Affections, and in blaming 
another, it is clear that there must be some common principles in all to serve as the basis of 
these unanimous judgements (ibid : 138)
The foundation of ethical judgements, it is maintained, is the standard of morality proposed 
by those principles that are commonly accepted by all members of a community. For it is in 246
246 C f Liddell Scott Greek-English Lexicon s.v. ippovih.
these unanimous convictions, in the conventions and norms which define the good, that the 
universal standard of human ‘Conscience’ can be said to reside.
To be sure, ‘public opinion’ is, in a certain sense, always the basis of an ethical code, 
since no concept of moral behaviour can develop outside a social community which defines, 
accepts or condemns people’s conduct either in the form of cultural conventions and rules or 
in the form of institutionalised laws Public opinions however can be of various kinds They 
can affirm, say, the right of all people to self-determination or they can enforce apartheid. 
What is more, these opinions are not so unanimous as Hampden envisages them, especially 
when the ‘good’ at stake may act towards the benefits of some members of a community, 
while being detrimental for others. In such a context, in which shared ethical codes do not 
derive from processes of collective deliberation within which participants are morally, 
socially and politically equals, an evocation of blind obedience to what is held as good by the 
public can only entail a prohibition of critical contemplation, a servile submission to 
conventional norms of social conduct and a cancellation of any form of autonomy, self­
interrogation, and ultimately thought itself. For the very capacity for thought in a non-trivial 
sense of the term, as Foucault has suggested, is precisely what allows for a step back from our 
ways of doing or reacting, for putting those ways forward as a thought object and 
interrogating them about their meaning, conditions and ends (19841; 1997: 117). A lack of 
this process of self-reflection, an absence of the potential to rethink and reconstitute what is 
held to be right and true by a social community cannot claim to posit an ethical standard but 
only an act of sustaining a status quo, whatever this may be.
A similar endorsement of submissive and conformist conduct emerges in the 
translations of the Aristotelian concept of 7tpadrn5, which is defined in the source text as the 
mean in relation to anger (npadtri? 6' ¿oft psodtric Jteo’i doydc iv.v.l). The term is 
generally translated as ‘meekness’. Hence Gillies’ translation states that “meekness is 
propriety of affection with regard to the causes and circumstances which naturally provoke 
anger” (1797:1 242) and the same rendering is adopted by the anonymous translation 
published at Oxford (1819: 99), by Chase’s (1847: 61) as well as Browne’s translations 
(1850:105).247 Meekness connotes a Christian as well as a social ‘virtue’. It evokes the idea of 
piously humble conduct which is ‘free’ from haughtiness or self-will and tends to submit
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247 The translations which differ from this pattern are Taylor’s which renders the concept by the term ‘mildness’ 
(1818 137), and Lewes’ revision of Chase’s work which uses the term ‘gentleness’ (1890 120) Taylor’s open 
opposition to Christian ideas can justify his choice, while Lewes' revision should probably be related to the liberal
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tamely to oppression or injury 24X This form of behaviour cannot have been virtuous in 
Aristotelian terms, as it was openly opposed to the attainment of the well-being of the moral 
agent, but was well integrated in an ethical code which posited 'duty' as its central concept 
and endorsed the unequivocal submission to existing rules and social structures.
The idealisation of interest that formed utilitarian principles is limited, but 
nevertheless not erased in these translations. Its appearance as identical with duty, as 
maintained by Chase’s translation (above), implies more that self-interest is channelled and 
constrained rather than that it is repudiated.249 Virtuous behaviour appears as self-controlled, 
limited action, which allows the moderate pursuit of one’s goals so long as these are 
compatible with the rules that enable the preservation of competitive and hierarchical 
relations that characterise bourgeois societies. It is precisely this concept of self-constraint 
that is employed by translators in order to render the Aristotelian virtue of ouxppocruvri, 
which posits, according to Aristotle, the ‘mean’ in relation to the enjoyment of pleasure 
(iii.x. 10). SoKppomivri is generally translated by the term ‘temperance’ with the exception of 
Chase’s work which renders the concept by the phrase “Perfected Self-Mastery" (1847: 106). 
Both translation choices make the same point. The term ‘temperance’ evokes the idea of self- 
restraint and moderation in the pursuit of gratification, the suppression and mastery of 
tendencies for indulgence to any affection or desire."’0 Likewise ‘perfected self-mastery’ 
conveys the notion of self-control with a particular stress on the capacity of the social agent to 
discipline and limit him- or herself. Aristotle's conception of otocppomivri, however, did not 
only emphasise man’s self-limitation in relation to pleasure. Ecmppoiv. in terms of the source 
text, is the man who chooses pleasures in accordance with the precepts of reason, rather than 
a puritan. This man is as capable o f  limiting himself as he is capable of enjoying pleasures in 
order to attain eubaipovia, worldly happiness. For the translations in question self-mastery is 
a virtue as long as it entails discipline and control that derive from one’s duty, and 
irrespective of the effect of this control on the agent’s happiness.
What is more, self-control, as Poole suggests, is directed to just those paths that are 
necessary in order to preserve the commercial order and social structures within which self- 
interested behaviour can operate (1991: 20). That is to say, it is directed towards the 
maintenance and justification of social relations of inequality, power and domination which 
stand at the basis of bourgeois societies. As regards this issue translations are in accordance 
with Aristotle’s text. For Aristotle, an ideal of virtue is represented in “the great-souled man’’ *24
24* Cf. OED s v meekness’
244 On a broader discussion of this issue in relation to Kantian ethics, see Poole 1991 20
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(neyaX6»|roxo^). This is a man who lays claim to great things which he deserves more than 
others. As Aristotle writes,
'H nEYaXotJJVxCa rrepi neY<iX.a uev xai ¿x xoO ¿vtSpato; Eotxev elvai. xep'i nota 6' 
ioxiv Tipaizov Xafku|iEV'... 6oxeT 6t) nEYa^ot^njxoq Eivai 6 g£Y<iktov ai'ixov &|wuv fii-io? 
iov (iv.iii. 1-3).* 251 25
Gillies wrote the following translation of the passage:
Magnanimity, as the name imports, is conversant about great things, what these are let us 
first consider; A magnanimous man is he, whose character being of great worth, is 
estimated by himself at its full value ( 1797 I 236)
Chase translated the passage in similar terms, adding only the idea that the great-sou led", 
‘great-minded’ man is just in his high self-esteem and evaluation:
The very name of Great-mindedness implies that great things are its object-matter; and we 
will first settle what kind of things Well then, he is thought to be Great-minded, who 
values himself highly and at the same time justly (1847 128)
Both these translations follow closely the description of this Aristotelian figure. They thus 
state that the great-souled man is happy to accept honours from persons of worth because he 
feels that they belong to him, but he is not affected by honours offered to him by the 
multitude. He is however courteous and merciful towards his inferiors, despite the fact that he 
despises their unworthiness. What is more, he is justified in despising people who are not like 
him, for his low opinion of them is a correct one. The great-souled man does not rejoice 
overmuch in prosperity, nor grieve overmuch at adversity, values only a few things, prefers 
the beautiful to the useful, is fond of conferring benefits but not eager to receive them, never 
asks for help from others, and, apart from the above, he walks slowly, has a deep voice and is 
always conscious of what he says (iv.iii. 1-34; Gillies 1797: 1 236ff.;Chase 1847: 128ff).‘5'
So complacent a character could not be further removed from the Christian ideals of 
meekness and humility However, the same translators who interpreted the Ethics as an 
endorsement of Christian duty and read in the source text an affirmation of the 'Supreme 
Good’ of God meticulously follow Aristotle’s description, without perceiving any 
contradiction between a figure that is “very nearly an English gentleman”, as MacIntyre aptly 
puts it (19661; 1998: 78), and a religious concept of human virtue. It seems that the function 
of this figure in the translations cannot have been a religious one. The notion of a man “who
2,0 OED s.v. ‘temperance’
251 “Greatness o f  the Soul, as the word itself implies, seems to be related to great objects, let us first ascertain 
what sort o f objects these are Now a person's thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves 
much” (Rackham 1934 213-215)
252 It is worth noting that John Stuart Blackie, who also endorsed the conviction that the truth of Christianity 
were parallel to the truth o f the Ethics, did not hesitate to approve “the thoroughly masculine, thoroughly manly, 
and thoroughly healthy” character o f  the latter ( 1872 157)
From an Ethics of Virtue' to an Ethics of Duty' 221
claims much and deserves much”, as presented by Aristotle and reproduced by translators, 
entails an affirmation of the secular superiority of certain people or groups and a duty to 
respect their dominance as the fundamental part of one’s Christian duty. In other words, the 
translations which evoked man’s duty to subject himself to God as the supreme good, 
ultimately locate this duty in the need to preserve a society of inequality. For all traits of this 
figure, as MacIntyre points out, require a society of superiors and inferiors within which the 
great-souled man can exhibit his ‘excellence’ as well as contempt for others. This man “is 
essentially a member of a society of unequals” (ibid.: 78-79) and it is precisely such society 
that is sustained and reinforced by the appropriation of this Aristotelian claim by a Christian 
discourse centred on duty. 253
2. Morality and Civil Society: Towards a Secular Ethics of Duty
After the middle of the nineteenth-century Christian interpretations of Aristotle were 
substantially challenged by the publication of Alexander Grant’s edition of the Ethics 
published in 1857 and 1858.2'4 Grant’s work articulated a significant transformation of 
British approaches to Aristotle which consisted of the dissociation of the treatise from 
modern ethical systems, and Christianity in particular. This was for Grant a conscious task, 
which he first pursued in a polemical essay entitled “On the Relation of Aristotle’s Ethics to 
Modem Systems” published at the outset of his edition. In opposition to the creeds of the 
previous period, this essay denied any parallel between Aristotelian and modem conceptions 
of morality and sought instead to emphasise the historical and intellectual gap that divides the 
latter from the former. As Grant argued.
All we need at present is to make it felt, that between the point from which Aristotle started 
in writing his Ethics, and that from which any thinker of the present day or of the last two 
centuries would commence, — a great interval is set, an interval too. full o f powerful 
influences, during which the whole spirit o f the world has been changed (1858 I 244)
Not only do the Ethics differ from the moral concerns and life of the present, but also this 
present, in Grant’s view, is not predominantly defined by a religious spirit. The origins of the
2>y The only translator who feels the need to comment on the distance between the idea of the great-souled man 
and Christianity is Browne His translation includes the passage (“Magnanimity, even from its very name, appears 
to be conversant with great matters Now the magnanimous man appears to be he who. being really worthy, 
estimates his own worth highly”) but also emphasises that magnanimity’, as it is described by Aristotle, cannot be 
viewed to “be consistent with the humility required by the Gospel” Still, as soon as he recognises this point, he is 
quick to readopt the motif established by the other translators This unworthiness notwithstanding, he argues, 
“there is such a virtue as Christian magnanimity” which is equivalent to “the character of a virtuous Athenian", an 
example of which is found in Aristotle himself ( 1850: 97)
2,4 The first volume of Grant’s work was published in 1857 and was reprinted in the following year together with 
a second volume These include his essays as well as books i-vi o f the source book A year before the publication 
of the first volume Grant had published two of his essay? in a private edition (1856)
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modem world, from the perspective of which Aristotle is read, are found in the secular 
tradition “o f  the last two centuries”, rather than a divine origin. It is this tradition. Grant 
argues, which has gradually shed “fresh lights ... upon the world” and “we now look with 
different eyes upon antiquity” (ibid.: 2.xi). The very first among these “lights”, it is suggested, 
is “the historical spirit”, which enables us to see that “human thought can only be known by 
knowing its antecedents”; second is "the critical spirit, which is neither hasty to accept nor to 
reject, but which weighs and discriminates"; and third is “the philosophical spirit” which has 
itself “a certain sympathy and affinity for the speculation of the Greeks” (ibid.: 2. xi-xii). 
None of these aspects of enlightenment is related by Grant to religion. The articulation of the 
spirit which drives the knowledge and life of modem society is a secular, human trait and 
constitution.
Hence Aristotle, according to Grant, should initially be seen through the light of an 
‘historical spirit’ of which his work was part. The Ethics needs to be considered as a 
manifestation of a particular time and development in the world history, which is equally 
distinguished from an eternal system of morality and from contemporary ethical precepts We 
have mistakenly “amalgamated” so “much of Aristotle’s thought ... with our own”, he writes. 
For while there is clearly much in the Ethics which may constitute “a real revelation with 
regard to human life”, such inclination can by no means be validated when applied to the 
ancient text in its totality:
Taken as a whole, however, when we consider this noble treatise in relation to modem 
thought, we feel there is something about it that stands apart from ourselves, that its main 
interest is historical, that we look back on it as on an ancient building shining in the fresh 
light o f  an Athenian morning (1858 1 258)
Herein emerges the first task of a contemporary approach to the treatise: “to ascertain as far 
as possible, and to make clear, the meaning of these Ethics from the point o f  view o f  their 
writer” ( 1858: 2,xiv, my italics).
From this perspective Grant proceeds to reject all previous interpretations of 
Aristotle's definition o f ‘good’ in terms o f ‘transcendence' Nothing beyond men and human 
goals determines the supreme good for Aristotle, he argues. Instead the moral system of the 
Ethics “comes to this, that the chief good for man is to be found in life itself’. For
life, according to his [Aristotle’s] philosophy, is no means to anything ulterior, in the words 
of Goethe. Life itself is the end o f life' The very use of the term ¿vepyEia, as part of the 
definition of happiness, shows, as Aristotle tells us, that he regards the chief good as nothing 
external to man, hut as existing in man and fo r man, - existing in the evocation, the 
vividness, and the fruition of man’s own powers (1858 1 194-195 my italics)
F ro m  an  ‘E th ic s  o f  V ir tu e ’ to  an  'E th ic s  o f  D u ty ’ 223
The distance between this affirmation of ‘life’, ‘vividness’, "human power’ and the 
translations of the ‘good’ as a divine ‘Summum Bonum’ could not have been greater At the 
turn of the eighteenth-century Aristotle’s conception of ¿vepyeia was seen by Gillies as the 
line which unites imperfect human creatures to God, thus defining the purpose (teAxn;) of 
humanity as lying beyond any aspect of worldly life. In Grant’s writings it is not only life that 
acquires value as an abstract entity, but men’s concrete capacity to direct this life and define 
for themselves its ethical end. Hence Grant’s translation of the beginning of the Ethics rejects 
all previous renderings and defines the good’ in terms of human concepts and purposes. As 
he writes.
Every art, and every science, and so, too, every act and purpose, seems to aim at some good 
(ibid 2. 5, n. i.i).255
The main purpose of this translation, as Grant suggests, is “to exclude religious associations 
(as being un-Aristotelian) from our conception of the ethical teAxx; (end]” Only then would 
we be able to recognise that this teXo?, the best of ‘goods’ which constitutes happiness “is 
evidently meant to have a definite relation to the nature and constitution of man” (ibid.: I 
173).
For Aristotle, in Grant’s view, this nature was not formed in accordance with a 
transcendent model, nor was it contingent or accidental. The Ethics, he argues, escapes “from 
pure indefiniteness and relativity by asserting that the standard” for the understanding of 
human nature and the subsequent definition of life’s ethical end “is to be found in the good, 
the wise, the refined man. This standard is evidently” for Aristotle “the expression of the 
universal reason of man”. Hence the man whose life truly reaches the Aristotelian ‘best of 
goods’, he who actualises the universal human nature most perfectly and absolutely is “the 
educated man”. The meaning of the Ethics is “that the laws of reason must decide” (1874: 
2.91).
On the basis of this reading Grant suggests two novel translations of the terms 
¿vcpyciu (previously translated as ‘energy’ or ‘activity’) and <pp<ivr|ou; (previously translated 
as ‘prudence’). He rendered the terms as ‘consciousness’ and ‘Thought’ (or in some cases 
‘wisdom’) respectively. Hence in his translation of the definition of the best of goods' 
(i.vii. 15) he wrote:
If so, I say, it results that the good for man is conscious life according to the law of 
excellence, and if the excellence be more than one, according to that which is best and most 
absolutely in itself desirable (1858 2 34) 256
2"  The source text is quoted in the first section of this chapter 
2V’ The source text is quoted in the first section of this chapter
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Grant was well aware of the novelty of his translation of the source term by the concept of 
‘consciousness’, which he sought to sustain in an essay devoted to an analysis of 
contemporary equivalents to the source concept. In this work he argued that the term 
‘energy’, which seems to be related more directly to évépyeta, “has ceased to convey the 
philosophical meaning of its original, being restricted to the notion of force and vigour” and 
its consistent employment "has been a material hindrance to the proper understanding of 
Aristotle”. Consciousness was far closer to the Aristotelian meaning, but had to be further 
qualified. For in the original, Grant suggests, it was not merely related to a contemplative 
process, but to contemplation that is inextricably related to “life”. In saying that the idea of 
consciousness’ is implied in Aristotle’s concept of évépyeta "we need not overshoot the 
mark, and speak as if Aristotle made the Summum Bonum to consist in self-consciousness, or 
self-reflection”. That would be giving far too much weight to the subjective side of évépyeta 
and being unfaithful to Aristotelian philosophy. Instead the term evokes a “conscious vitality 
of the life and the mind”, which “entails the blooming of something perfect” that is achieved 
through contemplation, but is not quite reduced to it. By the use of the term évépyeia, Grant 
writes in a passage which owes most of its vocabulary to Hegel, Aristotle evokes “the mind 
itself called into actuality”. Thus defined, évépyeia or its contemporary equivalent, 
‘consciousness’
springs out of the mind and ends in the mind It is not only life, but the sense of life; not only 
waking, but the feeling of the powers, not only perception of thought, but a consciousness of 
one’s own faculties as well as of the external object (ibid : 1.193-195).
‘Consciousness’, it is argued, is actualised as the mind -  not the subjective modes of 
understanding but the mind as an abstract entity -  which springs out of itself within life and 
thereby forms and transforms itself (“it ends back in mind”) through a process of 
understanding itself in relation to external objects (ibid.: 1. 200-201). In an attempt to 
represent this complex idea in the target language (and possibly as a response to critiques of 
the choice of the term ‘consciousness’257) Grant chose to change, in the third edition of his 
book, the translation of évépyeta from consciousness to ‘vitality’ in many of the footnotes to 
the Ethics. Yet he maintained almost intact the essay which relates the Aristotelian term to 
the modem concepts of “consciousness’ and vitality (1874). In the fourth edition he translated 
Aristotle’s definition of the good for humankind as “vital action according to the law of 
excellence” (1885: 1:451).
2'7 Grant's choice was felt to be controversial and was criticised by the Saturday Review in 1858 as ‘unhistorical’: 
“Is it possible" the reviewer writes “to depart more widely from the canons of the historical method than by saying 
for a philosopher what he never says for himself, on the ground that we see he meant it?” (Turner 1981 352).
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Despite his dedication to an historical approach to Aristotle, Grant’s reading 
constitutes an anachronism. Aristotle’s philosophy is understood through the Hegelian 
concepts of ‘actuality’ and the spirit’ (although the source of these ideas is not always 
acknowledged by Grant) which had no place either in the Ethics or any other aspect of Greek 
philosophy. That Aristotle was not Hegel is a point that has to be made, but need not concern 
us any further in this context. Equally beyond the scope of my work is the way Hegelian 
philosophy is transformed by Grant’s writings. What is, however, important to examine is 
why a Hegelian conception of the ‘Spirit’, termed here as ‘mind’, is used in order to 
appropriate Aristotle’s Ethics and transform the source notions of ‘happiness’ and ‘good’ into 
a modem conception of a progressing human thought or consciousness.
Grant’s position begins with the affirmation that there exists for Aristotle an absolute 
priority of autonomous and rational thought among all traits that fulfil man’s nature. The 
ultimate purpose of human beings is thereby identified with their capacity to understand and 
articulate judgements, to use reason without reference to authority that lies beyond worldly 
standards. This idea is sustained both by the employment of the term ‘consciousness’, which 
conveys the idea of knowledge that originates in man, and the translation of the ‘cppovipoq’, 
the prudent man’, as “wise”. As Grant writes in the translation of the Aristotelian passage in 
question (ii.vi.15)258
Virtue, therefore, is a developed state of the moral purpose in relative balance, determined by 
a standard, according as the wise man would determine (1858: 2. 83, my italics).
Likewise Grant translates (ppovqav; by the term thought’ and explains that the ancient notion 
must be related to that aspect of ‘reason’ and ‘consciousness’ that is applied to “the general 
ordering of life”. <l>pbvi|ioi, he suggests are “the men who take good counsel” with regard to 
this issue (ibid. 255; 1885: 2. 145); a translation which stands in accordance with his 
statement that for Aristotle, the principles of rationality must rule.
Reason, however, had assumed many faces in the modem world, not all of which were 
deemed by Grant to be appropriate as the grounds of ethical precepts. Rationality was not 
merely a neutral means for scientific understanding. As a form of mathematical, calculative, 
quantifying means of cognition, and simultaneously a means for appraising the ‘right’ mode 
of action in relation to one’s goals and interests,259 it was intimately related to the concept of 
the ‘self, as defined by utilitarian ideals. Instrumental reason, as Adorno and Horkheimer
The source text is quoted in the first section of this chapter 
2,9 Max Weber gives an illuminating description of “instrumentaJ rationality” As he argues “action is 
instrumentally rational when the end, the means, and the secondary result are all rationally taken into account and 
weighed This involves rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relation of the end to 
secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends ( 19561, 1978: I 26)
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have argued, was essentially mediated by the idea of the self and thus became a means whose 
end culminated in “self-preservation” (1944‘;1997: 30). Such a development pertained most 
directly to the utilitarian, self-interested logic which governed the social and commercial 
relations of bourgeois societies. Yet the very function of these relations had to be completed, 
as has been discussed, by a range of rules for self-restraint that would be seen as beyond self- 
interest: a conception of duty which would not be contestable by instrumental rationality. 
While this duty was expressed in the first part of the century in terms o f a religious 
vocabulary, such form could not be easily sustained by the creeds and convictions of a 
disenchanted society. Grant assumed the role of transforming duty into a secular concept: 
once he separated ancient from modem ethics, he sought to suggest that the former’s 
glorification of contemplative reason was a premature stage in the advancement o f the human 
mind, while the latter’s concern with duty indicated an advancement of the world’s ethical 
consciousness. Hegel comes into the picture in order to confirm that
in the mailer of morals the world has clearly outgrown the Ethics of Aristotle (1874: 1 388)
In modem systems, Grant argues, “the spirit of the world seems deeper”, as it has become 
more self-conscious of the fact that man is not “capable of realising the absolute, the supreme 
End-in-itself by means of noble actions and moments of philosophic thought”. Instead, 
individual will, and therefore individual responsibility, are now the Erst thoughts of Ethics It 
is no more a question o f happiness, or, as with Aristotle, what is the chief good? hut rather, 
what constitutes duty? Why is anything right, and why are we obliged to do the right? (1858:
1. 249)
The “good and the joy of life are no longer” the predominant ethical conceptions, Grant 
argues, and in this sense the spirit of the world seems also “sadder” when compared to its 
stage at the time of Aristotle. Yet the paramount importance of ‘life’ and happiness' in 
Aristotle’s world derived from the fact that Greek thought was confined to “those conceptions 
that form the object of moral action, the good or happiness, and the beautiful or virtue” With 
regard to the “subjective side of these conceptions -  the moral subject -  the relation of the 
me,’ o f the will and consciousness of the individual, to the good in life and action” 
Aristotelian theory does not seem complete. For we can see today that “it is this subjective 
side of morals which has assumed importance”. In modem times it is “duty”, “right”, and 
“moral obligation” which “imply bringing home an act to the innermost consciousness” 
(1858: 1. 249). From this perspective the question of ethics which has mostly troubled and 
“divided the modems, is one that in Aristotle’s day had never been mooted, namely, why are 
we obliged to do any particular right action instead of its contrary?”
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Grant’s answer effects a complete and conscious break with an ethics of virtue. In a 
complex argument which advances by rejecting, one after the other, ancient Greek morality, 
utilitarian precepts and the idea of duty defined in religious terms, the writer explicitly turns 
to Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’.2W) He thus suggests that man’s ethical duty consists of this 
form of conduct which the agent should will to be posited as a universal law (ibid.: 1.251-2).
This idea stands, indeed, as Grant would be the first to acknowledge, in opposition to 
an ethics of virtue, from which the very principles of subjective responsibility and duty are 
missing. Instead, it posits a maxim of morality which is defined by formal consistency (all 
kinds of ethical conduct must be capable of becoming universal ethical decrees) but lacks 
definitive content. As Pool explains, the Kantian categorical imperative presumes, by its very 
formalism, and depends upon a pre-existing conceptual content: the already legitimated 
principles of the capitalist world of production and commodity exchange, whose function is 
canonised and controlled by formal reason. Thus, the range of rights and duties defined on the 
grounds of formal consistency rather than content "provides the framework of justice 
necessary for commercial society” (1991: 20).* 261 *What is more, such a framework can only 
develop on the condition of a cancellation of autonomous judgement as regards the actual 
moral and social consequences of behaviour. As MacIntyre maintains, insofar as a concept of 
duty remains purely formal and distances itself from notions of ends, purposes and needs, it 
suggests that,
given a proposed course of action, I may only ask whether, in doing it, I can consistently will 
that it shall be universally done, and not ask what ends or purposes it serves Anyone 
educated into the Kantian notion o f duty will, so tar, have been educated into easy 
conformism with authority (I9661; 1998 198)
It was ultimately this conformism with and voluntary subjection to authority Grant 
deemed to be missing from the Ethics and found in modem ethical systems. Aristotle’s 
imperfect understanding o f virtue, he argued, is mostly evident in the character of the “high- 
minded” or “great-souled” man:M an “appalling” figure who cannot be accepted by modem 
ethics. The notion of the ‘great-souled man’, which had been appropriated by the translators 
of the previous period without any substantial objection, represents for Grant “a certain 
loftiness of spirit” which is not “prompted by duty; rather it stands quite beside the idea of
2,M Kant’s “categorical imperative” posits the basic principle o f his ethical system: “I ought never to act except in 
such a way that 1 can also will that my maxim should become a universal law"(178S'; 1991: 67).
261 A similar point is made by MacIntyre who suggests that the doctrine of the categorical imperative “does not 
tell me whence I am to derive the maxims” which would be universal laws and thus becomes "parasitic upon some 
already existing morality” (19661; 1998: 197).
■’,'J The term "high-minded man" is employed in the first two editions (1858: 2. 166-167, 1866: 2 166-167) and 
changed into the term “great souled man” in the third and fourth editions (1874: 2. 72; 1885: 2. 72).
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duty” and as such should be rejected. Greatness, as Aristotle defines it, “does not evoke any 
sense of moral obligation”, since for the great-souled man
there is no self-subjection to a law. The great-souled man does not avoid vice because it is 
‘wrong’ (in the modem sense) but simply because it is unworthy of him. Thus he is most 
essentially a law to himself and above all other law (1874: 2.72)
However fine the other qualities of this character may be, Grant argues, his social disposition 
“is essentially not a human attitude”. No man can stand above law and secular restraints 
which posit precisely that “conception of ‘moral goodness’ that has arisen out of later” 
modem associations (1874: 2.72)
Grant’s work not only put an end to religiously oriented interpretations of the 
Ethics, 1 it further enabled the development of a new reading of the treatise, which employed 
the concept of secular duty in order to interpret the Ethics as a work that is mostly relevant to 
questions of duty, civil conduct and citizenship, in a sense Grant had actually prepared this 
change, however strongly he may have objected to it. By dissociating the Ethics from the 
notion of a revealed good and by arguing, simultaneously, the contemporary priority of 
secular ethical precepts, he enabled subsequent translators to read Aristotle through these 
modem precepts rather than against them and interpret the Ethics as the predecessor of an 
ethics of duty. Thus, while most translators of this period acknowledge the utmost 
significance of Grant’s work for their endeavour,2M they seem to stand in contrast to his 
distinction between modem and ancient morality. As Williams puts it in the introduction to 
his translation,
Not only do the Nicomachean Ethics lie almost at the threshold of Moral Philosophy But 
they have, perhaps, more in common with modern thought than any other among the 
treatises o f Aristotle o f equal length and importance (1869 vii, my italics).
In this context the relevance of the Ethics is no longer perceived as confined to questions of 
personal moral appraisal. Instead, the treatise is read and translated as an inquiry into the 
rules of civil conduct, that is, on the nature and perfection of man as a civil citizen.265
The philosophical logic which underlies late nineteenth-century translations is 
provided by the writings of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) and Andrew Cecil Bradley 
(1846-1924), whose work was also concerned, among other issues, with the contemporary 
resonance of the Ethics. While none of these thinkers attempted to translate Aristotle, their 2634
263 As a reviewer of Grant’s edition wrote in the Westminster Review. “Let a man once read through the Ethics 
with ordinary intelligence, and he can never afterwards countenance the stupid belief in the necessary dependence 
of morality on revelation” (1867: 44)
264 See for example Hatch 1879: v; Stock 1886: iv; Welldon 1892: 335.
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significance for translators becomes evidenced in the range of references to their 
publications265 66 as well as the employment of ethical concepts suggested by their wntings in 
the translated texts. Both Green and Bradley, as MacIntyre points out, suggested a break with 
the individualistic perceptions of society developed by utilitarianism. They drew as much on 
ancient Greek as on German philosophy (Kant and Hegel in particular) in order to question 
the idea that the rules and shared aims of a community are the outcome of agreements and 
compromises of individuals. Instead they argued that each individual can only discover his 
aims and desires from within a range of rule-governed relations to others, that is, in an 
organised social community. From this perspective, the moral ‘good' is seen by Bradley as 
man s effort to transcend his finite bounds, in order to realise himself anew as a member of a 
social whole. In this capacity”, Bradley suggested, “your finitude ceases as such to exist; it 
becomes the function of an organism. You must be, not a mere piece of, but a member in, a 
whole; and as this, must know and will yourself’. Likewise, Green believed that the 'good' 
could not "admit of the distinction between good for self and good for others" since the good 
is essentially realised in a form of social life in which individuals participate. These 
evocations of social coherence and solidarity, as MacIntyre points out, placed the individual 
in a metaphysical context which idealised existing social structures and relations, and 
culminated in a mere apology for their contemporary societies. Hence the idea of the social 
whole, in which the individual self is located was seen by Bradley as divided into various 
"stations”, each of which bestows on men different rights and duties. The end of each man, it 
was argued, is to find his concrete station in the social whole and carry out its duties (19661; 
1998: 245-246, 248).
The conception of the ‘good’ as a worldly, but nevertheless not personal achievement, 
is expressed in the translations by the progressive abandonment of terms with religious 
connotations267 as well as a significant transformation of Aristotle’s definition of happiness 
(i.iv. 1-2), which presents the Ethics as an argument against utilitarianism. Hence Hatch 
translates the passage which defines eibaipovia as follows:
265 This shift of emphasis from Christianity into civil rules and values took place, as Turner points out. in the time 
of a transformation of Oxford from a stronghold of the Church into a school for statesmen and civil servants, who 
would by employed by the liberal democratic state (1981 358)
266 References are made by translators to Green’s t’rotegomena to Ethics (1883) and Bradley 's Ethical Studies 
(1876).
267 The term ‘meekness’ for example, which is closely related to Christian ideas, is replaced by most translations 
with the term gentleness’ See for example Stock 1886 83, Peters 1881 122, Welldon 1892: 121, Franklin 
1897 57
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The masses no less than the elite say that Happiness is the Summum Bonum, and they are 
under the impression that ‘living well and faring well’ is identical with ‘being happy ’ (1879 
18)“ *
The employment of the phrase "they are under the impression”, which indicates a presumed 
distance between Aristotle’s thought and what is claimed in this definition, follows a motif 
that was also adopted by early nineteenth-century translators (or at least those who rendered 
both the concept of ’acting’ and of ‘being well’). Yet in opposition to the tendency of the 
previous period to leave the idea of prosperous life out of the definition of happiness, what is 
omitted in this translation is the notion of ‘acting well’. The definition of the ‘Summum 
Bonum' as a condition of ‘living well’ conveys more the idea of a good life rather than one 
lived in accordance with virtue, while the phrase ‘faring well’ refers to a happy and 
prosperous life. None of the concepts seems therefore to evoke an appraisal of one’s acts in 
terms of their ‘goodness'. Hatch’s rendering is indicative of a wider tendency to read Aristotle 
in such terms. Williams translated the passage as follows:
Upon its [the highest good's] name almost all men are agreed For both the untaught many 
and the educated few call it Happiness, and understand this same happiness to consist in a 
ftood and a prosperous life  ( 1869: 5)
Likewise Peters made the following translation:
As to its name (the highest good’s], I suppose nearly all men are agreed, for the masses and 
the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to "live well " or to "do 
well" is the same as to he "happy" (1881 5)
A last example of this choice is presented in Wilson’s translation:
Well, in name it is agreed upon by pretty nearly the majority of men for both the oi polloi 
and the refined call it happiness only they suppose that living well and faring well is identical 
with being happy ( 1884 11)
The result o f  this change is a striking one By rewriting this definition of enbatpovia as a 
pursuit of success and prosperity (an idea that was not, of course, found in Aristotle) and by 
implying that such a claim is obviously a mistaken one, or one from which Aristotle’s thought 
was distanced, these translations make at the very outset of the Ethics the implicit claim that 
the subsequent arguments of the book should be read as standing against this conviction. In 
other words, while Aristotle bases his ethical system on this definition of happiness, what the 
translations suggest is the very opposite: that the Ethics presents an argument which questions 
the relation o f ethical ideals to concepts of personal prosperity and happiness.
Of what then, if not happiness, does the nature of the Summum Bonum consist9 Hatch 
asks at the introduction to his translation. “What constitutes the perfection of man? What is 26
26* The source text is quoted in the first part of this chapter
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the ideal towards which all the powers and tendencies of our nature are directed?” (1879:1) 
The response to these questions is straightforward. Man’s perfection is found in
a life in community under the guidance o f the State. There is no sphere in which a man’s 
activities can be exercised or his virtues practised, save in the community of his fellows.
There is no security for his freedom, save under the protection of the State Nature herself 
teaches us so much: the very constitution of man marks him out as a ‘social being’ (ibid.: 2).
Because of his natural sociability, man can only realise perfection in a community. Yet this 
cannot be just any kind of community but one in which the authority of the state guarantees 
and protects individual freedom. Hence Aristotle’s ethical inquiry, Hatch concludes, instructs 
us that “the study of life” in terms o f ethical precepts “will therefore be a study of civil life” 
(ibid.: 2).
Hatch’s suggestion that the best of goods has for Aristotle a social and political basis 
stands much closer to the Ethics than any previous attempt to interpret the treatise in terms of 
religion. For Aristotle, there exists an inextricable relation between ethics and politics, and 
the knowledge of the ‘best of goods’, as he argues at the beginning of the Ethics can only be 
attained by the art of politics. The subject matter and method of his book are thereby defined 
as a “political” issue, while the Politics is presented as the immediate completion of the 
Ethics. Yet it is important to clarify that the world rco^vnicói; (political) is not directly 
equivalent to the modem term political. As MacIntyre observes, for Aristotle 7ioÀmKÓg covers 
both what we mean by ‘political’ as well as what we mean by ‘social’ without assuming any 
discrimination between the two (19661; 1998: 57). In modem society, this identity breaks and 
the political institutions -  codified in Hatch’s claim in the use of the term State’ -  are 
considered to be distinguished from social (that is, civil) life, although the former are also 
intimately related to the latter by ensuring the protection’ and ‘security’ of civil freedom and 
rights.
When translators come to represent the community within which men can realise 
perfection they refer to a civil society, which consists of “individuals” and a modem “State” 
as separate entities. Aristotle develops his argument on the relation of ethics to politics as 
follows:
òóSjeie 6' &v xf|; xupuoxdxri; xai pa/aaxa àpxitexTovixfi^ xoiaiixt) 6' i) itoXmxri 
tpatvxxai- xivac; yixQ elvai y.Qtwv rwv fiucmipffiv èv ta t ;  jióXeai, xai ito (a? éxaaxou; 
pavBàveiv xcù péxQi rivo;, auxi) òiaxaoaEi" ._ òh xaiixris ra t ;  koutat?
[itpaxtixais] xù>v èiucm(pujv, f u  òè vopo0ExoOoriS t i  bel itpaxxEiv xai xiviov 
àite'xEatìai, rò tau ri); téAo; itEpie'xoi &v rii rwv ù/.Xu/v wore xoOx’ &v Etri 
xàvfrpojjuvov ùyadóv. ti  yàQ xai xaùxóv èoxiv évi xai nóXei, pEt^ov ye xai 
xeX,e(oxepov xò xf|s itókEo); qpaivExai xai kaftelv xai oqj^Eiv (1.2. 4-8).
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It seems then that the ‘best good’ is the object of the most important and authoritative art, 
which seems to be the art of politics, Aristotle argues. For it is this art which determines 
which of the other sciences should be studied in the cities, which branches of them should be 
learned by the different ranks of citizens and up to what point. Since the rest o f the sciences 
are employed by politics, and since politics legislates what men should do and what they 
should refrain from, the end of this art must include the end of all others. It follows that this 
end must be the good of man. For even if this end is the same for every single man and for the 
city, that of the city seems to be greater and more perfect to attain or to preserve.
Williams translated the passage as follows:
It would seem to be the object of that art which is the master art, and so the most supreme 
And such, manifestly is the art political. For this it is that determines what branches o f 
knowledge ought to be pursued in States, and which are to be studied by the individual 
citizens, and up to what point. And so, since this art uses as its instruments all the other 
practical branches of knowledge, and further lays down general principles as to what must be 
done and what avoided, its end will comprehend the end of all these other arts, and will 
consequently be the supreme human good. For, although the end o f the individual and o f the 
State may perhaps be identical, yet that o f the State is evidently a grander and more 
complete object both to win and to preserve (1869: 3 my italics).
All subsequent translations of the passage follow Williams’ rendering without any major 
discrepancies. No translator avoids the use o f the term ‘State’ as the equivalent of the concept 
of the city (although some choose not to capitalise the term). Equally consistent is the 
employment of the terms ‘individual citizens’ and ‘individuals’ as the translations of the 
notions of ‘citizens’ and ‘men’. (Most translations use the term ‘individuals’ in both cases). 
The source concept of ‘political art’ is translated by the terms ‘politics’, ‘political art’ or 
‘political science’, with the only exception of Hatch’s translation, which speaks about the 
“Science o f  Society as being the science which ordains what other science shall rind a home 
in States” (1879: 13, my italics).
The changes are far from being insignificant. The term ‘State’, whose capitalisation 
evokes the notion of the political institution, is differentiated in the translation from 
individuals. What is more, the end of these “individuals ”, as the translator writes, may or may 
not be identical to the ends of the state, but in any case should be subjected to state-authority. 
Aristotle could not have conceived of such a separation and does not draw an opposition 
between personal aims and the aims of the city. What the source text says is that even though 
the ‘good’ of man and the good of the city are the same,2' 9 that of the city seems more 269
269 This point is evident in both Rackham’s (1934: 7) and Ross, Ackrill and Urmson’s translations (I980';1998: 
2).
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“perfect”, in the sense that it realises the good of man in the most excellent way. The ‘good’ 
of the city does not stand in contrast with men’s happiness in the context of classical Greek 
thought. It is only in a society whose very unity is founded on the basis of antagonism and 
conflict, and in which men’s freedom is essentially cancelled by being restricted to the civil 
realm, that the ‘State’, as an entity that is separated from the social community, can be 
evoked as the embodiment of the “grander” and “more complete” good to which people’s 
goals must be subsumed.
In this society men are not required to realise virtue in the sense of excellence. 
Instead, they need to develop a moral consciousness, in the sense given to the term by Grant: 
a conception of ‘duties’, ‘rights’ and ‘moral obligations’ that are defined by the consistency 
of formal reason and conform to existing rules of bourgeois society. And indeed, Grant’s 
suggestion to translate Aristotle’s concept of ¿vepyeux by the term ‘consciousness’ had an 
important influence on late nineteenth-century translators, who employ the term in order to 
render both Aristotle’s definition of virtue as “moral action consciously accompanied by 
reason” (Williams 1869:17) and the definition of ‘prudence’ and the ‘good’. Williams’ 
translation suggests that prudence is “a conscious habit o f correct reasoning on matters of 
action, concerned with that which is good for man (1869: 189; Ethics xi.v.6, my italics), while 
Hatch speaks about the good as “a conscious exercise of the faculties in conformity with the 
law of virtue” (1879: 37; Ethics i.vii.15, my italics).27" Greenwood explains in his translation 
that the prudent man, who has the “truth-attaining intellectual quality concerned with doing 
things” and has therefore “practical wisdom” is not one who exercises “a selfish unsocial 
consideration of [his] own individual interests”. The prudent man,
the (ppovqwx; must act as what Nature intends him to be, the member of a community (1909:
151).
Read from this perspective, the Aristotelian figure o f the great-souled man’ (iv.iii.l- 
3), whom Grant criticised because he fails to subject himself to the law, is transformed in the 
translations into the very embodiment of “moral elevation” or is left untranslated. Hatch 
translated the passage which defines pcyaXoyuxiu as follows:
Now the objects wherein Moral Elevation is displayed, seem, from the very force of the 
term, to be objects of greatness The man then who has this characteristic of Moral Elevation 
seems to be one’ who esteems himself o f high worth, and whose life is worthy of his 
profession (1879: 207).270 71
270 The source text is quoted in the first part of the chapter
2,1 The source text is quoted in the first part of the chapter
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Wilson uses the Greek term peyaAoyoxu* in his translation (1884:165), thus indicating a 
refusal to incorporate the concept of the great-souled man into the vocabulary of modem 
ethical systems. The logic which underlies both translations had already been articulated by 
Grant’s work: an ethics of duty posits rules that cannot be broken by any individual, no matter 
how charismatic, skilful or talented he may be. The laws of civil society must be 
fundamentally defined by their formal consistency.
That this principle could only act to sustain social conformism and subjection to 
already established authorities not only becomes evident in the employment of the notion of 
the “State” in the above translations, but also in the rendering of one aspect of Aristotle’s 
conception of justice, which suggests precisely the identity of the “just” and the “lawful” 
man. As Aristotle writes
£jxe'i 6 ' 6  ;tap av o p o 5  661x05 6  6e v6p ipo5  61x0105, 6f|Xov 6x1 jtav x a  x a  v d tiq id  £axi
^(05 6ixai<r xd xe ydp u ip iap fv a  tm 6  xf|5 vouo0Exixf|5 vd tupa  io x i, x a i  fx ao x o v  
xouxiov 6 fxaiov  E tvai cpa^iv. o t 6e v d p a i dyopeiiouai rcep'i djxdvxoiv oxo^a^dpevoi ?\ 
xoO xoivfi oi)|i<pEQOvxo5 Jidoiv [f) X015 &ptoxoi5] fj X0X5 xupioi5 xax" apExfiv f| xax ’ 
aXAov xivd xpoitov xoioOxov- iuoxe gva  pev  xpo.xov 6 ix a ia  /.eyopev xd ito irix ix a  x a i 
(pukaxxixa x?|5 Exi6ai|iovia5 xa'i xff)v popicov auxf|5 xf| noXixixfi xoivaivCo (v.i.12).272 
Williams translated the passage as follows:
Again, since we said that the transgressor o f the law was unjust and that he was just who 
observed the law, it is clear that all that the law commands is in a sense just. Now the 
commands of law are co-extensive with the axioms of the science of legislation, and we hold 
that each and every one of these commands is just Law, moreover, is universal in its range, 
its object being either that which is for the interest of all, or that which is for the interest of 
the best and noblest, or that which is for the interest of the powerful few, while it adopts for 
its standard either virtue or some other similar criterion And hence, in one acceptation of the 
term ‘just,’ we apply it to all such acts as tend to produce or to preserve for the body politic 
either happiness as a whole, or any o f its constituents (1869: 140-1)
Aristotle’s position, as MacIntyre observes, constitutes one of those moments of the Ethics 
which is not sustained by argument When Aristotle’s discussion of justice comes up against 
the use of the term Siicaux;, and questions whether the term means either ‘fair’ or ‘right’ or ‘in 
accordance with the laws’ it is simply asserted that everything unfair is unlawful and 
everything unlawful unfair (19661; 1998: 79). Williams’ translation maintains this part of the 
argument, which is in accordance with late nineteenth-century conceptions o f the ‘laws’ and
272 “Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a 
sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these, we say, is just Now the 
laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who 
hold power, or something o f  the sort; so that in one sense we call those ac's just that tend to produce and 
preserve happiness and its components for the political society (Ross, Ackrill and Urmson I9801, 1998 107-108).
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of ‘justice’. It adds however the idea that “law is universal in its range” which is the 
translation of the source phrase “the laws posit enactments on all subjects” (oi be vouch 
&Yoq£uovoi jieqi ¿tjtdvTwv o toxa Wpe voi). Such a change can be attributed to the 
conviction of the translator that the fundamental feature of ethical precepts is their universal 
validity; an idea which Grant had already elaborated by employing Kant’s categorical 
imperative. What is more, Williams’ translation suggests a transformation of the last phrase 
of the passage, writing that the term ‘just’ applies to all those acts which tend to produce for 
the body politic either happiness as a whole or any of its constituents, while Aristotle refers to 
those acts which produce happiness and its components for political society.
Happiness as a whole constitutes for Aristotle ‘perfect good’, which is defined at this 
point as the good of society as a whole, in which the good of men as citizens is included. The 
particular conceptions o f happiness are the good of people in their different social roles, 
within which they realise particular forms of virtue. The two notions of the good are in 
harmony in the context of ancient ethics. The attainment of happiness at the level of the polis 
is not distinguished from the well-being of people. Each of them feeds on and sustains the 
other. Yet Aristotle’s position is far from evoking a community of social equality. Virtue 
ethics, as MacIntyre suggests, stems precisely from and sustains the division of labour and the 
differentiation of function in early societies by producing a vocabulary in which men are 
described in terms of the roles they fulfil and the particular good of men is related to these 
roles (19661; 1998: 84). Such a description does not seem to contradict the quest for an ideal 
of social unity which does not challenge social inequality, but rather entails the subjection of 
conflicting social needs to the needs of the society as a presumably organic w hole/7’ On the 
contrary; Aristotle’s thesis could have well sustained an anti-utilitarian argument or the 
conviction that there is no essential conflict produced by social hierarchies and stratification 
in nineteenth-century British society. In this sense, what Williams’ choice indicates is an 
inconsistency which relates less to the source text and more to the conditions of the target 
society. These conditions produce the unconsciously expressed admission that in a society of 
unequals the good of the whole and the good of different people or groups cannot coincide; 
that however strongly such an identity may have been endorsed by translators and rewriters of 
the Ethics, it only acted to impose a false and precarious unity in a class society, within which
273 For a further discussion o f this issue see chapter 3, section 2.3.
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what was claimed to be the good for all was merely the good for a dominating minority that 
stood in direct opposition to the good and interests of the main social body.
C h a p t e r  6
From the end of the eighteenth century until the first years of the twentieth, as George Steiner 
points out, it was widely held by European poets, philosophers and scholars that Sophocles’ 
Antigone “was not only the finest of Greek tragedies, but a work of art nearer to perfection 
than any other produced by the human spirit” (1984: 1). An exaggerated statement, of course, 
but nevertheless indicative of the status and importance of Antigone in European thought 
during the last two centuries. The play, which has exercised a particular fascination for 
audiences since the time o f its first performance in Athens (442 B.C.),274 is far from being a 
marginal work in the Western cultural tradition. As Steiner puts it, “it is one of the enduring 
and canonic acts”, whose meaning has been at once literary, philosophical and political, and 
whose various rewritings have played a significant role in the formation of all of these aspects 
of the Western culture (1984: Preface).
Because of its status, it would be a mistake to assume that this work has been 
exclusively rewritten by translators. Antigone has attracted such consistent interest in the 
fields of philosophical, political and literary thought, that one must consider translation as 
only one means through which the themes and meaning of the work are inherited. What is 
more, translation developed as an apparently marginal form of rewriting, with the notable 
exception of those Antigones written by well-established writers (including Alfieri, Anouilh, 
Brecht, Cocteau and Hölderlin275), which seem to belong more to the fields of ‘original’ 
literature and philosophical contemplation than to the field of translation. One need not push 
this division too far in order to suggest that such canonical rewritings of Antigone are missing 
from the nineteenth-century British tradition. The majority of translations that were written 
during this period tend to follow the source text in a pedantic, utterly scholastic manner, and 
seem to lack any literary or philosophical aspiration. Their words appear to lead quite 
securely to the original, and yet this is an original which, in most cases, can only be 
meaningful in a translation exercise, a text which bears no marks of a living intellect or 
culture standing behind its production. To be sure, there were certain exceptions to this
I d e o l o g y  a n d  Ut o p ia  in  T r a n s l a t io n s  o f  So p h o c l e s ’ A n t ig o n e
274 Sophocles was honoured with the political appointment of 'strategos' of Samos (in 441 or 440 B C.) because 
of the success of his Antigone.
21' Steiner’s Antigones (1986) is, to my knowledge, the most systematic study of rewritings of Antigone in the 
Western tradition. Yet it is also a study that proves beyond any doubt the ‘invisibility’ of translations of 
Sophocles’ play While Steiner examines an impressive range of rewritings in the context of literary, artistic and 
philosophical production, the number of translations he chooses to discuss is strictly limited to the works of well- 
known writers, while there is hardly any reference to less ’distinguished’ translations of the play Charlie Louth’s 
study of the work of Hölderlin as a translator (1998) also provides useful insights in this particular rewriting of 
Antigone
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tendency to literalness, among which Richard Claverhouse Jebb’s (1841-1905) translation is 
the most significant example (18881; 1900). In general though, nineteenth-century British 
translators of Sophocles seem to be far more concerned with following established rules of 
faithfulness, conforming to conventional values and reinforcing established norms of 
propriety, rather than producing texts that may aspire to have a more radical cultural impact 
or challenge their self-imposed invisibility.
This choice of adhering to the source text should not be taken as entailing either a lack 
of interest in the social relevance of Antigone or a conviction that the play was a merely 
philological object, which had no repercussions for nineteenth-century moral, cultural and 
political life. On the contrary, all the works of Sophocles, and Antigone in particular, were 
considered as valuable precisely because of their presumed social relevance, their assumed 
capacity to provide insights regarding forms of personal and social conduct. As Arnold argued 
in his lecture “On the Modem Element in Literature”, the main feature of Sophocles’ work 
was its completeness and unrivalled adequacy, which touched upon all aspects of human 
nature and social life:
The peculiar characteristic of the poetry of Sophocles is its consummate, its unrivalled 
adequacy, that it represents the highly developed human nature of that age -  human nature 
developed in a number of directions, politically, socially, religiously, morally developed -  in 
completest and most harmonious development in all these directions, while there is shed over 
this poetry the charm of that noble serenity which always accompanies true insight (18571;
1962: 28)
What is more, Sophocles’ poetry (frequently cited together with that o f Aeschylus, but very 
seldom along with Euripides’ tragedies) was seen as representing a world whose social needs 
and concerns were parallel to those of nineteenth-century Britain. Arnold, who respected 
Sophocles more than any other of the ancient tragedians,27(1 explicitly drew such a parallel by 
arguing that
Aeschylus and Sophocles represent an age as interesting as themselves; the names indeed, in 
their dramas are the names of the old heroic world, from which they were far separated, but 
into these figures of the old world is poured all the fullness o f life and o f thought which 
the new world had accumulated This new world in its maturity of reason resembles our own 
(18571; 1960: 31).
If then the philosophical and historical writings of ancient Greece were employed in order to 
justify an intellectual and political resemblance between the classical and the modem world, 
tragedy gave reasons for articulating a more extended parallel, which evoked a whole mode 
of life and social conduct. What the Athenian tragedies were deemed to show, as George Eliot
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wrote in 1856, was that the Greek dramatists “had the same essential elements of life 
presented to them as we have” (1981: 254).
A basic aspect of this parallel was considered to be the relation of Greek tragedy, and 
Antigone specifically, to the democratic institutions of classical Athens. Tragedy, Grote 
argued in his History, was a product of the Athenian democracy and while many tragic 
composers came to Athens from other parts of Greece to exhibit their genius “nowhere else 
were original tragedies composed and acted, though hardly any considerable city was without 
a theatre” (1846-18561; 1888: 7. 6) .* 271 This was not a coincidence, as Grote points out, since 
the subject matter of tragedy, which is "pregnant... with ethical debate and speculation” can 
only pertain to a democratic polity. The favourite themes of Greek drama, i.e. “characters of 
mixed good and evil -  distinct rules and duty, one conflicting with the other -  wrong done 
and justified to the conscience of the doer, if not to that of the spectator by previous wrong 
suffered”, all these belong to a democracy that is strong enough to encourage debate, tolerate 
unfriendly tones and recognise men’s conflicting obligations. These are precisely the themes, 
in Grote’s view, “which Sophocles so forcibly brings in his beautiful drama of Antigonê” 
(ibid.: 14, 19-20). A similar connection was made towards the end of the century by Jebb, 
who praised “Sophocles’ genius” as much as the historical context of the city within which 
this could be developed: “The poetry of Sophocles”, he argued, “is the expression of a mind 
in which the happiest natural gifts had been ripened during the happiest years of Athenian 
history” (1893: 208). But also the entirety of “Attic tragedy” was described by Jebb as “the 
final outcome of the Greek genius in poetry” and the “perfect expression of the Athenian 
mind in the best age o f Athens” (ibid : 248).
This belief led to the publication of a substantial number of translations of Antigone 
throughout the nineteenth century. At the beginning of this period, Antigone was mainly read 
in translations written during the previous decades by Thomas Francklin and R. Potter.27* 
Two further anonymous translations appeared, both in prose, in 182227’ and 1823 (the latter 
reprinted with minor revisions in 1828, 1842, and 1849). George Downes’ translation of 
Antigone (1823) and D. A. Talboys translation of the Sophoclean tragedies (1823; reprints
276 On this issue see Anderson, W 1975: 274, Gerhard 1981
271 This position has been endorsed by the overwhelming majority of contemporary scholarship As Cornelius 
Castoriadis for example has argued, there is no Greek only Athenian tragedy For only in the city in which 
democracy and the processes of self-institution reached their climax, could tragedy be created as an integral part 
of these institutions ( 19831 ; 1997) For a further discussion of the political role and repercussions of Greek 
tragedy see also fcuben ( 1986 and 1990); Hall(1989and 1997); Meier(1988', 1993).
' 7* The eighteenth century translations of Sophocles by Thomas Francklin originally written in 1758-9 e^pear in 
several reprints during the nineteenth century (1806; 1809; 1832; 1886, 1894) R Potter’s verse translations 
published in 1788 were reprinted only once in 1808 
79 1 have not been able to view this translation
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1828; 1842; 1849) were also published during these years. These were followed by Thomas 
Dale’s verse translations of Sophocles’ plays published in 1824, T. W. C. Edwards’ 
translation of Antigone (1824), and D. Spillan’s translation (1831). In the middle of the 
century, Matthew Arnold wrote a poem entitled ‘Fragment of an Antigone’ (1849; reprint 
1855), which will be considered as a rewriting, but not a translation of the source text. The 
next translation of the play was by J. W. Donaldson in 1848 and was followed by the 
translation of Sophocles’ tragedies by C. D. Yonge280 and Edward Hayes Plumptre in 1849 
and 1865 (reprints 1867; 1872; 1902) respectively. Antigone was subsequently translated by 
Roscoe Mongan in 1865 (reprint 1880), by Lewis Campbell in 1873 and by John Benson Rose 
in 1872. The entire corpus of Sophocles was translated into verse by Robert Whitelaw in 
1883, a translation that was reprinted twice in 1897 and 1906. Antigone was translated again 
in 1887 by Reginald Broughton and then by Richard Claverhouse Jebb (1888; reprints 1891, 
1900). Jebb, a well-reputed Sophoclean scholar, translated the entire corpus of Sophocles’ 
tragedies (1885-88) and his work became definitive for the rest of the century and for some 
time in the twentieth (until the publication of Gilbert Murray’s translations from 1911 to 
1948). A further translation of Sophocles’ dramas into verse was published by George Young 
in 1888 and of Antigone by A. H. Allcroft and B. J. Hayes in 1889. Edward Philip Coleridge 
published a translation of Sophocles’ tragedies in 1893, based on Jebb’s edition This work 
was followed by William Hardie’s and C. E. Lawrence’s281 translations of Antigone in 1894 
and 1898 respectively. At the beginning of the twentieth century two further translations of 
the play were published, one by John Swinnerton Phillimore in 1902 and one by Martin 
Richard Weld in 1905.
Despite persistent evocations of faithfulness and an attempt to follow the source text 
as closely and ‘literally’ as possible, this corpus developed a reading of Antigone that was 
fully embedded in the discourses and value-models of the target context. Translations 
manipulated and appropriated the source text, at the very moment they sought to recover it 
with faultless accuracy Thus, Antigone assumed many faces during the nineteenth century: it 
became one further proponent of a divine order of truth and morality; a paradigmatic 
exposition of the strength and limits of individuals; or -  quite surprisingly, given the theme of 
the source text -  a defender of the submission of individual will to state-authority. The 
consistency of these interpretive choices shows that the original was no longer read in the 
target context in the ways that it was perceived in classical Athens. That is to say, the fact that
2,0 1 have no: been able to view this translation
2,11 1 have not been able to view this translation
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translators, who were not always in contact with each other and did not necessarily consult 
each other’s works, adopted similar renderings of Antigone, which were further consistent 
with the broader thought-modes and value-systems of their time, entails that the source text 
did not merely function as the fixed and unaltered product of a given moment. It became, 
instead, a segment in an historical chain, within which its initial reality was mobilised and 
transformed, and thus Antigone in nineteenth-century Britain was different to Antigone in the 
classical world. What is more, these new renderings were integrated into a broader context of 
other translations, rewritings of the classics as well as ‘original’ writings, within which their 
meaning was further interpreted and redefined. Thus, each of the translations, as José 
Lambert and Clem Robyns have argued in their description of translation writings, should not 
be seen as the final component of a static dichotomy, but as a sign in itself, subjected to other 
interpretations, whose formation is derived from the interaction of different codes and 
normative models in the target society (Lambert and Robyns forthcoming).
Yet to say that translations of Antigone stemmed from an interpretation and 
appropriation of the original should not be taken to entail an act of subjugation of the source 
text to the target conceptual framework, which itself remained finite and unalterable. 
Translations formed, instead, a relatively autonomous space, which was not dissociated from 
target discourses, but was nevertheless located at their outer limits, at the very intersection 
between target norms and the source text meaning and culture. From this perspective, the 
notion of appropriation itself, as Paul Ricoeur has suggested, should not indicate a one- 
directional process, which would subsume reading and rewriting to the fixed capacities of 
understanding of the translator. It should rather be seen as the trait of a dialogue between the 
translator and the text, in the context of which neither does the text reveal its supposedly 
hidden design nor does the translating subject project her a prion understanding, but both 
translator and text are shaped and transformed simultaneously. This means, for Ricoeur, that 
the text becomes the projection of a world and a mode of ‘being in the world’, which is, 
indeed, made to conform to the translator’s concepts and beliefs, but also gives her new and 
enlarged capacities for knowing herself and worldly context. Thus, appropriation “ceases to 
appear as a kind of possession, as a way of taking hold of . .. It implies instead a moment of 
dispossession”, which engenders the possibility of a new self-understanding that is provided 
by the written word as it exists within and through reading, interpretation and translation 
(1981 1995: 192-193).
This conception of appropriation’ as a process of acquiring and also of dispossession 
and self-transformation opens up a fruitful way of seeing the relation between translation and
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source text. For what can be entailed from Ricoeur’s position is that translation, as the 
manifestation of a form of reading and interpretation, does not only produce a difference 
between itself and the original, which stems from the norms and conventions of the target 
culture; it also entails a novel employment of these norms, which is able to establish a self- 
critical distancing from them and a potential for their transformation. It influences and 
modifies the thought of the target community, perhaps as much as it is modified and 
manipulated by it.
In the next sections, I shall seek to develop this point in relation to nineteenth-century 
translations of Antigone. My reading will seek to show how these translations acquired a 
densely ambiguous role in the target society. On the one hand, they acted as endorsements of 
a dominant social discourse on the relation between man’s ‘autonomy’ and the need for 
subjection to ‘authority’; a discourse which was directly related to the ideological motifs that 
characterised other translations from the classics. On the other hand, the introduction of 
Antigone into the target context entailed the enunciation of ideas that were by no means 
compatible either with these motifs or with the social conditions that brought them to being. 
Instead, the process of translating created a gap in the certainty o f nineteenth-century 
bourgeois thought, it gave rise to a discourse of a multivocal and self-critical nature, which 
does not pertain either to Sophocles’ text in itself or to a presumably unitary framework 
through which Antigone was understood at the time; it pertained to Antigone in translation
1. Defining the ‘Order of Things':
Antigone's Conflict between the Private and the Public Sphere
For the whole of the nineteenth century Antigone was viewed as the embodiment of a heroine 
who raises herself beyond mortal standards of justice. Having a consciousness of immanent 
truth and duty, it was suggested, she decides to comply with them and act against the 
contingent laws of the city of Thebes. From this perspective most translators saw the conflict 
between Creon and Antigone as an opposition between the eternal values of family piety -  
which were almost unequivocally related to Christianity -  and the unjustified power of state- 
authority over the moral stance of individuals. Donaldson articulated this position in the 
introduction to his translation of the play, published in 1848:
On the general design and leading ideas of this Play, it is quite unnecessary to enlarge l ivery 
reader must see that it is the poet’s object to represent, in their antagonism, the duty of 
obedience to the constituted authority in a state, and the duty of carrying out the laws of 
religious and family piety (1848 xvii).
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It is important to note that while Donaldson describes the ideas of the play as obvious, he 
feels the need to prevent a misreading of his translation. He is eager to emphasise that every 
reader must see that the poet’s intention was to represent a conflict between our debt to 
society -  represented by the constituted laws of the city of Thebes -  and one’s personal 
obligation towards divine doctrines, which dictated Antigone’s choice.
A similar identification of Antigone’s character with the eternal laws of justice was 
suggested by the translator Plumptre, who argued that Sophocles’ work is a paradigmatic 
expression of the unchangeable truths of divinity, an instrument of “moral education”, which 
would “lead men upwards to the eternal laws of God and the thought of His righteous order” 
(1865 : xcvii-xcviii). What is more, Antigone was not only paralleled, but was claimed to be 
even truer and nobler than the works of Christian writers. As Plumptre argued:
Nowhere, even in the ethics of Christian writers, are there nobler assertions of a morality 
divine, universal, unchangeable, o f laws whose dwelling is on high, -  
“In which our God is great, and changeth not,” (Oid. King. 863-71) 
of which it is true that
“They are not o f to-day or of yesterday” (Ant. 450-7)
that they, written on the hearts of all men, are of prior obligation to all conventional 
arrangements o f society, or the maxims of political expediency (ibid : Ixxviii-lxxix).
The rhetoric mode by which the argument advances is again marked by an urge to enforce the 
meaning of Antigone upon the reader, to avoid misinterpretation. The beginning of the 
passage with the negation of any possibility to find a truth that is more noble than that of 
Antigone, the comparison of Sophocles with Christian writers, which surprisingly 
distinguishes the former as truer than the latter, the constant repetition o f adjectives that 
denote permanence and universality (“divine”, “universal”, “unchangeable”), not only stress 
the truth of Antigone’s position; these discursive devices also seek to stabilise the very 
wording of this position, the univocality and firmness of the translation’s meaning.
The text o f Antigone, the translators argue, obviously represents and legitimises the 
validity of family and religious duties, as these are prescribed by a divine order. Yet there is 
so strong a possibility of misunderstanding, of misplacing the truth of this representation, that 
they need to sustain their position, to confront and reject alternatives. Thus, Jebb’s translation 
presents in the introduction a lengthy discussion of “the moral intended” by Sophocles, in 
which the scholar acknowledges “the definiteness and the power with which the play puts the 
case on each side” represented by its heroes. Jebb realises that no matter how noble Antigone 
may appear, when conceived of as an enlightened heroine “listening to the private 
conscience”, she also weakens her truth-claims, when her “family duty” becomes the reason
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for effacing her social responsibility, or when she declares that she would have not done what 
she did for a husband or a child, as she could have had others, while her brother was unique to 
her 282 Jebb further apprehends that Creon’s position is also fraught with ambiguities: his 
verdict defies religious laws and is enforced on Antigone. However, the same verdict 
represents a social law, it is ratified by the judgement of the city of Thebes which, however 
contingent and mortal, cannot be straightforwardly appraised as inferior to “individual 
conscience” (ibid.: xx-xxviii, 164, xxxv-xxxvii). While devoting a significant part of his 
introduction and footnotes to these possible “misunderstandings”, Jebb repeatedly affirms the 
need to reject them: “A careful study of the play itself will suffice (I think) to show” that the 
view expressed by Antigone “is the true one”:
Sophocles has allowed Creon to put his case ably, and he has been content to make 
Antigone merely a nobly heroic woman, not a being exempt from human passion and human 
weakness, but none the less does he mean us to feel that, in this controversy the right is 
wholly with her. and the wrong wholly with her judge (ibid xxii, my italics)
The situation of Antigone, Jebb concludes, is therefore “analogous to that of a Christian 
martyr” inspired by the “unfailing statutes of Heaven”. She claims an allegiance which could 
neither be disputed nor cancelled by any human law: an allegiance to family and religious 
duty (ibid.: xxv).
This conviction entailed the employment of a vocabulary that was Christian in origin 
throughout the entire body of translations Hence when the Chorus speaks in the first strophe 
and describes as evibaipovec (happy) those people whose life has not had a taste of bad 
fortune and whose family has not been struck by the gods, the majority of translators 
introduce alterations that allude to a Christian conception of life and God’s power over it. The 
source text reads:
EuSaipove; oioiv xaxuiv fiyEvoto; alwv.
oi? yap av oeio0f| 0e<50ev bdpoc, fixa;
oiiSfev ¿XXeuiei yeveftc: ¿.Ti :tXf|0o? epjtov- (583-585)
Dale translates the passage as follows:
What blessedness is theirs, whose earthly date 
Glides unembittered by the taste of woe1 
But when a house is struck by angry Fate
Through all its line what ceaseless miseries flow! ( 1824 I 248, my italics) 283
283 Jebb discusses this point at length in a footnote to his translation, pointing out that it seems to contradict the 
validity of the divine law prescribing family piety and be unworthy of the character o f Antigone Although he 
translates the passage, he suggests (among others) a possible interpolation ot the "e. ies (903-912) after 
Sophocles’ death, either by his son lophon, or by some other poet or by some aciors (1888 , 1900 164)
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The translation renders the concept EiihaipovEC by ‘blessed’, thus using a term with obvious 
religious connotations, and further employs the phrase ‘earthly date’ -  a concept that is 
opposed to ‘divine date’ -  in order to refer to the notion of aicuv, which denoted a space in 
time, a period, and, by extension, a ‘lifetime’ in ancient Greek.2*5 Jebb follows a similar 
pattern in his translation of the passage:
Blest are they whose days have not tasted o f evil For when a house hath once been shaken 
from heaven, there the curse fails nevermore, passing from life to life of the race (18881,
1900: 113, my italics).
Apart from the use of the terms ‘blest’ and ‘evil’, Jebb’s translation renders the source 
concept 0e<50ev (‘from the gods’) by the phrase “from heaven” -  thus setting a pattern for the 
substitution of the gods’ of Greece for the Christian God, that would be frequently repeated 
in his work. The belief that the gods reside in heaven was, of course, foreign to the Greeks, 
for whom the anthropomorphic nature of divinity necessitated its positioning within earthly 
limits. Yet the consistent metonymic use of ‘heaven’ for the term ‘gods’ in the translation 
acted to reaffirm the relation of Antigone to modem religious thought, and sustain the parallel 
Jebb sought to draw between Antigone and a Christian martyr2M
The relation of Antigone to Christianity becomes stronger at the point where the 
source text contrasts the law established by Creon and the laws of justice prescribed by the 
gods. When Creon asks Antigone how she dared transgress the law of the city, she answers 
that it was neither Zeus nor Justice who established these laws, but Creon himself, and that 
she does not believe that his verdict, the verdict o f a mortal, could be powerful enough to 
override the unwritten and unchanging laws of the gods For those, Antigone says, were not 
written today or yesterday, but have always existed, and no one knows when they first 
appeared:
oii&e otifveiv xoooOxov ipoguv xa oti 
xtipvyua0' ¿box’ fiypajxxa xtioyakt) 0efflv 
v<5(npa 6uvao0ai 0vtix6v 6v0' utiepbpapetv. 
oil ydp xi vOv ya xdyO^c; tikk'tiei note 
tfl xaOxa, xoiiSeT; olbev £§ 5xov 'qpavr) (453-457)
Plumptre translates the passage as follows:
Nor did I deem thy edicts strong enough.
Coming from a mortal man, to set at nought 
The unwritten laws of God that know not change
2,3 Cf. Liddell and Scott, ( ireek-Engiish lexicon  t  v. aicuv.
2K4 A similar translation of the passage was written by Donaldson, who also employed the terms ‘blest’ and 
‘heaven’ in his translation of the passage (1848 59) as well as Mongan who rendered the term 0e60ev as ‘from 
heaven’ but translated Efrbaipove; as ‘happy’ (1865: 18)
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They are not of to-day nor yesterday.
But live for ever, nor can man assign
When first they sprang to being (1865: 168 my italics)
What the translation suggests is that the unwritten laws which Antigone obeys are not those of 
the Greek gods. The substitution of the source term 0eo>v (‘gods’) by the term ‘God’, which is 
capitalised in the translation, ensures that the concept of an eternal justice is compatible with 
contemporary Christian standards. A similar idea is conveyed by Donaldson’s translation, 
which renders the source-text concept o f ‘gods’ by the term ‘heaven’:
Nor did I deem thy heraldings so mighty.
That thou, a mortal man, could’st trample on 
The unwritten and unchanging laws o f heaven 
They are not of to-day or yesterday;
But ever live, and no one knows their birth-tide (1848: 45, my italics)
Jebb’s translation follows the same pattern for the translation of the term gods’, while further 
employing ‘unfailing’ in order to render the source term fitocpaXf|, that is, secure, stable:2*5 
nor deemed I that thy decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override the unwritten 
and unfailing statutes o f heaven. For their life is not of to-day or yesterday, but from all time, 
and no man knows when they were first put forth (18881; 1900 89, 91, my italics)
The concept aotpaXi) vdptpa is rewritten by Downes as “secure institutes” (1823: 100) and 
by Mongan as “immovable laws” (1865: 15), while Rose translated the phrase as “the laws 
unwritten of the deathless gods brought on infallible” (1887: 21).
All of these renderings effect a significant transformation o f the source text. For while 
the idea of a divine, stable order of justice is, indeed, conveyed by the passage, this order is 
not so sharply distinguished from social conceptions of justice, as is implied in the 
translations. In Christianity God stands beyond humanly constituted laws, and this is both the 
reason and the basis for his “infallible” judgement. For the Greeks, however, and the 
Athenian audience of tragedy in particular, social and divine order are not strictly separable. 
Antigone’s dilemma concerning her religious obligation to bury her brother and her social 
responsibility to obey the laws of the city do not form two separate groundings for justice. For 
Sophocles and the Athenians to bury their dead, as Cornelius Castoriadis suggests, was not 
only a religious but also a social law, as to defend and sustain one’s country was not only a 
social, but also a divine law (19831; 1997: 285). For this reason, the term ‘infallible’ is not 
applicable to the Greek conception of divine justice, whose precepts emerge by establishing 
their direct connection to social and historical laws.
2R5 C f Llddell-Scott Greek-English I,exicon s v àoqiuXnç.
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This point is strongly emphasised by the characters in Antigone. When, for example, 
Antigone speaks to her sister Ismene and seeks to justify her decision to act against Creon’s 
order, she ambiguously describes her deed as a reverent act of infringement, a holy crime. As
she says,
<pfA.r| per’ aiiToO xeioopai, cpfXov peta, 
óoia jtavoupYnoao'- ÉJtt'i jiXeígov xpóvo; 
ov 6el p’ ápéaxeiv tolg xárai tuiv évOáóe. 
éxet yhQ del xeíoopai- (72-76)
The phrase 8o ia JiavovQYfjoaoa is not a contradiction in terms in the source context. 
Instead, it denotes precisely the lack of distance, the essential unity between a notion of laws 
that is seen as contingent and contestable, and the more stable standards of justice evoked in 
order to uphold it. The law of man and the justice of anthropomorphic gods, gods which are 
made according to man’s image, stand next to each other and none of them can be imposed 
on or efface the other.
The translations of the passage in question can be divided into three categories, each 
of which develops a different rewriting of this idea. The first eliminates the notion o f crime 
conveyed by the term Ttavoopyijoaoa, and presents Antigone as the maker of a holy, pious 
deed. As Downes writes in his translation,
1 dear will lie with him, with him dear [sic], having contrived pious things, since the time 
is more during which it becomes me to please those below than those here (1823: 86 my 
italics).
The phrase “having contrived pious things” erases the negative connotations of the source 
concept mvoopytjaaaa and only maintains the notion of ‘holiness’, denoted by the term 8oia 
of the source text. This is far from being an insignificant change. Downes’ translation not 
only suggests an unqualified justification of Antigone’s choice which is absent from the 
source text; it further eliminates the human role in the constitution of the rules of justice The 
only order that appears in the translation is an immanent, divine one; a Law by which all other 
laws can be justified or rejected; a Justice that stands above social standards of judgement.
The second category of translations maintains the negative meaning of the source term 
7tavoupyf|oaaa by employing the notion o f ‘sin’. As Donaldson writes:
Loving with one who loves me 1 shall lie.
After a holy deed o f sin the time 
Of the world’s claims upon me may not mate 
With what the grave demands for there my rest 
Will be for ever lasting! (1848: 11 my italics)
A similar logic underlies Mongan’s rewriting of the phrase in question:
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I beloved will lie with him, -  with him 1 love, having done a holy deed in an unholy way 
(1865: 7 my italics).
The employment of a religious term denoting the ‘unjust’ and ‘wrong’ — ‘sin’ -  as the 
equivalent of the term raxvoupyijoaaa is a choice that is only ostensibly incompatible with 
Downes’ translation. For while both Donaldson’s and Mongan’s translations convey the 
negative connotations of the source concept, they do so by implying that the grounding of this 
negative appraisal is again an immanent law provided by God, a transcendent order against 
which human thought and judgement vanish.
In contrast to the above renderings, a third category of translations follows closely the 
ambiguity of the source text, thus presenting Antigone’s act as the object of two domains of 
justice: a divine and a social one. It is worth pointing out that this choice is made by precisely 
those translators who seem to be the most fervent advocators of the Christian meaning of 
Antigone, namely Plumptre and Jebb. Plumptre translates the passage by describing the 
heroine as guilty of a holy crime:
Loved I shall be with him whom 1 have loved.
Guilty o f holiest crime (1865: 152, my italics)
Likewise, Jebb employs the notion o f ‘sin’ in order to suggest that Antigone is innocent on the 
basis of religious laws -  “sinless” -  but also guilty on the basis of social ones:
I shall rest, a loved one with him whom I have loved, sinless in my crime (18881; 1900: 23, 
my italics).
Neither Plumptre nor Jebb seem to be willing to articulate a radical challenge to Antigone’s 
religious image. On the contrary, both of these translators, as was examined, were particularly 
keen on reinforcing the nineteenth-century parallel between Antigone and a Christian martyr 
as well as the creed that, in the conflict between the timeless values of God and the laws of 
men, Sophocles’ work shows the power of the former over the latter Yet the notion of 
‘crime’ does not easily fit in such a religious vocabulary. The criteria for defining an act as 
“criminal’’ (rather than sinful) begin and end in society; they stem from social laws and refer 
to acts which are considered injurious to public welfare. The notion of a sinless crime is 
literally meaningless, when both its terms are taken to refer to a divine conception of justice. 
A sin can, indeed, only be judged as such by God, but a crime is a violation of a socially 
constituted order; an order which emerges in the translations as parallel to a transcendent one, 
and thereby restricts and limits the latter, despite all conscious intentions of translators to 
endorse Antigone's religious significance
It follows that these latter translations constitute a secular, social space for the 
definition of laws and justice As such, they arc in accordance with the source text and the
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secularised conceptions of justice that informed the broader political discourses o f the target 
society. Yet when it comes to the particular forms by which this space is to be constituted, 
then nineteenth-century translations indicate the cultural and political distance between the 
Athenian context of tragedy and modem societies, by locating the institution of justice in the 
private rather than the public realm and thus transforming the source notion of justice into a 
matter of personal rather than collective attainment.
In Sophocles’ Antigone one can perceive three main participants in the conflict over 
Antigone's act: Creon, Antigone and the city of Thebes. The voice of the latter, i.e. the city, is 
nowhere heard directly, since the fictional context of the tragedy is not a democratic but a 
monarchic society, of which Creon is the sole and legitimate king. A visible presence of the 
people of Thebes, in this setting, would have been an anachronism that would have not made 
sense even to the Athenian audience, not least because o f the strict conventions as regards the 
content and themes of tragedies. Yet the historical context of the play, namely democratic 
Athens, necessitates that the verdict reached by the people of Thebes is inserted in the words 
of all of the main heroes, none of whom (not even Creon) can utterly deny the role of the 
society in the determination of justice. What is more, Antigone indicates that both Creon’s 
decision to prohibit Polyneices’ burial and Antigone’s decision to bury her brother are posited 
against such a collectively instituted justice, and this is the reason why they bring about the 
hubris and tragic fall of the doers.2Xf'
Let us then follow how this dual hubris is rewritten in the translations. In the opening 
dialogue between Antigone and her sister, Ismene, the latter asserts that by refusing to join 
Antigone, she does not want to dishonour the laws of the gods. She is nevertheless unable to 
act against the rest of the citizens:
iyw  pev oux ¿ttipa rcoioOpai, to  6fe
Pfo jioXiTfijv body  fqpuv ipfjxavo? (78-79).
Ismene’s statement is crucial. While at other points in the play Ponyneices’ burial is presented 
as an act against Creon’s order, at this moment it is suggested that acting against the laws of 
the city (represented in Creon’s verdict) is the same as acting against the citizens. It is thus a 
choice which is not justifiable even on the grounds of personal-religious duty Ismene’s words 
seem to pertain more to Sophocles’ historical time, in which there existed no conceptual 
distinction between the city, as an institutionalised community, and the citizens, as an 
autonomous social body, rather than the fictional time o f the play. That is to say, it is because 
Ant.gone is written and performed in Athens, and because tragedy is directly related to the
21,6 For a further discussion of this issue see Castoriadis 19831, 1997
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democratic institutions of the city, that a character who is imagined to live in a monarchic 
regime can conceive of and articulate such an idea.
In nineteenth-century translations of the passage the notion of jiokivzq, citizens, is 
substituted for the notion of the State. As Plumptre wrote:
I do them [the laws of gods] no dishonour, but I find 
Myself too weak to war against the State ( 1865: 152).
Jebb made a similar choice in his translation:
I do them [the divine laws] no dishonour; but to defy the State, -  I have no strength for that 
(18881, 1900 25). 2,7
While in the source text the heroine is presented as standing against the city’s laws and 
citizens, the translations present an antithesis between her, as an individual, and the authority 
of the state. The capitalised term ‘State’ used by the translators does not convey the notion of 
a social body.2** As was the case with Aristotle’s translations, it is employed in order to 
denote an institution that is strictly separated from the citizens and has the legal power to 
canonize individual conduct and social processes.
In the source text, Creon’s character is no less guilty of violating the city's laws than 
Antigone. His decision to prevent Polyneices’ burial and subsequently convict Antigone is 
repeatedly declared as standing against the judgement and feelings o f  the people of Thebes by 
Haemon (731-739), Antigone herself (509-510) and the men of the Chorus (724-725), who 
hesitate in front of Creon’s edict and Antigone’s act throughout the play, without choosing to 
endorse either Creon’s injustice is stressed by the translators, even more perhaps than it is 
emphasised in the source text. By the same move, it is also transformed into an arbitrary act, 
the personal choice of an illegitimate ruler, which bears no repercussions for modem forms of 
authority materialized in the power of laws and state-institutions
In Sophocles’ Antigone, Creon’s position is ambiguous, it oscillates between the 
king’s subjection to the good o f the city and his will to maintain his power and impose his 
edict on citizens In the translations Creon becomes a mere tyrant, he evokes an arbitrary 
power which is forced on the citizens, in the same way an oppressive regime would impose a 
social order, irrespective of both laws and justice. Although Creon was presumably the lawful 
king o f the city, Jebb argued, the Athenian audience could easily realise that his power must 
have been illegitimate: 287
287 A similar rendering was suggested by Donaldson, in whose translation Ismene says that “Nay /  disgrade [sic] 
no rite: but lack the skill to contravene the edicts of the state" ( 1848: 11)
2,<K When translators refer to the community or the people of Thebes they employ the terms ‘state’ without 
capitalisation, ‘c'ty’, ‘country or ‘nation’ See for example Jebb 18881, 1900: 45, 47, Downes 1823: 85, 
Donaldson 1848 21,23, Plumptre 1865. 157,
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The Creon of Antigone, though nominally a monarch of the heroic age, has been created by 
the Attic poet in the essential image of the historical tyrannus He resembles the ruler 
whose absolutism, imposed on the citizens by force, is devoid of any properly political 
sanction (1888*; 1900 xxiv).
The image o f a tyrant who had no right to constitute laws (and is thereby clearly distinguished 
from the legitimate power and the authority of the state) is further sustained by the 
translations o f the text. Thus, on his first appearance, Creon declares his personal dedication 
to  the good o f the citizens, and asserts that the city, as a social body and an institution, has 
priority over the will of all o f its members, including himself. 
tyio ya.Q, ratio Zeu; 6 Jiav8 ' 6pd>v Aei, 
oCt' &v ouoitnoaigi TT|V &TT|V opiov 
OTEi'xouaav A atol; Avfi tfis oaitripias. 
oCt‘ fiv iptX.ov ran ’ fivbpa 6uanevf| yOovoc; 
eEiprtv ipauTip, toOto yiyvioaxiov 6ti  
h6’ ¿aflv  i) oip^ouoa xai tau tr); Era 
tXZovte; 6peti5 to b ; (pikovg jtoiovpeOa. 
toioioS’ iyui vopoiai xf|v6' au^aj ra5X.iv (184-191)
Plumptre translates this passage as follows:
Zeus be my witness, who beholdeth all 
Will not keep silence, seeing danger come.
Instead o f safety, to my subjects true.
Nor could I take as friend my country’s foe;
For this 1 know that there our safety lies.
And sailing in her while she holds her course 
We gather friends around us. By these rules 
And such as these will /  maintain the State (1865: 157, my italics)
In the source text Creon speaks about citizens and the city of Thebes. He presents himself as a 
guardian of the safety of the people and the city itself. In the translation Creon speaks about 
his ‘subjects’ and the ‘State’, thus presenting himself as the all-empowered leader of these 
subjects. What is more, while in the last phrase of the source text Creon asserts that “such are 
the laws by which I shall make the city great” (or “I shall uphold the city’s greatness”) in 
Plumptre’s work the term ‘laws’ is translated by ‘rules’ (a notion which evokes a much lesser 
degree of legitimacy than the notion o f ‘laws’) and Creon ambiguously declares that he seeks 
“to maintain the State”: a phrase which can refer at once to his possession of State-authority 
and the institution itself, but is not relatable to a city governed by its instituted laws, as is the 
case in the source text.
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At the end of this speech, the Chorus endorses Creon’s position towards the friends 
and enemies of the city, and reinforces his power to employ the laws in order to issue orders 
both for those who are living and for those who are dead. The source text states: 
voptp 6 c xQf|o0ai TiavTi, toCt’ fv c a ti  aoi 
xai tojv 0av6vtonv ydiredooi tlfflpev ti£ q i  (213-214)
Plumptre translates the passage as follows:
And thou hast power to make what laws thou wilt.
Both for the dead and all of us who live ( 1865 158)
The translation introduces a critical transformation of the original. While in Sophocles’ work 
it is emphasised that Creon has the right to use the laws of the city, in Plumptre's work he is 
deemed himself to have the power to introduce any laws he wills. Creon becomes an arbitrary 
king and by the same move his act does not damage any similar enforcement of the laws in 
the context of modem societies. A similar logic underlies Jebb’s translation of the passage: 
and thou hast power, I ween, to take what order thou wilt, both for the dead, and for all 
us who live (18881, 1900 51)
The notion of laws disappears in this translation. What we are left with is the order Creon 
may wish to impose on the citizens -  an order which derives from an imposition of power and 
is not deemed to have any nghtful legitimacy. This change does not merely intensify the 
translators’ conviction that Creon’s conception of justice must be annihilated in view of the 
eternal justice that guides in Antigone’s act. What is further suggested is that Creon’s position 
must be seen as a personal and tyrannical violation of the law, whose huhns does not entail a 
questioning of all forms of authority and power. Hence, when Jebb anxiously asks in the 
introduction to his work “In what sense and how far, does Creon, in this edict, represent the 
State?” he can easily dissociate him from the otherwise legitimate power of state-institutions, 
on the grounds that “the Greeks for whom Sophocles wrote, would not regard Creon’s edict 
as having a constitutional character" and “they would liken it rather to some of the arbitrary 
and violent acts done by Hippias in the later period of his tyranny” (ibid.: xxiii-xxiv).
From this perspective, Antigone is still judged to be right in her judgement. Yet the 
justice that legitimises her act no longer comes to conflict with the validity of laws and allows 
no space for the questioning of institutionalised authorities. Instead, this justice is 
strategically removed from the realm of politics and confined to a private sphere, that is 
supposedly dissociated from public affairs. Her choice becomes an act of domestic affection 
and family duty, which can exist as parallel to the political order, and within which individual 
freedom and judgement are appropriately positioned Thus, when Jebb describes the main 
“qualities” of Antigone’s character, he can refer to her intense tenderness, purity, and depth
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of domestic affection”, which are “manifested in the love of sister for brother ... braced by a 
clear sense o f the religious duty (ibid.: xxvii-xxviii). In other words, Antigone’s moral virtue 
is defined as a private achievement and the justice she follows as a justice that stands side by 
side to the laws enforced by state-institutions, without any of them being challenged by the 
other.
This division, which locates justice and morality in the private realm, while affirming 
the canonisation of the public realm by laws, has developed as a distinct feature of modem 
bourgeois societies. In a context in which social relations are formed by precepts of utility and 
self-interest, the field of public life is de facto  deprived of all references to justice. What this 
condition implies is that the laws which canonise social behaviour must be able to enforce 
their validity not in terms of the justice and morality of their content, but because they are 
laws: as determinations of one’s duty.2X9 Yet a society constituted merely be such principles, 
that is to say, a society completely deprived o f  unity, solidarity and feelings of care among its 
members (however limited these may be) would not have been viable. A market society, 
which merely consists of self-interested individuals, as Poole has argued, would not be able to 
reproduce itself. To believe that it would assumes that these individuals would enter into 
relationships with each other in order to produce, nurture and thus care for others. Yet if we 
are to make sense of the apparent sacrifice o f  self-interest inscribed here in the notion of care, 
as Poole suggests, we would at least need to posit the existence of goods of a different kind to 
those involved in market transactions and also suppose that there exists a range of human 
relationships (such as the relationship between parents and child) which are different in kind 
to the contractual and voluntary engagements for mutual benefit found in the market (1992: 
46). Insofar as these relationships play an irreplaceable role in maintaining a social 
community, but are excluded from the public realm, then it is necessary to form a separate 
space for their establishment, a space which does not interfere with the regulation of public 
affairs, but is nevertheless a precondition o f  their functioning, as it is presupposed to the 
viability of the society as whole. In modem bourgeois societies, this space was delimited by 
the private sphere of the family and personal relations, and was associated, as Poole aptly 
argues, to a notion of “feminine principle o f  social experience”: a range of characteristics, 
capacities and moral precepts that were connected to a concept o f ‘femininity’, and were, by 
the same move, opposed to an understanding of ‘masculinity’ that was associated to the 
public sphere (ibid.: 48). The logic of this division was precisely expressed in Antigone’s 
translations, which maintained that the two spheres of social life -  that o f domesticity and
For a further discussion of this issue see chapter 5.
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that of public administration -  exist as parallel and complementary, while the principles that 
define the one of them (i.e. the justice that prescribes Antigone’s act) need not and should not 
affect the validity of principles that define the other (i.e. the laws of the state)
This idea was further sustained by Arnold’s rewriting of Antigone (1849), in which the 
dilemma between the heroine’s personal duty and the laws of the state was designated as 
irrelevant to nineteenth-century thought and social experience. "An action like the action of 
the Antigone of Sophocles”, Arnold wrote,
which turns upon the conflict between the heroine's duty to her brother’s corpse and that to 
the laws of her country, is no longer one in which it is possible that we should feel a deep 
interest (18531995: 12).
This perspective informed Arnold’s “Fragment of an Antigone” (18491; 1995); a poem which 
did not attempt a rewriting of the whole myth of Antigone, but, as the title indicates, consisted 
of a fragment: a dialogue between Haemon and the Chorus. Arnold’s work was not presented 
as a translation, but nevertheless made evident its relation to the Greek tragedy, by employing 
both the names and main themes of Sophocles’ play. There is no dialogue in Antigone which 
may be considered as the direct source of Arnold’s text. Nevertheless, the original play also 
presents a dialogue between Haemon and Creon, which provides us with enough evidence to 
attempt a comparison between the two works.
In Sophocles’ play, Haemon tries to persuade his father that he is wrong, and while he 
does not explicitly take Antigone’s side he points out that his father's decision stands against 
the judgement of the whole population of Thebes (683-723, 726-765) The Chorus takes part 
in this dialogue in order to describe Haemon’s words as wisely and timely spoken (681-682). 
In Arnold’s poem the image of Haemon is entirely changed. Both he and the Chorus no longer 
focus on the ethical and political implications of the heroes’ action, but speak about the 
personal relationship between Haemon and Antigone, and Haemon’s feelings towards his 
father after the death of his would-be wife. In this context, Haemon does not stand against 
Creon, but openly against Antigone, who is accused of having betrayed their love and being 
disobedient to Creon’s order As Haemon says,
No, no, old men, Creon I curse not 
I weep, Thebans,
One than Creon crueller far 
For he. he, at least, by slaying her,
August laws doth mightily vindicate 
But thou, too-bold, headstrong, pitiless.
Ah me! -  honourest more that thy lover.
O Ant’gone,
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A dead, ignorant, thankless corpse (ibid.: 50)
This rewriting transforms Haemon’s original views in precisely those ways that sustain 
Arnold’s conviction that the idea of a conflict between individual consciousness and state- 
laws cannot be related to modem social concerns. Hence this conflict, which gives the basic 
theme of the ancient tragedy, disappears in his poem. What is presented, instead, is an 
Antigone not recognisable in Sophoclean terms: a woman who is thought of as cruel to 
Haemon, overly bold, headstrong and disobedient. That is to say, a woman who fails to fulfil 
both her feminine-domestic identity and her public duty While Sophocles’ Antigone only 
marginally touches upon the relationship between Haemon and the heroine,2yo in Arnold’s 
poem this issue becomes the most central point for consideration. What is more, it is on the 
grounds of this relationship that Antigone is judged in the last phrase of the above extract as 
“ignorant ”, unable to see the substantive truth of justice -  that is, a justice inscribed in a 
‘feminine’ nature, which should not contradict, but should act instead to support the rules that 
define social life in the public sphere.
The constitution of the private and public spheres as parallel did not entail the 
independence of these fields of social experience, but their coexistence as mutually 
complementary and supportive of each other. This idea profoundly informed Phillimore’s 
translation, which sought to suggest that neither Antigone nor Creon can be considered as 
merely just or unjust, but ought to be appraised in terms of separate categories of justice, all 
of which are necessary for the attainment of social unity and coherence. In the introduction to 
his text, Phillimore suggests that Sophocles’ play “is permeated with the sweet 
reasonableness which M. Arnold makes the essence of Atticism” and expresses a “temper 
which digests contradictions and harmonises all things” (1902: Iv). This temper, in 
Phillimore’s view, is constituted by two kinds of justice, i.e. a moral one identified with 
Antigone’s character and a political one related to Creon’s rule. The former (a justice that 
pertains to the private sphere) sets up the principles that unite society, while the latter (a 
justice that is established in the public sphere) canonises a condition of “war” that instigates 
and nourishes social progress. As was evident to Sophocles and his audience, it is argued, 
"the glory of Athens” was not one engendered by peace. It “began in war and bloomed 
through war”. For “peace” is not, as is commonly believed, “the nurse of arts |and] 
philosophy”, but a condition which only “favours philosophical superstition”. Still war, 
Phillimore writes, can generate civilisation once it is controlled and directed by a temper of 
wisdom, accompanied by sweetness and tolerance, the sprit of euPouAia. For it is only this
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kind of morality that can transform conflictual relations into the harmonious whole of a social 
order (ibid.: xxiv-xxvi, Iv).
From this point o f view, Phillimore presents Creon’s hubris as a moral and intellectual 
error, but not as a political one. In moral terms, Phillimore writes, Creon exemplifies the 
hubris “which flouts the sacred claims of burial”, while at an intellectual level he “scoffs at 
the supernatural” revelation of God’s order to personal consciousness, since his “practical 
mind” is unable to apprehend this higher and divine ideal of justice (ibid.: 1-li). Yet when 
judged in political terms, the Creon of Antigone is justified, he cannot be described as a 
“villain”. “The beauty o f the tragedy partly depends upon this, that he is not a bad man or a 
bad king, only wanting in the saving grace of Eii|}ovX.ia, as is suggested at the end of the 
tragedy” (ibid.: lvii). Creon’s position, according to Phillimore, is summarised in his initial 
speech (162-210) in which he declares his devotion to “public duty”. So long as he is himself 
the only legitimate authority which guards public welfare, Antigone’s “appeal to the 
ftypcuiTa x&acpaXfj vtSgqia”, the unwritten and everlasting laws, “is mere hubris to him” 
(ibid.: lix). At this point, Phillimore misquotes the source text, which refers to the Sypajita 
xriacpaXf| dewv vdpqta (the unwritten and everlasting laws o f gods) in order to sustain his 
position Likewise, his translation of the passage refers to “the unwritten code of Gods which 
cannot change”* 291 (ibid.: 156), thus rendering the notion of ‘laws’ by the term ‘code’; a 
concept which defines a different category of justice to the one established by the laws of 
political authority.
The grounding spirit of the tragedy is then found by Phillimore in the harmonious 
coexistence of the two categories. Hence when, in the source text, Creon condemns anyone 
who may disobey the laws of the city’s leader, Phillimore’s translation seeks to associate the 
force of unquestionable laws with the ideal of unity evoked by the concept of the nation. As 
the source text reads:
8cm? 6’ uiteefid? f) vdpou? (kdt£xat, 
toujutdooeiv to t?  xeatuvouaiv voel, 
oux Eat' Ejiaivou toOtov Eg EpoO tuxelv. 
dkV ov ndki? ortiaeie, tot)6e xptl xktietv 
xa'i opixpa xai 6 ixa ia  xai td v av tia  (663-667).
Phillimore translates the passage as follows:
But one shall never conquer my applause 
Who oversteps and does despite to laws.
2,0 Antigone addresses Haernon in only one verse in the play (572) and it is even disputable whether this verse
belongs to her or to Ismene
291 The source text is quoted above
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Or dreams of playing master o’er the powers 
Whomso (sic) the nation might set up ’tis ours.
In the least things, tho ' right or wrong, to obey (ibid.: 164 my italics).
The translation renders the term ‘city’ by ‘nation’ and further transforms the last phrase of the 
source text, which asserts that a man must obey the city’s rulers as regards both “the small 
things and the right, and the opposite”. The original phrase does not clarity whether Creon 
argues that one should obey to the opposites of both small and right things or whether the 
phrase "the opposite” refers to only one of these terms (presumably the small). The 
translation articulates this position clearly, but renders the antithesis between just and unjust 
by a different one between right’ and ‘wrong’. The concept of the ‘nation’, as was discussed 
in the first chapter, was constructed along with the image of family relations; it evoked a 
unity that is established in terms of the private sphere and was meaningful only once it had 
been separated from public affairs.292 The use of the notion in the translation2 '1 represents the 
realm of justice defined by Phillimore in terms of "morality”; a realm that would complement 
the public condition of war by the traits of private relations: tolerance and sweetness. None of 
these traits can actually affect the power of laws of the public realm, which must be obeyed 
not because they accord with justice or because one appraises them as right, but because they 
are laws. What Sophocles maintains, it is argued, is that "law is absolute, authority infallible-. 
that is the position clearly laid down” (ibid.: lix, my italics).
At the same time, however, Phillimore suggests, this authority must be completed by a 
moral spirit of “tolerance”; an idea eloquently urged in the play by Haemon. This spirit, 
which is represented, in Phillimore’s view, by Heamon’s advice to Creon not to seek 
EuPoukia alone, is the principle that “harmonises the relations of State and individual” and 
sets up a basis for unity in the context of war and social conflict (ibid. Iv-lvii). This position 
manifests a reading of Heamon’s speech that is not sustainable by the source text, but stems 
from a society which needs to address and canonise actual conflicts through a rhetoric which 
displaces and transforms their reality. In the passage in question Haemon says 
rifj vvv lv  f|0o? goOvov iv  oavtcp cpdQei. 
a); cpr)S cru, xovhfev &A.A.O, toOt ' 6g0a>; fxeiv.
¿km; yixQ a v tb ; f) cppovelv govoc ftoxel, 
t) yXwooav, f)v oux fiAAo;, f) tyvxhv fXElv- 
o u to i 6iajrrux0£vre; ukp0t)oav xevoi (705-709).
Have not then one mood, Haemon states, posited only by yourself; do not believe that your 
words alone are the right ones For the man who holds that he alone thinks wisely, that no one
292 For a further discussion of *his issue see chapter 1 section 4
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can be like him in speech or attitude, this man has a soul which, when is laid open, is found 
empty.
These words do not suggest either sweetness or tolerance. But more than this, they are 
far from expressing a morality established in terms of the private sphere. Haemon maintains 
that there can be no attainment of (ppóvqau;, no knowledge o f  truth and justice by one man 
alone. Creon, it is argued, cannot be wise alone -  and this is precisely the point which 
constitutes his hubris. He seeks to enforce a law that does not derive from a collective 
definition of justice and is presented as final and incontestable. Thus he acts against the 
principles posited by the Athenian democracy. For truth and justice, as Sophocles’ audience 
could infer from Haemon’s words, cannot be reached by one man alone and cannot be 
imposed as an authority grounded on non-social standards. Instead they are the product of 
dialogue that takes place in the public sphere among equal and free citizens, the product of a 
society which is capable of instituting itself.2 '14
2. Antigone's Translations and the Articulation of Political Utopias
In Sophocles’ Antigone all certainties on which truth and justice can be grounded are 
eclipsed One after another, gods, the human mind and laws are shown to be unable to posit a 
permanent and indisputable order for society. Truth becomes unstable and contingent, it 
cannot evoke either the indisputable norms of a religious tradition or the absolute power of 
existing social institutions. Justice stems from a process collectively undertaken, which 
questions finalities and entails the essential contestability o f laws, as products of human 
thought and action Yet this eclipse of certainty does not undermine truth altogether. Instead, 
by contextualising it and by stressing its social origin, the tragedy also indicates that the 
demarcation of the limits between the true’ and untrue’ is a social necessity; that “without 
untruth” as Nietzsche wrote, “there can be neither society nor culture” (1979: 92). The tragic 
arises precisely from the conflict between thought's uncertainty and the urgency of choosing 
and acting, from the absence of definitive answers to moral and political questions and the 
awareness of the need to make decisions.2 '1'
This particular form of uncertainty which is not dissociated from the necessity for 
choice and judgement was crucial to the constitution of democratic processes in ancient 
Athens. For a society that posits an ultimate philosophical or religious basis of truth, be it 
God, Nature, Reason, or Man as an abstract, universal category, acknowledges a non-social *2945
2 ’’ Phillimore translates the term polis by city or state throughout the rest o f  the play
294 For the notion of the self-instituted society see Castoriadis 19751; 1987.
295 On this issue see Snell 1983: 396.
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principle by which it should perceive and order itself, a law which is given as an a priori and 
stands unchangeable since it does not stem from human thought and action. Yet for the 
Greeks, as Castoriadis has argued, society as well as the relations society entertains with 
nature are a "creation”: the creation of total forms of human life. Society is self-creation and 
so is the world when it is seen, used and transformed by people. This assumption entailed the 
equal distancing of Greek thought both from the belief in an absolute order and from a total 
absence o f  ordering. If the world were fully ordered, either by natural or God-given laws, then 
philosophy and politics, as they were conceived of and practised in Athens, would have been 
pointless, non-realisable. For there would have existed only one absolute system of truths, and 
only one absolute political institution, which would spontaneously maintain or transform 
itself. It would have made no sense to ask what is right or wrong, just or unjust. But if, on the 
contrary, human beings were not capable of creating some order for themselves, by 
establishing knowledge-claims and laws, then again there would be no possibility of political 
choice, institution and action (19831; 1997: 274). This conviction formed, according to 
Castoriadis, the basic principle of Athenian democracy:
If  a full and certain knowledge (episteme) of the human domain were possible, politics would 
immediately come to an end, and democracy would be both impossible and absurd 
democracy implies that all citizens have the possibility of attaining a correct Joxa and that 
nobody possesses an episteme of things political (ibid.: 274).
Once a society recognises the absence of immanent groundings of truth, then questions of 
truth and justice are posited on the assumption that no norm, law, or human being can give an 
ultimate response to them; the 'right’ and the ‘just’ must be treated as questions open to 
deliberation in the public sphere, rather than a priori standards
None of these ideas was foreign to rewriters and translators of Antigone in nineteenth- 
century Britain. As has been discussed in previous chapters, uncertainty and doubt were as 
prominent in modem thought as was the evocation of an immanent order of things, while the 
quest for autonomy, freedom and equality became as integral to the constitution of modem 
bourgeois societies as the establishment of social hierarchies, inequality and power 
differentials. For this reason, translations of Antigone entertained a dual relation to the source 
text. While on one level they employed and appropriated the play in order to endorse an ideal 
of submissive social behaviour, on another level, these works articulated a different range of 
principles, which disrupted the images of absolute order and justice, and brought to light a 
self-critical discourse: a space in which the source-text’s meaning and the political 
unconscious of the target society intersected
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Thus despite the ostensibly solid religious faith of translators, manifested in the 
parallel between Antigone’s act and Christian doctrines, the undermining of divine order in 
the source text seems to force its presence into the translations. The truth of God, the truth of 
absolutist justice, is thereby challenged in these works at the very moment it is posited as an 
ideal. It becomes evident that “when Antigone looked to heaven”, as Jebb writes in a minor, 
but nevertheless significant comment, she could find no certain comfort” ( 1888*; 1900. 
xxxiv), precisely because the laws of God could no longer provide the grounds that could 
justify her choice. This absence of religious certainty is strongly expressed in the source text 
when Antigone contemplates, before her death, the validity and meaning of the divine laws 
evoked previously by her:
;ioiav ,-taoe|E>.0oOoa òaipóviuv 6 ixr|v:
Tl xon pe TT1V ÒtÌOTTlVOV è ; 0eou; £ti
pXéjteiv; tìv' avbftv |up.pdx<uv: ènei ye &t|
tt)v 6vooéf5eiav eùoePoCo' éxTnoagriv (921-924)
Plumptre translates the passage as follows:
What law of Heaven have I transgressed against?
What use for me, ill-starred one, still to look 
To any God for succour, or to call 
On any friend for aid? For holiest deed 
I bear this charge of rank unholiness ( 1865: 189).
Jebb suggested a similar translation of the passage:
And what law of heaven have I transgressed'1 Why, hapless one, should I look to the gods 
any more -  what ally should 1 invoke, -  when by piety 1 have earned the name of impious?
(18881; 1900: 167)
Apart from the translation of the term gods’ by heaven’ or ‘God’, both Plumptre’s and 
Jebb’s works follow the source text closely What Antigone says at this point is by no means 
compatible with a religious worldview. Her words directly question the semantic stability of 
the concepts of ‘holiness’ and ‘piety’. They point out that the deed which was considered to 
be “the holiest one”, on the basis of religious laws, merges with its opposite, becomes an 
“unholy” and “impious” act, and there exists no secure standard by which its appraisal can be 
finalised. By transforming this statement through their reference to the Christian God, the 
translators make precisely the same point: they undermine the certainty of absolute truths, 
they disrupt the permanence provided by an eternal world order, and, by the same move, they 
open up a possibility for a conception of justice as an historical issue, a law that can only be 
posited by secular and social standards
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What then are these standards people can posit for themselves? This question remains 
essentially unanswered in Antigone. What is more, the play emphasises that any attempt to 
construct a unitary response to it, a response that would claim to provide a final conception of 
human nature and purpose, is bound to be falsified by the plurality of this nature and the 
absolute dependence of ‘truth’ and ‘right’ on such plurality. This conviction underwrites the 
hymn of the Chorus in the first strophe o f the play, where ‘man’ is described as the 
SeivÓTEpov among all Setva that exist in the world: 
xokkh to óeiva xouóev áv- 
Optójiov hetvótepo treter (330-331)
The concept o f ‘Serva’ is notoriously difficult to translate because of its ambiguity in ancient 
Greek. The term denotes something which is marvellously strong and powerful, capable of 
making admirable things and wonderful in itself, but also something that is fearful and 
terrible. When used as a qualification for human beings, it further conveys the idea of 
someone who is clever and skilful.296 Aeivct is a term that has intensely positive and 
concomitantly intensely negative connotations. So when man is described as the most 
powerful, capable of wonders, skilful, fearful and terrible worldly creature, then what is 
stated is an ambiguous, contradictory and inherently open conception of human nature and its 
social repercussions.
The translations of this passage can be best described as forming a conceptual map, a 
network of rewritings, by which all of the above meanings are introduced into the target 
context. Hence, man is first depicted by translators as fearful and strange, the most fearful 
among all other forms of life. As Plumptre writes,
Many the forms of life.
Fearful and strange to see,
But man supreme stands out.
For strangeness and for fear (1865: 163)
The standard Oxford translation (whose writers remained anonymous) employed the term 
mighty and gave in a footnote the term ‘awful’ as an alternative rendering of the passage:
Many are the mighty things, and nought is more mighty than man (18231849: 173)
The description of man as ‘strange’ and unknown to himself becomes the basic human 
trait in Broughton’s, Young’s and Allcroft and Hayes’ translations, which do not introduce the 
negative connotations evoked by the concept o f  ‘fearful’:
Many are the strange things, and not one is stranger than man (Broughton 1887: 17).
Much is there passing strange. Nothing surpassing mankind (Young 1888 18)
Many strange things there be, and none more strange than man (Allcroft and Hayes 1889: 8)
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A significant number of translations adopts the term ‘wonder’, which conveys 
simultaneously the idea of the ‘unknown’ (and perhaps fearful) as well as the connotation of 
astonishment and admiration implied in the source text. This choice is first manifested in 
Downes’ translation, written at the very beginning of the century:
Many are the wonderful things, and nothing is more wonderful than man (1823: 96).
This work is followed by Dale’s translation, which suggests a similar rendering of the 
passage:
Mid nature's countless wonders none is found more marvellous than MAN (1824: 234).
Likewise, Campbell’s translation stresses that o f all the strange creatures, the most wonderful 
is man:
Of many creatures wondrous strange most marvellous is man (1873: 17)
From a similar perspective, Whitelaw renders the source text as follows:
Many are the wonders o f the world 
And none so wonderful as Man ( 1883:154)
Jebb suggests a similar translation:
Wonders are many, and none is more wonderful than man ( 18881; 1900: 69)
Weld’s translation, written in the first years of the twentieth century, also describes man as 
the most wonderful of all things:
Many the things that wondrous be
But none more wonderful than man (1905: 10).
The notion of wonder’ is not, however, only used in a positive way. It is explicitly 
related to fear and ‘awe’ in Phillimore’s translation:
Wonder and awe at large 1 find:
No such wonder of all as Man! (1902: 152).
Mongan’s translation adopted a different viewpoint, which particularised the grounds of the 
above descriptions, by suggesting that man is as much ‘wonderful’ as he is ‘wily’. As he 
writes,
Many things are wily (or. wonderful), and nothing is more wily than man ( 1880 13).
The word ‘wily’ refers to someone who is astute, crafty and inventive, and therefore 
constructs an image of man as the maker, the creator of things, but also denotes someone who 
is cunning and sly,2,7 thus conveying the negative connotations of the source concept
Two further translations choose to prioritise the notions of ‘power’, ‘strength’ and 
‘potency’ as the distinct feature of human nature, by describing man as the ‘mightier’ of all 
things. Donaldson translates,
2.6 Cf Liddell and Scott Greek English Lexicon s.v. 0eiv6<,
2.7 Cf. O E D s.v. ‘wily’.
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Many the things that mighty be.
And nought is mightier than -  Man (1848: 35).
Rose suggests a similar translation:
Of works created unto Might
Sure there is none to equal Man (1872: 147).
Each of these translations is, at one and the same time, equivalent to and different 
from the source concept. The meaning of 8etvfi appears to elude them at the very moment 
they seek to capture one of its aspects -  and yet this inescapable ‘infidelity’ seems to lie more 
in the self-annihilating, contradictory meaning of the source term, rather than a presumed 
incapacity of translators. Aetvit seems to prevent the possibility of a final translation. It 
presents us with a concept which strongly confirms Walter Benjamin’s suggestion that the 
specific significance inherent in an original work can be fully manifested in its translatability, 
in its intrinsic potential to bring into being a multiplicity of translations, in which the ‘life’ of 
the original blossoms in its fullness by being transformed into an essentially open-ended 
‘afterlife’ (19551; 1992: 71-72). The ambiguous meaning of Seivfx gives rise to a 
differentiated, intrinsically plural range of rewritings, none of which is identical to the source 
concept. And yet this original meaning can only be fully attained through this multiplicity, 
since its reconstruction is inscribed in the totality of translations, in the entire network of 
meanings that are formed by the source concept and voice its ambiguity.
Let us then seek to read this conceptual grid291* created by the translations in question. 
The first point to emerge in this context is that man, as the ‘mightier’ of all things, must be 
seen as the origin of his collective life and thus as the source of substantive truths on which 
law and justice are grounded. No other power, apart from the human capacity to think, create 
and act can take upon itself the praise and responsibility for the institution of social order Yet 
this capacity and the social products it engenders are far from being transparent and 
immediately visible to us. Far from possessing an unequivocal understanding of himself and 
the world he creates, man is, among all things, the ‘strangest’ to himself However intelligent, 
astute or skilful he may be, he cannot claim total mastery over the meanings he ascribes to the 
world and his life within it. His thought is bound to uncertainty and doubt.
This condition does not entail the absence of all criteria by which human beings can 
make sense of and appraise their thought and action.* 299 What is rather suggested by the
2,8 The idea that translation operates within culturally specific 'textual grids’ was suggested by Bassnett and
Lefevere (1998a: 5).
299 Castoriadis suggests that this absence of correspondence between understanding and ‘worldly order’ indicates 
that the political dimension o* tragedy lies first and foiemost in its onto'ogical grounding, which shows 'not 
discursively but through i*s presentation) that “Being is Chaos” ‘Chaos in the world, in which the order that
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translations is the necessity for the constitution of standards by which human beings may be 
deemed to be worthy of admiration or may be judged to be sly, deceitful and fearful to each 
other. Man cannot claim an absolute, final knowledge, and yet the very process of speaking 
and describing himself, that is, the constitutive traits of his existence qua human being, 
involves distinctions and appraisals: between true and untrue, right and wrong, just and the 
unjust. The necessity of drawing these distinctions from a position of uncertainty remains to 
be explained in the last verses of Antigone in which the Chorus asserts that 
rtokktp t6 tpgovelv eiiSaipovia? 
npuiTov urcdexei... (1348-1349).
“Wisdom” as Jebb writes in his translation, “is the supreme part of happiness” (18881; 1900: 
2 3 7 ) 3oo Wisdom is a presupposition of being well and acting well, the most fundamental part 
of eubainovia. The translation follows closely the source text, and by this move introduces a 
conception of wisdom as a social rather than a merely intellectual issue. Wisdom is not 
defined here as the product of contemplation or the trait of the mind which has attained 
‘truth’. It stands as the presupposition of worldly life, as the first and foremost grounding of 
human happiness, and -  if  we follow the meaning of eubcugovia -  happiness in our co­
existence with others.
Yet what is the meaning of ‘wisdom’ (tppovelv) in this context? And where could this 
meaning be grounded, given the eclipse o f God, Nature, Reason and Man himself as universal 
and absolute principles o f truth and justice? We have already encountered an answer to these 
questions given by Haemon’s assertion that a man cannot be wise alone (705-709). Let us 
follow this position through Jebb’s translation:
Wear not, then, one mood only in thyself, think not that thy word, and thine alone, must be 
right For if any man thinks that he alone is wise, -  that in speech, or in mind, he hath no 
peer, -  such a soul, when laid open, is ever found empty (I8881, 1900: 133).
This statement defines knowledge and judgement as a political problem. It not only 
denounces the possibility of wisdom as the attainment of a revealed Truth; it further 
maintains that no individual consciousness can claim to be wise in itself. For truth and justice 
become meaningless outside the public sphere. In this sense, Jebb’s translation brings us back 
to Kant’s thesis, considered at the beginning of this work: that true cognitions and judgements 
can onl> be articulated in society -  and more specifically in that kind of society in which all 
citizens have the freedom to participate in the collective constitution of knowledge and 
justice, as equals. The parallel could be taken a step further. As Kant envisaged no limits in
prevails is order through catastrophe, that is, a “meaningless” order and “Chaos in man, that is, as his hubris” 
(19831; 1997: 284).
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his utopian society, Jebb’s translation does not address a limited community or a state, but 
takes man as its object. It thus associates this public sphere to a cosmopolitan perspective and 
a cosmopolitan society. It is ultimately in such a society, which is not materialised by liberal- 
democracies, but could nevertheless be imagined through them, that the ideals of democratic 
equality and freedom could be realised.
wo The passage is rendered ir a similar way by ail of the translations examined in this chapter
C o n c l u s io n
T r a n s l a t io n , H is t o r y  a n d  P r o b l é m a t is a t io n s
In one of his last interviews Foucault announced his intention of writing a history of thought 
as distinct from a history of ideas (by which he referred to systems of representation) and from 
the history of mentalities (the analysis of attitudes and types of action108). While this project 
was never undertaken, Foucault suggested that a key element that would define such a history 
would be the element of ‘problems’ or, more precisely, problématisations. He argued that 
what distinguishes thought is something different from the range of representations that 
underlie behaviour and is furthermore something different from the domain of attitudes that 
can determine this behaviour:
Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what 
allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an 
object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions and its goals (19841;
1997: 117).
The most significant aspect of this definition lies in Foucault’s choice not to essentialise 
‘thought’, while simultaneously allowing for the constitution of a field within which the 
meaning, historical preconditions and aims of certain forms of behaviour can be investigated 
and appraised. Thought, he suggests, is that mode of contemplation which prevents one from 
considering a system of concepts or a world as the final response to human quests, questions 
and needs. Yet, while it is sharply distinguished from positivities, thought cannot be identified 
with something purely negative. It rather develops as the position of problems, a process of 
self-distancing from a given order, which entails the rewriting of certainties into questions. 
What is more, thought poses itself as a problem to itself, and thus concedes that concepts, 
representations, convictions and values that underwrite and sustain one’s view of the world 
are contextually and historically constituted.
While the above definition seems to reduce ‘thought’ to a form of reflective 
consciousness, which may not be deemed to differ substantially from traditional conceptions 
of understanding as a mode of self-critical enquiry in search for truth, Foucault quickly 
distinguishes his suggestion from these positions by locating thought in the domain of social 
life rather than pure theorising. He thus defines self-reflection as a kind of dissociation from 
one’s worldly actions. Thought, he points out, is “freedom in relation to what one does”, the 
move by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object of enquiry and reflects 
on it as a problem (ibid.: 117). In other words, thought is marked by the disengagement from a 
given mode of action and conduct, and thus the disengagement from a given mode of social
108 The original term (provided by the translator of the interview) is “schémas de comportement".
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life. It develops as a process through which personal and collective choices become 
problematised as they are viewed from a position that stems from, but is not immediately 
determined by them.
But how then is this freedom attainable? Where can one find the concepts which 
would not simply emerge as the products of their historical condition, but would rather permit 
the viewing of this condition from a perspective that is somewhat external to it? How is it 
possible to attain a position which, while being located in history, can also stand beyond 
certain historical limitations in order to render these limitations visible as questionable and 
contestable objects?
The instigation of such a move, Foucault suggests, is not to be found in contemplative 
processes taken in isolation. It derives rather from the world of historical and social action in 
its intrinsic connection to the ways thought conceptualises it and seeks to address it. For a 
domain of behaviour to enter the field of thought, Foucault argues, it is necessary for a certain 
range of factors to have made this behaviour lose its familiarity or to have provoked certain 
difficulties around it. Such elements, it is argued, result from social, economic and political 
processes. Yet the role of these processes should not be understood as determinative of the 
particular directions thought takes, but as the creation of possibilities which may not be 
pursued for a long time or may never be followed (ibid.: 117-118). Problematisations emerge 
in the context of social life as experienced difficulties, problems or uncertainties, but these can 
be grasped as such and posited as issues for enquiry in the realm of thought. The latter is 
thereby inherently related to, but concomitantly dissociated from the world that marks its 
engendering. Thought is constituted by establishing both its difference and distance from the 
world it addresses. Unlike other forms of discourse, it neither expresses nor represents objects; 
it transforms them into problems; it defines those elements of them that would constitute the 
object of problematisation; and it provides us with the means for responding to them. This 
process of understanding a group of existing obstacles and difficulties as problems, to which 
diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response, defines, in Foucault’s view, what 
constitutes the point of problematisation and the specific work of thought (ibid.: 118).
As this thesis sought to argue, a line of thought that has developed such a problematic 
can be situated in the discourses on translatability, knowledge and politics that developed in 
the context of modernity. It should be immediately stressed that this is considered as neither a 
unique nor a final mode of articulating such a form of reasoning. But more than this, it is not 
one that would constitute ‘thought’ in another historical context, in which different social 
experiences would have produced different problems and responses. Yet in the time and place
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delimited by the Western tradition (a term which no longer denotes a distinct geographical 
area, but refers, in a sense, to a globalised context) it seems that modem discourses on 
translation, and the broader issues of knowledge, historicity and society they evoked, have set 
up some grounds for this possibility.
From this perspective, my work has sought to develop two levels of analysis in 
parallel. On the one hand, it has employed conceptual tools and theoretical viewpoints 
constituted by modem discourses on translation in order to rewrite them, as well as 
contemporary approaches to translation phenomena as an historical object. This attempt 
advanced by a discussion of conceptions of translation from the sixteenth until the late 
eighteenth-century (with particular emphasis on the latter period) which sought to describe the 
various uses of the notion of translation as a metaphor for knowledge-processes. In this sense, 
my reading of these works was meant to articulate and clarify the theoretical lines along which 
my subsequent arguments would develop, namely the contestability of knowledge-claims and 
the interrelation of cognitions and judgements to the social and historical conditions of their 
constitution. On the other hand, my discussion of these metatranslation discourses sought to 
present and examine them as historical constructs. It thus attempted to define a number of key 
features and changes that have marked their development, to illuminate their contextual 
position and finally to suggest their connection to the constitution of norms for the translation 
of ‘democracy’ in nineteenth-century Britain. In other words, the first of these levels 
contributed to the elaboration of a theoretical standpoint from which translations can be 
examined, while the second sought to delineate some aspects of the historical background 
against which translations of ‘democracy’ were considered to stand. In a way, translations of 
classical Greek texts have also acquired a similar role in my work. In one sense, they stand as 
the main object of my research. Yet in another sense, they shape, clarify or stress a number of 
theoretical points as regards the relation of translation to society and politics, which would not 
have been attainable through purely theoretical contemplation.
I shall then try to sum up the main points that were reached at these two levels and 
briefly recapitulate the basic arguments sustained by this work. At an historical-empirical 
level, I sought to describe translation as a socially symbolic act. This was not meant to be a 
definition, let alone a prescription of what translation should be. The notion ‘symbolic’ was 
employed in order to denote the location of translation at the level of language, while 
emphasising that this level is neither the only nor the ultimate sphere of historical reality, but 
nevertheless acts as the medium, through which this reality becomes conceptualisable and 
attainable. The notion ‘act' was employed in order to denote the status of translation as also
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part of this reality; that is, as a discourse which does not only articulate historical conditions 
and processes that are external to it, but also stands as one of their constitutive elements.
This relation between translations and their social and historical context is not to be 
considered as either straightforward or direct. The production of translations rather entails a 
process of transformations and rewriting of this context, which do not allow for the 
endorsement of a simplistic parallel between translation choices and social formations, but 
nevertheless indicate the co-production of translations, translation and cultural systems and 
the social reality which brings them into being. Two main concepts were employed 
throughout my work in order to delineate this relationship: ideology and problématisation. 
Conceptions of translation as well as translations of ‘democracy’ were therefore examined as 
dually related to the constitution of modem bourgeois societies in Western Europe, and 
nineteenth-century Britain in particular: firstly as expressions and ideological reinforcements 
of the social, economic and political conditions that were established in this context; and 
secondly as a means of criticising, problematising and challenging these conditions, by calling 
into question the convictions which sustained and legitimised them.
These two aspects of translations were seen as historically and methodologically 
inseparable, in the sense that neither of them would have been realisable or reconstructable 
without the other. Hence the ideological function of the claim that human societies are 
destined to form a system of hierarchies and asymmetrical power relations became evident 
when the translations that defended this position also indicated that this was neither a 
necessary nor a universal precondition for the institution of social communities. It could then 
be argued that this claim developed as a discourse by which a certain social formation, i.e. 
modem bourgeois societies, conceptualised and legitimised historically instituted hierarchies, 
which served the interests of specific social groups within them and acted to sustain actual 
social relations of domination, exploitation and inequality. Likewise, the glorification of the 
notion of the ‘autonomous individual’ as the subject of liberal-democratic politics was 
deemed to have an ideological function on the grounds that the translations I examined not 
only posited the value of an abstracted individual sovereignty in the context of civil society; 
they also stressed that this context entailed the cancellation of freedom by necessitating the 
subjection of individuals to commercial necessities, social hierarchies and the authority of 
established state-institutions. In other words, the criteria by which translation discourses were 
defined as ideological were drawn from the translated texts themselves: from gaps, 
contradictions and inconsistencies, which indicated points of rupture and tension in the ways
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the target community conceptualised its historical context and a move towards a critique and 
problematisation of the social conditions established in this context.
The form of reasoning which informed this analysis prevented any attempt at claiming 
the universality or scientific neutrality of models employed in contemporary translation 
research. Thus the main point argued at a theoretical level was that concepts, precepts, modes 
of classification and explanation that pertain to the various paradigms in translation theory 
develop as historical constructs. At the beginning of this work, I have sought to locate the 
discursive and socio-historical roots of a range of concepts and suppositions of contemporary 
translation theory in the context of modem thought on translation and knowledge. This 
attempt was not intended to suggest an unqualified relativisation of theoretical schemes on the 
grounds of their historicity. My aim was rather to posit these schemes as research objects, in 
order to be able to appraise their usefulness as methods and tools of analysis; to examine their 
historical constitution in order to be able to employ them, subsequently, as a means of viewing 
the history of which they are part. The reasoning behind this choice did not only deny any 
conception of translation theory as decontextualised and ahistorical; it was equally distanced 
from the endorsement of an all-embracing relativisation of standpoints, which seems to evoke 
a plurality of opinions as an end-in-itself, and by the same move blurs and diffuses already 
made choices as consistently as it disables thought altogether.
To be sure, the need to develop a plurality of approaches, positions or paradigms, none 
of which can claim to have attained a final description of translation in history, is indisputable. 
Its evocation, which became the key feature of the intellectual and political move of 
modernity, defined knowledge as essentially engendered within doubt and described 
incontestable certainty as the symptom of authoritarian thought and oppressive social 
structures. This move is in many respects irreversible. No knowledge of history can 
legitimately profess today an objectivity whose underlying reasoning is the absence of 
perspective. What is more, no perspective can claim to be dissociated from a condition of 
cultural and social belonging without indicating, by the same move, its role in sustaining these 
very conditions of its constitution.
Yet it also seems possible that one can assume various degrees of distancing from 
one’s historical context. The notion of belonging can itself only be grasped through a 
distinction between the internal and external aspects of a socio-cultural space, and thus if one 
can make sense of the former, one must be able, at the same time, to grasp the existence of the 
latter. This process of self-distancing must not be understood as the constitution of an 
intellectual sphere that is situated outside historical time, and can thus maintain the capacity
Translation, History and Problématisations 271
for problématisation in all historical worlds and contexts. ‘Thought’, as was argued, is 
developed in situation, it stems from a certain form of social life and acts in responding to 
difficulties that emerge in this life. It is thus grounded on the world and becomes actualised in 
it, yet having already transformed this world by enunciating it, by articulating it in a novel 
form. Neither does the work of thought need to be understood as leading to a unique 
standpoint, which would pretend to possess the exclusive right to self-reflexion and criticism. 
Responses to difficulties can be many and their common ground is not formed by their 
answers, but by their propensity to view a situation and their position within it as inherently 
contestable. Herein lies the categorical difference between ‘thought’ and what Foucault 
describes as ideas, mentalities and attitudes: the former is moved by a principled self­
questioning, as it understands itself as the product and articulation of a world that precludes 
objectivity and necessitates its partiality; the latter conceives of itself as secure and justified 
insofar as it denies representation to the problems of the world that sustains it.
One may surely doubt the extent to which the study of translation is related to aspects 
of our social world which can be appraised as problematic. The reality of domination, social 
inequality and power differentials that define social experience in the context of globalised 
late capitalism stands apparently so far from intellectual insights into the nature of cultures, 
that it seems easy to affirm that our theoretical contemplation is not substantially affected by 
such conditions, while the latter cannot be influenced by the adoption of one or the other 
mode of enquiry. What this thesis forgets, however, is that the very capacity for theorising and 
the institutions that make it possible to reflect on translation and history are established on the 
grounds of a social division of labour, which does not merely transform intellectual activity 
into a luxury a few can afford; it further enables this activity at the very cost of confining the 
majority of our world in conditions that neither instigate nor allow contemplation.
Whether one considers this situation as problematic or, indeed, as a given is a matter 
of choice between two mutually exclusive assumptions: that human societies are naturally 
structured on the basis of hierarchical relations or that these relations are the products of 
certain historical actions and processes, which do not necessarily mark the end of the human 
condition and history. Both these assumptions are, in a sense, sustainable by the course of 
human history, which lends itself equally well to two different readings: one that would 
describe societies as founded on competition, wars, relations of domination and oppression 
and another that would see in them attempts for the constitution of a different world, that 
would establish the conditions for social equality, solidarity and autonomy. While both these 
readings are possible, as we saw in the previous chapters, they are also mutually exclusive.
Translation, History and Problématisations 2 7 2
They thus necessitate a choice. At the same time however, any attempt at choosing between 
them on the basis of rational argumentation is bound to be based on and determined by an 
initial leap of faith. For neither of them can be proved to be true and legitimate by merely 
intellectual contemplation.
The extent to which one’s thoughts on translation and culture affect one’s historical 
conditions can neither be exaggerated nor ignored. Concepts and ideas are the means by which 
human beings make sense of their world, become capable of making choices, distinguish 
between right and wrong, truth and untrue, and act in relation to these distinctions. In this 
sense, words become as important as deeds, because they underlie and sustain all forms of 
human choice and action. One must not, however, delude oneself as to the social resonance 
and contribution of theoretical contemplation to the shaping of its worldly conditions, which 
would probably have been different long before, had they been so conveniently manipulatable 
by intellectual discourses and intentions. Words can stand as acts and provoke actions only 
once they have already been fabricated, manipulated and limited in the context of institutional 
and social frameworks, whose organisation and function is not sustained by words alone. 
Once this limit is recognised, a critical approach to translation cannot only be confined to a 
reflexive mode of theorising; it should further seek to articulate a problematic that would 
advance theory’s own transformation and transcendence.
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